



Does the Crisis Make People Move?

EU Internal Migration and Economic Disparities in Europe

Preface: About this Policy Brief

This policy brief looks at the internal migration in the European Union (EU). Special emphasis is placed on the development of internal European mobility and migration movements after both the EU expansions in 2004 and 2007 in light of the global economic and European sovereign debt crises. The individual articles give priority to the mobility of EU citizens that take advantage of the right to freedom of movement within EU borders. Emphasis is placed on the observa-

tion of the revived tendency of South-North migration within Europe. Countries of origin and destination of these movements are put in the form of short country profiles that relate to each other. The goal of this dossier is to highlight the different facets of the current internal migration movement in the EU and to offer a point of reference to more thoroughly deal with this topic.

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EU Internal Migration before and during the Economic and Financial Crisis – An Overview

by Vera Hanewinkel

(Translation into English: Jocelyn Storm)

Introduction: Migration in the EU

The principle of freedom of movement for employees belongs to the four basic freedoms of the European Union (EU). According to this, every citizen of an EU member state has the right to live and work in another member state.¹ European Union citizenship², implemented in 1992 by the Treaty of Maastricht, ensures each citizen additional rights as well. For example citizens of the EU must be treated the same as nationals in the filling of job vacancies (nationals take no precedence over other EU-state citizens). Furthermore, they are allowed to participate in municipal elections in the host country and therefore have the right to participate politically.

The provisions easing mobility have not, however, led to a much higher occurrence of mobility within the European Union. Only about two percent of EU citizens live and work in another EU member state. This figure has remained stable for about 30 years, on which even the EU eastward enlargement has had little effect.

Abbreviations – What Do they Stand for?

EU-15: all states that belonged to the EU before the 2004 expansion: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Spain and the United Kingdom

EU-10: all states that acceded into the EU in 2004: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Cyprus

EU-8: all EU-10 states except Malta and Cyprus

EU-2: Bulgaria and Romania (accession: 2007)

EU-12: EU-10 + EU-2

EU-25: EU-15 + EU-10

EU-27: all current EU member states (as of January 2013)

EU Internal Migration after the 2004 and 2007 Expansions

In light of the largest expansion in the history of the European Union in 2004, in which eight of the ten countries that acceded into the community were Eastern European states (EU-8), a large wave of immigration into the heart of Europe driven by economic disparities was feared. Therefore most of the EU-15 states established temporary provisions that initially restricted the freedom of mobility for citizens of the EU-8 states. Only Ireland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom granted full freedom of movement. At the end of April 2011 the period of transition in Austria and Germany that were the last countries to hold on to the restrictions on the freedom of movement for EU-8 citizens expired. In the face of Romania and Bulgaria's accession in 2007 into the EU, many EU states again initially restricted the freedom of movement of citizens of these states. The transition periods for the EU-2 in all of the EU-25 states expire at the latest by the end of 2013.

The EU eastward expansion has led to an increase of labor mobility inside the European Union. In 2003, 1.6 million citizens from the EU-8 and the EU-2 lived in fifteen of the "old" member states. In 2009 there were 4.8 million (Fic et al. 2011). However, the migration from these countries is scattered unevenly amongst the EU-15. Ireland and Great Britain received 70% of the immigrants from the EU-8 states (Kahanec et al. 2009), while the majority (ca. 80%) of Romanian and Bulgarian migrants went to Spain and Italy.

In view of the immigration from the eight Eastern European new member states (EU-8), the temporary provisions adopted by a majority of the EU-15 states seem to have had an effect on the direction of migration flows inside the EU. This has become clear in the examples of Germany (restriction on freedom of movement until the end of April 2011) and the United Kingdom (no temporary provisions). In 2003 more than 50% of those EU-8 citizens that had migrated to an EU-15 country lived in the Federal Republic of Germany. By 2009 the figure was just at 30%. In this same time period the percentage in the United Kingdom rose from 15% (2003) to 35% (2009), thereby developing into a leading country of destination in the EU-15 for migrants from the EU-8 (Fic et al. 2011). Polish citizens made up the largest immigrant group (cf. Breford's contributions). The temporary provisions alone, however, cannot explain the change in the direction of internal European migration after the EU expansion. Take Sweden as a case in point: Although Sweden likewise allowed freedom of movement for the citizens of the new member states from the very beginning, immigration from these states rose only moderately.

Effects of the Economic and Debt Crises on EU Internal Migration*Brief Outline of the World Economic Crisis*

The global economic and debt crises began in 2007 with the collapse of the speculative and inflated real estate market in the USA. The bursting of the real estate bubble brought the banking sector into distress because many credit users could not repay their loan debts. The financial and credit crisis spread quickly to other countries. Because the banks re-

Spotlight: Facts on the Immigrant Population in the EU

- In 2011, 33.3 million foreigners lived in the EU-27, of which 20.5 million (about 2/3) were third country citizens.
- More than 75% of foreigners living in the EU are spread over only five countries: Germany, Spain, Italy, the United Kingdom, and France (as of 1 January 2011).
- In Luxemburg, Cyprus, Latvia, Estonia, Spain, Austria and Belgium the percentage of foreigners in the total population was more than 10% (as of 1 January 2011) (compared to Germany: 8.8%).
- Romanian and Turkish citizens, with 2.3 million each, make up the largest groups of foreigners in the EU, followed by Moroccans (1.9 m) and the Polish (1.6 m).
- 78% of Romanians that live in other EU member states live in either Italy (42%) or Spain (36%), 75% of Turks living in the EU reside in Germany, and 50% of all Portuguese migrants live in France (as of 1 January 2011).

Source: Vasileva (2012), Nearly two-thirds of the foreigners living in EU Member States are citizens of countries outside the EU-27, *Eurostat Statistics in focus*, No. 31.

stricted the allocation of loans, many businesses hence fell into financial difficulties. Investments had to be deferred, numerous businesses filed bankruptcy, and overall demand and production fell, while simultaneously unemployment rose (Beck/Wienert 2009). In many countries of the world the financial crisis caused a recession. The national debt of many countries rose as they had invested large capital sums to save the banks and to stimulate the economy.

From the World Economic Crisis to the European Financial Crisis

Each European state was affected by the economic crisis to a different extent. In Spain the real estate sector collapsed. The UK's economic performance sank due to its high dependency on the financial sector. The Baltic States fell into a


deep recession, whereas Poland's economy continued to grow during the crisis.

While some countries, including Germany, recovered quickly from the economic crisis, in the autumn of 2009 serious budget problems began showing themselves in some countries in the euro area which had already partially existed before the onset of the global economic and financial crisis and were then further exacerbated by it. It was thus that Ireland overextended itself when saving its banks and had to be bailed out by the euro rescue package (EFSF)³ which was enacted in June 2010.

Currently the so-called PIGS states (Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain) in the south of Europe are being hit by large budget deficits and even to some extent by a threat of national bankruptcy. The most publically visible aspect of the current crisis is the high unemployment, which mainly affects young people and immigrants (primarily from third countries).

Unemployment in the EU (September 2012)


Harmonized unemployment rate, seasonally adjusted



Source: Eurostat

Youth Unemployment in the EU (September 2012)

Harmonized unemployment rate by age group 15-24, seasonally adjusted



Source: Eurostat

Immigration from the New Member States

The global economic crisis and the financial crisis in the euro area have affected migratory movements inside the EU. According to OECD data, internal European migration based on EU freedom of movement between 2007 and 2010 decreased by more than 470,000 people (OECD 2012). Migration from countries that acceded into the EU in 2004 and 2007 into the EU-15 slowed significantly. A strong return migration to countries of origin especially stands out in 2009 (European Commission 2011). The number of immigrants from the EU-8 in the United Kingdom fell slightly, and in Ireland even heavily (cf. Bredford's contributions). Between 2006 and 2010 Spain showed a significant decline in the Bulgarian and Romanian immigrant population. In 2007, 44% of EU-2 citizens that had immigrated into the EU-15 lived in Spain, and in 2010 there were still 37%. Because the total population of the EU-2 population living in the EU-15 has not diminished in this time period, it can be assumed that this decrease is due to secondary migration, meaning migrants left Spain to migrate into other countries. In fact, Italy demonstrated an increase in its EU-2 population in the same time period, from 32% to 37% (European Commission 2011). Other countries like Germany, France and the United Kingdom also registered increases in EU-2 populations. The economic and

financial crisis has shown itself to be a contributor to the change in the destination choice of migrants, the large part of EU-2 migrants living in Spain and Italy notwithstanding.

Southern European Immigration

Several countries in the heart of Europe, including the United Kingdom and Germany (cf. contribution by Engler/Hanewinkel), have shown a current increase in immigration from Southern Europe. In particular, young people from Greece, Spain, and Portugal who cannot find work in their home countries are immigrating (cf. contributions by Engling and González-Martín). In media reports they are already being referred to as the “new guest workers” (Völker 2012). In contrast to the Southern European labor force that were recruited into many Central and Northern European countries from the 1950s to 1970s, however, these “new guest workers” are predominantly highly qualified and already have experience to some extent in inner-European mobility (e.g. through stays abroad within the framework of the EU-sponsored ERASMUS program). Their immigration is perceived positively in states like Germany which struggle with a lack of qualified employees in several regions and branches.

Spotlight: EU Internal Migrants’ Motives to Migrate

Sixty percent of migrants from the new member states emigrate for principally economic reasons, while this is only the case for 40% of migrants from the EU-15, whose migration is more strongly motivated by other factors such as love relationships, the desire for autonomy and the search for a fulfilling lifestyle (lifestyle migration).

Source: European Commission (2010), Geographical and labour market mobility, Special Eurobarometer 337.

Future Prospects

EU internal migration offers the chance to balance out the disequilibrium in the labor markets of the individual member states (Bräuninger 2011). Businesses that are searching for specialists profit from immigration. At the same time emigration out of the crisis-shaken PIGS states contributes to the abatement of pressure on the labor markets of these countries. This emigration is observed with concern because it is feared that the flight of young, well qualified people (brain drain) could negatively influence economic development in the long term. How EU internal migration will develop in upcoming years depends on whether the economic disparities inside the EU are balanced out or if they will continue to persist.

Notes

¹ For a summary of the freedom of movement provisions according to Directive 2004/38/EC see

http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/citizenship_of_the_union/l33152_en.htm (accessed 2-24-2013).

² For more detailed information see http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/citizenship_of_the_union/index_en.htm (accessed 2-24-2013).

³ The euro rescue package EFSF (European Financial Stability Facility) was superseded by the European Stability Mechanism – ESM – in 2012.

Short Overview: East-West Migration after the EU Enlargement

by Lisa Breford


The EU enlargement in 2004 and 2007 has had a significant impact on migration flows from the Central and Eastern European member states.¹

As we can see in Figure 1 and 2 below, the stocks of nationals from the ten new member states in the EU-15 countries increased significantly after the enlargement of the EU in 2004. In contrast, migration flows from the old member to the new member states and those between the new member states of 2004 and 2007 did not change significantly over the same time period (Fic et al. 2011).


While the overall numbers of migration from the new to the old member states have been significant, the actual size of emigration movements differed for every new member state. Not only did the destination countries for migration from Bulgaria and Romania (Italy and Spain) differ to those of the EU-8 states (Ireland, UK, Luxembourg) but also did the size of the share of the population that emigrated vary significantly (Fic et al. 2011). On the one end of the scale Hungary and Slovenia are the two countries that experienced the smallest outflow relating to their total population (below 1%), whereas Romania experienced an outflow of nearly 9% of its population. The reasons for these differences can be found in the different economic situation in each country but also other factors such as their geographic position (Fic et al. 2011).

Slovenia

The fact that Slovenia was the most prosperous among the new member states reduced the incentive for its citizens to emigrate. In 2010 the unemployment rate was 7.2% (International Migration Outlook 2012, p. 270), which meant that it was significantly lower than in the Baltic States (for example Estonia had an unemployment rate of 16.8% in 2010) (International Migration Outlook 2012, p. 227). Furthermore, due to the geographic position of their country, Slovenian citizens can commute easily to Italy without having to migrate (Fic et al. 2011).

Fig. 1: EU-8 and EU-2 migration to the EU-15 (stocks)

Source: Fic et al. 2011, Table 3.1 and Figure 3.9

Fig.2: EU-2 migration to EU-10 (stocks), 2004-2009

Source: Fic et al. 2011, Table 3.2 and Figure 3.9

Hungary

The other state with a rather low emigration rate, Hungary, showed the lowest unemployment rate among the new member states in 2003, which meant that this push factor for migration was less strong than in other EU-8 states. However, the economic situation worsened in the following years, resulting in an increasing unemployment rate (to 11.2% in 2010) (International Migration Outlook 2012, p. 237). Nevertheless, migration outflows from Hungary remained at a low level. One reason for this could be rising wages and a strong welfare system, which also supports home ownership. As a result, “[i]n Hungary, the majority of the population are homeowners” (Galgóczi et al. 2011, p. 20), a fact that may discourage emigration (Galgóczi et al. 2011, p. 20).

Romania

Romania has witnessed large-scale population outflows since its EU accession in 2007, continuing its long-term history as a country of emigration. Due to difficulties with migration data it is difficult to determine the actual size of emigra-

tion, however, “[t]he number of Romanians ... abroad in 2010 is estimated to be around 3 million” (International Migration Outlook 2012, p. 264). Romania has been hit by the recent recession relatively hard, with GDP growth rates falling from 4.2% in 2005 to -6.9% in 2009. In 2010 the country was still in a recession, however, the GDP growth rate had recovered to -1.1% (International Migration Outlook 2012, p. 265). Hence, push factors for out migration remained relatively strong.

Poland

Poland, the largest economy among the new member states, maintained positive GDP growth rates throughout the economic crisis (1.6% in 2009, 3.9% in 2010 (International Migration Outlook 2012, p. 261)). Nevertheless, Poland has experienced large-scale emigration since 2004. Polish migrants accounted for the majority of the migration flows to Ireland and the UK after the EU enlargement in 2004. In the UK, Poles accounted for 66% of all migrants from the new member states, increasing the Polish population in the UK from 75,000 in 2003 to 532,000 in 2010 (Office for National Statistics 2011, p. 1). However, during the crisis migration flows slowed down significantly (cf. Article on Ireland and the United Kingdom).

Return Migration

Generally, the expected effect of the crisis was an increase in return migration, as migrant workers were likely to be hit the hardest by worsening conditions in receiving countries during the crisis. This, combined with a relatively minor economic decline for example in Poland was seen to act as a strong pull factor for return migration (Barcevičius et al. 2012, p. 5). While such return migration took place, it is hard to establish its actual size, not only because of incomplete or differing data sets, but also because of the fact that migrants within the EU are very flexible due to the freedom of movement. They can therefore alternate their migration plans at short notice in order to react to economic changes and this may result in an increase of circular migration movements (Grabowska-Lusinska 2010, p. 150).

The Baltic States

However, such changes strongly depend on the economic situation in individual states, as the migration flows from and to the Baltic States exemplify. Here, a phase of initial emigration after 2004 was followed by a phase of strong return migration during times of economic recovery (Barcevičius et al. 2012, p. 9). However, in 2009, the GDP growth rate dropped dramatically for all three states, with Latvia showing the sharpest drop from 10.0% in 2007 to -18% in 2009 (World Bank 2012). The consequential growth of unemployment resulted in another phase of emigration.

Conclusion

Overall, these examples show that it is hard to generalize findings with regard to all new member states. Differences regarding economic development and geographic location as well as cultural proximity to certain Western European countries all influence the actual nature of inner-EU migration flows. While all states have been affected by their accession to the EU and resulting migration movements, the scale of migration differs between countries. The same can also be said regarding the impact of the economic recession.

Note

¹ As in many other cases, it needs to be highlighted in this context that the analysis of inner-EU migration is often hampered by limitations with regard to the quality and quantity of migration data available. See for example Fic et al. (2011) for a discussion. Also, the book by Fassmann et al. (2009) provides an overview of migration statistics and their issues in individual European states.

Statistical Data on Migration

Data on immigration and emigration flows, as well as the stock of immigrants can hardly be compared internationally. Existing definitions and concepts of what an immigrant or emigrant is, and who counts as immigrant stock and who does not, vary from country to country. Each country also differs in regards to their methodology, i.e. how these phenomena are measured – if they are statistically captured at all. Moreover there are serious differences with regard to the quality of the collected data. All these aspects also apply for EU member states and must be taken into account in the consideration of a country comparison.

Ireland

by Lisa Breford

With regard to migration movements within the European Union, Ireland poses an especially interesting example as it only began to experience a period of prolonged immigration from 1996 onwards, “making it the last EU Member State to become a country of net immigration” in 1996 (Ruhs, updated by Quinn 2009). Until then, Ireland’s migration experience had been dominated by emigration (see Figure 1). One event that developed a major impact on the country’s immigration experience at the beginning of the 21st century was the EU enlargement in 2004 and the consequent immigration of citizens of the new member states. In 2004, Ireland was one of three EU member states that decided not to apply any restrictions to the immigration of nationals from the new member states (Kahanec et al. 2010, p. 4). Consequently, Polish nationals became a major driver behind the significant rise in Ireland’s net migration rate, which peaked in 2007.

Immigration of Polish Workers


A major source of data about the actual numbers of Polish migration to Ireland can be found in the allocation of Personal Public Service Numbers (PPSN)¹ to Polish citizens. Figure 2 gives an overview of the annual number of allocations to Polish citizens from 2003 to 2009. As the graph shows, Poland’s EU accession and the free movement for Polish citizens to Ireland had an immediate effect on PPSN allocations, leading to a rise from only 3,824 in 2003 to more than seven times as many (27,292) in the following year. This trend continued until 2006, with 93,615 allocations. After this, numbers began to drop, with the most significant decrease from the year 2008 (42,475) to the year 2009 (13,765).

While these figures give a general impression of how many Polish migrants came to Ireland initially, they do not provide an indication of how many stayed in the country or chose to leave again, especially after the start of the economic recession in 2008.²

Effects of the Economic Crisis


Ireland has been hit hard by the economic recession with the unemployment rate rising from 4.7% in 2007 to 14.8% in 2012 (Central Statistics Office 2012b). On the whole, immigrants were affected by the economic downturn to a larger extent than Irish natives, with “the rate of job loss in most sectors [being] higher for immigrants than natives” (Barrett and Kelly 2010, p. 12). The worsening economic situation lead to a rise in emigration among EU-12 (see Figure 3) but also among Irish nationals, resulting in a return to negative net migration in 2010 (see Figure 1). While emigration numbers for EU-12 migrants peaked in 2009, emigration numbers for Irish nationals have been rising continuously from 12,900 in 2007 to 46,500 in 2012 (Central Statistics Office 2012a, Table 3) (see Figure 4). The main destination countries for Irish emigrants are Australia³, Canada and the UK (Gilmartin 2012, p. 12).

Fig. 1: Ireland - Net migration, 1987 – 2012




Source: Central Statistics Office 2012a, Table 1.

Fig. 2: PPSN allocations to Polish nationals, 2003-2009



Source: Central Statistics Office 2011, Table 7.

Fig. 3: Estimated immigration and emigration of EU-12 nationals, 2006 – 2012



Source: Central Statistics Office 2012a, Tables 2 and 3.

The fact that the economic recession has had a significant impact on migration from Central and Eastern Europe to Ireland also becomes visible in the activity rate of PPS numbers allocated to migrants from these countries. Here, data shows that activity rates for migrants from the EU-10 states, of which Poles form the biggest group, have declined significantly (Central Statistics Office 2011). The activity rate for EU-10 migrants that arrived in 2007 dropped the sharpest from 68% on arrival to 46% in 2009 (Central Statistics Office 2011). This suggests that a number of Eastern European migrants left the country during this period. Such an assumption is also supported by the official estimates of emigration published in 2012 (Central Statistics Office 2012a). Overall, emigration numbers for migrants from all EU-12 countries are presumed to have peaked in 2009 at 30,500 and to be around 14,800 in 2012 (see Figure 3). At the same time, immigration rates for EU-12 nationals were estimated to have decreased to 10,400 in 2012 from their peak of 85,300 in 2007, which means that the estimated net migration has been negative since 2009 (see Figure 3). While the recession is likely to be the major reason for these developments, other explanations may be “improved labor-market conditions in Poland and the fact that the pool of potential emigrants [in Poland] has diminished” (Krings et al. 2013, p. 90). Also, labor market restrictions in other member states such as Germany ceased to exist in 2011, which might have led to Poles migrating to these countries rather than to Ireland (see also Office for National Statistics 2012, p. 12).

Despite the drop in immigration and a rise in emigration numbers, Polish nationals now form the largest group of non-Irish nationals living in Ireland, accounting for 2.7 per cent (122,585) of the overall population according to the Census 2011 (Central Statistics Office 2012c, p. 33). The Census also showed that the gender composition of Polish migrants in Ireland has become more balanced compared to the last census in 2006. One reason for this might be that Poles in Ireland are “re-uniting families” (Central Statistics Office 2012c, p. 30).

Notes

- ¹ The Personal Public Service Number is allocated to individuals by Irish authorities and “used by state agencies for identification purposes, so it is needed, for example, to pay tax, avail of social welfare payments, or to use public health facilities” (Gilmartin 2012, p. 8).
- ² As already mentioned, PPS numbers can provide an indication of initial immigration to Ireland of those who want to work or avail of any of the state services such as public health care or social welfare. However, once a PPS number is allocated, there is no system in place which would allow authorities to track whether a person leaves the country or not, as a deregistration in such cases is not required. The only indication of whether people might have left is to look at the activity level of PPS numbers. If a number is inactive this might be an indication that this person left the country. However, there might be other situations where numbers are inactive, such as circular migration. Overall, these limitations indicate that data from PPS numbers has to be treated with caution in the context of analyzing migratory movements (see also Gilmartin 2012, p. 9).
- ³ A large part of Irish migration to Australia is based on Australian Working Holiday Visas which means that it is temporary, as the Working Holiday Visa only allows migrants to stay in Australia for a certain amount of time (Gilmartin 2012, p. 12).

Spotlight: What Do EU Citizens Think of the Freedom of Mobility?

According to the Eurobarometer in spring 2012, EU citizens consider the freedom of mobility as the second most important achievement of the EU. Only the conservation of peace between the individual member states was given higher value.

Source: European Commission (2012), European Citizenship, Standard Eurobarometer 77, Spring.

United Kingdom


by Lisa Breford

One major indicator of migrant influx to the UK are the National Insurance Numbers (NINo). Foreign (overseas) nationals who want to gain employment “or claim benefits / tax credits in the UK” (Department for Work and Pensions 2012, p. 1) are required to attain a NINo.¹ Regarding EU based immigration, the overall allocation of NINos has decreased by 8.2% from 2010/11 to 2011/12² for those states that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 (EU-12) (Department for Work and Pensions 2012, p. 9).

However, total allocations of NINos to nationals from the rest of the EU have risen by 6.6% for the period from 2010/11 to 2011/12. This rise is due to an increase in numbers for a few countries only; the three countries with the highest rise were Spain with an increase in registrations of 24.6% compared to the previous year, Portugal rising by 24.3% and Greece by 53.6% (Department for Work and Pensions 2012, p. 10).

The fact that all of these countries have unemployment rates higher than the UK with 8% in 2011 (in comparison to Spain (21.7%), Portugal (12.9%) and Greece 17.7% (Eurostat 2013, Table 2)) could suggest that this is the main reason for the increase in migration to the UK from those countries (Department for Work and Pensions 2012, p. 10). However, this reasoning does not hold in the case of Ireland which has also been heavily affected by the recession and is struggling with high unemployment rates (14.6% in 2011 (Central Statistics Office 2012a)). Yet, NINo allocations for Ireland have decreased – even though only slightly by 1.4% – for the same period (Department for Work and Pensions 2012, p. 10). Hence, the interrelation between the two areas is not as straightforward as it may seem (Department for Work and Pensions 2012, p. 10).

Foreign resident population in the United Kingdom by citizenship, 2004-2011



Source: Office for National Statistics 2012, Figure 3.1, 10.

Immigration from Ireland

The decrease in NINo allocations to Irish nationals is especially surprising as one would expect the close ties between Ireland and the UK with regard to culture and language as

well as their geographical proximity³ to act as strong pull factors for Irish migrants.

However, it seems that recent migratory flows of Irish nationals have been influenced by trends originating in “the Celtic Tiger era, particularly the Irish version of the Gap Year in Australia” (Gilmartin 2012, p. 13)⁴, which means that especially young Irish migrants might move to countries overseas such as Australia rather than migrating to Great Britain.

The Gap Year denotes a year during which people take time off from work or after graduating from university for traveling, volunteering or working abroad. In Ireland, the Gap Year became very popular among the younger generations during the boom with Australia being the main destination country (Gilmartin 2012, p. 12). Young Irish migrants, the maximum age at time of application is 30 years (Department of Immigration and Citizenship 2012, p. 3), access Australia “through the Working Holiday Visa program, which facilitates temporary migration” (Gilmartin 2012, p. 12). This is due to the fact that the Working Holiday Visa limits the stay in Australia to a maximum of one year with the option to apply for another year only if certain requirements have been fulfilled (Department of Immigration and Citizenship 2012, p. 4).

According to Australian statistics, the number of Irish citizens holding a Working Holiday Visa in Australia increased by 32.7% to a total of 19,441 between the 30/06/2011 and the 30/06/2012 (Department of Immigration and Citizenship 2012, p. 20). Hence, it seems that at least in the case of Ireland, overseas destinations maintain an important role and may even be seen as gaining importance.

Although immigration from crisis-hit euro zone countries has so far been moderate, it has been the topic of a heated debate in the UK. One area of specific contention is the introduction of immigration restrictions for EU citizens which would be a clear diversion from the fundamental principle of freedom of movement within the EU (Leppard and Hookham 2012).

Notes

¹ Following the EU enlargement in 2004, migrants from EU-8 countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) were also obliged “to register with the Home Office administered Worker Registration Scheme if they [were] employed in the UK for a month or more.” (Kahanec et al. 2010, p. 4). The purpose of this additional scheme was to support the supervision of the development and impact of migration movements from the new member states (Kahanec et al. 2010, p. 4). The Worker Registration Scheme ended in April 2011.

² In this report, NINo allocations are reported for the financial year (i.e. April 2010 – March 2011).

³ Traveling between Ireland and the UK is also eased by the Common Travel Area between the two countries whereby Irish and British nationals are subject to less controls than citizens from other EU countries when crossing the border (Gilmartin 2012, p. 13).

⁴ The term Celtic Tiger era refers to a period of rapid economic growth in Ireland between 1995 and 2008.

Spotlight: Internal Migration and Identification with the EU

According to results of the PIONEUR project (duration: 2003-2006), EU citizens who are mobile within the EU feel more strongly connected with the EU than those who are not mobile. The so-called EU-Movers consequently contribute to European integration.

Source:
<http://www.obets.ua.es/pioneur/difusion/PioneurExecutiveSummary.pdf> (accessed 1-11-2013)

Spain

by *Beatriz González-Martín*


(Translation into English: *Jocelyn Storm*)

Immigration in Times of Economic Boom

Between 1996 and 2007 Spain experienced one of the longest phases of economic growth in its most recent history. The characteristic that dominated this phase of prosperity was the strong surge in the number of new jobs. In the third quarter of the year 2007, Spain reached a historical high point with 20.5 million employees (EPA¹ 2012).

The growing job market, full of opportunity, was one of the main pull factors for immigrants. The share of the foreign population in relation to Spain's total population that had been only 1.6% in 1998, grew by 2007 to more than 10%. The year 2007 had the highest influx of immigrants, totaling 920,534. 40.6% of these immigrants came from a European country, the majority (37,5%) from EU member states.

Fig. 1: Development of immigration by most important areas of origin



Source: Statistics on changes in the resident population [Estadística de Variaciones Residenciales], National Statistical Institute INE (Spain); author's illustration

Immigration from Europe

Differentiation must be made between the various immigrant groups when referring to the immigration from Europe.

For one, there is the traditional immigration from the EU-15, in particular from Germany, the United Kingdom and France that had been continuously growing until 2007.

Secondly, there is the immigration from states that had acceded into the EU in 2004. However, only a few immigrants from these countries went to Spain. Only Poland stands out from the list, sending more than 15,000 immigrants in 2007. However, the out-migration from Poland to Spain was distinctly lower than into other European countries (cf. Bredford's contributions).

In addition, since the beginning of this period of economic growth (1996-2007), Bulgaria and Romania have played an increasingly important role in immigration to Spain. Both countries have profited from bilateral immigration agreements made in 2004 (with Bulgaria) and 2002 (with Romania), as well as from their EU accession in 2007. Since 2004, Romanians have been the largest immigrant group in Spain. Romanian immigration reached its peak in 2007, numbering 174,000 new immigrants.

Last but not least to be mentioned are the immigrants from European countries that do not belong to the EU. The immigration from these countries has remained, however, at a low level.

Non-European Immigration

Outside of Europe, important countries of origin of immigrants include the Latin American countries of Ecuador, Colombia, Argentina and Bolivia. However, their share of immigration to Spain has decreased since 2004, while the share of European immigrants has grown. The chief sending state of migrants from Africa has been Morocco, which sent more than 70,000 people to Spain in 2007 alone. With regard to Asia and Oceania, only the immigration from China and Pakistan has shown to be significant; it has remained uninfluenced by the current crisis.

The large influx of the characteristically mostly young and generally not very qualified or experienced migrants into the Spanish labor market enabled the expansion of employment in sectors such as agriculture, the hotel business, household services, and above all construction, where there had been a noticeable lack of native workers and where a large share of migrants found employment.

The Economic Crisis and its Consequences

Since 2006 there has been a dramatic collapse in the real estate market sector, which had been one of the main drivers of the growth in Spain's economy. The onset of the global economic crisis in 2007 with the burst of the real estate bub-

ble in the USA had a negative effect on Spain's economic performance. In the second quarter of 2008 Spain's economy fell into recession. There was a hint at an improvement of the situation in 2010, but in the last quarter of 2011, Spain fell back into a recession that has continued until today.

One of the most difficult consequences of the economic crisis is the massive retrenchment of jobs in recent years. Unemployment is one of the fundamental problems that influence the recovery of Spain's economy. The climbing unemployment rate is leading to an ever-increasing burden on the social security system because, on the one hand, both the number of contributors and hence, the tax yields are sinking, while on the other hand, the number of recipients of social welfare benefits is increasing.

The unemployment numbers take on historical dimensions. In the third quarter of 2012 there were more than 5,778,000 unemployed, of which 1,200,000 were foreign citizens. Unemployment is particularly serious in the youth population. 44% of the unemployed Spanish are between 16 and 34 years old and in the same age group among the unemployed foreigners the rate is above 46%.

Immigrants are affected by the crisis to a greater degree than is the native population. In the third quarter of 2012, the unemployment rate of the foreign population was 34.8%, whereas in the Spanish population it was at a lower 23.3%. Particularly affected are the citizens of third countries, whose unemployment rate (34.6%) was above that of EU citizens (28.9%).

Decreasing Immigration

Employment conditions in Spain have affected migration patterns. The effect is that the immigration is decreasing and many migrants that already live in Spain are deciding either to immigrate again to another country or to return to their home countries. Between 2007 and 2011, more than 1.5 million people left the country, of which 1.3 million were foreigners. The number of incoming migrants has dropped by half while out-migration has been continuously increasing (increase by 65% between 2007 and 2011). This has led to the migration balance currently being in the negative. In 2011, there were 50,000 more people who left the country than those who immigrated into the country in the same time frame. The most recent numbers published in September 2012 show that this number has more than doubled, amounting to 138,000. Nevertheless, immigration to Spain has continued, albeit at a rather low rate. In 2008 there were still 690,000 immigrants to Spain, though this number has dropped down to the current annual average of 400,000. This indicates that the migration streams are adjusting to the new situation in Spain.

Changes in Migration Policy

The effects of the crisis also influence migration policies. The socialist government issued an ordinance in 2008 entitled "Plan for a Voluntary Return" (Plan para el retorno voluntario), which is intended to encourage immigrants to voluntarily return home. The ordinance allows migrants to

continue receiving unemployment benefits if they return to their home countries and if they promise to not return to Spain for three subsequent years.

After the change in power in 2012, the Spanish People's Party (Partido Popular – PP) made two changes to their aliens act (Ley de Extranjería). The first change made the requirements for registration in the resident registry more difficult. Registration, however, is an essential requirement for the assignment of a health insurance card. Having disguised it as an austerity measure, the People's Party limited the access of irregular immigrants to public health services.

The second legal change deprived irregular migrants of the possibility to obtain a legal residence status on the basis of their social embeddedness (*arraigo social*).²


Studies show that one of the effects of the economic recession is the change in behavior of the Spanish towards the immigrant population and that immigrants are confronted with growing resentment, particularly in the workforce. The social conflicts that have risen due to the economic situation have led neither to an open public discourse on immigration nor to a noticeable increase in anti-foreigner movements. But the aforementioned restrictive measures appear to have been developed in order to calm the native population and to make it clear to them that measures were being taken to avert a possible negative economic impact because of jobless immigrants.

Emigration of Spanish Citizens

The media especially highlights the changes concerning the immigration balance and stresses in particular the renewed tendency of Spaniard migration. On the other hand, there are only a few reports about immigrants and immigration. The emigration of Spanish workers, which grew by 88% between 2007 and 2011, is a matter of public debate, although the number of emigrants has, until now, not been alarming. However, since 2008 the migration balance of Spanish citizens has been in the negative, meaning that every year the number of Spaniards leaving the country is higher than the number of Spanish citizens returning to Spain from abroad. In 2011, 52,000 Spaniards emigrated (INE, 2012) in comparison to the 38,400 that returned from abroad to their home country. This has resulted in a negative migration balance of more than 13,000 people (EVR, 2012). The migration losses increased in the time from January to September, 2012 to a negative balance of more than 25,000 people.

Many young, well-trained Spaniards with foreign language knowledge and international experience are beginning to see emigration as a possibility to find work. At the same time they are looking at Spain as a country which is void of job opportunities and are certain that they will find work abroad which corresponds to their qualifications.

The majority of Spaniards that emigrated in 2011 decided to settle in another EU country. Of the 22,282 total, 7,000 went to England and 4,000 to Germany. The USA became the second most important country of destination for Spanish emigrants, receiving 4,410 people in 2011. The current stream of Spanish emigration, made up of young people, also shows up in the statistics. The majority of emigrants are

Fig. 2: Development of emigration of Spanish nationals

Source: Statistics on changes in the resident population [Estadística de Variaciones Residenciales], National Statistical Institute INE (Spain); author's illustration

between 25 and 44 years of age. In Germany, the USA and Great Britain emigrants in this age bracket make up 59%, 57%, and more than 64% of the total, respectively.

The discussion about the consequences of the growing emigration circles primarily around the fact that a large number of well qualified workers are leaving the country. Should the economic crisis persist, so does the concern that brain drain could have a lasting effect in weakening Spain's economic performance.

Notes

¹ Encuesta de Población Activa (EPA) [Study on the Working Population], published by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) [National Institute for Statistics]

² Up to now irregular migrants were able to legalize their status if they could prove that they had lived longer than three years in Spain, that they had not committed a crime in their home country, that they had family members in Spain and that they had either a work contract or an offer of at least a year of employment. Although the law foresaw the possibility of regularization only in exceptional cases, there were in fact large numbers of immigrants that took advantage of it.

Portugal

by Feline Engling Cardoso

(Translation into English: Jocelyn Storm)

Drop in the Immigrant Population

In 2010, as a result of the economic crisis, the size of the foreign population living in Portugal decreased for the first time since the beginning of the 1980s (SEF 2012, p. 15; OECD 2012, p. 262). Immigration dropped by 12% in comparison to

the previous year to 30,000 new arrivals (OECD 2012, p. 262). The migration balance totaled a mere 3,815 people.

According to data from the Portuguese foreigners' registration office, SEF, at the end of 2011, 436,822 foreign citizens with a residence permit lived in the country, which was 1.9% less than the year before. Almost half (47.9%) of the immigrants came from Portuguese-speaking (lusophone) countries, mostly from the former Portuguese colonies of Brazil, the Cape Verde Islands, Angola and Guinea-Bissau (SEF 2012, p. 15). Brazilians made up the largest immigrant group, numbering 111,445 people. However, this number has dropped, compared with the previous year, by 6.6% (-7,918). The size of other migrant groups also decreased: the number of immigrants from the Ukraine (48,022) sank by 3% (-1,487), from the Cape Verde Islands (43,920) by 0.1% (-59) and from Angola (21,563) by 8.2% (-1,931) compared to 2010. Only the number of immigrants from Romania (39,312) rose by 6.7% (+2,482) in the same period of time (SEF 2012, p. 17f.)

Emigration of Portuguese Citizens

In the course of the economic and Euro crises, whose effects have been noticeable in Portugal since 2008, the unemployment rate in Portugal rose rapidly (INE 2012c, p. 75; PORTADA 2012). According to the national Institute for Statistics, INE, the unemployment rate climbed to 15.8% at the end of 2012 and to 39% in the age group of 15-25 year olds (INE 2012b). The drastic austerity program of the Portuguese government under Prime Minister Pedro Passos Coelho (PSD—middle right) and the high unemployment is currently compelling more and more people to leave Portugal. Against the backdrop of the crisis, migratory directions have distinctly changed, partly reversing themselves. Whereas for a long time Portugal was an important country of destination for migrants from the former Portuguese colonies, in recent years

Tab. 1: Emigration from Portugal by citizenship, 2008-2011

2011	Total	43998
	Portuguese citizens	41444
	Foreign nationals	2554
2010	Total	23760
	Portuguese citizens	22127
	Foreign nationals	1633
2009	Total	16899
	Portuguese citizens	14138
	Foreign nationals	2761
2008	Total	20357
	Portuguese citizens	18462
	Foreign nationals	1895

Source: Statistical Institute INE (Portugal) [Instituto Nacional de Estatística]

Tab. 2: Emigrants by future place of residence, 2008-2011

2011	Total	43998
	Other EU member states	28491
	Non-EU countries	15507
2010	Total	23760
	Other EU member states	19418
	Non-EU countries	4342
2009	Total	16899
	Other EU member states	10409
	Non-EU countries	6490
2008	Total	20357
	Other EU member states	14983
	Non-EU countries	5374

Source: Statistical Institute INE (Portugal) [Instituto Nacional de Estatística]

more and more Portuguese are emigrating to Angola, Brazil and Mozambique (PÚBLICO 2012). The Portuguese embassies and consulates in Angola registered the Portuguese population growing from 60,000 in 2008, at more than 74,600 in 2009, to 91,900 in 2010 (Observatório da Emigração 2012c). A similar, if also numerically lower trend can be deduced from the consulate registry in Brazil, where the population born in Portugal grew from 406,242 (2010) to 425,449 (2011). While the number of Portuguese that immigrated into Brazil in 2010 totaled 798, in 2011 there were twice as many, numbering 1,564 people (Observatório da Emigração 2012e). The Portuguese population has also grown in Mozambique since 2008 (16,556) and comprised 21,114 people in 2011 (Observatório da Emigração 2012i). All three countries are presently experiencing an economic upswing, have significantly lower unemployment rates than Portugal and are looking for specialists (PÚBLICO 2011). In 2011, about 80% of the Portuguese that sought their fortune out-

Percentage of Female Immigrants is Growing

The economic and financial crisis has also had an effect on the gender makeup of the migrant population in some countries. The share of women in the total foreign workforce rose in Spain, Italy and Ireland. This development came about because sectors in which predominantly men are employed, such as the building industry, were particularly hit by the crisis. However, female-dominated employment areas, like the nursing sector, continue to have a high demand for foreign workers.

Source: IOM (2010), Migration and the Economic Crisis in the European Union: Implications for Policy, Brussels. (Authors: Jobst Koehler et al.)

side the EU immigrated to Angola (Diário de Notícias 2012). According to the state secretary of the community of Portuguese-speaking countries, José Cesário, in 2012 between 25,000 and 30,000 (5,000 to 10,000 more than in the year before) Portuguese immigrated to Angola and 2,500 to Mozambique (Observatório da Emigração 2013).

At the same time, according to the Observatório da Emigração (OE), which was founded in 2008, Portuguese immigration to the USA, Canada and Australia decreased (Observatório da Emigração 2012d; 2012f; 2012h). The OE reports that the Portuguese immigration into traditional countries of destination inside the EU grew until 2007 – totaling 59,912 people going to Spain, Great Britain, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland – but decreased owing to the economic crisis to 53,710 in 2008 and eventually down to 43,225 in 2011 (Observatório da Emigração 2012g). This general decline, it is to be assumed, is a result mainly of the strong decrease of immigration to Spain (2007: 27,178, 2008: 16,857, 2010: 7,678, 2011: 7,424) (Observatório da Emigração 2012k), which has also been strongly affected by the financial and economic crisis (cf. contribution about Spain in this dossier). In contrast to this, migration from Spain to Great Britain (2008: 12,980, 2009: 12,230, 2010: 12,080, 2011: 16,350) and Germany (2008: 4,214, 2009: 4,468, 2010: 4,238, 2011: 5,752) increased between 2008 and 2011 (Observatório da Emigração 2012a; 2012j). In the first half of the year 2012, the German Federal Office for Statistics, Destatis, registered an increase in Portuguese immigration to Germany which was proportionally relevant (+53% in comparison to the first half of 2011), however moderate in absolute figures (+2,000 people) (Destatis 2012). In total Portuguese migration takes place predominantly in the EU.

The total number of migrants from Portugal is difficult to determine. The Portuguese Institute for Statistics, INE, reports that the number of emigrants has more than doubled since 2008 (20,357), recording 43,998 people in 2011 (41,444 Portuguese and 2,554 of foreign nationality) (INE 2012a). The OECD assumes a higher number of emigrants, estimating that since the beginning of the crisis in 2008 more than 70,000 people have left the country each year (OECD 2012).¹ According to this estimation, emigration has reached comparable proportions to the 1960s and 70s (approx. 70,000 per year). However, in comparison to the “guest workers” of the 1960s and 70s, migration expert, João Peixoto (OE), states that the emigrants are younger, more urban and more qualified (Observatório da Emigração 2012b). The changed level of qualification of the emigrants makes the economic relevance of these emigration movements visible: even social groups with high education and living standards sense the necessity to emigrate (Observatório da Emigração 2012g). Because of this, the emigration of Portuguese citizens has become a main object of political discourse. The Portuguese government recommended young people emigrate in an effort to relieve the national labor market and to prevent social tensions (cf. quote by the Portuguese Secretary of State for Youth and Sport, Alexandre Miguel Mestre). The public sharply criticized this behavior and called for an improvement of the work and living conditions in Portugal (RTP Notícias 2010).

»Se estamos no desemprego, temos de sair da zona de conforto e ir para além das nossas fronteiras«. Alexandre Miguel Mestre, Secretário de Estado da Juventude e do Desporto

"If we are unemployed, we must leave our comfort zone and go outside our own borders." Alexandre Miguel Mestre, Secretary of State for Youth and Sport.

Source: RTP Notícias (2011), Secretário de Estado aconselha emigração aos jovens, 31 October.

Perception of Immigrants

In addition to Portuguese citizens, increasing shares of the immigrant population are leaving the country. Contrary to popular opinion, however, no mass return migration into their countries of origin is taking place (IOM 2010). In 2011 1,790 people applied for the voluntary return program (PRV). The majority were Brazilians, followed by Angolans (PÚBLICO 2011). Eastern Europeans have also increasingly decided in favor of returning to their country of origin (Diário de Notícias 2010). In 2011, 594 people returned to their home country with the help of the voluntary return program, mostly to Brazil (500), followed by Angola (25) and the Ukraine (8) (Observatório da Imigração 2012, p. 3).

Differently from the situation, for example, in Greece, the economic crisis appears not to have negatively influenced the behavior of the Portuguese population towards immigration and towards immigrants living in the country. Portugal practices inside the EU a comparatively generous and advanced migration policy (Observatório da Emigração 2012b). In 2009 the UN classified Portugal as a country of open integration policy (PÚBLICO 2010). The Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX III) placed Portugal in second place behind Sweden in the ranking of 31 analyzed countries and stressed that immigrants in Portugal are not considered to be scapegoats, but rather victims of the recession. Consolidation measures and austerity programs by the government have not led to an increasing rejection of immigrants.

Note

¹ The Observatório da Emigração assumes a higher number of emigrants in their estimations. Since 2008 between 25,000 (INE data) and 125,000 (information from the Secretary of State of Portuguese-speaking countries) people of both Portuguese and foreign nationalities left Portugal. The latter number was particularly discussed in the media.

Greece

by Feline Engling Cardoso

(Translation into English: Jocelyn Storm)

Migration to Greece has continued to last, despite the economic crisis, though has decreased in comparison to previous years (Malkoutzis 2011, p. 1). The migration balance is currently negative in total, however, meaning that the number of emigrants exceeds that of immigrants.

Immigration and Emigration Statistics

According to data from the Greek Institute for Statistics, EL-STAT, 110,823 people immigrated to Greece in 2011 (60,453 of Greek nationality, 31,229 third country citizens and 19,141 EU-citizens). In the same period, 125,948 people left Greece (62,961 of Greek nationality, 37,083 third country citizens and 25,940 EU-citizens), 5% (+5,999) more than in 2010. The migration balance, at -15,161, was negative (2010: -915) (EL.STAT 2013; EL.STAT 2012c). As of January 1, 2012, according to ELSTAT estimates, 975,374 foreign citizens are living in Greece, the majority of whom are third country citizens (824,220) (EL.STAT 2013).¹ Almost half of the immigrants do not possess a legal residence status (Kasimis 2012).

Irregular Immigration

The number of residency permits has decreased since the beginning of the crisis. While in 2009 the total amount of residency permits issued stood at 602,797, in 2010 it went down to 553,916, and in 2011 dropped down to only 447,658. This downward tendency points not so much to a decreasing immigration as to a trend toward de-legalization. Greece in particular has been heavily hit by the debt and financial crisis, the effects of which have been seen since the end of 2008. Against this background fewer legal residency permits are

Tab. 1: Immigration and emigration in 2011 (by citizenship)

	Immigrants	Emigrants	Balance
Total	110823	125984	-15161
Greek citizens	60453	62961	-2508
Citizens of other EU states	19141	25940	-6799
Citizens of third countries	31229	37.083	-5854

Source: EL.STAT

Tab. 2: Total population of Greece in 2011 (by citizenship)

Greek citizens	10314693
Citizens of other EU states	151154
Citizens of third countries	824220
Total population	11290067

Source: EL.STAT

being exhibited. Migrants can therefore often only fall back on irregular immigration channels or a non-authorized stay. According to a Greek employee survey, in the fourth quarter of 2011 almost 60% of immigrants (both regular and irregular) came from Albania (449,706), 6% (47,348) from Bulgaria and 5% (40,620) from Romania (Triandafyllidou 2012a, p. 5-13). Greece has in the meantime become a transit country for many migrants from Africa, Asia and the Middle East (Sotiropoulos 2012; Kasimis 2012, p. 3). The European border patrol agency, FRONTEX, states that 64% of all irregular migrants in the EU in the first quarter of 2012 entered EU territory by illegal entry through Greece (RIN 2012).

Irregular immigration has been strengthened even more as a result of the *Arab Spring* (European Commission 2012, p. 8; Triandafyllidou/Ambrosini 2011). Measures like "Operation Xenios Zeus" and the erection of a 12.5 kilometer long wall on the Greek-Turkish border are supposed to counteract irregular immigration (Ekathimerini 2012a). Since the beginning of August, 2012, under the name "Operation Xenios Zeus", Greece's minister of citizen security, Niko Dendias, has led police raids against unwanted foreigners in Greater Athens and in the Evros Region near the Turkish border. This "cleansing" targeted at refugees has led to the arrests of thousands of unwanted foreigners and mass deportation of migrants and asylum seekers to their countries of origin. The often violent action of the Greek police and the inhuman conditions in the reception camps have been strongly criticized by human rights organizations (Pro Asyl 2012).

Emigration of Greek Citizens

In view of the precarious economic and job market situation, the national unemployment rate rose in the second quarter of 2012 to 23.6%. In the age group of under-25 year olds unemployment stood at 53.9% (EL.STAT 2012a; EL.STAT 2012b, p. 3). One of the reactions to this situation was the decision to emigrate from Greece, which can scarcely be documented due to missing data. Traditional emigration destinations have registered a moderate increase in Greek citizens. According to data from Greek migration expert, Anna Triandafyllidou, the Greek population in the Netherlands grew from 2011 to 2012 by about 20% to 10,100 people. In Great Britain the number of Greek citizens living there in this time period also grew by 20% (Triandafyllidou 2012a, p. 23f.). In the first half of 2011 8,890 Greeks were drawn to Germany, doubling in the first half of the year 2012 to 16,571 (Triandafyllidou 2012b).² Newspaper reports point to emigration movements to Australia (2,500 in 2011), Canada and the United States (The Guardian 2011). The Greek emigrants are predominantly young, highly qualified and trained in foreign languages (Daily Kos 2011; GR Reporter 2012; New York Times 2012). Despite the climb in emigration numbers, Professor Triandafyllidou considers the media coverage about this phenomenon to be exaggerated because most of the country's residents have stayed in the country in spite of the economic crisis (Triandafyllidou 2012/email correspondence; Daily Kos 2011; Ekathimerini 2012; GR Reporter 2012). Of those foreigners living in Greece, it has mainly been the Albanians

who have returned to their home country (Triandafyllidou 2012a, p. 2; Kasimis 2012, p. 7).

Growing Xenophobia

The political and public discourse is characterized by a growing intolerance towards migrants, with xenophobia increasing at an alarming rate (Triandafyllidou 2012a, p. 28f). According to UNHCR Greece, racially motivated acts of violence have become in the meantime almost the order of the day. In the course of the year 2012 these acts of violence have increased immensely (UNHCR 2012). UNHCR has reported 87 cases of racist violence alone between January and September 2012 (Netzwerk Migration in Europa 2012). According to the Racist Violence Recording Network, created in 2011, the estimated number of unknown cases may be significantly higher (UNHCR 2012).

Notes

¹ Migration expert, Anna Triandafyllidou, assumes in her estimations that about 840,000 (12-1-2011) third country citizens live in Greece, based upon 447,658 regular (legal) issued residency permits and 391,000 irregular migrants, excluding co-ethnicities (Pontic Greeks and Greek-Albanians) (Triandafyllidou 2012a, p. 7f.).

² According to data from the German Federal Statistical Office, the number of Greek immigrants in the first half of 2012 increased by 78% (+6,900 people) in comparison to the first six months of the previous year (Destatis 2012).

Italy

by Feline Engling Cardoso

(Translation into English: Jocelyn Storm)

Immigration to Italy has continued despite the financial crisis. The foreign population living legally in Italy has almost doubled since the beginning of the crisis, although the yearly growth rates have decreased overall in comparison to the years before the crisis (Pastore 2010, p. 121).

According to the Italian National Institute for Statistics, after its peak in 2007, immigration has dropped slightly over the course of the economic crisis, but has still clearly exceeded emigration movements. In 2011, immigration decreased by 13.8% compared to the year before. During 2011, 386,000 people (62,000 less than in 2010) migrated in from abroad, whereas 82,000 people (up 14,000 from 2010) left Italy. The positive migration balance amounted to 304,000 people in this time period (ISTAT.IT 2013).¹

On 1 January 2012, the national population registry reported 4.9 million foreign citizens living in Italy (+6.3%, or +289,000 people in comparison to 2011) (ISTAT.IT 2012g; ISTAT.IT 2012b). Immigrants originated mostly from European countries (53.4%), especially from countries which had recently acceded into the EU (Romania, Poland, Bulgaria) (cf. focus Migration country profile 23: Italy). The largest immi-

grant group living in Italy, with 969,000 people, comes from Romania. The majority of third country citizens (+102,000 from 2011 to 2012) come from Morocco and Albania (506,369 and 491,495 respectively) (ISTAT.IT 2012c).

In the wake of the unrest of the *Arabic Spring* and the Libyan conflict the number of irregular migrants who traveled by water and landed in Italy rose to over 60,000. The flight of thousands of people from North Africa led the Italian government to declare a humanitarian state of emergency in February 2011.²

The outlined developments show that the economic crisis has only minimally influenced Italy's migration rates to date (Limes 2012). The political stance on migration is affected by the need for complementary foreign labor in the low-wage labor market, which has induced decision makers to keep legal immigration channels relatively open in times of crisis (Pastore/Villosio 2011, p. 3f.) A look at the employment rate of the foreign population in Italy shows, however, that the ability of the Italian labor market to absorb foreign labor has diminished with the crisis (EMN 2012, p. 7). In the beginning of 2009 the employment rate of the foreign working population exceeded the 10% mark and reached 12.1% in 2011 for the first time in recent years (ISTAT.IT 2012d; Pastore/Villosio 2011, p. 5). Meanwhile one fifth of immigrants are unemployed. However, the majority have not returned to their countries of origin (EMN 2012, p. 7).³

In total the nationwide unemployment rate in Italy stood below 10% in the last decade, despite low economic growth (Limes 2012). In the third quarter of 2012 it amounted to 9.8% (ISTAT.IT 2012f). In the same quarter, however, it rose to 35% in the 15 to 24 year age bracket (ISTAT.IT 2012d). In spite of the risen unemployment, emigration of the national population is lower than in other crisis-ridden countries in the euro zone (cf. article about Spain in this dossier). The makeup of the emigrant group is similar, however: they are predominantly young and have an academic degree (Limes 2012). Next to traditional immigration destinations such as the USA, Great Britain and Germany, Africa and South America are gaining popularity (Johnston 2012).

Notes

¹ Net migration has decreased from 5.2/1000 (2010) to 4.3/1000 (2011). ISTAT.IT (2012a); ISTAT.IT (2012e).

² The humanitarian state of emergency was extended until 31 December 2012 with the ordinance of 6 October 2011. EMN (2012, p. 43 and 49).

³ The exact number of immigrants that left Italy to return to their country of origin or to migrate into another country is difficult to determine due to unreliable data. According to ISTAT, in recent years less than 1% of the foreign population has been stricken from the Italian population registry every year. Nevertheless the institute concedes that this number is considerably too low. See Pastore/Villosio (2011, p.11f).

The Current Development of Immigration to Germany

by Marcus Engler und Vera Hanewinkel

(Translation into English: Jocelyn Storm)

Introduction


After more people emigrated from Germany in both years 2008 and 2009 than immigrated during the same time period into the country, the emigration of professionals and specialists and Germany's lack of attractiveness for highly skilled migration was discussed. In the course of the financial and economic crisis, however, this picture has been transformed. In international comparison, Germany has come through the economic crisis so far quite well. Employment is growing and unemployment is at a low level in European comparison. Yet there are specialists missing in a few regions and branches.

In contrast, the countries of Southern and Eastern Europe suffer more severely from the recession and the effects will be more sustained. Mainly new entrants to the job market, many of whom are migrants and young people, are affected by high unemployment and drastic austerity programs. Youth unemployment accounts for over 30% in several of these countries, and even over 50% in Spain and Greece. By contrast it is only around 8% in Germany.

The Development of Immigration


Since the low point in 2008, when a net 66,000 people emigrated, there has been a steady trend toward more immigration. In 2010 the migration balance, that is, the difference between immigration and emigration, was in the positive range with around +128,000. In 2011 a balance of 279,000 people was attained – the highest value since 1996 (cf. Figure 1). Final data for 2012 is not yet available. According to estimations the migration balance could have risen to 400,000. This development is most notably to be ascribed to climbing immigration numbers. On the other hand emigration numbers have remained relatively constant in recent years, between 600,000 and 700,000 each year. The elevated emigration numbers of 2008 (738,000) and 2009 (734,000) can be con-

Fig. 1: Net migration since 1991



Source: Federal Statistical Office (Germany)

Fig. 2: Development of immigration flows since 1991



Source: Federal Statistical Office (Germany)


tributed for a large part to the correction of the municipal residency register.

Immigration numbers have risen considerably since 2006 (see Figure 2). At that time around 662,000 people came to Germany. This number was almost 50% higher (960,000) in 2011 and could have incurred well over a million people in 2012.

Although these numbers initially appear high, in long term comparison it appears that immigration has not reached any completely new dimensions. In the beginning of the 1990s both immigration and the migration balance were considerably higher. More than 1.5 million immigrated in 1992, and also between the years 1969 and 1971 around one million people came into the country each year.

No assertions can be made about whether the new immigrants will merely stay temporarily in Germany or permanently. The migration numbers that can be determined by the municipal registration office are comprised of both short and long term immigration. As freedom of movement exists in the EU, short term immigration could often remain unnoticed at the moment because registration with government agencies is not always taking place. It can be assumed, however, that immigrants from EU-states that stay longer than a couple of months in Germany end up registering sooner or later and then are recorded as immigrants.¹

Fig. 3: Immigration from the four most important countries of origin in Central and Eastern Europe




Source: Federal Statistical Office (Germany)

Countries of Origin

While immigration out of Southern Europe is especially discussed in the mass media, a look at the migration statistics shows a different picture. The most important countries of origin numerically in recent years have been in Central and Eastern Europe.

A strong increase in immigration from countries that entered the EU in 2004 (EU-8) and 2007 (EU-2) has been recorded in recent years. Full freedom of movement has been in force since 2011, with the exception of Bulgaria and Romania, and is being put to use by many (cf. Figure 4).²

Fig. 4: Monthly inflows of immigrants from EU-2 and EU-8 countries, 2011 and 2012



Source: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), Central Register of Foreigners, preliminary figures, reference date: end of each month


There were also distinct increases in past years in immigration from Southern European countries which were particularly affected by the financial and debt crisis (cf. Figure 5).

But here there must be a difference made between the extremely proportionally high increases discussed in the media and the absolute immigration numbers. Immigration from Southern Europe had majorly scaled itself back in years prior to the economic and financial crisis. With a surge of 78%, as in the case of Greece (in the first half of 2012 compared to the first half of 2011), the absolute immigration numbers themselves turn out moderate³ – especially in comparison to immigration from Central and Eastern Europe. Also in long term comparison it becomes clear that immigration from Southern European countries has not reached any new dimensions as of yet (cf. Figure 6).

German Learners as an Indicator for Immigration

The number of participants in German courses at Goethe Institutes in countries of origin is an indicator of the increased intentions to migrate to Germany. In 2011 the institute reported record numbers of participants in German courses and tests. The number of German learners was at 235,000 people in 2011, which is around 8% higher than in the year before. Participant numbers increased particularly in Southern Europe, with a rise of 10% in Greece, 14% in Italy, 20% in Portugal and 35% in Spain. "This development is ascribed to an

Fig. 5: Immigration from Southern Europe by countries of origin, 1st quarter of 2008 - 2nd quarter of 2012



Source: Federal Statistical Office (Germany)

increased interest in inclusion in gainful employment in Germany. Whoever learns German has better chances in the local job market” (Vogel 2012).

The Goethe Institutes are reacting to the growing demand by expanding their capacity and with the initiative “Mit Deutsch in den Beruf” (lit. “With German in the Profession”), sponsored by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In technical language courses and projects young people in Portugal, Spain, France, Italy and Greece looking to migrate are prepared for everyday working life in Germany. These technical language courses are offered for doctors, nurses, engineers, lawyers and for the tourist branch, among others. With additional job application training the program participants are prepared practically for a career start (Goethe-Institut 2012b).

Reactions in Germany

Reactions to the climb in immigration numbers appear differently according to immigrant group. There are strong defensive reactions regarding the immigration of less qualified people groups, for example the Roma from Central Eastern Europe who often come as asylum seekers.⁴

In contrast, immigration from Southern European states in crisis has been considered thus far mainly positively due to the profile of the immigrants from these countries. First reports on these migration movements show that these are young, well-trained and highly motivated people that integrate themselves into the German labor market, for which they are ready and willing to learn the local language (Traubant 2012). These people are counted among the immigrants that Germany internationally recruits.

Economy: Active Recruitment of Immigrants

The economy recognizes the immigration from Southern Europe as a chance in the global competition for the brightest minds. The highly qualified immigrants facilitate eco-

nomical growth and counteract the decline of labor force potential, which takes place because of demographic change (cf. in addition Parusel/Schneider 2010). Headhunters abroad recruit targeted personnel in bottleneck areas, like for example doctors for hospitals in rural areas that have problems to fill their positions (Student 2012).


Several chambers of commerce offer international events for businesses on the topic of “professional recruiting in the EU internal market”. The chamber of foreign trade supports companies with the recruitment of specialists abroad (Financial Times Deutschland 2012, Preuss 2012).

In July 2012 a German-Spanish training conference took place in Stuttgart in the presence of the minister of education at the time, Annette Schavan (CDU), and her Spanish counterpart, José Ignacio Wert Ortega (Partido Popular, conservative). At that conference the possibilities of introducing a dual training system in Spain were discussed. The German apprenticeship model, which combines a classroom education with practical experience, should contribute to the reduction in youth unemployment on the Iberian Peninsula. So far the training in Spain has taken place exclusively in schools. A large part of a year’s graduates studies in Spain, and many subsequently work beneath their qualification level (Financial Times Deutschland 2012). A cooperation treaty for the implementation of a dual system was signed in September 2012 by the Spanish Chambers of Commerce and the German Chambers of Industry and Commerce.

Assistance in the Job Search

Immigrants from the EU can take advantage of the assistance from the European Union labor administration (EURES) in their job search. There are 850 EURES consultants Europe-wide that help them in the search for job vacancies.

Fig. 6: Immigration from Southern Europe (PIGS states)



Source: Federal Statistical Office (Germany)

In addition the International Placement Services (ZAV) under the German Federal Employment Agency, represented in the EURES network, organizes events by invitation of other EU-states, which inform about job offers and working conditions in Germany. Present in these events are also employers who conduct job interviews on-site for definite positions. According to the ZAV there has recently been a “significant increase” in such events in Southern Europe (Vogel 2012).

Future Prospects

How long these immigrants from Southern Europe will stay in Germany is unclear. Those immigrants that bring qualifications with them that are needed in the German labor market, or work in bottleneck sectors or where there is a lack of workers could stay longer, for example doctors and nurses or trained workers in the so-called MINT-occupations⁵. In many other branches in which the labor force demand can be met through people who have been educated in Germany, it could be much more difficult to find a job which allows for a long-term stay in Germany. Already before the economic crisis in some branches there were more job seekers than open positions – a situation that has among others led to the casualization of employment conditions.

There are indicators that the trend of a high immigration will continue. According to a prognosis by the economic research institute, Kiel Economics, in the years 2013 to 2017 a net 2.2 million people could immigrate. The migration numbers in that case strongly depend on whether the asymmetric economical development in the EU will continue or whether it will even become accentuated.

The development of the German labor market is also relevant. According to economy experts the yearly migration balance should be calculated nearer to 200,000 in the long term (Müller 2012). Moreover it must be noted that migration does not take place based only on economic considerations. If that were the case, then, in light of the disparate economic development worldwide, the migratory pressure on wealthy states would have to be higher than is currently the case. Therefore, personal factors would also always have to be taken into account on the examination of migratory movements, as, for example migrants’ networks. These networks make information and support available at the place of destination which can dramatically reduce the “migration costs”. The building of such networks can also contribute to the development of permanent and relatively stable migration relationships between two (or more) countries.

Also, if it is the case that the immigrants currently arriving in Germany are highly qualified, that alone does not guarantee smooth integration in Germany. Integration involves effort on both the side of the immigrant as well as the receiving society. What is important is that the immigrant is seen not only as labor, but as a person, whose social participation through a corresponding welcoming culture should be made possible.

Notes

¹ Immigrant numbers also include asylum seekers that are still in the asylum process. Thus they include people who ultimately might not receive the right to remain in Germany.

² For both countries is this allowed only as of 2014.

³ In the first half of 2012, according to the Federal Statistical Office of Germany, 16,577 people emigrated from Greece to Germany and 6,297 people to Greece. The migration balance was respectively 10,280.

⁴ Cf. contributions by Alscher 2012 and Wöhrle 2012 in the newsletter “Migration und Bevölkerung“ [Migration and Population].

⁵ MINT stands for Mathematics, Computer Science, Science, and Engineering.

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Further Reading

In April 2013, the Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration (SVR) will release its annual report which will deal in detail with the Phenomenon of intra-EU migration movements.

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Publishers: Institute for Migration Research and Intercultural Studies (IMIS) of the University of Osnabrück, Neuer Graben 19/21, 49069 Osnabrück, Germany, Tel.: +49 (0)541 969 4384, Fax: +49 (0)541 969 4380, E-Mail: imis@uni-osnabrueck.de
German Federal Agency for Civic Education (bpb), 53113 Bonn; office in Berlin, Friedrichstraße 50, 10117 Berlin, Germany; with the collaboration of Network Migration in Europe e.V.

Editorial staff: Vera Hanewinkel, Apl. Prof. Dr. Jochen Oltmer (head)

Focus Migration country profiles (ISSN 1864-6220) and policy briefs (ISSN 1864-5704) are produced by the above-named cooperation partners.

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