POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTION VIOLENCE IN

DISTRESSED SOCIETIES:

A CASE STUDY ON HOW CAMPAIGN STRATEGY OF POLITICAL PARTIES DEVALUED DEMOCRACY IN NIGERIA, KENYA AND GHANA

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Dissertation

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(i).   Abstract:

The dissertation found out that the pre-colonial animosity and political division, which separated the various ethnic groups, remained very strong in the political calculation of the various ethnic groups in Nigeria and Kenya. This was evidently proven through the ethnic mobilization campaign strategy adopted by political actors, especially in Nigeria and Kenya. However, I was able to find out how debate on national policy issues directed the 2012 presidential election campaign in Ghana, while ethnic identity legitimacy rights dominated public discourse and directed voter mobilization in the 2011 and 2007 presidential elections in Nigeria and Kenya, respectively. The dissertation discovered how the collaboration between the Media and the public discouraged and compelled political actors in Ghana to defocus Inter-ethnic grievances and concentrate on those issues with national policy implications.

The dissertation was able to discover that the political Party alliances and interest alignments, which produced the "coalition of convenience", were direct product of ethnicity and religion identity legitimacy rights in two of the three case study countries; namely, Nigeria and Kenya. Consequently, campaigns in the focused elections were streamlined to support the political concerns of each group under the premise of Solidarity. Indeed, voters' electoral loyalty was premised on ethnic and regional political concerns. In that sense, ethnicity identity legitimacy rights and political interest were raised above national interests during the elections in Nigeria and Kenya. By extension, the active political participation of the people was anchored on the ethnic affiliation of the candidates. This was very evident in the observed voting pattern in Nigeria and Kenya. The use of "Ethnicity centered Mobilization Strategy" was a disservice to democracy and the electoral processes leading to the 2011 and 2007 elections in both Nigeria and Kenya. Indeed, I am well convinced that, as electoral mobilization strategies, Inter-ethnic grievances, identity legitimacy rights, regional and religious affiliation were catalysts to the election violence experienced during the presidential elections in Nigeria (2011) and Kenya (2007).

The dissertation found out that the desire and privilege to wield political power and authority in the case study societies contributed heavily in the violent mob action that emerged from the focused elections.

The Dissertation was able to establish how Campaigns anchored on Inter-ethnic grievances and the desire to exert identity legitimacy rights for political relevance created ethnic irredentists, religious hard-liners, shaped the mobilization and voter participatory capacity in each ethnic group during the focused elections.

The dissertation was able to establish how Campaign Strategy as used by the political actors through "Material and Solidarity Incentives" drove the electoral processes. So, it is my belief, that the use of ethnicity centered solidarity as voter mobilization strategy by political actors in Nigeria and Kenya, prepared the ground for violent response. Nevertheless, the use of Material Incentive Strategy to lure voters compromised voters' electoral conscience and subsequently led to commercialization of the elections, especially in Nigeria. Consequently, the binary effects of the strategy are represented in the compromised status of the voters and the commercialization of the processes. The various events as orchestrated by the political actors devalued the elections and democracy itself.

I hereby conclude that the spontaneous eruption of violence in Nigeria and Kenya was as result of Campaign Strategy adopted by the political actors in the Elections, as the "Ethnic Alliance" supporting each of the two Opposition groups had expected their candidate to win the Election in the 2007 and 2011 in Kenya and Nigeria respectively. Indeed, the violent outcome of the Presidential Elections in Nigeria and Kenya confirmed the negative role of "Solidarity Incentive Strategy" as campaign method in a distressed society. The reliance on Solidarity Campaign strategy, through Ethno-regional voter Mobilization method, which is centered on Inter-ethnic grievances, as well as Religion influenced voter Mobilization to achieve electoral success negatively distorts the basis for violent free democratic Elections in the Case Study countries.

(ii).   Abstrakt

Die Dissertation fand heraus, dass die vorkoloniale Animosität und die politische Spaltung, die die verschiedenen ethnischen Gruppen trennten, bei der politischen Berechnung der verschiedenen ethnischen Gruppen in Nigeria und Kenia sehr stark blieben. Dies wurde, besonders durch die ethnische Mobilisierung Kampagne Strategie, die von politischen Akteuren, vor allem in Nigeria und Kenia bemerkt. Allerdings habe ich herausgefunden, wie die Debatte über nationale politische fragen, die Präsidentschaftswahlkampagne von 2012 in Ghana leitete, während ethnische Identitäts-Legitimationsrechte, die Wählermobilisierung bei den Präsidentschaftswahlen 2011 und 2007 in Nigeria und Kenia, den öffentlichen Diskurs dominierten. Die Dissertation entdeckte, wie die zusammenarbeit zwischen den Medien und der Öffentlichkeit entmutigte und hatte die politischen Akteure in Ghana daran gezwungen, ihre Kampagne von Fragen der Inter-ethnische Spaltungen zu defocusieren, und zur nationalen politischen zentrierte Debatte fuhrte.

Die Dissertation stellte fest, dass die politischen Partei-Bündnisse und Interessen-alignments, die die "Koalition der Bequemlichkeit" produzierten, stammt direkt aus ethnische und religionsbezogene Legitimätsrechte Gründ in zwei der drei Fallstudienländer, nämlich; Nigeria und Kenia. Infolgedessen wurden Kampagnen in den fokussierten Wahlen rationalisiert, um die politischen Interessen jeder Gruppe unter der prämisse der Solidarität zu gewehrleisten. Die Wahltreue der Wähler stützte sich auf ethnische und regionale politische Belange. In diesem Sinne wurden die ethnischen Identität legitimationsrechte und das politische Interesse die gruppen, während der Wahlen in Nigeria und in Kenia, Vorrang die nationalen Interessen erhoben. Außerdem, wurde die aktive politische Partizipation des Volkes auf die ethnische Zugehörigkeit der Kandidaten verankert. Dies war in der beobachteten Abstimmung Muster in Nigeria und Kenia bemerkbar. Der Einsatz von "Ethnicity centered Mobilization Strategy" war ein Bärendienst für die Demokratie und die Wahlprozesse, die zu den Wahlen 2011 und 2007 in Nigeria und Kenia führten. Ich bin daran überzeugt, dass der Einsatz von „Inter-ethnic grievances", legitimität Identitätsrechten, sowohl regionaler als auch religion Zugehörigkeit als Wahlmobilisierungsstrategien, Katalysatoren für die Wahlgewalt in Nigeria und Kenia waren.

Die Dissertation fand heraus, dass der Wunsch und das Privileg, politische Macht und Autorität in den Fallstudiengesellschaften zu leisten, maßgeblich zur gewalttätigen Mob-Aktion beigetragen haben, die aus den fokussierten Wahlen hervorgegangen ist. Die Dissertation stellte fest, wie Kampagnen die auf „Interethnische Beschwerden" verankert, und der Wunsch, Identitäts-Legitimationsrechte für politische Relevanz auszuüben, die ethnische irredentisten, religiöse Hardliner geschaffen, die Mobilisierung und Wahlbeteiligungskapazitäten in jeder ethnischen Gruppe während der fokussierten Wahlen geprägt haben. Die Dissertation konnte feststellen, wie die Kampagnenstrategie, die von den politischen Akteuren durch "Material und Solidarity Incentives" genutzt wurde, die

Wahlprozesse trieb. So ist es meine Überzeugung, dass die Verwendung von ethnischer zentrierte Solidarität als Wählmobilisierungsstrategie, welche die politischer Akteure in Nigeria und Kenia förderte, anschließend den Boden für eine gewaltsame Reaktion vorbereitete. Trotz der Einsatz von Material Anreizstrategie, um die Wähler zu locken, beinträchtigte das Wahlbewußtsein der Wähler und fuhrte zur Kommerzialisierung der Wahlen, vor allem in Nigeria. Folglich stellte es binären Effekte der Strategie dar, durch kompromittierten Wähler und der Kommerzialisierung der Wahlprozess. Die verschiedenen Ereignisse, die von den politischen Akteuren orchestriert wurden, haben die Wahlen und Demokratie selbst abgewertet.

Der Autor kommt zu dem Schluss, dass der spontane Ausbruch der Gewalt in Nigeria und Kenia als Ergebnis der von den politischen Akteuren der Wahlen angenommenen Kampagnenstrategie entstand, da die "Ethnische Allianz", die jede der beiden Oppositionsgruppen unterstützte, hatte es so erwartet, ihren Kandidaten in den Jahren 2007 und 2011 Präsidentsschaftswahlen in Kenia bzw. Nigeria zum Sieger zu erklären. Tatsächlich bestätigten die Gewalt Ausbruch über der Präsidentschaftswahlen in Nigeria und Kenia die negative Rolle der "Solidarity Incentive Strategy" als Kampagnenmethode in einer bedrängten Gesellschaft. Die Abhängigkeit von der Solidaritätskampagnenstrategie durch ethnisch-regionale Wähler-Mobilisierungsmethode, die auf „Interethnische Beschwerden" ausgerichet ist, sowie die von Religion beeinfluste Wähler Mobilizierung um Wahlerfolg zu erreichen, verzerrt negativ die Basis für gewalttätige freie demokratische Wahlen in der Fallstudien-Ländern.

(c) Cyprian Friday Okoro (2017)

(iii).   Dedication

I wish to dedicate this study to my late parents Okoro Agwu, and Grace Okoro (Nee Ekeowu), my brothers, and to my relations.

(iv).   Acknowledgment

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iv).   **Acronyms/Abbreviations**

(1).   PDP: Peoples Democratic Party

(2).   ANPP: All Nigerian Peoples Party

(3).   ACN: Action Congress of Nigeria

(4).   CPC: Congress for Progressive Change

(5).   APGA: All Progressives Grand Alliance

(6).   LP: Labor Party

(7).   NDC: National Democratic Convention

(8).   NPP: New Patriotic Party

(9).   PNU: Party of National Unity

(10).   ODM: Orange Democratic Movement

(11).   S-I: Solidarity Incentive

(13).   M-I: Material Incentive

(14).	AHCC:	Affordable Health Care Coverage
(15).	IRP:	Immigration Reform Program
(16).	WWW:	World Wide Web
(17).	N2N:	Neighbor 2 Neighbor
(18).	NTA:	Nigerian Television Authority
(19).	AIT:	African Independent Television
(20).	NEDG:	National Election Debating Group
(21).	P2R:	Party, Regional and Religious Solidarity
(22).	MI-CS:	Material Incentive Campaign Strategy
(23).	SI-CS:	Solidarity Incentive Campaign Strategy
(24).	KADU:	Kenya African Democratic Union
(25).	KANU:	Kenyan African National Union
(26).	NAK:	National Alliance Party of Kenya
(27).	RC:	Rainbow Coalition
(28).	NARC:	National Alliance Rainbow Coalition
(29).	PPP:	Progressive peoples Party
(30).	CPP:	Convention Peoples Party
(31).	PNC:	Peoples National Convention

X).   Synopsis and Organization of the Study

The Dissertation is structured into two parts. Part 1 contained chapters 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, while Part 2 is divided into three sections. Part 2 section 1 contained chapter 7, and section 2 contained chapters 8, 9, 10, while section 3 contained the Hypotheses, Variables, Findings, Recommendation, Conclusion, Inter-ethnic grievances as a concept, and Material and Solidarity Incentives. It is structured in that order, so that each part can deal with a specific aspect of the issues under review.

Chapter One of this Dissertation contains the Introduction and Theoretical factors and arguments on Election campaign violence. It is designed to discuss the choice of Nigeria, Kenya and Ghana as case study countries. It contained also theoretical questions and Hypotheses used in the evaluation of several factors. This chapter one contained as well some of the existing literatures on election, campaigns and political violence reviewed in theoretical terms.

Chapter Two of this Dissertation explained the methodology adopted in the course of information generation. It established factors and links through which political actors generated electoral feedbacks from the various constituencies. I was able to discuss in this chapter two the reason for the selection of the ethnic nationalities as factor in describing political hostility. It discussed the explanatory variables, the tools I used to conduct inquiry into election campaigns. The chapter contained information on electoral relations among the contending ethnic groups, basis for campaign controversy among political actors, as well as Data, the Sources and the processes I used in data collection.

Chapter Three dealt with Election Campaigns as an instrument in democratic politics. It went further to discuss the argument for society induced Election campaign factors in democracies. It discussed Electoral market as factor in election campaign, potential voters and social solidarity in preferences and choices. The chapter three of this dissertation exposed the imports of social cleavages in political marketing strategies as argued by several scholars. It contained the analysis of various factors, methods available and marketing of political ideas to the receiving public; this includes the Media and Internet vote canvassing platforms.

Chapter Four: This chapter focused on the geography of the people and the political development of each selected case study country. It exposed the ethnic configuration and authority pattern in each of the case study countries that I have used in this dissertation.

Chapter Five: This chapter is focused on Elections and Politics in the case study countries I have chosen for this study. It discussed how institutions of democracy in the case study countries are constituted. It exposed how elected public office holders are recruited in each country bearing in mind the ethnic configuration and demands in the countries. This chapter exposed also the political competition among the various ethnic blocs, the evolution of multi-party representative democracy, and Campaign factors in the case study countries.

Chapter Six: This chapter contains issues on the presence of democracy in the case study countries. It analysed the operational mechanism in each of the Institutions of democracy in each of the case study countries. It exposed the structure of government, especially on interest representation factor.

Chapter Seven: This chapter contains issues about our critique of the existing Discourse and theories. It discussed also the need for theoretical reappraisal, the nationalities and their political interest, the concepts of Material and Solidarity Incentives as election campaign paradigm, coding solidarity incentive, the application of Material and Solidarity theory in voter mobilization, and the implications of Material and Solidarity Incentives in sociological research.

Chapter Eight: This chapter contains the Election Campaign Strategy of political parties and political actors in Nigeria. The chapter exposes and evaluate the measures taken by political actors in the 2011 presidential election, the Campaign messages, area of Campaign concentration. This chapter eight elaborates also the outcome of the Election and how Campaign messages and strategies prepared the ground for spontaneous violent response.

Chapter Nine: This chapter dealt with the 2007 presidential election in Kenya. The chapter is used to expose Campaign deficiencies in Kenya. It exposed the various Campaign strategies adopted by candidates and political actors in the execution of their campaigns during the 2007 presidential election.

The Chapter factored also the configuration of the polity as well as the contending forces with their capacities, which trigger-off violence after the election. It contained also the outcome of the election, especially with regard to the vote hunting strategies used by the political actors.

Chapter Ten: This chapter is focused on the Campaign development in the 2012 presidential election in Ghana. The Chapter concentrated essentially in how each political party and the political actors conducted their voter mobilization exercises in the 11 regions of Ghana. It contained also the evaluation of Media role in moderating the Campaign field during the 2012 presidential election in Ghana. The chapter is dedicated to expose the outcome of the election, especially through the campaign strategies used by political actors in the election.

Chapter 11 contains my Hypotheses, the Explanatory Variables. I used the chapter 11 to expantiate more about the Case Study countries and the focused Elections. I used the chapter to establish the link between my hypotheses, the political actors and the outcome of the elections.

Chapter 12 contains the summary of my Findings. It has also as content, the implications, which are derived from the Elections and Campaigns Strategies, used by political actors. It contains also my Recommendations for the Case Study countries.

Chapter 13 contains the concept of Inter-ethnic historical grievances in the realm of election campaign. Also in this chapter 13 is the evaluation of Material and Solidarity Incentives as election campaign dilemmas.

Finally, the Conclusion of the Dissertation followed the chapter 13. In addition to chapter 13 are the policy implications, bibliography and curriculum vitae of the Author.

Chapter 1:

1).   Introduction

The artificial configuration of the Case Study societies was designed at inception for administrative purposes, but at Independence the contents and design became permanent without resistance from the natives. However, the consummation of that unexpected socio-cultural marriage subsequently remained critically an important factor in democracy consolidation efforts in the societies. Indeed, the complexities that originated from the divergent ethno-political concerns and interests embedded in the communities, as represented in the political questions and concerns of each of the ethnic groups, built up horizontal political relationship among the various nationalities in the case study countries. It is my belief that these discovered political complexities probably had escaped the expectation of several scholars, thus; the need to consider the contribution of Campaign Strategy used by political parties to fight elections in the case study countries. Of course, my prime intention and expectation is to use my findings to establish how democracy became devalued in the case study countries. The prime idea is to locate the connivance between used voter mobilization strategies in election campaign, and the violence that erupted consequent of the targeted election periods.

The dissertation is structured to probe vigorously into the elections conducted in the selected countries. This is especially on the fundamental factors inherent in voter mobilization processes used during the focused elections. As an explicit study of Election Science in the case study countries, the process of Information generation is heavily aided by the accounts generated through inter-personal communication in the field. However, the study itself is necessitated and premised on the spontaneous eruption of deadly violent crisis from the outcome in two of the three focused presidential elections. It is my desire to re-evaluate the situation, especially with regard to the gravity of the destruction in both human and in material sense.

I believe that such endeavor and exercise would provide cues needed to infer if the development was structurally created to reinforce the pre-election manipulated

scenarios, Or if it is a continuation of age long held animosity between various ethnic nationalities in the case study countries.

Indeed, I have classified these adjudged manipulated scenarios to be politically induced development. They are evident in the pre-election and campaign period's rhetoric, embedded in politics of Nativism as found among the ethnic groups. Indeed, they manifested heavily through the expressed Inter-ethnic historical grievances, Campaign slogans, Material and Solidarity Incentives' voter mobilization strategies, as well as ethnicity motivated voters' responses. Consequently, the discreet nature of the electoral mobilization processes used in the campaigns as well as the publicly acknowledged ethno-regional political innuendos provide reasons for my deep held apprehensions and suspense. This held fear is most appropriate, especially when one considers the possibility of the situation becoming socially internalized in the polity. Another danger is the possibility of the entrenched cultural traits resulting to Inter-ethnic grievances motivated political party alliances, as well as religion centered electoral alignments, which unfortunately could be obvious during the campaigns in the case study countries, especially in Nigeria and Kenya.

1.1).   THEORETICAL PROBLEM AND FRAMEWORK

It may not be out of place to claim that the United Kingdom's colonial adventure in several localities in sub-Sahara Africa in the 19th century brought about political modernization in the administration of societies. However, the content of the legacy did not emerge until the departure of the colonial adventurist from the various areas occupied by them. Although, according to Huntington, the products of colonialism in Africa and in other places became evident and defined as,

"New and sovereign independent states"

(See Huntington 1965: pp. 415-416).

At a period dominated by call for promotion of functional representative democracy in many of the colonial constructed societies, the direction and pattern of campaigns during democratic elections around Africa attracted huge interests from scholars

within and outside Africa. However, the concern of several scholars in Politics has been how best to promote democracy; make states less autocratic and less violence prone. According to Posner and Young (2010) who were of the view that,

> "Elections are also becoming more important as a mechanism for selecting leaders in Africa, as reflected in the large increase in both their number and their competitiveness"

> (See Posner and Young, In: Diamond and Plattner, 2010, pp. 60 – 61).

Indeed, most scholars in the field of politics shared the belief that given the check and balances structure inherent in democracy and democratic governance, the democratization process in the countries would become entrenched and lead to modernization of state institutions and governance. Many were convinced beyond doubt that free, fair and violence free Election campaign process would lead to political stability and economic development in the developing democracies.

Obviously, the establishment of model campaign process would provide opportunity in the developing democracies for the situations advanced by Suberu (2010: pp, 121-126) in the case of 2003 presidential election in Nigeria. Indeed, study of strategies adopted by organized groups during elections had become necessity imperative in the sustenance of democratic ideals, especially in the developing democracies. On account of the above, I want to concur and align my argument with the opinion of scholars of election communication such like Schmitt-Beck and Farrell. According to Schmitt-Beck and Farrell opinion, they argued that,

> "Political actors of all sorts – parties and candidates, governments and other political institutions, lobby groups, social movements and other kinds of citizens' associations – have increasingly come to view campaigns as an essential supplement to their engagement in the process of policy making"

> (See David M. Farrell and Rüdiger Schmitt-Beck (2002: pp, 121-126).

Again, if one looks into the position of Horowitz (2000) on the issue of new independent states, especially in the sub-Sahara Africa, one would see reasons in the argument as advanced by him. He had therefore argued in his study that ethnic nationalities in most colonial independent states had engaged in power struggle. Horowitz noted that,

"No longer was the struggle against the external powers paramount. No longer was colonial domination the issue. Self-determination had been implemented only to the level of preexisting colonial boundaries. Within these boundaries, the question was to whom the new states belonged. As some groups moved to succeed to the power of the former colonialists, others were heard to claim that self-determination was still incomplete, for they had not achieved their own independence."

(See Donald L. Horowitz, 2000: p. 4)

Then, if one should consider critically the above argument by Horowitz, it would be evidently clear that the diverse interest groups, by policy argument were going to create situations during campaigns. In such circumstance, public expectations, especially for fair election process, and violent free election campaigns would become conditioned. Consequentially, democracy and democratic elections in the developing countries would become false, tainted and opposite. In the light of the above expressed postulations, the search for a functional Election Campaign mechanism becomes necessity imperative. In the postulation of the great political theorist Hobbes (1651), and as cited by David Held (1996, pp: 73 – 78) in his study, whereby Hobbes described human beings as,

"Profoundly self-interested, always seeking 'more intense delight' and a strong position, as Machiavelli had held, from which to secure their ends"

… Conflicts of interest and the struggle for power define the human condition"

… a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power that ceaseth only in death"

(See Leviathan, 1651, p. 161, David Held, 1996, p. 76).

Indeed, the above description depicts the political actions of several political actors in sub-Sahara Africa. It points also to such people like Machiavelli who had assumed the character definition, and through which he secured his political ends. Even Iris Marion Young in her opinion had argued in favor of inclusive democratic process. Iris Young was of the opinion that,

"Inclusion allows for maximum expression of interests, opinions, and perspectives relevant to the problems or issues for which a public seeks solutions"

…democracy means political equality. Not only should all those affected be nominally included in decision-making, but they should be included on equal terms"

…participants in an ideal process of deliberative democracy must be equal in the sense that none of them is in a position coerce or threaten others into accepting certain proposals or outcomes"

(See Young, 2000, p. 23),

Indeed, it could be viewed to be a given that conflicts of interest and the struggle for power define human condition, but then, democracy and election scholars believed democratic process demands that collective stability should be the determinant of individual interest. I want to argue as I did above on the premise that humans are of natural creation. As noted by Anthony H. Birch, whereby he argued that,

"Humanity is naturally divided into sexes and perhaps into races, but these are the only divisions produced by nature. The divisions into societies, cultures, religions and nations have been brought about by human activities, with the divisions sometimes being accidental by-products of economic enterprise and geographical mobility, sometimes the product of deliberate action by preachers, teachers, poets, philosophers, politicians and soldiers"

(See Anthony H. Birch, 2007, p. 19).

If one views politics as a game of interest, thereby aligning one's argument to that suggested by Hobbes (1651) as cited by Held (1996, pp: 76 – 78), then it would be ultimately concluded that general inclination of all mankind is actually reinforced by a perpetual and restless desire for political power. Birch (2007, p. 19), and Young (2000, p. 23) positions' can be viewed to have aligned with Hobbes's argument on human insatiable interest as basis for power-seeking mentality. The argument as advanced by Anthony Birch does suggest that among all factors that divide humanity, only two were natural causes, while the rest of the factors are humanly produced. So, I hold the belief, since the divisions as one have them in every society are humanly created, the societies should attempt to use Iris Marion Young's (2000, pp: 23 – 24) argument on "inclusion and inclusive democratic process." Obviously, if every constitutionally qualified person is included as a participant with equal rights in the political process in each society, then there would not be any need to desperately seek for power in order to protect individual's interest.

In view of this, the competing arguments that political parties and candidates could project democracy further through elective, civil and issues driven campaigns during elections, respect each other's policy position and political opinion, honor election campaign regulations, and cooperate with Election Commission, seems eluded. My argument on how violence during elections had devalued democracy is based on the fact that when self political interest overwhelms community's interest, then, the attendant consequence would be an avoidable devastating conflict.

Although, I must concede to Hobbes's political argument as presented by several scholars, especially (Madison, 1788; Held, 1996, p. 73 – 91, Macpherson, 1968, Pocock, 1975), that politics is founded on self-interest, but I want to insist that the results obtained should be a true reflection of the overall outcome.

In that circumstance, politics becomes dependent on actions exhibited by other contending forces in a society. However, I hold the belief that Hobbes's "politics of self-Interest" argument could confer legitimacy to violence and divisive voter mobilization strategies adopted by political parties and political actors during election campaigns.

The quest for political power and all the trappings that comes with the ability to wield authorized power gives birth to several tendencies as embodied in human actions. Democracy as a bastion of authorized power betrays in several circumstances the aggregate belief that power given through publicly sanctioned mechanism is devoid of abuse by recipients. Basically, the mechanisms inherent in democratic politics made scholars and particularly classical democracy theorists like Locke and Montesquieu to erroneously believe that individual interest and power preferences cannot decimate the very foundation of political Institutions and the delegated authority freely given through democratic balloting. However, the desire to keep democratic power through public bequeathed authority set many interests crashing against each other. Most often, the effects do crystallized into several disturbing political implications. Iris Marion Young (2000, pp: 23 – 24) was very conscious and mindful of the above situations and consciously advocated for an inclusive democratic process, where every citizen would have equal rights and opportunity to participate. According to Young,

"In real political conflict, when political actors and movements protest exclusion and demand greater inclusion, they invariably appeal to ideals of political equality and do not accept token measures of counting people in."

… When discussion is inclusive, in this strong sense, it allows the expression of all interests, opinions, and criticism, and when it is free from domination, discussion participants can be confident that the results arise from good reasons rather than from fear or force or false consensus"

(See Iris Marion Young, 2000, p. 24).

In several countries, democracy is admonished as the best means and method of governance any free society can ever adopt. However, the relevance of the above stated system is differently appreciated by each society. This is equally boosted by the fact that Democracy as a theory and as a systemic reality is fundamentally

contested by several scholars such like Benhabib (1996, pp: 21 – 44), Birch (2007, pp: 109 – 132), and also Carter and Stokes (2002, pp: 23 – 46).

Although, the fundamental reason for democracy is universally acknowledged, but the history of democracy and the application is in itself deeply marked by conflicting interpretations as both the classical and modern notions of participatory and representative democratic processes have intermingled to produce ambiguous and inconsistent accounts of the key fundamental features of democracy. This comes to mind, when one considers the position of several democracy theorists on society and representation, especially Linz and Stepan's position on democracy consolidation. Both scholars had argued that a consolidated democracy in their opinion is the,

> "Political regime in which democracy as a complex system of institutions, rules, and patterned incentives and disincentives has become in a phrase, 'the only game in town"

They argued further in their evaluation of the above statement that,

> "Democracy becomes the only game in town when all of the actors in the polity become habituated to the fact that political conflict within the state will be resolved according to established norms, and that violations of these norms are likely to be both ineffective and costly."

> (See Linz and Stepan in: Diamond, Plattner, Chu and Tien, 1997, p. 15).

In essence, the practical definition of features embodied in democracy remains point of debate among practitioners as well as scholars of politics, namely; functional as well as practical meaning of participatory democracy; the idea of representative legitimacy; level of political right to freely express preference from among several ideological alternatives in a defined political environment[1]. Conversely, Linz and Stepan argued further about the chances of democracy and democratization of societies. I can conclude that the position of Linz and Stepan is premised on the

onerous fact that societies differ in several ramifications. Both scholars submitted that,

> "The greater the percentage of people in a given state who either were born there or arrived without perceiving themselves as foreign citizens, and who are subsequently denied citizenship in the state (when their life chances would be hurt by such denial), the more unlikely it is that this state will consolidate democracy"

> …in a multinational, multicultural setting, the chances of consolidating democracy are increased by state policies that grant inclusive and equal citizenship and give all citizens a common "roof" of state-mandated and state-enforced individual rights"

> (See Linz and Stepan in: Diamond, Plattner, Chu and Tien, 1997, p. 26).

Conversely, since democracy is an export from colonial adventurers as well as an import by those countries in sub-Sahara Africa that accepted the doctrines of delegated representation in place of previously existing traditional authority structures, there shall remain continuous attempts to come to terms with the practical and fundamental demands of the system. It is the fundamental features embodied in the explicit demands in participatory democracy, that I want to explore through this dissertation.

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1). See Held, David (1996), Models of Democracy; 2nd edition/preface

The solemn idea of representative democracy that gave rise to series of events in three distinct societies in sub-Sahara Africa; namely Nigeria, Kenya and Ghana, formed the cardinal reasons for this exploratory journey into campaign strategy of political parties and politicians in the three selected Case Study societies.

The principal aim of this dissertation is to evaluate and unmask the consequences of campaign strategy adopted by candidates and political parties during the focused elections. My utmost intention is to find out the fundamental factors responsible for violent outcome in the presidential elections conducted in 2007 in Kenya, 2011 in Nigeria and compared the situation to that conducted in 2012 in Ghana. This is with the view of finding the place of campaign strategy and how the adopted strategy by individual candidates and political parties during these mentioned elections devalued democracy.

With the 2011 presidential election in Nigeria, the 2007 presidential election in Kenya as well as the 2012 presidential election in Ghana in mind, my primary focus is on the attendant crises that characterized the elections before, during and after announcement of results. Indeed, to re-evaluate and establish how the attendant crises devalued Democracy in the three countries, I have chosen to consider the various issues, measures taken or neglected and objections raised by the concerned participants. Democratic election is meant to be guarded by prescribed rules and conditions. But when the outcome becomes opposite, then, the situation and issues involve must require a research study to unravel. But the unanswered question remained, why democratic elections despite being staged under the assumed democracy prescribed norms ends in fiasco and crisis becomes more visible and pronounced?

Drawing inference from the position of Schmitt-Beck and Farrell (2002: p, 1-2), Lees-Marshment (2011, pp: 45 – 46), Strömbäck (2010, p: 23), Lees-Marshment and Pettitt (2010: p: 18), democratic election can provide contending political forces the opportunity to approach citizens with different positions. It can provide opportunities for contestants to give reasons why certain options should be adopted for policy initiation and implementation. This policy argument is done through act of campaigning, using convincing logic grounded on persuasive approach, which could be located in marketing strategy.

In my evaluation of several opinions as advanced by scholars such like Dahl (1982, pp: 5 – 7), Grügel (2010, pp: 12 – 50), Lijphart, (1977, pp: 61 – 64), Bratton and Van de Walle (1997, pp: 194 – 225), I became convinced that a society can only become democratic, when the electoral processes are structured to accommodate and provide platform for equal participation, devoid of any sort of disruption, whether imaginary or real, either through instruments of the state power or otherwise. Of course, all these assumptions as made above complement the arguments that democracy suggested, especially that elections must be organized without rancor, although with minimal disagreement, but only on issues bordering on right of participation and not otherwise. It suggests also that democracy mechanism recommends that processes leading to conduct of elections in any given democratic aspiring society must be seen to be free, fair and credible.

But looking at the credible Campaign indicators enunciated above and with reference to election outcome in the three countries under review; it becomes pertinent to find out, if the methods of campaign used in the prosecution of elections under democratic mechanism corresponded to the outcome in the three countries. Commenting on democracy and ethnic violence in the developing world, which includes Africa, Jack Snyder argued that,

> "Democratization in the developing world, as in other settings, is most likely to stimulate nationalist conflict when elites are threatened by rapid political change and when the expansion of political participation precedes the formation of strong civic institutions"

> (See Snyder, 2000, p: 266, quoted by Rothchild in Wimmer, Goldstone, Horowitz, Joras, and Schetter, 2004, p, 228).

In the light of the above postulation, I want to equally argue that electoral violence or ethnic conflict during and after election result is announced can be society dependent, especially considering the ethnic composition in such societies. Indeed, such reactions can be anchored on several events that happened during campaigns both verbal and non-verbal, than say the political differences between individual candidates and the party each of them represent. All these put together played major role in contriving reasons for eruption of violence.

Election and Campaign does not suggest wanton destruction of lives and properties, and it does not condone any act of vandalism or fraud that could necessitate breach of public peace. The overriding idea in this dissertation is to provide information on how Campaign strategies of individual candidates and political parties contributed in the devaluation of democratic elections in the three countries under review.

In contemporary democratic elections, especially in the developed democracies, ethnic, religious or class affiliation rarely determine election outcome and this suggest the reason elections are relatively peaceful and orderly in most countries outside the three countries this dissertation covers. As I have reiterated about Dahl (1982, pp: 5 – 6), Whitehead (2002, pp: 10 – 11), propositions earlier, democracy and democratic election does suggest for absence of use of naked force, fraud, manipulation of all kinds and indeed playing according to the rules establishing or guarding the exercise. Violence as was argued by several scholars, such like Cordell and Wolff (2011), Stathis, Shapiro and Masoud (2008), Chenoweth and Lawrence (2010), and Guichaoua (2012), does denotes absence of peace, which may result to sustenance of injuries, deaths and loss of properties and valuables. However, to effectively conjure and determine what consists of violence has become interpretational dependent, as situations, causes and environment have combined to define the scope and degree of each violence act that erupts.

Indeed, the many variations of violence as presented by Bamgbose (2012, pp: 205 – 219) in his study, and as tabulated below by this author, does suggest three types of violence and their sources as well as degree of effects (See table 1.1 below).

Violence and theoretical assumptions	
Dimension	**Components**
Physical	- Physical assault of persons during campaign, elections, and when election results are released. - Assassination of perceived political opponents, destruction of public and private properties - Partisan harassment, forceful disruption of campaign events by thugs - Destruction of voting materials by thugs or political opponents - Armed attack on voting centers - Snatching of ballot boxes and ballot papers
Psychological	- Threat of attack, harassment of opponents and voters - Security clampdown before election - Fear for safety before and during election campaigns - Incitement through publication on papers - Hate speech through broadcast on electronic media - Negative advertorials through text messages
Structural	- Denial of rights and opportunities in the use of public facilities - Deliberate denial of right for campaign venues - Withholding of electoral materials in selected constituencies.

Table 1.1 showing three classification of violence, Adapted by the Author from Bamgbose, Adele (2012, pp: 205 – 219)

1.2)   Theoretical Factors: the reason for focusing on Election Violence

Since the Independence of several countries in Africa, democracy has been seriously impeded by political rivalry among the various ethnic nationalities in each country. However, since the democratization process assumed fundamental change in political engineering in the countries, the method of Campaign during Elections has attracted low reviews from scholars of politics and history. I did share the opinion that the exponential rise in interest and concern among scholars in politics about democratization process in Africa, especially on the issue of Election Campaigns, is mostly because Election Campaigns in several countries in Africa has persistently been violent prone and ethnically defined. As human induced phenomenon, Election´s and Campaign Strategy adopted by political actors continue to attract extensive consequences in several countries. In the light of the above, I have decided to focus on it as the problem of interest in this study.

Although, many studies of Elections in Africa have persistently emphasized the presence of periodic Elections and not the opportunities for violence free elections, issue based or policy defined campaigns by candidates and political parties in their evaluation of democratization in several African states. However, the hypothetical reason for such a situation could be located in the absence of residual knowledge about the ethno-regional political competition, which defines Election campaigns in many of the societies in Africa, especially in sub-Sahara Africa.

Election campaigns as one among the fundamental sub-sectors in democracy and democratization processes provide opportunity for policy and candidate evaluation. According to Schmitt-Beck and Farrell,

"Campaigning is a core feature of the political process in contemporary democracies" (see Schmitt-Beck and Farrell, 2002: p. 2).

Most scholars of Election science and democratization process in Africa focused more on the winners and losers in a contested election to draw conclusions and determine the outcome of democratic elections. Indeed, the reason could be associated with negligence of the capacity and effects of ethno-regional composition

of many of the societies in sub-Sahara Africa. Democracy as a system and model of governance premised on a tripod, namely; an individual, constitutionally recognized and registered political parties and the constitutionally qualified voting population, suggest that assumption of leadership responsibility on behalf of citizens must be competed for by all eligible and interested candidates in a given society. According to Dahl (1982, pp. 5 – 6), Whitehead (2002, pp. 10 – 11), "an ideal democratic process would certify five criteria." See Table 1.2 below.

Five Criteria for Ideal Democratic Process	
Equality in Voting	In making collective binding decisions, the expressed preference of each citizen ought to be taken equally into account in the determining the final solution.
Effective Participation	Throughout the process of collective decision making, including the stage of putting matters on the agenda, each citizen ought to have adequate and equal opportunities for expressing his or her preferences as to the final outcome
Enlightened Understanding	In the time permitted by the need for a decision, each citizen ought to have adequate and equal opportunities for arriving at his or her considered judgement as to the most desirable outcome.
Final Control over the Agenda	The body of citizens should have the exclusive authority to determine what matters are or are not to be decided by means of processes that satisfy the first three criteria
Inclusion	The demos ought to include all adults subject to its laws, except transients.

Table 1.2 showing the Author's Democratic Election processes using Dahl's criteria (1982, pg: 5 – 6).

Aside Dahl's minimal democratic principles and requirements, there are several scholars who believed that violence was also part of democratization process in the developed countries. Ted Gurr was emphatic in his conclusion about acts of political conflicts in some European countries in the pre-millennial years. Indeed, while Ted Gurr was making a strong case about violence and democracy, he argued viciously about the old political order in Europe, whereby he noted that,

"Violence has been the staple of the history of organized political life in Europe"

(See Ted Robert Gurr (1970, p.3),

In the same light, there cannot be an exception, where the history of Elections in sub-Sahara Africa is a discourse. Ted Gurr did not just end his argument on the basis of presence of violent acts in western European democracies, but he was as well interested in the overall effects of violence on the society. Ted Gurr was emphatic when he noted that,

"Violence often destroys men and property, and is corrosive of political institutions."

(See Ted Gurr 1970: p. 10).

Elections and Campaigns in several sub-Sahara Africa societies confirmed the argument advanced by Gurr in his observation about politics in Europe.

Table 1.3 below attempt to prove that since 2005, the selected Case Study countries have experienced series of Election campaign induced violent acts. Most violent and contentious of the Elections conducted in Nigeria, Kenya and Ghana took place in 2011, 2007 and 2012 respectively.

Country and Year of violent/controversial Elections		
Country	Year of Election	Parties involved
Nigeria	2011	PDP and AC, ANPP, CPC
Kenya	2007	PNU and ODM
Ghana	2012	NDC and NPP

Table 1.3 showing Election year and political parties involved as tabulated by this Author.

Despite the controversies generated by the Elections, and the inability of the conducted elections to meet the minimum criteria as advanced by Dahl (1982: pp: 5 – 6), governments were formed on the basis of the elections outcome. Nevertheless, in opposition to the Elections product, it is my belief, that to determine the legitimacy of a given political authority; ordinary pronounced freewill from the institutions of democracy without legitimate corresponding public participation cannot qualify to be define as universal and representative electoral process.

In reference to Dahl's argument (Dahl, 1982: pp: 5 – 6), Democracy participation requires the absence of every element of intimidation and disenfranchisement of opponents as well as perceived opponents, free conduct of elections, fair in the handling of all election relevant issues, and the evaluation of a conducted election as credible and satisfactory. The above postulations were the cardinal points on which scholars like Bratton and Van de Walle (1997, pp: 194 – 225), Diamond (1988, p. 21), Chazan, Lewis, Mortimer, Rothchild and Stedman (1999, pp: 197 – 216), Alexander Jeffrey (2006, p: 122), and Birch (2007, pp: 109 – 158) centred their arguments on democracy and democratization. Indeed, the opportunity to compete with others or any hitherto interested individual must be unhindered. In essence, the democratic right of every qualified individual must be guaranteed by the institutions entrusted with the responsibility of election conduct. Considering the five cardinal issues raised by Dahl (1982: pp: 5 – 6) as minimal precondition for Election in a democracy to be adjudged to have satisfied the laid down criteria in modern political society; the absence of intimidation, in my opinion, remains a fundamental factor.

In the same light, I have chosen to align my opinion to that of Schumpeterian school of thought, which had argued that,

> "The essence of democratic governance is, at a minimum, the competitive struggle for the people's vote"

> (See LeDuc, Niemi and Norris, 2010: p. 7, and Schumpeter, 1950).

I do sincerely argue that democracy without competition in the strict sense of political contestation negates the universality and representative identity it portrays. Farrell and Schmidtt-Beck maintained also that,

"The objective of a political campaign is to influence the process and outcome of governance"

<div align="right">(See Schmitt-Beck and Farrell, 2002, p. 3).</div>

In other words, political actors are constantly in the search for means to market their held objectives to various communities within the society. Indeed, I hold the belief that the above assumption was the reason Schmitt-Beck and Farrell went further to assert that campaigns,

"Consists of an organized communication effort, involving the role of one or more agencies (be they parties, candidates, government institutions or special interest organizations) seeking to influence the outcome of processes of political decision-making by shaping public opinion"

<div align="right">(See Schmitt-Beck and Farrell, 2002: p, 3).</div>

I have chosen to argue that political campaigns accord Elections and democratic politics the fundamental legitimacy that other form of governance system lack. However, the overall importance of Campaigns during Elections cannot be over emphasize; because, campaigns gives the public the necessary and needed platform to compare the market value of the contestants as well as the political values each person and his party represent. Indeed, according to Powell, Jr,

"Elections provide variable options to the general public to scrutinize the field in retrospective and prospective ways"

<div align="right">(Powell, Jr. 2000, p.9).</div>

In essence, Campaigns during Elections provide voters the medium to sieve through the Campaigners so as to separate the pretenders from the serious candidates. Ever since the 2007 election violence in Kenya, as well as the 2011 election induced

violence in Nigeria, and the political controversy that was evident in Ghana for several months after the 2012 presidential election; the reasons behind the ugly

Developments, as well as the solutions needed have remained elusive, not only to those societies directly involved, but collectively, the general society. Unfortunately, the crises never arose because of differences in political ideology, but the loss of democratic conducted election by a given political party and this has received less enthusiasm from scholars in several branches of study in social sciences. The destruction and controversy associated with the enumerated Elections underscores the postulation of Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, who argued that,

"Regime transitions are abnormal periods of undetermined political change, in which there are insufficient structural or behavioural parameters to guide and predict the outcome"

See O'Donnell, and Schmitter, 1986, p. 3).

However, the low research attention on Election Campaigns in sub-Sahara African democracies and particularly the case study countries may not be far removed from the credibility problem of organized elections in the countries. Indeed, the effects of the colonial era political competition among various ethnic groups in the case study countries featured hardly in the consideration of most scholars on African politics.

However, the explanation cannot be removed from the absence of comprehensive knowledge as well as neglect of the campaign formula adopted by politicians on individual basis as well as the political parties during elections. Election violence and Campaign Strategy adopted by political parties represents a fundamental shift or deviation from the five minimum criteria of democratic election as advanced by Dahl (1982: pp: 5 – 6).

I have noticed, many studies on democratic elections concentrated more on the victory aspect in an election to draw conclusion if a conducted Election is democratically credible or otherwise. Many scholars and commentators have ignored various controversial and dangerous events that preceded elections.

Many of the pre-election and post-election security concerns and the Election campaign strategy adopted by parties and candidates seldom picture in the analysis of many scholars on Elections in sub-Sahara Africa, especially in the countries selected for this study. However, one might be right to speculate that the election violence is a product of political interest protection anchored on contestation. Election induced violence as a recurring event in most countries in sub-Sahara Africa requires a thorough assessment considering the adoption of incompatible measures as campaign strategy.

I have chosen to embark on this research journey on the strength that the role of Campaign strategy adopted during elections has not been found to feature among the several problems recognized facing democracy in sub-Sahara Africa. In Ted Gurr's analysis of Europe's political journey, he recognized that the organized political history of Europe was intermittently punctured by violence. It was Gurr's belief that politically induced violence often destroys humans as well as properties and of course very "corrosive to political institutions" (See Ted Gurr, 1970:p.3). In that light, a critical look at the three elections under review in this dissertation will prove Gurr's assertion to be politically and historically applicable to the outcomes. Table 1.4 below establishes causes, crisis level and casualties recorded in the 2007, 2011 and 2012 presidential elections in the three countries I have adopted as case study for this dissertation.

Number of casualties in the elections and countries			
	Nigeria/2011	**Kenya/2007**	**Ghana/2012**
Factors	Campaign Strategy	Campaign Strategy	Campaign Strategy
Intensity	High	Very high	Moderate
Number of victims	2,500+	500,000+	N/A
Number of Deaths	900+	1200+	N/A

Table 1.4 showing casualty figures recorded in the 3 presidential elections (Source: adapted from www.ndi.org, www.eu.eom.org, www.usip.org, www.iri.org).

The economic dislocation, human and material loses that arose from election induced violent acts underscores the reason for this study. Basically, the high rate of casualty that was made possible through the Election campaign strategy, as adopted by political parties and individual candidates in the selected countries, created many unanswered questions, and especially, looking at the Election year that featured in this dissertation.

As reported by Bamgbose (2012, pp: 205 - 219) in his study, and also the violent acts as contained in the reports released by Election Observation teams such like the European Union Election Observation Mission (EU-EOM, 2011), and the National Democratic Institute (NDI, 2012), over 800 deaths were recorded in Nigeria as a consequence of the violence, which erupted in the course of the 2011 presidential election[2]. Furthermore, Jeremy Horowitz (2009, p: 4 – 8), The EU-Election Observation Mission (EU-EOM, 2008, March), The International Republican Institute (IRI, 2007, Dec, 28), United States Institute of Peace (USIP), reported that over 1000 people were killed in Kenya, and also as consequence of the violence, which erupted in the course of the 2007 presidential Election[3]. Although, In Ghana, there were intermittent clashes and disagreements between the supporters of the ruling party (NDC) and the main opposition party (NPP). However, despite the volatile situation generated through aggressive campaign efforts by the political actors and supporters, there was no evidence of massive violent acts throughout the period of the presidential election in Ghana. The massive destruction of lives and property, which accompanied the violence in Nigeria and Kenya, shocked not only the immediate countries and continent, but, indeed the entire world.

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2). Bamgbose, J. Adele (2012), Electoral Violence and Nigeria's 2011 General Elections, International Review of Social Sciences and Humanities, Vol. 4, Nr. 1. (2012) Pp 205-219, See also www.eu-eom.org/Kenya/presidential/election/2007/, and www.ndi.org/2011/presidential/election/ election observation teams' reports on the conduct of the 2011 presidential election in Nigeria.

3). See Jeremy Horowitz, (2009), Ethnic Groups and Campaign Strategy in Kenya's 2007 Election, A Seminar paper Online edition, unprinted Manuscript, University of California, Bekeley, Los Angeles. See also the EU-EOM, IRI, USIP, election observation teams' reports on the conduct of the 2007 presidential election in Kenya.

Election campaign strategy adopted by the political actors and their supporters, especially in two of the three case study countries, challenged the universal assumption, which suggested that election as an instrument of democratic politics functions in the focused countries. The Campaign strategy adopted by political parties and individual politicians in the countries concerned formed the fundamental factor, which I am going to analyze and prove how democracy became devalued in the three countries.

1.3). The Choice of Nigeria, Kenya and Ghana as Case Study on how Campaign Strategy and Electoral Violence devalued Democracies

In the pre-colonial era, many societies in sub-Sahara Africa were far removed from each other. The emergence of the colonial powers in sub-Sahara Africa opened a new channel in interaction between and among various tribes and ethnic groups. War of conquest was order of the day at the time, and nationally organized state was ethnic centered. Nigeria as a product of colonial adventure was founded on a tripod of ethnic configuration; namely the Igbo nation located in the eastern part of the country, the Yoruba nation located in the western part of the country, and the Hausa-Fulani that inhabit the northern part of the country, and then with several other minority groups (See Coleman (1955. Pp: 44 – 57, Coleman, 1958, pp: 4 – 15), Morrison and Stevenson (1971, pp: 347 – 368), Sklar (1965, pp: 201 – 213), Diamond (1988, p. 21), Atanda (1973, pp: 1 – 9), Okoro (2015, pp: 97 – 139).

The political structure and affiliation in the country has remained streamlined along ethnic configuration as presented above. Unfortunately, the premising of election campaign calculation in the country using Material Incentive and Solidarity Incentive as well as political thought anchored on ethno-regional and religion Mobilization have also continued to divide and separate the common ideological enthusiasm embedded in democracy and democratic mechanisms. The desire to control political institutions at the centre succeeded in enthroning divisive political reaction from among contenders and supporters.

The ability to evolve a unified pattern in response as well as the inability to align with political concerns of other competing interests leaves room for grumbling.

In the process, one ends up only to create political problems in place of policy solutions. Likewise in Kenya, the country is a by-product of colonial adventure and in that regard left in its wake a political legacy in the country. The political space in Kenya is equally dominated and built on the premise of ethno-tribal framework. The traditional political rivalry among the Kikuyu, Kamba, Maasai, Luhya, Mijikenda, Galla and Luo ethnic groups is a fundamental factor, which had shaped political consideration in the country for decades (See Horowitz, 2000, p. 207), Berg-Schlosser (1984, pp: 4 – 18), Thompson (2010, pp. 23 - 28), and Cherry Gertzel (1970, p. 16).

Like the situation in Nigeria, the 2007 election in Kenya was dominated by the issue of right to rule and right to occupy. As much as individual candidate qualification matters, what I have viewed as matter or point of greatest importance in this dissertation is the role played by campaign strategy used by the ruling party, and the Opposition Parties that went into coalition to form the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) few months to the 2007 presidential election in Kenya.

In contrast to electoral events recorded in Nigeria in 2011 and Kenya in 2007, the Ghana's 2012 presidential election does present a total different outcome, especially in the area of campaign acrimony and the management of the tensions generated in the country. The election campaign strategies used by political parties in the elections in Nigeria and Kenya were designed to motivate voters and to appeal to their emotions based on regional, ethnicity, and religion solidarity. Coincidentally, the three countries were colonized by Great Britain, and all the three gained independence from the British between 1957 and 1963 (See Coleman, 1964, pp: 259 – 315 and 597 – 654, Diamond, 1988; Berg-Schlosser (1984, pp: 7 – 18), Thompson, 2010, pp: 23 – 28, 74 – 80, and 205 – 210). In this regard, the three countries were handed the same pattern of British political ideas and administrative structure.

But in societies characterized by ethno-regional and religious mindset as well as power domination rivalry predating colonial intervention; the interest in the international political scholarship about democracy becomes very elusive. The political implication of such constructed societies was to attract measureable

attention from various social scientists across continents (See Lindberg, 2006, pp: 139 – 151), Van de Walle, 2003, pp: 297 – 332), Lewis (1965, pp. 64 - 67), Diamond (1988, 2004, 2010), Thompson, (2010), Mozaffar, Scarritt, and Galaich, (2003, pp: 379 – 390), Chazan, Lewis, Mortimer, Rothchild, and Stedman (1999, pp: 137 – 155), Bayart (2013, pp. 51 – 56).

Unfortunately, many of the scholars failed to imagine and dissect the possible political reality in these three constructed countries after the departure of the colonial master, and thus, left political vacuum difficult to fill to the convenient factor that formed the premise for the formation of the countries. Ultimately, the concern of majority of scholars in sub-Saharan African affairs was placed on the functionality of democracy and democratic institutions within the three societies. The aspect of possible deviation from the universally assumed democratic tenets was ignored; and instead, concentration was given to national aggregate outcome.

The traditional political rivalry pitching different ethnic groups from the ancient time as well as the subsisting administrative structures in the various ethnic homelands failed to feature in the political calculation of democracy promoters in the three sub-Saharan Africa societies. Indeed many political scientists at the time of Independence in the early 1960s believed that given the British-type democratic institutions handed over to the new independent states, they would be guarded to transform the administrative structures of their societies into that of Western countries (See Lewis, 1965, p.67). Many had believed that democracy and democratic politics would eventually provide the three societies best possible opportunity to development. This was projected without any measure of reference to the ethnic rivalry that existed among the various groups in the countries under study.

Accordingly, those Students of Politics like Eckstein, Gurr, McClelland, Dahl, Lijphart and Diamond, who have been particularly interested in democracy promotion in diverse and colonial constructed societies, had equated democracy in the newly formed societies to take cue from how democracy functions in the western world. This is of course with regard to high political performance.

The scholars mentioned above variously listed five factors according to their classification to have direct representation of governance through democracy in the western world to include; Legitimacy of authority and power wielded by those in

government, durability of government, presence of civil order and permeation as well as the efficacy inherent in decision taken or made by government. Of particular importance in this analogy is the issue of disorder or violence in a democracy or democratic environment. The events that followed the mentioned elections built up my interest to ask questions why the presence of violence in democratic transition in Nigeria and Kenya, and its partial absence in Ghana despite the inclusiveness contents of democracy.

According to several media sources, including official and un-official information, the number of deaths recorded in the violence that erupted after the 2011 presidential election in Nigeria was put above 800 people[4]. As reported by the National Democratic Institute (NDI, 2012),

> "Clashes on election day turned into large-scale violence in twelve northern states in the following days. Rioting youth reportedly burned mosques, churches and the homes of prominent political leaders and traditional rulers they considered sympathetic to the ruling PDP. Human rights groups have estimated that at least 800 people were killed during this period, including ten NYSC members on election duty"

(See www.ndi.org/final-report-on-the-Nigeria-2011-presidential-election/pdf/2012-12).

while the number of people that perished as a result of the deadly violence, which followed the 2007 presidential election in Kenya was also put above 1200 victims[4]. In Ghana the story was that of great apprehension as the candidates appealed to the emotion of the various political groups in the country. However, the absence of massive killings associated to elections won and lost does not remove Ghana from a society dogged by election related skirmishes. Tribal chauvinists built up and orchestrated unfounded allegations on electoral frauds against the ruling party and the Election Commission.

The declaration of Goodluck Ebele Jonathan as the winner of the 2011 conducted presidential election as well as that of Mwai Kibaki as the elected President of Kenya in 2007 election led to vicious political violence in both countries.

However, the turbulent Election campaign driven by candidates and political parties in Ghana, especially the ruling Party and the main Opposition Party (NDC, NPP) made the society to remain always on the edge in that particular election cycle. The 2012 Presidential Election contest in Ghana witnessed high density of political nervousness and uncertainty among the population. Indeed, threat to peace was very evident in how political elements conducted several political activities in the countries. Politicians and Campaign strategists exploited the porous relationship and mistrust among the various contending tribal groups in the case study countries. With the deployment of divisive strategy to promote and project candidate's political ideals and capacity, the various Campaign teams succeeded by diverting the focus of their campaign in the Elections from being an issue oriented one to that of group survival.

1.4).   Theoretical Questions and Hypotheses

The dissertation intends to find answer to the question on Election violence using the prism of campaign strategy used by candidates and political parties in the three countries under review. My primary intention is to determine through this dissertation if the violence that erupted during the elections under review is a "continuation of the ancient Inter-ethnic grievances among and between ethnic units, or if it is purely a case of wrong campaign strategy in an evolving democracy". However, I hold the belief, that the methods, which were used to campaign for votes by political parties and the direction of violence during the focused elections in the countries under review, had posed serious problem to realization of enduring democracy.

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4). The International Republican Institute (IRI), European Union-Election Observation Mission (EU-EOM), United States Institute of Peace (USIP).

1.5) Some of the Existing Literatures on Democracy and Election Campaigns Reviewed in their Theoretical Perspectives

As a Social Science study, campaign for election into political offices in a democracy provides the academic community the opportunity to speculate and make projections on elections based on hypothetical assumptions. However, the failure of scholars of democratization process in sub-Sahara Africa to identify the major factors that resulted to democracy devaluation renders any account on democratization progress substantially incomplete. It is in view of this failure that it becomes pertinent to look at the contribution of election campaign strategy as a significant factor. The primary idea is to expose the failure in the previous studies and accounts as narrated by Boahen in (Zartman etal, 1997, pp: 95 – 144), Lindberg (2006; pp: 139 – 151), Snyder (2000, p: 271), Mozaffar, Scarritt, and Galaich (2003, pp: 379 – 390), Nicolas Van de Walle (2003, pp: 297 – 332); Lijphart (1977, p: 16 – 18), Diamond (2004, pp: 4 – 17); Osei-Hwedie (2001, pp: 57 – 77), Herrnson (2000, p: 189), and other Africans and non African scholars who dedicated time and research on democracy in sub-Sahara Africa.

Indeed, it is not enough to explain democratic processes and then go ahead to centre one's theoretical and hypothetical assumptions based on number of countries where election were conducted and authoritarian regimes replaced by an elected civilian government. Consequently, to guarantee the optimum functionality of democracy and democratic processes, I want to argue and demand that the internal structure as well as the traditional cohesion synonymous with every human society should be properly re-evaluated before the processes leading to an election as well as the outcome could be adjudged as credible.

Of course, I have chosen to align my opinion with that expressed by Donald Rothchild (2004), whereby he argued that,

> "The Setbacks to democratization can be explained by the constraints placed on African governments, including an insecure political and social setting, intense conflicts (involving religious fundamentalism, ethnic nationalism, class antagonism, and resource allocation), protracted economic decline, the continuance of clientelistic networks, lack of widespread agreement on norms and values, inadequate channels of political communication, the problem of establishing responsive political institutions, and obstacles to maintaining a dynamic civil society"

> (See Rothchild in: Wimmer, Goldstone, Horowitz, Joras and Schetter, 2004, p. 232).

Unfortunately, none of the scholars on democracy in sub-Sahara Africa was able to establish the role of Election campaign strategy used by parties and candidates in the devaluation of democracy in the case study countries. Although, there are arguments within the academia on the belief that the devaluation of democratic elections in the three case study countries has root in the democratic Institutions service returns, but they failed to provide the basis for their conclusion.

In the argument of Hobbes (1651) and as cited by David Held, "self-interest" (See David Held, 1996, PP: 76 – 91) forms the fulcrum of democratic activity of politicians and mankind in general. As such, the import of campaign strategy cannot be over emphasized, especially as most political actors in the three selected countries fought for individual political self-interest, though, they used ethno-regional and religious solidarity as mobilization instrument. Boafo-Arthur (2006), Lindberg (2006, pp: 139 – 151), and Sanusi (2013) had rephrased to their convenience the opinions and theoretical positions about the functionality of Institutions of democracy in the case study countries, but they failed to take appropriate look at turn of events in the campaigns executed by each political party and the political actors. I did hold the belief that relying absolutely on theoretical assumptions as championed by Institutionalism scholars like Diamond, Dalton and Sanusi and attempt to evaluate democracy progress in sub-Sahara Africa would be a wrong approach. The above scholars failed to demonstrate, establish or substantiate how political actors' low performance could have invoked violent protest through manipulation of the existing

fault-lines during and after the elections. However, one must submit that perceived held political interest to large extent contributed in overheating the polity and made democracy as well as democratic elections in the three case study countries to be overwhelmed and dogged by sectional interest, rather than general good. In essence, the desire to safeguard a sectional held political interest orchestrated through election campaign messages created disaffection in the society and prepared the ground for crisis as a response to election outcome. According to the submission of Morrison and Stevenson,

"Political violence is a condition in political system and such that it takes centre-stage the moment institutionalized patterns of authorities in a society break-down"

(See Morrison and Stevenson, 1971: pp. 347 – 348).

In view of the above expressed opinion by Morrison and Stevenson, other scholars argued also that the influence exerted on the polity by the elites make voters, especially in divided societies, to be vulnerable. According to Wilkinson's opinion,

"Election processes, despite their emphasis on individual choice and possibility of cross-party voting, remain vulnerable to elite mobilization along ethnic lines, especially when elites play upon the latent fears that members hold about their group's security and economic well-being"

... in closely contested districts, the approach of elections brings heightened tensions, even the possibility of riots and disturbances"

(See Wilkinson 1998, pp. 21 – 24; in: Wimmer, Goldstone, Horowitz,

Joras and Schetter, 2004, p. 232).

Chapter 2:

2). Methodology

This is a comparative case study on Election campaign strategy in 'Nigeria' Kenya and Ghana. Among the significant factors is the role played by Campaign strategies as well as various candidates who jostled for political power. It intends to seek for answers to the question, 'Is Election violence in the case study countries a continuation of the ancient Inter-ethnic grievances? I have intended to use the ethnic and tribal configuration in the countries to determine how campaign strategies affected the elections under focus in the three countries of Nigeria, Kenya and Ghana[1]. The dissertation is tactically packaged to meet the demand of three genres in Social Science study.

These are namely; Case Study (Bryman, 2008, 3rd edition) Interview, and Questionnaire (Bradburn, Sudman, and Wansink (2004, pp: 283 – 333), and as regard social science research methods (Bryman 2012, 4th edition). The dissertation is designed to cover only one single Election cycle in each of the three countries. However, the focus is on the campaign strategy adopted by candidates, Interest groups, and political parties during the elections. How events leading to the elections played out in the polity. Above all, I concentrated more consciously on the message factor adopted by each ethnic and religious group during the Elections under review. The study is designed in comparative form to cover three election cycles in the three case study countries, but certainly focuses on the strategy of campaign by the contestants and their sponsoring political parties.

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1).Bamgbose, J. Adele(2012), Electoral Violence and Nigeria's 2011 General Election, International Review of Social Sciences and Humanities, Vol. 4, Nr.1 (2012), PP.205 – 219, Michael Chege (2008), Kenya: Back from the Brink, in: Democratization in Africa: Progress and Retreat edited by Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (2010: pp, 197 – 210), Baltimore, The John Hopkins University Press

2.1) Selection of the Ethnic Nationalities for Describing Political Hostility in the Case Study Countries

Among the major methodological issues encountered in the run up to this thesis are: (i) Deciding the countries that met my expectation in terms of proven human structural deficiencies to use as case study; (ii) Deciding, which aspects of Election problems in the selected countries to be measured. These ideals were further developed in the methodology. However, one is mindful of the tangential relevance of the statement that Election campaign is dependent on the penetration of the message and success rate of adopted campaign strategy, and, with other issues in mind. Consequently, an Election campaign strategy can affect political stability only, or significantly, depending on its capacity and the magnitude of generated stimuli from certain political issues from the contending factors in a society. Therefore, a significant push for political solidarity by a section in a given divided state might motivate and emboldened individuals and parties' before and during campaign in elections. In essence, an Election campaign strategy adopted can instigate democratic instability, because strategies are conditioned and promoted by certain systemic pressures derived from socio-cultural cleavages inherent in a society.

The dangers inherent in Election campaigns, especially in a structurally configured state, where groups' survival instincts determine the level of electoral participation, pose serious methodological questions and limitation to scholars. In essence, the desire to adopt an all embracing criteria that sequences the preparation and campaign plans as designed by each party and candidate before, during and after the focused election years compelled me to approach the study through qualitative research format. This method demands that the author move into different localities in selected towns and cities, interact with locals both victims and non-victims of election violence and conduct of interviews with some experts in democratic elections in the three countries selected for this dissertation. However, my desired intention was to include many democratized countries in sub-Sahara Africa region as cases in the study; but the constraint of time and dearth in the availability of resources would not permit that.

Even if time and resources were not constraining factors, the absence of an agreement on the actual factors responsible for crisis during and after an Election has been won and lost is another big obstacle to any attempt to include every one of them in a study like this one. In the absence of that opportunity, I have decided to use three countries in a representative form.

Some scholars like Diamond, Lijphart, and Sanusi used frequency of Elections as evaluation factor to assess democracy in divided societies, and which sub-Sahara Africa is fundamentally a factor. Many scholars of political science, especially, politics and democracy in the three countries selected, had based their assumptions only on 2 out of the 5 factors raised by Dahl (1982, pp: 5 – 6), Whitehead (2002, pp: 10 – 11), Powell, Jr (1982, pp: 1 – 11). Basically, one might argue in the direction of an aspect in Freedom House Index that frequency of democratic election legitimize a governance system in a society and as such qualifies a society as either democratic or quasi-democratic. The 2007 and 2011 election observers' report failed to identify the utilization and the tone of language used by certain influential individuals in the society prior to the election as a criterion for their assessment. In many studies two or three democratic factors are often given as the basis for qualifying the three selected countries as democratic and totally ignoring the classical problems facing conduct of elections in the countries (See Mensah: 2010: p, 190), Van de Walle (2003, pp: 297 – 332), Lindberg (2006, pp: 139 – 151), Mozaffar, Scarritt, and Galaich (2003, pp: 379 – 390).

There are also other Scholars who have come up with the idea of ability to form political parties as a criteria describing a society as democratic or quasi-democratic (See Powell,Jr. (1982, pp: 3 – 29), Vanhanen (2003, pp: 79 – 100 and 133 – 182), Birch (2007, 109 – 158), Lijphart (1977, pp: 61 – 64), and Lijphart, (1989, pp: 74 – 89), while several political scientists have also used the political stance of certain individuals as a yardstick for describing the state of democracy and democratic elections in the three selected countries (See Diamond (1984), Lindberg, (2006, pp: 21 – 52). The more serious strong-point of employing language as a criterion for identifying election violence facilitation in the countries include the fact that each section of the society "used language as an electoral tool" (See Nnoli 1995: 26), Horowitz, (2000, p: 219 – 224), Posner (2005, p: 106), Chandra (2004, p: 63), while language is known to have solidarity instincts that are often deployed to drive-home

political points. Other arguments, like the economically deprived interior dwellers often manipulated by the political class, which was to some extent through the process of hand-out, plays also vital role in creating fertile environment for democracy devaluation.

Despite the seemingly failure on the part of many experts to agree on the salient issues that prepared the environment for election violence in the countries selected, the appetite for democracy continued to grow in the three focused countries. There has never been any scientifically acknowledged sociological evaluation study about the Campaign strategy of the contending political parties and candidates. In this regard, it becomes increasingly difficult to have an inventory through a single study and include even half of what had facilitated crisis during the focused election periods. As argued before, most scholars have adopted convenient criteria to fathom claimed facilitators to meet the purposes of their study. Hence the selection of the three countries, Nigeria and Ghana in West Africa, and Kenya in East Africa and interestingly all the three countries were formerly under the colonial authority of Great Britain.

Considering the ambiance of Ethnic confrontation, it may not be a misplaced concern to believe that Election could provide politicians opportunity to build up ethno-regional Solidarity sentiment, and use it as campaign tool. At the same time, political parties could as well use political marginalization to create solidarity from people who are so affected by such claims[5]. However, as widely argued, politicians and political parties could exploit ethno-regional concerns in their campaigns to secure good number of votes from certain ethnic group bearing in mind the population value of such group in the election (See Donald Horowitz (2000), Kagwanja (2009, pp: 265 – 267), Jeffrey Horowitz (2009, pp: 13 – 16), Horowitz, 1994, pp: 35 – 54, in: Diamond and Plattner, 2004), Chandra (2005, pp: 235 – 252). Noticeable factors in this regard have call to mind the possible voting pattern by the various ethnic and regional groups in the three focused countries.

Existing literatures on national election history of the countries have failed also to provide supportive and convincing insight on how electoral fortunes recorded by each candidate and his political party is significantly related to "Policy-issue-based" campaign strategy used during elections. There is abundant evidence to substantiate

the argument that election violence, prior to elections, is highly related to the activity of political parties, prominent politicians and candidates.

The pre-election political rhetoric that were credited to certain political actors, several ethno-regional and religious biased groups, and political interests in Nigeria, Kenya, and Ghana, does demand for a proper sociological evaluation as to determine the degree such volatile outbursts had impacted on the political psyche of the people during elections.

Moreover, ever since the countries became sovereign and independent free from colonial control of the British beginning from the late 1950s, with regard to Ghana and early 1960s with regard to Nigeria and Kenya, the more populous ethnic groups have dominated politics and political contestation in each of the countries under review. For instance, in Nigeria, the political battle has been rotating around the Igbo ethnic group, Yoruba ethnic group and Hausa-Fulani and each of them has consistently displayed their disaffection against other ethnic group's perceived dominance in the national politics.

In Kenya, the age-long acrimony between the Kikuyu and Luo ethnic groups constantly set candidates and political interest apart in the country. As it is in Nigeria and Kenya, so it is also in Ghana among the various tribal groups with regard to political contestation in the country, particularly between the Akan, Ga-Adamgbe and the Ewe. As a consequence of the nature of campaigns and political arrangement in the three countries, issues of national question are usually neglected, especially in Nigeria and Kenya. In the context of this study, all such contentious issues as projected through campaign messages and political pronouncement by leading politicians from different political blocs in the countries under review demand strong evaluation. Further ideas behind this dissertation is the intention to look critically on the unchallenged pre-election violent tendencies linked to politicians in the three countries as explicit and imaginary actions of politicians constitute valid indicator of election campaign strategy and election violence, of which Nigeria, Kenya and Ghana are the case in this study.

2.2).   Selection of the explanatory Variables

The selection of the variables is dependent on the factor of influence in the focused countries. However, the variables are located on the following:

1. Size of the polity
2. Presence of political Competition
3. Presence of Ethnic groups
4. Presence of Ethnic rivalry
5. Evidence of Ethnic homeland
6. Ethnic mobilization
7. Religious mobilization

2.3).   Tools for Inquiry into Election and Campaign

However, before one can delve into the main issues on election and campaign strategies used in the 2011, 2007, and 2012 presidential elections in Nigeria, Kenya and Ghana, respectively, it is important that one displays the fundamental factors that are needed to move forward. Furthermore, I find it pertinent to show how the question of Inter-ethnic grievances can be used in voter mobilization processes, how political interest alignment could graduate to ethnic electoral alliance, and to show how material incentive and electoral solidarity incentive as recruitment concepts in voter mobilization could be utilized by political actors to manipulate electoral preferences of voters in the case study countries.

The concepts of Material and Solidarity Incentives apply to voter mobilization in my case study societies, and that is, irrespective of socio-cultural variations, and their impacts on factors such as ethnicity, power configuration, and electoral relations. Election and voter mobilization in divided societies cannot be said to have explicit conclusions, rather one can only assume a hypothetical conclusion. As Horowitz in his argument about the Kikuyu of Kenya on the right to succeed the colonial power said,

"Because the actual struggle, with its suffering and its secret oaths, left the Kikuyu "with a sense of identity so much stronger that it would be difficult to subordinate to a larger nationalism"

(See Horowitz, 2000, pp, 205 – 207).

The concepts of material and solidarity incentives are products of practical observations, such that, they do not represent abstract conjectures. They evolved from the above conceptual schemes, which I want to use to facilitate the evaluation of campaign strategies used during democratic elections in three selected countries, namely, Nigeria, Kenya and Ghana. The four aspects of campaign strategies whose evaluation is embodied in M-S concepts are the following: (i). Presence of Inter-ethnic grievances among ethnic groups, (ii). Fear of political domination among contending interests, (iii). Inter-ethnic electoral alliances and (iv). The protection of collective interest:

The evaluation of the campaign strategies used in the 2007, 2011, and 2012 presidential elections in Kenya, Nigeria and Ghana, respectively, and the consequent violent outcome in Nigeria, and Kenya will benefit from comprehensive evaluation of fundamental links to variables 3 and 4 as I have stated above in voter mobilization factors, namely; Inter-ethnic grievances among the ethnic groups, and Inter-ethnic electoral alliances formed among ethnic groups. As Schmitt-Beck and Farrell noted,

"By investing ever more efforts and resources into political campaigns they seek to mobilize support among the mass public, to persuade citizens of their causes, and to inform the citizenry about public policies and political activities. So far as the practitioners are concerned, such campaigns matter a great deal. Those waging campaigns firmly believe that these efforts help them to achieve their political goals and thus count in the political process"

(See Schmitt-Beck and Farrell, 2002, p, 1).

Obviously, the evaluation of the voter mobilization strategies using my concepts of Material and Solidarity Incentives is going to provide objective generated cues as reference to the elections' outcome in Nigeria and Kenya. However, the concepts of

material and solidarity incentives are theoretically articulated to enhance clarity and knowledge about reasons for the violence as recorded in Nigeria and Kenya in 2011 and 2007, respectively.

2.4). Electoral Relations among contending groups in the Countries

The solidarity incentive concept is designed to evaluate the electoral relationship, which involved the political actors, and between ethnic groups, and among ethnic groups. In each democratic environment, the level of social interaction and mutual political relationship among various interests determines in large extent the fluidity of political opinions, and stability in the system. Indeed, the mutual interactions, which could happen between and among political actors, politically, or socially can have wide range of consequences in the polity. As I have indicated in figure 2.1 below, the data references amplify the above stated proposition.

Figure 2.1: Regional Interest factor among political actors and Voter Mobilization.

In the case of Nigeria, and as one among my case study countries, negative or positive political interactions between and among political actors from North, West and East of the country can generate negative or positive electoral intrigues, which could in turn destabilize or strengthened the entire society.

As one can observe from figure 2.1 above, the primary intention of each of the three sections in the country's electoral structure is to take control of political decisions in the centre or better still at the central government. Furthermore, I have designed in figure 2.2 below, a theoretical concept with alphabet A to represent Hausa-Fulani, alphabet B to represent Yoruba, and alphabet C to represent the Igbo. The intention is to show Election relational convergence between and among the major ethnic groups in Nigeria. However, the overlap that developed between and among the groups represents political interactions. The attempt is to generate cues on how each group built electoral alliance in the 2011 presidential election.

Key

1. A – Hausa-Fulani and others
2. B - Yoruba
3. C - Igbo
4. AB – Hausa-Fulani and others –Yoruba
5. BC – Yoruba – Igbo
6. CB – Igbo – Hausa-Fulani and others
7. ABC - Nigeria

Figure 2.2: Overlap of Voter mobilization strategies and Inter-ethnic alliance.

The overlap 'AB' represents Hausa-Fulani – Yoruba electoral alliance, and 'BC' represents Yoruba and Igbo electoral interaction, while 'CB' represents Igbo and Hausa – Fulani electoral interactions. The overriding idea is to use the formula to discover the level of electoral relation between and among the three major ethnic groups in the 2011 presidential election in Nigeria. Indeed, the overlap, which occurred between 'A' and 'B' implies the presence of interaction between Hausa-Fulani and the Yoruba during the 2011 presidential election, while the overlap between 'B' and 'C' implies the presence of electoral interaction between the Yoruba and the Igbo, finally, the overlap between 'C' and 'A' implies the presence of electoral interaction between the Igbo, and the Hausa-Fulani and others in the North.

Key

1. A = Muslim - Christian
2. B = Christian – Muslim
3. C = Christian
4. AB = Muslim – Christian
5. CB = Christian – Christian
6. AC = Christian – Christian
7. ABC = Religion - Voters

Figure 2.3: Overlap of religion and Voter mobilization strategy.

Election as a fundamental factor in democracy, compelled me to design figure 2.3 above to enable me discover the effects of religion on electoral relationship between and among major ethnic groups in Nigeria. In an effort to trace the role of religion in voter mobilization process, and how the relationship impacted on voters' electoral preferences during the 2011 presidential election in Nigeria, I want to use figure 2.3 above to illustrate the impact of religion in electoral preferences of voters. In figure 2.3 above, alphabet 'A' represents presence of Christians and Muslims, and alphabet 'B' represents presence of Christians and Muslims, while alphabet 'C' represents presence of Christians alone.

However, in the overlap junctures alphabets 'AB' implied the presence of political relationship between Muslims in the West and Muslims in the North, and alphabet 'CB' implied presence of political interaction between Christians in the East and Christians in the West, while alphabet 'AC' implied the presence of political relationship between Christians in the East and Christians in the North.

Key

1. A = Material Incentive
2. B = Solidarity Incentive
3. AB = Voter Manipulation

Figure 2.4: Overlap of Campaign strategies leading to Voter Mobilization and electoral preference manipulation.

The figure 2.4 above is an attempt to represent my two operational concepts as used in the evaluation of the relationship between political actors and voters during the 2011 presidential election in Nigeria. As indicated above, alphabet 'A' is used to represent Material Incentive concept, while alphabet 'B' represents solidarity incentive concept, and the overlap between alphabet 'A' and 'B' presented as alphabet 'AB' represents the impacts of the two concepts on voters.

Indeed, the overlap suggests conscious manipulation of voters through the application of the two concepts. The nature of the perceived political relationship between and among the contending political interests in the country is to be tested through the two strategies meant for the mobilization of voters in the focused presidential election.

As I have indicated in figure 2.4 above, the use of material incentive to lure voters could placed them under moral pressure and force voters to compromise in their electoral preferences. Consequently, the use of solidarity as mobilization incentive could unconsciously have voters' emotional psyche manipulated, destabilize the electoral process, and build political parochialism in the system.

Key

1. Kikuyu
2. Luo
3. Other Ethnic groups
4. Central Government

Figure 2.5: Relational concept between political actors and the central government.

In figure 2.5 above, my primary idea is to attempt to evaluate the nature of political relationship, which existed among political actors from the various ethnic nationalities in Kenya in reference to the 2007 presidential election. The intention is to analyze the impact of the perceived electoral interactions among political actors on the electorate, and evaluate their relevance in voter mobilization process. As I have indicated in figure 2.5, the primary intention of the contending political actors is the control of political power and the machinery of authority at the central government. As a fundamental factor in the variables I have listed above, fear for political domination could compel political players to hide under the influence of ethnicity, and communal identification to fight for political relevance, especially in the hierarchy of political authority.

Consequently, mobilization of voters for the 2007 presidential election in all probability was poised to create identity based mobilization process. Horowitz was right when he argued that,

> "In severely divided societies, ethnicity finds its way into a myriad of issues: development plans, educational controversies, trade union affairs, land policy, business policy, tax policy"

<div align="right">(See Horowitz, 2000, p, 8).</div>

As I have indicated in figure 2.6 below, the intention is to show that the quest for political relevance among contending ethnic groups could result to revolt against probable political domination, and political actors may want to result to using communal identification to fight election.

Figure 2.6: Alliances by contending political actors and voter mobilization.

As I have stated in the factors or variables listed above, the composition of the ethnic groups might confer undue advantage and undeserved disadvantage to some ethnic nationalities in the politics of a society*. In figure 2.7 below, the 2007 presidential election in Kenya showed the potential to heightened political acrimony in the society. In essence, there is the probability that the political actors could have the election contested along Inter-ethnic solidarity framework, and thus reflects my assumptions in figure 2.5, and figure 2.6 above. In reference to formation of ethnic alliances as I have indicated in the list of variables, political actors having resulted to Inter-ethnic solidarity might transmute into electoral solidarity, and consequently attract socio-cultural solidarity during elections. Figure 2.7 below does embodied features I have envisaged when I adopted presence of ethnic alliances, political domination, and opposition participants as variables.

```
                    ┌─────────────┐
                    │ Inter-ethnic │
                    │  Solidarity  │
                    └──────┬──────┘
                           │
                           ▼
┌─────────────┐                      ┌──────────────┐
│  Electoral  │                      │Social/Cultural│
│  Solidarity │                      │  Solidarity   │
└──────┬──────┘                      └──────┬────────┘
       │            ┌─────────┐             │
       └──────────▶ │ Election │ ◀──────────┘
                    └─────────┘
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
Figure 2.7: Alliances leading to solidarity mobilization.

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- The presence of ethno-regional demography and religious-demography could crystallize into tactical vote hunt by political actors. Voters could depend on co-ethnic and non co-ethnic sentiments to make electoral preferences and choices. Consequently, candidates are voted for or against on the basis of being an In-group or an Out-group person.

However, the figure 2.8 below is my attempt to show the probable exploitation of the electoral processes through absence of Inter-ethnic grievances as a variable in political competition. In the absence of Inter-ethnic grievances, political players in the system could be compelled to market their competences on the basis of perceived social demands, and voters would tend to focus on the credibility and capability questions. The electoral relationship, which existed between and among contending political actors would be moderated by voters' reactions to the developed cues in the electoral market. I want to present these indicators as alphabet A, B and C in figure 2.8 below.

Key

1. A = Social Pressures
2. B = Party Loyalty
3. C = Candidate's affectionate
4. AB = Social Pressures – Party Loyalty
5. CB = Candidate's affectionate – Party Loyalty
6. CA = Candidate's affectionate – Social Pressures
7. ABC = Social Pressures – Party Loyalty – Candidate's affectionate

Figure 2.8: Overlap in voter mobilization indicators leading to electoral preferences.

Alphabet 'A' in figure 2.8 above represent social pressures, which voters could rely upon to make their electoral preferences, while alphabet 'B' represents Party loyalty, which suggest that traditional party members and party traditional supporters could show unalloyed support to the party's candidate during election. Alphabet 'C' represents affection, which voters, traditional party supporters and non party affiliates, had for a candidate during election. Furthermore, the overlap between 'A and B' showed the presence of social pressures and party loyalty in voters' electoral preferences, while the overlap between alphabets 'C and B' showed the presence of affection and loyalty to the candidate and party in voters' electoral preferences. The overlap, which occurred between alphabet 'C and A', does suggest that affection and social pressures could influence voters' electoral preferences.

Finally, the relationship as represented in the overlaps between the factors, does show the possible relevance and interconnectivity of each factor in the electoral preferences of voters.

Figure 2.9: Interactions between political actors and voters leading to election.

As a follow up to figure 2.8 above, the electoral interactions among social factors could result to an election being determined through the combined effects of social pressures and voter mobilization processes (See figure 2.9 above). As I have indicated in figure 2.9, the reaction of voters from social pressures could compel political actors to embark on mobilization campaign using socio-political facilitators, such as employment, tax policy, and infrastructural development. In essence, the political interactions among political actors in the 2012 presidential election in Ghana does suggest a possible reliance of voters on social and policy induced political cues to make electoral preferences. Obviously, the combined effects as generated from figures 2.7, 2.8, and 2.9 does confirm the relationship among contending political actors, and the presence of the three factors of social pressures, loyalty to party, and affectionate or likeness of a candidate in the voter mobilization processes in the 2012 presidential election in Ghana.

2.5). Basis for Campaign Controversy among contending

Political Actors

Election as the basis for democratic election is dependent on intrigues, derived from socio-cultural pressures. However, the basis for political intrigues could be hinged on personality confrontation, or on interest competition among groups. Election is about interest protection through the ballot box, but then, election becomes controversial when a campaign leading to the election itself becomes controversial. As I have indicated and as contained in figures 2.1 to 2.9 above, the basis for electoral controversy is dependent on various social and cultural cues inherent in a society. According to Horowitz who said that,

"Nowhere, of course, is politics simply reducible to the common denominator of ethnic ties. Even in the most severely divided society, there are also other issues"

(See Horowitz, 2000, p, 7).

The above argument as stated by Horowitz suggested that there are several factors, other than identity questions, that could lead to electoral controversy in a society. Invariably, the absence of Inter-ethnic grievances in a political competition does demand for the application or the use of non ethnicity based or less ethnicity defined campaign tools in voter mobilization exercise. In reference to figure 2.1 to figure 6 above, the presence of ethnic grievances does confirmed what Horowitz stated in his evaluation of ethnic affiliations. Donald L. Horowitz had argued that,

"In deeply divided societies, strong ethnic allegiances permeate organizations, activities, and roles to which they are formally unrelated. The permeative character of ethnic affiliations, by infusing so many sectors of social life, imparts a pervasive quality to ethnic conflict and raises sharply the stakes of ethnic politics"

(See Horowitz, 2000, pp, 7 – 8).

Indeed, the basis for controversy in political competition could also be likened to what Horowitz called "ethnic identification with the polity". It was the belief of Horowitz that sources of conflict can be dependent on group entitlement. Horowitz had stated that some groups claimed,

"The country (or the region or the town) is or ought to be theirs and that the political system should reflect this fact by being constituted along essentially homogeneous lines. Other groups merely claim the right to be included on equal terms"

(See Horowitz, 2000, p, 185).

2.6).   Data and Their Sources

The contemporary nature of the study dictates that it should be based on both primary and secondary sources, but mainly from primary sources through physical contact between the researcher and several random selected people. I was able to identify and include diverse information channels centred on opinion of people, written documents and analysis of events that fitted properly into the political participation in the three focused countries of Nigeria; Kenya and Ghana. However, the primary sources of information and record of events are classified into three levels of:

(1.) Studies on the contemporary structure of Election Campaign in developed democracies

(2.) Studies on the political development in Nigeria, Kenya and Ghana from 2007 to 2012, and

(3.) How Election Campaign Strategy (ECS) of the parties affected democracy in the three countries.

(i)   Studies on contemporary Election Campaign Strategy in the developed democracies.

I developed a chart to enable one to sort the available data on the three focused countries, see Appendix (i) below. I made effort to cite work of diverse scholars, particularly those that have devoted much time to research the traditional and modern election campaign strategy of political parties covering some national election cycles in the developed democracies. The scholars include people like De Vreese, Powell, Jr, Newman Bruce, Robinson Mathew, Kamber, Issenberg, Victor Green, Donald P and Alan S. The analytical summation of the scholars presented ideal as well as practical patterns in election communication in develop democracies. Comparatively, the work attributed to the above mentioned individual scholars contained representative events or noticeable campaign activity of politicians as well as political parties. The references made above are represented in Appendix (i) below, and it includes: Election in USA, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and France.

Analysis of events with political implications both on individual candidates as well as the contesting political parties, particularly as noticed in USA's 2012 presidential Election, Germany's 2013 national parliamentary election, as well as the 2012 France's national election.

The campaign strategy adopted by political parties in a bid to market their programs as well as their nominated candidates for various political positions does provides valuable information needed for a thorough analysis of Election campaign strategy of the three focused countries of Nigeria; Kenya, and Ghana. The discovered election intrigues would be of immense benefit in the assessment of the level of democratic compatibility as well as Election induced violence among contending political parties and between the different political interests in the case study countries.

(ii)   *Studies on the political development in Nigeria, Kenya and Ghana from 2007 to 2012.*

Documents in this category include work of scholars like Chege, Kelly K; Abdoulaye Saine etal, Mutua, Lafarque and Katumangu, Mapau, Mensah, Larry Diamond, Sanusi, Mohammed, Julius Ihonvbere, Nwankwo (See Appendix ii below). All the above mentioned scholars have provided with their various academic works on democracy in Africa, large reservoir of data on Election conduct as well as individual's and Party's electoral activity. The analyses contained in the academic presentation of the above named scholars does provide relevant information on the many topical and disputed political issues among politicians and other political personalities in the case study countries. This include campaign and non campaign events of individuals and political parties prior to democratic elections of 2011 in Nigeria, the 2007 national elections in Kenya, as well as the 2012 democratic election in Ghana.

(iii) How Election campaign strategy of the parties affects democracy in the three countries.

The information channel in this category consists of direct personal contact between the author of this dissertation and several respondents randomly selected from the three Case Study countries. The Strategy adopted by individual candidates and political parties formed the central focus in the interaction between the author and the respondents. Appendix (ii) below is a snapshot of some of the important sources of secondary data, which I have explored in an effort to generate experts' opinions on contemporary democratic elections in some developed democracies. The major intention in this category is to locate the process, relationship between supporters and political parties, the regulative measures put in place to moderate the actions of political parties, candidates and supporters prior to elections. Above all, I want to re-evaluate the consciousness of the people within a defined socio-cultural political framework. The Re-evaluation of the role played by political parties, campaign teams and individual supporters would serve as a tangential factor in providing explicit evidence on how campaign strategy derived from "primordial cleavages" (See Geertz 1963:pp, 109-113) devalued democracy in the focused societies.

	Appendix (i) Important Sources for Secondary Data
1	Fund John (2008), Stealing Elections: How Voter Fraud Threatens Our Democracy, Encounter Books, New York
2	Gerken, Heather K (2009), The Democracy Index: Why Our Election System is Failing and How o Fix It, Princeton University Press, New Jersey
3	Issenberg, Sasha (2012), The Victory Lab: The Secret Science of Winning Campaigns, Crown Publishers, New York
4	Robinson, Mathew (2002), Mobocracy: How the Media's Obsession with Polling Twists the News, Alters Elections, and Undermines Democracy, Prima Lifestyle Publishers, California
5	Grant, David (2012), Why Elections are the Problem and How to Make Democracy Real, Common Lot Production
6	Kamber, Victor (2003), Poison Politics: Are Negative Campaigns Destroying Democracy? Perseus Publishing.
7	Newman, Bruce I (1999), The Mass Marketing of Politics: Democracy in an Age of Manufactured Images, SAGE Publications, Inc
8	Strohmeier, Gerd (2002), Moderne Wahlkämpfe, wie sie geplant, geführt und gewonnen; Nomos Verlaggesellschaft, Baden Baden

Appendix (i) List of Authors on Election and Campaign in democracies.

The above listed scholars have defined and discussed democracy in difference dimensions. The various records on the sustainability and perfection of democratic elections in developed democracies. Indeed, the relevance of extensive campaign drives during elections was to provide one the needed references on how best to organize campaigns. Comparatively, the many developments that defined typical campaign environment in any sub-Sahara African society will be tested through outcome of election campaigns in the developed countries.

	Appendix (ii) Sources of Information for political development in Nigeria, Kenya and Ghana
1	Mutua M (2008), Kenya's quest for democracy: taming the Leviathan. London, Lynne Rienner Publishers
2	Lafarque J and Katumanga M (2008), Post election violence and precarious pacification; in: Lafarque J (2007), the general elections in Kenya 2007. Dar es salaam: Mkuki na Nyota Publishers ltd
3	Maupau, H (2008), Revisiting post election violence; in: Lafarque J(ed), the general election in Kenya 2007 (pp: 187-223), Dar es Salaam, Mkuki na Nyota Publishers ltd
4	Badru, Pade (1998), Imperialism and Ethnic Politics in Nigeria, Trenton New Jersey, and Asmara, Eritrea: Africa World Press
5	Diamond Larry (1988), Class, Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria: the failure of the first republic, Syracuse University Press
6	Nwankwo, A.A (1988), The Power dynamics of the Nigerian Society: People, Politics and Power. Enugu, Fourth Dimension Foundation
7	Owusu, Maxwell (2009), Money and Politics: The challenge of Democracy in Ghana, Institute of Democratic Governance
8	Aye, Joseph (2000), Deepening Democracy in Ghana, Freedom Foundation
9	Boador-Arthur, Kwame (2006), Voting for Democracy in Ghana: the 2004 elections in perspective Vol.1. Freedom Publications, Ghana
10	Sanusi, Olatunde Samson (2013), Democracy in Africa: Nigeria, Kenya and Ghana Case Study, LAP Lambert Academic Publishing

Appendix (ii) showing some selected works on democracy in Nigeria, Kenya and Ghana.

Election campaign strategy has never been an issue of academic discussion in several of the democracy aspiring countries in sub-Sahara Africa; hence, the need to develop mechanisms that can help end violence attributed to election loss. The research study is one among those desired measures that can deepen democracy in sub-Sahara Africa.

The scholars are picked from the three countries under my focus. Their individual academic works will help me to discover more facts and opinions from another perspective. Above all, campaign strategy as a possible factor in post-election violence in the selected case study countries has continued to escape scientific recognition of several scholars.

2.6.1)   Process of Data Collection

As a topic, which derives its strength from events surrounding conduct of democratic elections, the method adopted in the source for reliable pieces of information became dominantly that of interpersonal communication. Despite the fact that national elections in the case study countries have been for many years dented by violence associated to several pre-election political contrived accusations and sentiments weaved around primordial cleavages, the academic community consciously or unconsciously ignored the development. In the absence of previous academic work with direct relation to democratic election induced violence in any of the Sub-Sahara Africa countries, especially from the three countries used as case study, collection of already processed news materials became a Herculean task. The process does involve organized interviews with experts in democratic elections in the three selected countries, as well as politicians and non politicians.

Another source of information for this Study was through Focus-group interviews. This particular aspect of Information generation was done in two phases. The first phase was with randomly selected people on the street in several cities in the three case study countries. It was very easy to find people willing not only to participate in the discourse but ready to argue out their positions with regard to effects from Campaign Strategy and Election Violence. I was able to conduct focus-group interviews in Lagos, Abuja; Nairobi, Mombasa; Accra and Kumasi and Tema, all located within the three case study countries of Nigeria, Kenya and Ghana. I was able to conduct also another focus-group interview amongst the ordinary people on the street. I had engaged also the locals in the streets and slums in the cities in a bid to get better and comprehensive feeling of the greater part of the population in each country.

It was very easy to find people who showed interest in the topic of the research and so many people wanted to participate in the debate. The inter-personal direct communication phase was not only with literates but it does involve also non literates. It had provided me with the avenue to compare and contrast the contribution of the literates and non literates.

I was equally able to distribute prepared Questionnaires to the public in some selected cities in Nigeria (Owerri, Port-Harcourt, Enugu, Lagos, Abuja); Kenya: (Nairobi); Ghana: (Accra-Legon) in an attempt to generate more unconscious Information from the public. The Questionnaire was structured in a simple format, that it enabled the respondents to grasp the overall intention of the research topic without external assistance. The questions were basically structured to eliminate any trace of partisanship from the researcher and to remove ambiguity that is usually traced to structured questions of this nature. The questions were open-ended as well as close ended questions (See Appendix (iii – xiii) in the Annexure

Chapter 3

3).   Elections and Campaigns

One among the fundamental intentions of campaign during elections is to educate the voting public about the various programs of intent being promoted by the contesting candidates and political parties. Indeed, an election campaign does provide the public platforms for political participation. As political actors and commentators have argued, campaigning in any democratic elections does require mobilization strategy. In this regard scholars like Lees-Marshment argued that "strategy is organic; it involves out of different processes and from different groups of people" (See Lees-Marshment, 2011, p. 53). Indeed, as a fundamental factor in democratic processes, an election situation can give voters the opportunity to reassess their political environment and make decisions accordingly. Such evaluation of electoral conditions and individual policy anticipation of voters keyed ideally into Christopher Wlezien's argument. According to Christopher Wlezien in his proposition on the voter-political actors' electoral relation, whereby he noted that,

> "The more we pay attention, of course, the more we may take stock of the government and its policies. We may reconsider our issue positions and possibly adopt new ones; we may even revisit our attachments to political actors or broader political system itself" (See Wlezien in LeDuc, Niemi and Norris, 2010, p. 98).

Even scholars like Farrell and Schmitt-Beck in their proposition argued in support of Wlezien's position. Election provides opportunity and platform where political actors and also the voters engaged each other in policy debate, performance evaluation and exchange possibilities. It is the belief of Farrell and Schmitt-Beck that Campaign during election make it possible for Voters and political actors to meet and evaluate performance for support previously sought and given. Both scholars had noted that,

> "Much like commercial producers in the market place, political actors campaign to remain or become visible in an ever more crowded public space" (See Schmitt-Beck and Farrell, 2002, p. 12).

An Election does demand that interested candidates market their programs to the public whose interest they aspire to serve and protect (See figure 3.1 below). In many democracies, both developed and those on the verge of attaining develop status, campaign by parties and contestants is used to raise the level of active public participation during elections. Consequently, I hold the belief that campaign strategies would continue to determine the state of democratization in democracy aspiring societies. In light of the above, Election campaign as designed and structured would always appeal to both supporters and opponents through the provision of platform for rational discourse and value argument on what is best for the society.

Figure 3.1 showing the link between Political Actors, Policy Intents and Voters.

Democratic election as a legitimacy instrument for recruitment into public Institutions can be argued to require the involvement of active as well as passive participants. Consequently, there abound to be several expressive factors and also policy alternatives for considerations. Several scholars have expressed divergent opinions about democracy and elections. According to Powell, Jr,

"The competitive electoral contest with several political parties organizing the alternatives that face the voters is the identifying property of the contemporary democratic process"

(Powell, Jr. 2000, p. 3).

The above position as expressed by Powell, Jr. does suggest that people are made to take part in elections on the basis of choosing policymakers with regard to societal needs. Since election is a prerequisite for democracy legitimacy, it does require that recruitment into the Institutions of democracy must be done through elections. Then, if the above is the case, interested and qualified individuals must present themselves to the voters for public evaluations through campaigns. Indeed, the public evaluation of actors and platforms through campaigns does support the argument advanced by Alexander who had in his study noted that,

> "The process and regulative power given to the public sphere through voting franchise, positioned voters as the ultimate decider in who is to be elected and who to be rejected"
>
> (See Alexander, 2006).

Indeed, the process of electing policy-makers as linked to election campaign, had confirmed the argument that election is a strong instrument of democracy. Based on the above positions, one might be right to agree with Alexander that,

> "Elections and campaigns grant voters regulative influence in policy making process"
>
> (See Alexander, Jeffrey C. 2006).

In essence, campaigning for vote gives the electorate opportunity to appraise the contending views and alternative options presented by political parties and politicians during elections. According to Schmitt-Beck and Farrell,

> "Campaigns also entail "bottom-up" components, since political actors constantly seek feedback by monitoring their target audiences in order to assess whether their strategies are working"
>
> (See Schmitt-Beck and Farrell, 2002: p. 5).

In several democratic states, especially democracy aspiring countries in sub-Sahara Africa, election campaign provides political parties and politicians the opportunity to talk directly to the voting public and by extension intimate the public about their plans for the society. Besides, election can offer opposing political parties the avenue to project their argument on how best they intend to pursue many of the problems in their communities better than the party and government in power.

3.1).   Argument for modified Election Campaign Models

As I have indicated previously, the conversion of individual political interest into group's interest often heightened tension in the polity. The penchant for the use of sentiments that were built on primordial cleavages during election campaigns by political parties and political interest groups make democratic election a contentious adventure in several divided societies. According to Diamond, and Plattner,

"Democracy as an idea is doing well in Africa, there is sufficient demand; it is the supply that remains uncertain. Although, an overwhelming majority of Africans prefer competitive elections, only minorities believe that elections will actually remove leaders from office"

(See Diamond and Plattner, 2010: p, xvi).

Also, Christopher Wlezien in his assessment and argument about election and public participation process was of the belief that not only does election provides scholars the opportunity to look into voter-actor relationship, but to evaluate performance card of each previously elected officials. He had noted in his study as he asserted that,

"Those who study elections want to know the extent to which campaigns influence who gets elected"

(See Wlezien, 2014, In: LeDuc, Niemi and Norris, 2014: p. 76).

But in reference to the position and argument as was made by Wlezien, Powell, Jr., Diamond and Plattner, which I have enunciated above, the need for modified election campaign in some societies becomes more necessity imperative, especially when one considers the social and ethnic composition of several developing countries. Indeed, if one evaluates also the position and argument of Arthur Lewis (1965) who was one among the non African scholars believed that democracy and democratic election cannot be so viewed in the same light as elections in the western countries. Lewis had argued that,

"Plurality is the principal political problem of most of the new states created in the twentieth century"

(See Arthur Lewis, 1965, pp: 66)

Of course, Lewis attempt was to establish a connection between societies, people, authority and democratic governance. Indeed, Lewis was convinced that the argument as advanced by some scholars, who argued for western type democracy in the sub-Saharan Africa societies, cannot be realized. Nevertheless, Lewis position cannot be separated from the fact that sub-Sahara Africa societies are heterogeneous, unlike the western European societies that are essentially monolithic in structure and social organization. The difference as regard to heterogeneity and homogeneity convinced Arthur Lewis to argue that most of the societies in sub-Sahara Africa include,

"People who differ from each other in language or tribe or religion or race; some of these groups live side by side in a long tradition of mutual hostility, restrained in the past only by a neutral imperial power"

(See Arthur Lewis, 1965: p, 66).

However, democratization process through organized election cannot be possible in isolation of societal structures. So, in the argument as advanced by Arthur Lewis (1965) democracy cannot be separated from society, and therefore, election cannot as well be separated from campaign through the mobilization of eligible persons. Therefore, election as instrument of democracy is centered on policy marketing through public sensitization. Since campaign is fundamentally relevant in modern democratization process, scholars have been consistent in the study of elections. In that light, Christopher Wlezien in his attempt to explore more on the net effects of campaigns in modern democracy asserted that,

"Election campaigns clearly have become more visible over time. Money flows more freely. Parties and campaigns rely more and more on pollsters to engineer and reengineer tactics and strategies. The use of advertising has exploded. Internet fundraising and communications have too"

(See Wlezien, 2014, In: LeDuc, Niemi and Norris, 2014, p. 85).

Borrowing from Wlezien argument as I have stated above, electoral messages and campaign strategies in some societies need to assume a more deliberative pattern grounded on issues, more than the existing pattern propelled by over dependence on contrived platforms built on group survival concept. As LeDuc and Niemi in their contribution on the issue of voting behavior, choice and context, noted that,

"The context within which voters act varies along several dimensions- one of the most important concerns the nature of the choices available, which can vary both qualitatively and quantitatively"

(See LeDuc, Niemi and Norris, 2014, p. 133).

In what seems to be a concluded discourse in developed democracies, economic policies, energy policy plans and social benefits usually dominate issues in party election campaign messages. But, in several developing democracies, especially in ethnicity divided societies, the use of change as an electoral slogan is interpreted differently, and therefore, conveys different meanings to voters. In that circumstance, the interpretation becomes dangerous, as reception of the message is dependent on the message dispenser and the recipient communities. On the account of the above discourse, LeDuc and Niemi cited the argument of Lipset and Rokkan (1967) where they had argued that,

"Elections are not a blank slate, but rather a kind of tapestry of old and new. Electorates change, but they do so slowly, as new voters enter the electorates, and the processes of generational replacement and other demographic factors press forward. While new issues and problems enter the political arena from time to time, older conceptions, alignments or divisions remain, or fade away only slowly"

(Cited in Leduc, Niemi and Norris, 2014, p. 140).

Although, depending on the society, voters are want to have varieties of needs and thus, the quantitative or qualitative nature of factors determine to large extent, the direction of the electorates. As LeDuc and Niemi in their proposition about voters behavior noted that,

"Choice itself is a function of the opinions that voters hold – about parties, candidates, issues and the myriad factors to which citizens are exposed over the course of an election campaign"

(See LeDuc and Niemi, 2014, p. 141).

Aside LeDuc and Niemi argument, other scholars like Evans and Tilley argued also that several voters are mostly interested in issues that concerned,

> "The inequality, re-distribution, and the unfettered operation of the free market - At one end of the continuum is a perception of unjust inequality and commitment to redistribution, with the government as a key agent of redistribution, and at the other, an endorsement of existing inequalities and rejection of the need for government intervention to ameliorate them"

<div align="right">(See Evans and Tilley, 2013, p. 91).</div>

But in several sub-Sahara Africa societies, the reverse is the case. As was methodically argued by Arthur Lewis in his study about some sub-Sahara African states, whereby he noted that,

> "No country in West Africa is homogeneous. Each consists of several tribes, speaking several languages. Each includes some Muslims, some Christians and adherents of African religions. In a few cases the tribes are historically hostile to each other; the larger and better organized have fought and enslaved their weaker neighbors, and traditional animosities are not entirely forgiven"

<div align="right">(See Arthur Lewis, 1965, p. 24).</div>

As an attempt to discover factors I believed were fundamentally responsible for the violence, which erupted in the case study countries during the focused presidential elections, I find it necessary to look at some normative beliefs. Indeed, the normative beliefs, which have centered on Inter-ethnic grievances among the several ethnic nationalities in the countries. Obviously, the pre-independence inter-ethnic wars, post-independence political competition, and economic domination were some of the fundamental issues in the midst of several conflicts in the countries. I am well convinced that they were factors on which issues were often anchored, evaluated and promoted by interest groups, political parties and political actors during elections.

As an attempt to seek for comprehensive knowledge on how the mobilization strategy used by political actors have created excessive political rancor in the societies, it is important to evaluate the methods exploited by political actors in the three focused election campaign periods. It is important for one to find out, if, and how the political actors across board, unduly and excessively exploited the existing system in place of campaign methodology, which could have thrived on policy debate and, on ideology based competition.

Nevertheless, the intention here is to reduce the usual tension and conflict that traditionally accompanied election campaigns in several divided societies, especially in sub-Sahara Africa. By adopting a more technology driven campaign calls, messages could become more focused and targeted. Obviously, the chances of two opposing campaign teams meeting on the campaign trail would be drastically minimized. Since most candidates and political parties in sub-Sahara Africa democracies are known to depend largely in the use of primordial cleavages for the promotion of electoral positions in the polity, the adoption of modern communication channels in the dissemination of campaign messages would eliminate such contrived messages in the political arena. On the economic and social necessities that are tangential factors in elections, campaigns would reflect and focus more on the inherent societal needs. The development of a media driven campaign, anchored on societal issues, could encourage healthy political competition among contenders. However, when new method of campaign is developed, chances are that, opportunity to engage touts and social miscreants during elections would be discouraged. Normatively, election campaigns in divided societies can be crisis prone, because, campaign messages are programmed not to revolve around the four factors as shown in figure 3.2 below; but are often propagated to attract political miscreants, and election results prone to violence no matter the outcome.

Figure 3.2 showing the three fundamental factors needed for violence free Campaign Rallies.

Of course, there are societies where negative campaigns or conflict influenced factors are not tolerated or acceptable. Although, election campaign strategy is a field very difficult to measured, but as Lees-Marshment admitted that,

"Strategy formulation involves a range of factors, including the nature of the market, history, culture and governance, economic and political principles, the media, the product, the grassroots, polling and image"

(See Lees-Marshment, 2011, p. 53).

There are other scholars who had equally believed in the proposition of Lees-Marhsment on the factors that combined to influence strategy formulation, especially with regard to public mass mobilization. Scholars like Baines and Lynch (2005, p. 2) in their study argued also about strategy factors. Even scholars like Newman (1994), as well as Medvic (2006, pp. 20 – 22) in their various arguments aligned with Lees-Marshment position. Christopher Wlezien in his contribution on modern democratic elections and factors that defined contemporary election campaigns argued that,

"Campaigns are much more capital intensive, where professionals manage things and communication with voters is highly mediated"

(See Wlezien, 2010, In: LeDuc, Niemi and Norris, 2010, p, 103).

In the light of the above arguments, it has become important to seek for comprehensive and innovative means that could encourage modernization of campaign processes in countries seeking democratization in sub-Sahara Africa. I want to agree with the notion that primordial loyalty is a fundamental aspect in group's identity, especially with regard to political relevance of groups in a divided society. Even in the opinion of Lucian W. Pye who argued that,

"The fundamental framework of non-Western politics is a communal one and all political behavior is strongly colored by consideration of communal identification"

(See Pye, 1958: quoted in Journal of Politics, 20, no, 3, p. 469).

Indeed, it is also the opinion of Geertz that primordial loyalty is a fundamental aspect in group evolution. Even though, modern society changes with varying phenomenal structural developments, human culture and the case for legitimacy right of groups in societies does not leave much space for cultural compromise among nationalities. So, I am convinced that Clifford Geertz was correct when he decided in his argument to base primordial loyalty on,

"Language, religion, custom, region, race or assumed blood ties"

(See Clifford Geertz, 1963: pp, 109-113).

In the light of the above opinions, the need for campaign model with less reliance on sectional sentiments does become a necessity imperative. Taking into account the opinions as expressed by Pye, Geertz, and Lijphart on the effects of primordial loyalty

on societies, it is evident that the need for a modified campaign model in several of the developing democracies cannot be denied. Representative democracy does require elections, and an election in itself does require moderated but competitive campaign by all the contending parties and candidates. In her contribution to the debate Verba argued that,

"Political participation affords citizens in a democracy an opportunity to communicate information to government officials about their concerns and preferences and to put pressure on them to respond"

(See Verba et al. 1995, p. 37).

Indeed, Marc Hooghe was also of the same opinion with the position projected by Verba. Both Hooghe and Verba had believed that citizens are stakeholders in the processes of governance, especially in agenda setting and policy implementation monitoring. Of course, campaigning is an aspect in electoral participation. This informed the reason Marc Hooghe said that "participation can be seen as a flow of information from the citizens to public officials (See LeDuc, Niemi and Norris, 2014, p. 60).

Consequently, campaigns during elections must be seen as a meeting-point between office seeking individuals and registered voters on one hand, and between political parties and policy needs of voters on another hand. However, in much of the divided societies, the desire to control better part of the institutions of democratic authority, compel political actors to result to the use of "primordial loyalty" (See Arend Lipjhart (1977: pp, 16-18), as electoral instrument to achieve their objectives. In essence, an election can become contentious, because, those participating in the process do want it that way and not necessarily because voters demanded for chaotic campaign process.

In the more developed democracies, campaigns are programmed based on positions and policy issues on economy as well as social necessities. Indeed, the social character in the developed societies are known to be factors, which often compel political parties and organizations to embark on the use of internet and other

electronic driven communication channels to reach their targeted voter communities. According to Wlezien,

> "The widespread use of cable and satellite television programming through the 1980s and the 1990s was a significant catalyst for more powerful changes. The proliferation of computers and the internet was too. With this technology it became possible to reach specific audiences at home"

<div align="right">(See Wlezien, In: LeDuc, Niemi and Norris, 2014, pp. 79-82).</div>

In appraising the effects of modern campaigning, Farrell and Schmitt-Beck revealed that modern campaigns is sophisticated because,

> "Services of specialist agencies and campaign consultants are engaged; candidates are sent on television training courses and are suitably color-coded; glossy literature, advertisements of many forms and items of campaign gimmickry are produced"

<div align="right">(See Farrell and Schmitt-Beck, 2002: p.1).</div>

Lees-Marshment was able to itemize several factors in her argument on electoral communication and campaigns, which she does believe impacted modern election campaigns (See Lees-Marshment, 2011: p, 138-154). In the developed democracies of USA, Germany, UK and France as well as other existing democratic societies, the use of technology inputs have tremendously helped to bring policy positions of different political parties and candidates closer to voters. According to Farrell and Schmitt-Beck,

> "Direct mail, telephone banks, inexpensive computer technology, the internet, cable, satellite and digital television, are just a few example of the new means of targeted two-way communications"

<div align="right">(See Farrell and Schmitt-Beck, 2002. p.12).</div>

Voters could easily make political decisions based on the information generated from any of the technology powered election campaign platforms as well as through other electronic communication mediums. The adoption of electronic airwaves for election campaigns had created room for space competition among political parties in societies with developed technology platforms. Indeed, several technology induced election communication mediums have enabled the voters to individually analyze marketed policy positions without a direct contact with contesting politicians or their agents. Politicians in many developed democracies, especially North America and Western Europe, have learned to anchor their campaigns on social media platforms. Technology propelled social media platforms, as De Vreese argued,

"Only a minority of most electorates directly interacts with candidates during a campaign, though new techniques and technologies increase the possibility for personalized contact"

(See De Vreese, In: LeDuc, Niemi and Norris, 2010, p. 119).

3.2). Argument for Society Induced Election Campaign Factors

Improvement in technology based communication mediums may have positive or negative impact on campaign success of political parties and candidates in many developed democracies, but the same cannot be said about several democracy aspiring societies in sub-Sahara Africa.   Unlike the situation in developed democracies of Western Europe and North America, election campaign strategies are chiefly anchored on old campaign mechanisms, mainly through public rallies, direct personal interaction. According to Christopher Wlezien,

"Campaigning largely involved direct interactions between campaigners and voters. Now, campaigns are much more capital-intensive, where professionals manage things and communication with voters is highly mediated"

(See Wlezien, in: LeDuc, Niemi and Norris, 2010, p. 103).

However, modern campaign communication is much more possible in a monolithic society, especially on campaign message and delivery strategy. I want to make the above argument based on the position of Clifford Geertz with regard to identity discourse premised on "primordial loyalty"(See Clifford Geertz, 1963, pp. 109 – 113), as well as what Lucian W. Pye called "communal identification"(See Lucian W. Pye, 1958, p. 469). In fact, the discourse on identity cannot be sorely discussed using Geertz's and Pye's argument alone. Arthur Lewis in his analysis of politics in West Africa had argued vehemently that,

"No country in West Africa is homogeneous. Each consists of several tribes, speaking several languages. Each includes some Muslims, some Christians and adherents of African religions"

(See Arthur Lewis, 1965, p. 24).

Consequently, issues such as economy, employment, taxation, energy and healthcare services (See figure 3.3 below) cannot win elections in several societies in sub-Sahara Africa. In the light of the above enunciated positions, I want to agree that election campaign strategies in sub-Sahara Africa democracies do require modification.

Structural	Political	Election Campaign
• Structural disadvantaged • numerical strenght • forced minority	• exclusion • numerical strength • power conspiracy • equality and fairness	• Social Solidarity • Religious solidarity • Ethno-tribal solidarity • Political Ideology

Figure 3.3 showing determinants of campaign message structures in democracy.

In many of the countries in sub-Sahara Africa with minimal democracy presence, election campaign is usually dominated by "ethnic legitimacy rights" claim factors (See Horowitz, 2000, pp: 181 – 189), Geertz, 1963, pp, 109-113) among the various groups in the countries. Unfortunately, and as Lucian W. Pye noted, politicians often exploit this very question of "communal identification" (See Pye, 1958, p. 469), and use it as a campaign tool to draw electoral sympathy from their various ethnic and tribal affiliations. Drawing support from the structural imbalance in a country, particularly in plural societies, where citizenship right of a person is in question, does make campaign message and strategies society defined.

This argument is derived from the fact that many political parties have almost always recorded high political patronage from areas and ethnic regions of candidates and from among the party's influential members.

Undoubtedly, the artificial structural imbalance, as well as the numerical superiority inherent in the systems can build up majority and minority political sentiment in the society. In essence, those forced into political minority status becomes the apostle of politics of solidarity incentive. Since, democratic politics is a game of "inclusion and exclusion"; therefore, candidates and political parties in plural societies are compelled by systemic pressures to prioritize their campaign message. Put differently; people classify political parties as belonging to certain ethnic group or dominated by people from a particular section in the country[1]. In most developing democracies, candidates and political parties have always structured their campaigns in the line of identity preservation. Consequently, ethnic identities can use primordial factors to build electoral solidarity. I want to look also into the proposition made by Donald L. Horowitz, where he argued that,

> "Ethnic parties thus derive from two sources: the internal imperatives of the ethnic group as a community and external imperatives of the ethnic group, in relation to others as the incipient whole community"

> (See Donald L. Horowitz, 2000, p. 294)

As argued by Horowitz, while he was referencing Owusu in the case of previous elections in Ghana,

> "Parties came to be identified with ethnic groups, the Progress Party with the Brong, Ashanti, Akim, and other Akan-speakers; the National Alliance of Liberals, with the Ewe and Krobo"

> (See Donald L. Horowitz, 2000, pp. 319 – 324).

_____

1). Examples can be seen from APC, APGA in Nigeria and ODM, PNU in Kenya as well as NPP, NDC in Ghana.

Obviously, voters support during elections is dependent on survival concern of the various ethnic nationalities and are clearly marked out by identity question. In essence, factors such as social solidarity, religious solidarity as well as ethno-regional solidarity are known to have combination effects to shape election campaign strategies in many plural democracies, especially in sub-Sahara Africa. This position of argument is manifested in political parties and candidates approach to campaign messages. The consequential effect is found in "Change mantra", and "It is our turn to rule" campaign sentiment. These election campaign themes were widely publicized in both Nigeria and Kenya[2]. Put differently, in the order of campaign dominated factors, communal identification is exploited by candidates and groups. In democratic Election campaigns, presidential or parliamentary, diversion or replacement of policy issues by either candidates or political parties with defeatist survival mechanism has made democratic legitimacy suspicious and authority acquired dubious.

Ordinarily, campaign strategists in more developed democracies have often engaged in negative campaigns, name calling and mudslinging, use of Spin-doctors, while election campaign teams in sub-Sahara Africa have thrived extensively in "primordial loyalty" branding or what Lijphart called "communal identification"[3] to source for votes. The mistrust, which accompanies primordial colored campaign models, can create opportunity for political tensions in the various democratic environments.

This outcome is much evident in several democracy aspiring societies in sub-Sahara Africa. Indeed, the operational and functional pattern of these contrived campaign inputs, as manifested through election campaign outputs, is explicitly detailed in Part two and three and how each of the inputs deployed affected election campaigns in the case study countries.

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2). See Arend Lijphart, "Religious vs. Linguistics vs. Class Voting; The "Crucial Experiment" of Comparing Belgium, Canada, South Africa, and Switzerland," American Political Science Review, 73, 1979, pp, 442-458

3). See Arend Lijphart (1977, pp, 16-17), Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration, Yale University Press. Lucian W. Pye (1958, p, 469), "The Non – Western Political Process, "Journal of Politics, 20, no, 3. Clifford Geertz (1963, pp, 109 – 113), "The integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States," in Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa, ed. Clifford Geertz, New York, Free Press

Again, several election campaign strategists in sub-Sahara Africa had believed that the best option to generate votes and public approval is to adopt "ethnic solidarity" driven sentiments and manipulate certain circumstances as witnessed in Nigeria during 2011 presidential election, as well as in Kenya's 2007 presidential election[5]. Therefore, to institutionalize campaign process in distress societies, there is the need to build up new thinking, which can be anchored on the importance of technology, as a necessity to eliminate "communal identification" factors during elections.

3.2.1).   Election Campaign: Electoral Market as a Factor

Considering the fundamental issues that propel campaigns during democratic elections, it is pertinent to look critically at the social configuration of societies. As one attempts to dissect the electoral market, it is pertinent that one must consider the opinion and position taken by other scholars about the structure of a society. In this regard, I want to quickly look into the argument of Seymour Martin Lipset where he said that,

> "The greater the changes in the structure of the society or organization that a governing group is attempting to introduce, the more likely the leadership is to desire and even require a high level of participation by its citizens or members"

<div align="right">(See Seymour Martin Lipset, 1963, p.180)</div>

In the light of the above, campaign during elections becomes streamlined to reflect the society's social characteristics. In support of the above assertion, political parties and candidates in developed democracies have always organized their campaigns to attract the middle class. The above situation does correspond with Lipset (1963) argument that,

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5). See BABS IWALEWA (2011.02.13), Northern Consensus candidate and 2011 PDP presidential primary, http://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/02/aftermath-of-pdp-primaries. The Nigerian Voice (TNV-2012), Ghana Elections 2012, who wins and Why? www.thewillnigeria.com/2012.12.07/ . Joe Kihara Munugu wrote: Who Caused Kenya's 2007 Post Election Violence & Why? By Paul N. Njoroge: Nairobi, Kenya: March 30, 2011/ http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/?articleID=2000095111/08/10/2013

"Even if people are not aware of a personal stake in the electoral decision, they may still be induced to vote by social pressures and inner feelings of social obligation"

(See Seymour Martin Lipset, 1963, p, 200).

There are also several other scholars of democracy and election who aligned themselves with the position taken by Lipset as I have cited above. Indeed, Christopher Wlezien is one among those scholars who presented his argument on the issue of voters and electoral decisions. Of course, Wlezien in his argument, believed that,

"The more people pay attention, of course, the more they may take stock of the government and its policies. They may reconsider their issue positions and possibly adopt new ones. They may even revisit their attachments to political actors, such as political parties or the broader political system itself"

(See Christopher Wlezien, In: LeDuc, Niemi and Norris 2014, p.76).

Considering the structure of electoral markets and the recurrent issues, which continually shaped elections, one may look also into the opinion of Dalton (2010). Dalton in his argument noted that,

"Issues such as environmental protection, social equality, self-expression, and lifestyle choices typify this new issues agenda"

(See Dalton in: LeDuc, Niemi, Norris, 2010, p. 150).

As noted previously, economic situation and social benefit preferences of voters in advanced democracies influenced largely outcome of elections. However, voters' electoral scale of preference and choices made can be directly connected to options in the electoral market. Participants in the electoral market have often provided different options and outcomes during elections. According to Lipset,

"Even if people are not aware of a personal stake in the electoral decision, they may still be induced to vote by social pressures and inner feelings of social obligation"

(See Seymour Martin Lipset, 1963, p, 200).

In view of the above assertion, one would but agree that combination of factors in the electoral market, irrespective of political orientation, could compel voters to re-examine candidate preferences and party ideological positions. Such appraisals are done usually in relation to social pressures in the polity, which have often influenced choices about the party or candidate to vote during elections. In support of the above statement, Dalton argued that,

"If parties offer clear Left-Right choices, then voters can more easily transfer their orientations into party choices"

(See Dalton, In: LeDuc, Niemi and Norris (eds), 2010, p, 163).

In several democracy aspiring societies in sub-Sahara Africa, campaign issues are based on what Clifford Geertz (1963, pp. 109 – 113) called "primordial loyalties", or as in Lucian W. Pye's (1958, p. 469) "communal identification" concept, but in contrast to the above situation, Dalton in his opinion believed that,

"Large part of the twentieth century the economic competition between social classes seemed to dominate politics in many Western democracies"

(See Dalton, In: LeDuc, Niemi and Norris (eds), 2010, p. 143).

Individuals and groups in western democracies are known to have depended largely on social pressures to make electoral choices. Consequently, the policy and ideological positions, which political parties are identified with, are known to have determined to large extent voters preferences. In essence, electoral market and voters in the developed democracies are faced with two ideological policy positions, either to accept the argument of those parties on the Left of the continuum or to buy into the position of the parties and candidates on the Right of the political continuum. In the light of the above discussed situations in the electoral market, the practical effects can be seen in table 3.1 below. Political campaigners in the electoral market were found to have assumed in my findings two dimensional approaches, namely; policy and solidarity variables.

The Electoral Market	
Policy variables	Solidarity variables
- Economic hardship - Energy policy - Taxation - Health-care Services	- Social exclusion - Political exclusion - Economic exclusion - Unemployment

Table 3.1 showing Electoral market and Campaign methods.

As social pressure drives electoral decisions in the developed democracies, so does identity legitimacy rights determine in societies divided by Inter-ethnic grievances, the electoral decisions of voters based on ideological loyalty. Even in the opinion of Seymour Martin Lipset, whereby he argued that,

"A society in which a large proportion of the population is outside the political arena is potentially more explosive than one in which most citizens are regularly involve in activities which give them some sense of participation in decisions making which affect their lives"

(See Seymour Martin Lipset, 1963, p. 180).

It implies that the condition in the electoral arena is unknown to various campaigners, because, the preferences and choices of the voters is not explicitly known. Since the polity is not evenly structured, the level of participation in the election can become subject of speculation. More so, the reason for participation or non participation in an election is individually determined. As Seymour Lipset in his quote about the 1953 German Bureau for Statistics report asserted,

"Male voting in Germany increased with education and with income. Among farm owners and the self-employed 90 percent voted in the previous election. The lower-paid among manual workers voted at a 78 percent rate. Within each occupational category, the better paid voted more. Also, when the workers were considered by level of skill, fewer of the unskilled than the skilled and semi-skilled voted"

(Quoted in Seymour Martin Lipset, 1963, p. 183).

The above statement from Dalton established that campaigns are subject to variations in the electoral market. Conversely, voters could rationally structure their electoral preferences and choices either on the premise of material variables or solidarity variables as pictured in table 3.1 above. As indicated in table 3.1 above, voters whose readiness to participate in elections is predicated on the Energy policy plan, Job creation measures, Tax policy as well as quality and affordable Health-care services of competing political parties, would ordinarily have to depend heavily on the campaign message and strategies adopted by the parties and candidates. Obviously, the ability of the competing political parties and candidates to manipulate or influence the electoral market can only be dependent on the preferences and choices of voters, whose concern is either one or all of the factors captured in table 3.1 above.

If one can look further into the opinion of Dalton, one would observe his fight about the necessity of divergent opinions, and like he rightly asserted, and as I quoted below,

"Democracy should be a competition between different worldviews or ideologies that address societal needs. Social Democrats, if elected, approach public policy with a different framework than Christian Democrats. Liberals have a different *Weltanschauung* than Green parties. And often the reporting on elections stresses the competition between liberal views and conservative views, Left versus Right, or other ideological frameworks"

(See Dalton, In: LeDuc, Niemi and Norris (eds), 2010, p. 143).

Conversely, electoral markets could also be influenced by factors premised on solidarity variables. While elaborating on the voting character of voters in the electoral market, Donald L. Horowitz noted that,

"Parties came to be identified with ethnic groups, the Progress Party with Brong, Ashanti, Akim, and other Akan speakers; the National Alliance of Liberals, with Ewe and Krobo. The allegiance of the Northerners was split between the two parties. The PP obtained 85 percent or more of the popular vote in the Akan heartland; much of the NAL vote there was accounted for by the presence of Ewe or Northerners resident in Akan areas. The NAL, for its part, received overwhelming majorities in Ewe areas"

(See Donald L. Horowitz, 2000, p. 323)

In essence, one could argue that the electoral market is filled with uncertainty, as Campaign teams, candidates and political parties have no ready-made knowledge how voters would react to various policy statements during elections.

3.2.1.1).   Potential Voters and Election Campaign

In their argument why campaign is important in democratic elections, Schmitt-Beck and Farrell noted that,

> "Campaigns occur not only in the political realm; they are increasingly important in all walks of life: for instance, a company mounts an advertising campaign to promote its product; a charity seeks to raise money for an overseas aid program; a city engages in 'city marketing' in order to attract investors and new businesses"

> (See Schmitt-Beck and Farrell, 2002, p. 3).

As the fundamental factor in democracy and democratization process, voters alone decide who wins and who loses in an election contest. Irrespective of society's demography and structure, voters can be divided into three types of voters; namely, party's traditional supporters, migrant voters (Voters who crossed over to vote for a candidate in another party) and of course Non-align voters (people without any allegiance or affiliation to a particular political party). In view of the above voter classification, I do hold the belief that potential voters need to be further identified based on ideological and philosophical orientations as tabulated in table 3.2 below. According to Seymour Martin Lipset,

> "In all democratic nations, including the United States, there has been a correlation between socioeconomic status and political beliefs and voting. The less privileged have supported parties that stood for greater equality and welfare protection, through government intervention, against the strain of a free enterprise economy….this pattern has changed in recent decades"

> (See Seymour Martin Lipset, 1991, p. 208).

Indeed, there are many scholars who hold the same opinion with Lipset, people such like Giedo Jansen, Geoffrey Evans and Nan Dirk De Graaf, (See Jansen, Evans and De Graaf, 2013, p. 46). Essentially, potential voters could be dissuaded ideologically to center their preference on ideal solution mechanism promoted by each party and candidate. Furthermore, I have reviewed critically, the argument of Dalton in relation

to election, ideological or policy positions represented by political parties and individuals; I did discover that his argument is applicable or functional only in the developed democracies. He had argued as I have cited below that,

> "Voters are judging parties on their economic achievements, but these judgments are not as firmly based on class or social groups' positions as in the past"

(See Dalton, 2010, p. 161).

But since democratic space is premised in each society under conservative-liberal realm, then debate over political contestation can ultimately become ideology driving. Based on the above assertion by Dalton (2010), voters are made to structure their preferences and choices under the two ideological realms of conservatism and liberalism. Conversely, political parties and candidates are known to often engage in mediated communication with the primary aim to convince voters to key into their policy plans during elections. As noted in table 3.2 below, I have chosen to structure potential voters into two ideological segments.

Potential Voters and Campaign	
Conservative	Liberal/Progressive
- Utra-religious voters - Investors - Elderly voters - High income earners - Family political history	- Social activists - Less religious leaning voters - Salary based voters - Low and middle income voters - Family political history

Table 3.2 showing potential voters and Campaign message formulation.

Considering the argument and position of scholars like Dalton; Schmitt-beck and Farrell, I hold the belief that potential voters in every democratic society belonged to different social constituencies. In table 3.2 above, religion inclined voters in most democratic societies are known to be conservative leaning voters, while liberal leaning voters exhibit fairly several identities. According to Seymour Martin Lipset,

"Such terms as "left", "liberal," and "progressive," and their opposites, "right," "conservative," and "reactionary," have been defined on the basis of many different issues; political democracy versus monarchy, the free market system versus traditional economic restrictions, secularism versus clericalism, agrarian reform versus landlordism and urban exploitation of the countryside, social reform versus laissez-faire, socialism versus capitalism"

(See Seymour Martin Lipset, 1963, p. 223).

When considered explicitly, one would observe that, decision to vote is moderated and influenced by policy position of political parties and candidates. In the opinion of Strömbäck (2010, p. 23),

"Within the electoral arena the most important decision makers are the voters, which decide which party or candidate to support"

(See Strömbäck, 2010, p. 23).

In relation to the above assertion by Strömbäck, campaign teams cannot claim to have explicit knowledge about the volume of active voters in the electoral market during elections. Furthermore, the opinion of Marc Hooghe can be assumed to support the argument that the exact volume of voters in a given polity is just hypothetical. Hooghe asserted that,

"For the vast majority of citizens, political participation remains limited to taking part in elections. In most democratic systems, well over two-thirds of all eligible citizens take part in elections and no other act of political participation is practiced so frequently"

(See Hooghe, 2014, p. 61).

However, potential voters in any democratic election could swing to either sides of the ideological continuum. Nevertheless, what is absolutely, and politically sacrosanct is the policy positions of competing political camps, which can determine the preferences and choices of many. Of course, preferences and choices are not necessarily the making of the campaign slogans alone, but political antecedents and policies promoted by each group during election campaigns, determine fairly well, the direction of voters voting preferences. According to Wlezien,

"Parties are less dominant in systems where voters choose directly among candidates and not parties *per se*"

(See Wlezien, In: LeDuc, Niemi and Norris (eds), 2010, p. 101).

The above assertion suggests fairly that in democracy, political parties, irrespective of ideological leaning, cannot with certainty claim to have control over the likely preferences and choices of voters. The reality of the above argument have compelled campaign teams, both conservative leaning as well as liberal leaning parties, to adjust and streamline campaign messages to correspond with the political and social needs of voters. Mobilization of potential voters during election campaigns have remained a difficult responsibility for political parties and candidates. As noted by De Vreese,

"Over the past decades, political campaigning has become increasingly professionalized and political parties are challenged to respond to the strategies of competitors as well as increasingly professional and critical journalists"

(See De Vreese, In: LeDuc, Niemi and Norris (eds), 2010, p. 127).

In essence, identification of voters, who are willing to vote for a particular party or candidate, is a tedious adventure. Contemporary speaking, many voters can no longer identify with political parties in strict ideological sense. Consequently, most potential voters choose to vote for another party or candidate, other than the party or

candidate, which they voted in the previous elections. Without doubt, voters do belong to different social and ideological communities; however, as Evans and De Graaf in their opinion argued,

"Ideological polarization in conjunction with higher levels of education, media consumption, and attendant 'cognitive mobilization' sensitized voters to their interests and how the parties addressed them, which in turn increased the impact of issues and ideology on electoral outcomes"

(See Evans and De Graaf, 2013, pp. 88-89).

There are also other scholars of politics who have written in recognition of the above opinion from Evans and De Graaf. Scholars such like Rose and McAllister (1986), and Franklin (1985) have argued also about the effects and influence of ideology, political education and media consumption. Voters have preferences and choices to make, irrespective of party promises. As Claes De Vreese argued in his proposition that,

"There is predictability in liberals arguing for tax reduction, privatization, and liberalization, Greens emphasizing the environment, and Social Democrats often campaigning more on social security"

(See Claes De Vreese, In: LeDuc, Niemi and Norris (eds), 2010, p. 127).

As a fundamental factor in party mobilization targets, potential voters can depend fairly well on the messages from political parties to make choices from set of preferences during elections. I want to align myself to Claes De Vreese argument, whereby he was of the opinion that,

"Political parties have three main targets of their communication in a campaign: the party members, the media, and potential voters"

(See Claes De Vreese, In: LeDuc, Niemi and Norris (eds), 2010, p. 127).

Members of a particular demography may decide to drum up support in solidarity for the candidacy of a particular individual, political party or issues that can promote their moral, religious or social values. In essence, a value identified with potential voters can fairly well influence the election message and campaign strategy of political parties.

3.2.2).   Social Solidarity and Voting Pattern

Looking at voting pattern in several monolithic democracies, one may fairly well conclude, that the same result is obtainable also in divided societies. However, it is pertinent to have exhaustive review of political solidarity in democratic processes. Indeed, as a fundamental factor in "communal identification", the probability of "solidarity" link between political parties and voters, does demand proper evaluation, especially, when democracy itself does provide for preferences and choices. In most democracies, especially those in developed societies of Western Europe and North America, social or value links as "cleavages" factor are known to have played vital roles in raising the electoral value of a candidate. According to Seymour Martin Lipset,

"Students of elections have been concerned with the relationship between one type of cleavage, political parties, and such other types as class, occupation, religion, ethnic group, and region, and have considered these factors primarily in their role as the social basis of political strife rather than of political consensus"

(See Seymour Martin Lipset, 1963, pp. 30-31).

In view of the above position by Seymour Martin Lipset, the 2008 as well as the 2012 presidential election in USA, many among the Gay and Lesbian (LGBT) voters did not only endorsed the candidacy of President Barack Obama, but they spent millions in US dollars to advertise and for other allied political activities in the promotion of his candidacy. Consequently, the National Riffles Association (NRA), which often campaign for Gun rights protection, had endorsed and spent millions in US dollars in the promotion of Republican Party candidate.

Conservative	Liberal/Progressive
• Gun Owners	• Same Sex groups
• Religious groups	• Labor Unions

Table 3.3 showing campaign message determinants in USA elections.

Even Susan Scarrow in her proposition was able to recognize the importance of group's interest protection during elections, whereby she made reference to democracies in Africa. Scarrow had argued that,

"Cleavage based competition is even more pronounced in African democracies, where ethnic and/or religious divisions tend to dominate political conflicts, creating deep-seated partisan preferences"

(See Susan Scarrow, In: LeDuc, Niemi and Norris (eds), 2010, pp. 47-48).

In essence, cleavage as a fundamental factor in society's organizational structure, culturally and socially, is known to have thrown up serious behavioral challenges in polities. Indeed, cleavages can create horizontal relationship among people and between groups in a society. Although, one may want to agree with Susan E. Scarrow argument that,

"Where there are few cross-cutting cleavages to create alternative claims on voters' loyalties, parties have less need to develop strong organizations or to articulate programs, because mobilizing support outside the cleavage is difficult within the social cleavage is easy, and wining support outside the cleavage is difficult or impossible"

(See Scarrow, in: LeDuc, Niemi, and Norris (2010, p: 48).

In essence, people with particular value judgment and strong affection to a given policy direction would vote political parties and candidates that are in support of such group's concerns. Ultimately, a social group can mobilize its' members to vote for a particular political party or candidate. Basically, social and value groups can fairly affect or have influence over election outcome in democracies, especially where "communal attachment" is deeply entrenched. As noted by Lachat and Sciarini in their argument about factors involved in voters' electoral decision-making, whereby they argued that,

> "Party identification is not the only cue a voter may use to make her electoral choice. Other kinds of cues or pre-campaign information, such as parties' previous positions and performance, may also be at work"

> (See Lachat and Sciarini, 2002, p. 43).

If one should want to evaluate the underlying factors in an election, especially where state of the economy is not viewed as a factor, then, voter mobilization facilitators cannot be far removed from the contents in the campaign messages given by political actors. In that respect, I want to agree with Lachat and Sciarini's opinion that,

> "Voters' reliance on pre-campaign information is also affected by the context of an election and, more especially, by the intensity of an election campaign"

> (See Lachat and Sciarini, 2002, p: 43).

3.3). Group Identity and Party's Election Message preference

As part of Election campaign focus, particularly on issues with social policy implications, it is clear that political parties do use partisanship postures to seek voters' attention. As noted by Schmitt-Beck and Farrell,

> "Campaign consists of an organized communication effort, involving the role of one or more agencies (be they parties, candidates, government institutions or special interest organizations) seeking to influence the outcome of processes of political decision-making by shaping public opinion"

> (See Farrell and Schmitt-Beck, 2002, p, 3).

In every existing democracy, the intentions of participants have always been about the best possible approach to shape public opinion, project and market the socio-political variables contained in its platform. Accordingly, Schmitt-Beck and Farrell claimed that,

> "Political actors are campaigning because they hope that the support of the public, or of relevant segments of the public, will help them to promote their political causes"

<div align="right">(See Schmitt-Beck and Farrell, 2002, p, 3).</div>

This is chiefly derived from the fact that voters' overriding interest has always been to vote into office or to vote out a representative or a government in power, with the sole belief that such an individual or government has failed to promote and protect their interest. In the United States of America, different groups are known to have formed campaign bodies to campaign for particular candidates and political parties and in essence work against the interest of other opposing candidates and political interests. Several associations and organizations have sponsored many online and electronic campaigns in support of candidates and political parties just for the fact that the social groups believed that one of the Party's policies promotes and protects their interests[5].

Conservative	Liberal/Progressive
Investors/Manufacturers	Same Sex groups
Immigration	Immigration
Religious	Labor
Race card / minority-marginalization	Race card / minority -marginalization

Table 3.4 showing voters' social identity and voting preference in elections.

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5). See American Action Network (AAN), and other Organizations under Article 501 (c) (4), as encapsulated in the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and also the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA). (www.gwu.edu/ democracy in action/ accessed on 01.02.2015/

Indeed, in every presidential election in the United States of America, elections are usually won or lost on the basis of conservative – liberal ideological continuum. Political actors do recruit and seek voters' support using several factors as contained in table 3.4 above. Nevertheless, in several democracies, political parties are known to devised messages purely to assuage the fears of several groups in the polity during elections. As a consequential effect, many voters are compelled to frame their voting preferences and choices based on the factors contained in table 3.4 above. Although, some scholars like Evans and Tilley had argued that,

"Political parties have converged ideologically and therefore voters' ideological orientations, in parts rooted in their class positions, are less relevant to their vote choice"

(See Evans and Tilley, 2013, p. 91).

I hold the belief that, despite the ideological convergence and orientations, voters' preferences are fairly centered on the factors in table 3.4 above. In Germany national parliamentary election in 2013, the Social Democrats had attempted to use the issue of Minimum Wage and Retirement age benefits to appeal to the working families against the position of the Conservative Christian Democrats but failed. The measure failed partly because, the CDU had adopted the same argument in favor of minimum wage and retirement age for workers, and although their offer was modified and different from what the opposition SPD had offered the electorate.

In the United States of America (USA), the position of Democratic Party on the continued debate on Pro-choice and Pro-life policy positions, Immigration reform, taxation and Affordable Health Care coverage (Obama-care) was to appeal to interest groups, and among minority voters in America. The position of Democratic Party and Republican Party had drew-out the classical political campaign war between proponents of liberal political policies as against proponents of conservative political ideology.

During the United Kingdom's 2010 national parliamentary election, the Conservative Party was able to use the anti-immigration as well as the lackluster performance in the country's economic recovery approach to energize its' support base and motivate them to participate actively in the polls. The vote-out campaign, which was embarked upon by the opposition conservative party paid off, as the traditional supporters and voters were able to turn out massively to cast ballot against the ruling labor party. Indeed, it is safe to submit that political parties and candidates can devise campaign messages, with intention to appeal to the security, social and economic needs of voters during democratic election, irrespective of society or political environment. Of course, the above situation is where I want to agree with the position taken by Schmitt-Beck and Farrell, 2002, p. 3) as I have cited above.

3.3.1).   Communal Identity and Political Mobilization

Identity question as a thorny and dangerous discourse in a democracy can create a situation of "us and them" in the campaign philosophy of all participants. It could become possible, where the party supporters are mobilized with the use of electoral solidarity under communal participation prism. As noted by Lucian W. Pye, while commenting about politics in Non-western societies, he had said that,

> "The fundamental framework of non-Western politics is a communal one and all political behavior is strongly colored by consideration of communal identification"

(See Lucian W. Pye, 1958, p. 469).

Of course, Pye is not alone in this line of argument, because while quoting Clifford Geertz's (1963) primordial loyalty concept, Lijphart was able to elaborate more on the position of Pye where he said that primordial loyalty may be based on,

> "Language, religion, custom, region, race, or assumed blood ties"

(See Lijphart, 1977, p. 17).

Even Seymour Martin Lipset in his evaluation and position on voters and elections was emphatic in his argument. He was of the opinion that despite individual positions on several issues in the state, a voter could be unconsciously motivated to act differently. Seymour Lipset had the view that,

"Even if people are not aware of a personal stake in the electoral decision, they may still be induced to vote by social pressures and inner feelings of social obligation"

(See Seymour Martin Lipset, 1963, p: 199 – 200)

Seymour M. Lipset neither stopped nor ended his argument on the above quoted statement; rather he went further to argue that,

"The variations in voting behavior, which correlate with socioeconomic class, may also be related to different degrees of conformity to the dominant norms in various societies"

(See Seymour M. Lipset, 1963, p. 200).

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Indeed, and as part of groups' political struggles under electoral competition in a divided society, political actors are known to have used divergent mobilization mechanisms to push their intents to the public. Such situation does compelled Donald L. Horowitz to argue, and affirmed that the reasons for competitive discontents among ethnic groups, and political interest in divided societies are about legitimacy rights of each group. Of course, he had noted in his study that,

"The objective of symbolic demands is a public affirmation of legitimacy, where legitimacy is contested. The precise issues chosen for symbolic emphasis depend on the issues that demarcate the contestants"

(See Donald L. Horowitz, 2000, p. 217).

Horowitz was emphatic in his argument, suggesting that the operational word "communal" includes religion, thereby referencing Pye's (1958, p. 469), "communal identification" concept, Geertz's (1963, pp. 109-113) "primordial loyalty concept", and Lijphart's (1977, p. 17) "communal attachment", or Cleavages as used by Lewis (1965, p. 66). Consequently, the derived cleavages that abound in each society can motivate voters to appreciate differently the political development and election campaign messages coming from the political arena. In such circumstance, the electoral processes, and group's interests, which are weaved around legitimacy rights, can compel voters to react accordingly. Even in the more developed democracies, especially in Western Europe and North America, Interests groups and non-profit organizations and institutions are known to have sponsored programs in the media during elections. In essence, political interests groups are permitted to endorse any contesting candidate or to canvass support for any issue being promoted under the platform of any political party. Under democratic election conditions, people could become emotionally compelled through "communal attachment" to react to various campaign issues and positions, bearing in mind the communal attachments that demarcate the contestants as well as the sponsoring political parties.

As a fundamental electoral factor in divided societies, communal identity can compel campaigners to conscientiously designed Election issues with the utmost intention to an ethnic motivated demarcation not only among the candidates, but also among the voters. As noted by Horowitz, while commenting on political competition in Guyana's 1964 election, and the 1961 election in Trinidad. He asserted that,

> "The crystallization of the ethnic party system in Guyana and Trinidad, the electoral contest became more intense. At the same time, ethnic voting made it easier for ethnic parties to mobilize the vote"

> (See Donald L. Horowitz, 2000, p. 326).

Nevertheless, communal attachment as propagated by (Lijphart, 1977) or primordial loyalty as projected by (Clifford Geertz, 1963), had no direct influence on party's

policy formulation during elections in most of the democracies in sub-Sahara Africa. But what is certain, is that, campaign messages and strategy used in the dissemination of such generated messages have most often poisoned the political arena. The import of inter-ethnic grievances, and legitimacy rights claims of ethnic groups as used by political actors to mobilize support, does suggest a linkage between the position of Pye (1958, p: 469), Lewis (1965, p:66), and Geertz (1963, pp: 109 – 113). However, among voters across ethnic groups, the inner political feelings most times have dictated voters' mobilization strategy, and the consequent voting pattern. In the three case study countries for this dissertation, political parties and candidates were found to have mobilized voters using ethnicity, regional and religion as linking bridges. In that case, none of the social issues, which involved the overall interest of the general public, was in any way considered in the realm of national policy plan of the parties. Consequentially, issues were considered based on religion, ethnicity, as well as on regional political interest.

3.4).   Democracy Process and Election Campaign

In contemporary speaking, democracy as espoused in competitive electoral process could be said to be based on debates over fundamental societal pressures. Although, social pressures cannot be universalized, because, societies differ in several ways and forms. Indeed, one may be right to claim that Democracy is complete only when the processes leading to realization of its set-goals are competitive and without structural hindrance. But, there cannot be a perfect democratic election, just as there cannot be an election without some reservations. This is the reason scholars like Dahl, Whitehead, Diamond, Berg-Schlosser, and host of other scholars in politics believed that democratic election must attain certain minimal conditions. According to Dahl, modern democratic process ought to be anchored on,

"Equality, effective participation, enlightened understanding, final control over agenda and, inclusion"

(See Dahl, 1982, pp. 5 – 7).

Even Whitehead, Schmitter and Karl were in agreement with the proposition made by Robert A. Dahl. All the above mentioned scholars stated in unison about the importance of inclusive democratization process (See also Whitehead, 2002, pp. 10-11). In referencing Robert A. Dahl position on democracy processes, I want to agree with the argument that political authority demands that the consent of the public must be the driving force behind its realization. In view of the above theoretical positions, it does imply that, democracy cannot be achieved in isolation of election and through the free will participation or assent of qualified majority in a given society. This does also qualify the argument made by Powell, jr. who said that "election is an instrument of democracy." It is given that in elections, majority participation is never guaranteed, but, what is fundamentally important is the constitutional guaranteed majority of votes cast and votes obtained through the free will participation of the qualified majority. Indeed, Powell, jr. argued further, where he stated that,

"The relevant national experiences today are found in political systems where representative leaders are chosen through competitive elections"

(See Powell, Jr. 1982, p. 2).

As one among several scholars who argued or hold the opinion that election provides the greatest legitimacy to democracy, Powell, Jr. in his 1982 study argued further that,

"The competitive electoral context, with several political parties organizing the alternatives that face the voters, is the identifying property of the contemporary democratic process"

(See Powell, Jr. 1982, p. 2 – 3).

Indeed, it is the belief of Powell, Jr. as well as the view of scholars like Lipset, Diamond, Huntington, Berg-Schlosser, Plattner, and host of others that competitive electoral process is synonymous with citizens' participation. With respect to the above stated opinion, Powell, Jr. argued that,

"Political performance in democratic systems among today's nations means to study political performance in those nations characterized by competitive elections in which most citizens are eligible to participate"

(See Powell, Jr. 1982, pp. 2 – 3).

In essence, I want to argue that the processes to be required for the achievement of electoral legitimacy in democracies should provide that candidates campaign and market their policy positions based on substance, and not relying on mere abstract projections or hypothetical assumptions. Indeed, I hold the view that the building of electoral processes by the use of political solidarity, emotional appeals or clouding of debates with social pressures dressed with sentimental invocation of identity variations erases the democratic legitimacy, which election campaigns provide.

Furthermore, it ought to be stated that election campaign strategy to be used by a political party must have the capacity to elevate the political discourse in the society. Indeed, Powell, Jr. is among scholars who seek that contemporary national democracies are seen to satisfy some fundamental electoral factors. Indeed, it is my belief that such electoral factors should be based especially on one of the basic norms of democratic election, which is absence of coercive force or violence. It is correct to believe that Powell, jr. was right when he argued that electoral principles anchored on,

"The legitimacy of the government rests on a claim to represent the desires of its citizens. That is, the claim of the government to obedience to its laws is based on the government's assertion to be doing what the people want it to do", the organized arrangement that regulates this bargain of legitimacy is the competitive political election. Leaders are elected at regular intervals, and voters can choose among alternative candidates. In practice, at least two political parties that have a chance of winning are needed to make such choices meaningful", "Most adults can participate in the electoral process, both as voters and as candidates for important political office", "Citizens' votes are secret and not coerced", "Citizens and leaders enjoy basic freedom of speech, press, assembly, and organization. Both established parties and new ones can work to gain members and voters"

(See Powell, Jr., 1982, p. 3).

In my agreement with the above propositions, I hold the view that the opinion of Powell, Jr. as stated above ought to apply that popular legitimacy, competitive elections, participation by qualified adults, secret votes, free from coercion, freedom of speech, press, assembly and organization, must be admitted and respected as processes of election. In reference to the above enumerated electoral conditions, contemporary democracy demands that electoral processes and campaigns should be synonymous with the citizens' rights. As indicated in Powell, Jr. (1982, p. 3); Dahl (1982, pp. 6 – 7) and Whitehead (2002, pp.10 – 11), electoral processes in contemporary democracies should adhere to rules and basic norms inherent in democratic politics. As it is done in product promotion, campaigns during elections referenced the general indicators inherent in product advertising. Ideally, policy issues and party positions are usually exploited and counter-balanced in a bid to create acceptable hypothetical image for the target voters. The above position of Powell, Jr resonated also in what John Street argued for while referencing Todd Gitlin's (1991, pp. 129 -133) article about electoral processes and voters, which in essence concerned the fate of elections in America. He had dealt with electoral factors with political implications,

> "of an American politics, which has always been 'raucous, deceptive, giddy, shallow, sloganeering, and demagogic for most of its history', but which is now covered by media that is obsessed with 'speed, quick cuts, ten seconds bites, one-second "scenes" and out of context images', and is therefore intolerant 'of the rigors of serious arguments and the tedium of organized political life"
>
> (See Cited in John Street, 2011: p, 238).

In likewise, modern politics demands that electoral processes and campaigns should adhere to the intricacies of contemporary democracy. The utmost demand of democratic electoral process is to achieve a standard that provide for maximum political endorsement from all constitutional empowered constituent. According to Powell, Jr. who argued that,

> "From one perspective, the citizens use elections to choose between prospective teams of policy-makers, from another perspective, the citizens use elections to reward or to punish the incumbents"

<div align="right">(See Powell, Jr. 2000, p, 5).</div>

It is not misplaced idea to argue that elections grants voters the constitutional rights, authority and powers to sanction political actors, and at same time to reward political actors. Alexander Jeffrey C. in establishing his argument about democracy and democratic power, whereby he stated that,

> "The civil community regulates access to state power. To do so, it constitutes a new and different kind of power of its own. To the degree that society is democratic, to that degree regulatory institutions are the gatekeepers of political power. It is civil power that opens and closes the gate"

<div align="right">(See Alexander, Jeffrey C, 2006, p. 110).</div>

In my evaluation of Alexander's argument, I have to agree with the view of Powell, Jr. about citizens, political actors and elections. The argument advanced by Alexander Jeffrey as I have cited above agreed with Powell, Jr's position on factors that influences election in democracies, whereby Powell, Jr. claimed that elections,

> "Establish connections that compel or greatly encourage the policy-makers to pay attention to citizens"

<div align="right">(See Powell, Jr. 2000, p. 4).</div>

Indeed, I want subscribe to it, that contemporary elections required robust grassroots voter mobilization as a precondition for effective participation and popular legitimacy. However, grassroots voter mobilization, though highly essential in electoral legitimacy consensus building, it ought not be reduced to what John street rejected in his criticism of election campaigns in America (See John Street, 2011: p. 238).

Nevertheless, Whitehead, in his argument about democracy and reasons for competitive election contest stated that,

"Democracy precludes conceptual closure concerning its own identity, and hence democratization must be understood as an open-ended process". He went further to argue that, "Democracy is 'essentially contestable' not just because our values may differ or because our political concepts may lack ultimate logical or empirical validation, but also because our political cognition is inherently critical and reflexive"

(See Whitehead, 2002, p. 18).

The processes involved in election contest and the defense of all politically adopted policy positions transcends ordinary policy advertising; this is so, on account that, every political issue evolved through two dimensional or binary factors, namely; economic and socio-cultural concerns. In his evaluation of voters and political ideology during elections, Seymour Martin Lipset noted that,

"If we look at the supporters of the three major positions in most democratic countries, we find a fairly logical relationship between ideology and social base"

(See Seymour Martin Lipset, 1963, p. 133).

Even Russell J. Dalton in his political observation of societies and democratic processes argued that, "Democracy should be a competition between different worldviews or ideologies that address social societal needs."[6] Dalton went further to argue and stated that,

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6). Russell J. Dalton (2010), 'Ideology, Partisanship, and Democratic Development, In: Comparing Democracies 3: Elections and Voting in the 21st Century, edited by Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi and Pippa Norris (2010), London, SAGE Publications Ltd

"Social Democrats, if elected, approach public policy with different framework than Christian Democrats. Liberals have a different *Weltanschauung* than Greens parties"

(See Dalton, 2010, p. 143).

The descriptive ideological framework relative to voters' preferences and choice during elections suggest, as Dalton noted that Left-Right framework,

"Provides a source of political identity that helps orient the individual to politics"

(See Russell J. Dalton, 2010, p. 146).

In view of the above postulations, it is clear that political parties and groups relied often on a given ideological framework to advanced politically formulated measures with the intention to attract voters' attention. In relation to the above, it is obvious that political parties designed variegated strategies and with the vote hunting agents, manipulate the ideological positions of voters' with legitimacy rights questions. Indeed, the manipulation of the debated ideological competition in the divided societies through ethnicity modified campaign strategies, ultimately, redefined the electoral preferences and rational judgment of many voters.

3.5). Issues and Voters in the Developed and Developing Democracies.

Election as a factor in democratic politics, demands that each organized election campaign ought to be driven purely by the several contested policy issues, which could be national, regional or social based. In democracies, voters do retain the right to use the regulative power provided by election. This they do by using their electoral preferences and choices to replace or reward previously elected public office holders. As argued by several scholars of politics, voters have the right to show their disapproval or approval of incumbent's performance, a rejection of proposed policies,

or a strong desire to change the subject. In respect to the above postulations, Powell, Jr argued that,

> "Democracies provide every citizen with a basic political resource and the freedom to use and expand it by organizing and mobilizing other citizens"

<div align="right">(See Powell, Jr. 1982, p. 20).</div>

Even, Robert Dahl in his argument on the connection between citizens, political actors, electoral preferences and democracy stated that,

> "It is part of the democratic faith that by creating a systematic need to pay attention to citizens, who are themselves paying attention to their own self-defined interests, democracy in the long run ties its policies to what its citizens want"

<div align="right">(See Dahl, 1989, p. 95).</div>

In an attempt to create link between democracy and citizens in one hand, and citizens and socio-political interest on another hand, Powell, Jr. made also similar statement to that credited to Dahl above (See Powell, Jr. 2010, p. 228). In view of the above positions, one would conclude that political parties and political actors in democracies do formulate campaign programs based on contrived, derived or shared concerns of voters. Since every society is socially, culturally, ethnically and religiously organized, it ought to be incumbent on candidates and political actors to structure their campaign message to reflect and accommodate the shared feelings of the voters. In the light of the above argument, Schumpeter believed that,

> "Acquiescence to a competitive electoral system entails a belief in the legitimacy of the system; Dahl contended that it was from the depths of political culture that support for a political system derives"

<div align="right">(See David Held, 1996, p. 210).</div>

Since democracy revolve around interest aggregation and interest protection, one may be right to claim that election campaign message and, its reception by the larger part of voters depends unconditionally, on policies and human political behavior, which is dynamic and reflexive. By the contents in figure 3.4 below, one could see the fundamental factors in electoral behavior in some democracies. In essence, it might as well be politically correct to assert that, people take interest in being part of the decision-making processes, which of course determine, who lead or represent the general interest of community of voters.

```
┌─────────────────┐          ┌─────────────────┐
│   Developed     │          │   Developing    │
│   Democracy     │          │   Democracy     │
└─────────────────┘          └─────────────────┘
        │                            │
        │  ┌──────────────────┐      │  ┌──────────────────────┐
        ├──│ Ideology influenced │   ├──│ Ethnocentrism/Regional│
        │  └──────────────────┘      │  │   and religious        │
        │                            │  │   irredentism          │
        │                            │  └──────────────────────┘
        │  ┌──────────────────┐      │  ┌──────────────────────┐
        └──│ Candidate Appeal │      └──│ Solidarity Instinct    │
           └──────────────────┘         └──────────────────────┘
```

Figure 3.4 showing campaign facilitators in democracies.

Indeed, I want to agree with the argument that voters in each democracy should be deeply immersed in the dictate of contemporary election campaign models, which views electoral participation by any given constitutionally qualified individual as a civic duty, for the good of the individual and for the good of the majority in his constituency. In view of the above argument, I want to agree with the opinion expressed by Claes De Vreese, whereby he stated that,

> "An election campaign functions as an empowerment of the electorate in which knowledge levels increase, engagement is sparked, and voters are mobilized to vote"
>
> (See Claes H. De Vreese, In: LeDuc, Niemi and Norris, 2010, p. 121 – 122).

The voter electoral preference and choice during elections might depend largely on the interest aggregation of voters, who actually took part in election. In essence, a voter might be motivated to make his voting preferences through retrospective and prospective political evaluations. I hold belief that the above situation is the reason Powell, Jr. wanted to know through his voters' time perspective' analysis, and he asked hypothetically,

> "Do citizens look primarily back at the performance of those in office before the election or primarily forward to what they expect the new office-holders to do"
>
> (See Powell, Jr. 2000, pp. 7-10).

In the developed democracies, voters' preferences and electoral choices are usually traced to retrospective and also on prospective views. Consequently, the above argument compelled scholars like Seymour Lipset and Rokkan to argue that,

> "Economic and religious cleavages defined the major lines of political conflict in western democracies"
>
> (See Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, as cited in Dalton, 2010, p: 149 - 150).

In referencing the above position of Lipset and Rokkan; Dalton in his argument expanded the scope of electoral discourse in the Western Europe, retrospectively, whereby he stated that,

> "In European political systems, economic conflicts were typically expressed in Marxian class-based issues such as the nationalization of industry, redistribution of income, and the government's role in the economy"

<div align="right">(See Dalton, 2010, pp. 149-150).</div>

However, ideology matters, as policies and political intents are products of ideological assumptions. Hypothetically, it is believed that in democracies, political ideology and amount of public appeal enjoyed by candidates, influences voters' preferences and choices during elections. Conversely, electoral decision of an individual can assume dimensions other than that obtained in the more advanced democracies in Western Europe and in North America. In most developing democracies, especially those democracy aspiring societies in sub-Sahara Africa, individual political interest is usually converted into group political interest during elections[7]. Several candidates and political parties are known to have recorded electoral successes on the basis of primordial cleavages and also by sentiments centered on regional affiliations.

Irredentism as electoral tool is massively exploited by many political personalities and interest groups in sub-Sahara Africa. Conservatives or Liberal Democrats, identity legitimacy issues are mostly designed to drive the campaign appeal among voters. However, in most developing democracies, social issues were never explicitly structured to drive campaigns during elections.

Ethnicity and regional biases as well as religious irredentism are made to overshadow ideology centered social factors. As Diamond quoted while referencing Huntington's comment on Elections and votes, noted that Huntington was of the opinion that,

_____

7). during the 2007 and 2011 Presidential elections in Kenya and Nigeria, ethnic groups converted the political interest of individual candidates into ethnic-regional contest. Whereby, ethnic, religious and regional alliances were formed. Voters voted in support of candidates from particular regions and affiliation to a particular religion.

"In many situations, the easiest way to win votes is to appeal to tribal, ethnic, and religious constituencies"

(See Diamond, Plattner, Chu and Tien, 1997: p. 6).

In such political situation, voters are compelled to cling on the levers provided by their primordial affiliations to build political preferences and make electoral choices. As proven through electoral outcome from several societies in sub-Sahara Africa, the position of rationality in electoral choice is solidarity driven. Even in the opinion of Huntington as quoted in Diamond, Plattner, Chu and Tien, whereby he asserted in his analysis of democratization and elections outcome in the Balkan States (former Yugoslavia) that,

"In Bosnia voters conspicuously ignored the multi-religious parties: Serbs voted for the Serb party, Croats for the Croat party, and Muslims for the Muslim party"

(See Diamond, Plattner, Chu and Tien, 1997, p. 6).

Furthermore, Huntington was emphatic in his identification of primordial cleavage as a fundamental factor, which can influence election and how voters are mobilized. He was of the view that,

"People identify with family, faith, and blood, and unless the rules of electoral engagement are very carefully constructed, politicians competing for office have little choice but to appeal for votes in these terms"

(See Huntington, In: Diamond, Plattner, Chu and Tien, 1997, p: 6)

Of course, the above argument from Huntington provides a clue to how distortions in the political field through interest motivated acrimonies have compelled politicians to modify and situate campaign messages to attract the attention, sympathy and support of voters in their constituencies. Indeed, it is the opinion of Huntington that, democratization "promotes communalism", when politicians in search of votes, appeal to tribal, ethnic, and religious constituencies. In many societies in sub-Sahara Africa, solidarity instinct is applied by individuals and groups on the basis of identity protection, thus; throwing up existential questions in the electoral process. Like in the case of the Balkan states as stated previously by Huntington; when solidarity assume prominence in electoral preference decision-making, then national identity and social cohesion becomes devaluated. Indeed and normatively speaking, if voters' electoral preference is decided on the basis of "primordial cleavages" or by solidarity prism, the end product of such election would be a divided society. If one can have a closer view on what Huntington said while evaluating the essence of election in the choice of leaders, he said that,

"The initiation of elections forces political leaders to compete for votes"

(See Huntington, 1997, pp: 5 – 7, Democracy for the Long Haul, In:

Diamond, Plattner, Chu and Tien, 1997. p. 6).

As one would want to believe, the argument that I want to establish is that the fundamental reason for the use of solidarity frames during election campaigns by candidates, interest groups and political parties is to add electoral value to their policy argument. Both Conservatives and Liberals politicians are in competition on how best to penetrate and control valuable share of the electoral market in democracies. Nevertheless, in several developed democracies, where social oriented concerns dominate other national policy issues, prospect for jobs creation, identity preservation and political protection are factors, which usually combine to dictate outcome of elections.

3.5.1).   Lifestyle factor and Elections in Democracies

Conservative or Liberal induced lifestyles in societies can influence in many respects the campaign and electoral behavior of political actors. Voters are known to seek motivations through implementable but contestable policy actions. In view of the above postulation, scholars like Linz and Stepan were of the opinion that,

"Democracy entails free public contestation concerning governmental priorities and policies. If a democracy never produced policies and generated governmental-mandated public goods in the areas of education, health, and transportation, and never provided some economic safety net for its citizens and some alleviation of gross economic inequality, democracy would not be sustainable"

(See Linz and Stepan, 1997, In: Diamond, Platnner,

Chu and Tien, 1997, p. 22)

However, I do hold the belief, that social motivations through policy contestations can enable voters to act or react in certain ways. Democracy being a system entrenched with processes, and election as a legitimacy tool, does provide voters the opportunity to evaluate their overall environment in comparison to those political actors seeking electoral endorsement. In this regard, Linz and Stepan noted that,

"Policy decisions by democratic governments and legislators certainly affect the quality of life, particularly in the long run"

(See Linz and Stepan, 1997, In: Diamond, Plattner,

Chu, and Tien, p. 30).

Despite the obvious proof of connectivity between political actors, voters and social environment, democracy cannot be faulted in the policy implementation outcome in a society. Of course, the above may not also be divorced from the position taken by Linz and Stepan, whereby they argued in defense of democracy and legislators. Both scholars had insisted that democracy was not to be blamed, because,

"No democracy can assure the presence of reputable bankers, entrepreneurs with initiative, physicians devoted to their patients, competent professors, creative scholars and artists, or even honest judges"

(See Linz and Stepan, In: Diamond, Plattner,

Chu and Tien, 1997, p. 30).

I have evaluated the above position taken and reasons adduced by Linz and Stepan, and I want to cautiously conclude that though democracy may be absolved of complicity in the social decays that might have afflicted societies, but, election as a legitimacy tool has responsibility to protect voters and citizens. But, I want to disagree with Linz and Stepan decisions to absolve democracy and election in its entirety. My position is anchored on the fact that election is a process of political recruitment, consequently, the policies enacted and its implementation is the responsibility of the recruited public office holders. Nevertheless, in disagreement to my objection and position, both Linz and Stepan went on to suggest that,

"The overall quality of a society is only in small part a function of democracy (or, for that matter, a function of nondemocratic regimes). Yet all of those dimensions of society affect the satisfaction of its citizens, including their satisfaction with the government and even with democracy itself"

(See Linz and Stepan, In: Diamond, Plattner,

Chu and Tien, 1997, pp. 30 – 31).

Suffice to say, lifestyle obtained in a society can also influence the pattern of political thinking and electoral behavior among eligible voters. Conversely, democracy is known to carry universally admonished contents, but the motivators and facilitators do also differ from one country to another country. In the light of the above, Guillermo O'Donnell asserted that,

> "Fair elections are the main, if not the only, characteristics that certifies countries as democratic before other governments and international opinion"

> (See Guillermo O'Donnell, 1997, In: Diamond, Plattner,

> Chu and Tien, 1997, p. 51).

Obviously, electoral responses in various democratic societies do differ from each other. Similarly, Abraham F. Lowenthal in his reference to Huntington's proposition, while analyzing democracy in Latin American countries pointed out that democracy for the Long Haul,

> "May depend less on these easily identifiable moments of decision than on the painstaking construction and quotidian care of democratic political institutions, practices, and culture"

> (See Abraham F. Lowenthal 1997, In: Diamond, Plattner,

> Chu, and Tien, 1997, p. 62).

In view of the above argument, I am further convinced that democratic elections in sub-Sahara Africa depict situations anchored on uneasiness and political anxiety. Of course, reason for anxiety in the polity might be that any change in electoral expectations could produce tremendous aggressive response from opposing tribal group, which might feel threatened by the election outcome, or had the impression of being shortchanged through anticipated government policies. Indeed, the above situation corresponds also to Linz and Stepan's argument that,

> "The greater the extent to which the population of a state is composed of a plurality of national, linguistic, religious, or cultural societies, the more complex politics becomes, since an agreement on the fundamentals of democracy will be more difficult"

(See Diamond, Plattner, Chu, and Tien, 1997, p: 24)

People tend to vote not persuaded by prospect of economic improvement, but rather on the premise of the two slides of society induced incentives, preservation of ethnic identity and regional political relevance.

3.6)   Policy-Packaging and Voters Mobilization

Election as an instrument of democracy provides opportunity for voter sensitization. The argument in praise of election as a regulative instrument was discussed by Alexander, whereby he quoted Wendell Phillips's argument about the America's Fifteenth Amendment in respect to voting. Wendell Phillips had argued that,

> "A man with a ballot in his hand is the master of the situation. He defines all his other rights. What is not already given him, he takes. … The Ballot is opportunity, education, fair play, right to office, and elbow room"

(Quoted in Alexander Jeffrey C, 2006, p. 122).

In the same manner, scholars like Powell, Jr, argued in his postulation that the importance of elections in democracy supported electoral competition. However, I hold the belief, that since voting is a necessary factor in democracy itself, then, it does suggest that mobilization and sensitization of voters as argued by Alexander in Wendell Phillips's case, makes campaign for vote necessity imperative. Indeed, Powell, Jr had stated in his evaluation of election and democracy that,

"Elections are instruments of democracy to the degree that they give the people influence over policy making"

(See Powell, Jr. 2000, p, 3).

Even Christopher Wlezien in his opinion argued that campaign for votes during elections largely involve direct interactions between campaigners and voters. He is further convinced that campaign activities before and at present differs greatly, when he said,

"Now, campaigns are much more capital intensive, where professionals manage things and communication with voters is highly mediated"

(See Wlezien, 2010, In: LeDuc, Niemi, and Norris, 2010, p. 103).

In effect, the ability to win a democratic contested election by a political party or candidate is fairly dependent on the level of interactions between voters and campaign mobilization agents. Similarly, ideology marketing, or candidate's competence marketing during elections can only become effective, if campaign messages are well structured to attract the attention of the electorate, and also appeal to voters' interest. According to Schmitt-Beck and Farrell,

"From being exposed to campaign communication, voters may become motivated to follow politics more closely on the news, and thereby become better informed about politics more generally"

(See Farrell, and Schmitt-Beck, 2010, p. 15).

Similarly, the policy position of a candidate, or that marketed by political parties, can contribute significantly in building up voters' political interest. Consequently, voters' electoral preferences and choices are fairly based on the policy position of contesting political parties.

Nevertheless, I hold the belief, that in modern democracies, a candidate marketing takes two dimensional approaches, in the context of political parties, and also in the context of candidate's image (See figure 3.5 below). As the primary constituency of political parties, the supporters' base could be mobilized through chains of activities, both formal and informal. As Lees-Marshment noted,

"The first point to understand about the political product is that it is more than just policies: it includes everything a party does, including its organization, conferences/conventions and events, and also the behavior of many different people, including the key party figures and leaders, elected politicians and candidates, membership/supporters, staff and advisors"

(See Lees-Marshment, 2011, pp. 45 – 46).

I am interested also in what other scholars said in their various evaluations of democracy marketing. Indeed, one of such scholars like Mellman had said in his effort to explain the relationship between candidate's competence, party policy and message formulation that,

"If your message is we need someone who's tough and you have a wimpy sort of candidate… that can't really be your message"

(See Mellman, 2007; Quoted in Lees-Marshment, 2011, p. 47).

I want to establish in view of the above argument, it does imply that the quest for electoral success drives political actors into product packaging through campaign message modification. As I have noted, the quest for product marketing medication compelled political actors in most democracies to strive for programs friendly to voters, irrespective of demography. I hold the belief that situations as such made scholars like Lilleker to conclude as was cited in Lees-Marshment work, whereby he said,

"If the party moves away from the core principles that motivate members to join and be active supporters, some will withdraw their support and membership"

(See Lilleker, 2005c, p, 573: Quoted in Lees-Marshment, 2011, p. 49).

In essence, I want to argue that the reason for political parties' effort in product packaging is essentially on policy formulation, and implementation strategy. Of course, the overarching idea responsible for policy consistency on the part of some political actors is to promote the policies supported by the party. I have the impression also that the attempt is to give voters assurance on policy implementation when elected into office. If one considers the emphatic subjective analysis given out by some scholars, it would be clear that political actors and political interest groups have been in constant policy realignment, especially as election comes closer. In the light of the above, I want to view the comment advanced forward by Lavigne, who projected objective assumption, and as was cited in Lees-Marshment study, whereby he said,

"You can't embrace policies that will alienate your next tier of voters… what we want to do is we want to break through to that next grouping of individuals"

(See Lavigne, 2009; cited in Lees-Marshment, 2011, p. 48).

Even Gillan was not different from the position projected by Lavigne as I have stated above. Gillan in his argument on candidate's packaging, marketing, and elections, implies that there must be an established processes and articulated projections through which one must relate with voters. Consequently, Gillan insisted and as cited by Lees-Marshment in her work that,

"You can't market yourself unless you look like the population you are trying to represent"

(See Gillan, 2006; cited in Lees-Marshment, 2011, p. 50).

Indeed, policy packaging for election purposes demands a strategy that is capable to hold back supporters. The above position implies, that parties must promote policies that appeal to each demography of voters, and at the same time retain core party values. Gould was very emphatic in his support to the idea of policy marketing through effective packaging strategy. In his opinion, Gould insisted that,

"Unless you've got a strategy that is robust, long term, linked to serious political projects, you're not going to win elections"

(See Gould, 2007; cited in Lees-Marshment, 2011, p. 51).

However, I want to concede that a strategic plan could help parties to brainstorm on best possible means to promote the party, defend its policy intentions, and above all market the candidate nominated by the party to various demography of voters.

Political Party
- Policy Intents
- Policy Implementation

Candidate's Political Image
- Leadership character
- Policy position

Figure 3.5 showing Candidates and Policy marketing approach.

With the policy intents, and policy implementation mechanism well promoted, the personal image of a party's candidate can be mediated. As presented in figure 3.5 above, with a good packaging plan, voters will receive more information about the policy intents, policy implementation plan, leadership competence of the party's candidate, before the election. As Lees-Marshment noted,

"The political brand is a mere psychological entity, made up of impressions, associations, and the overall perception of a party or politician"

(See Lees-Marshment, 2011. p. 66).

Lees-Marshment went further to argue, that "brands are long term, created by past behavior and harder to change" (See Jennifer Lees-Marshment, 2011, p. 66). Therefore, it is the responsibility of political parties to convince voters about its policy plans, and also the credibility of its candidate. In modern democratic politics, the image of a political party, and the personality of a political party's candidate are binary features needed to give voters the opportunity to make choices during elections. Indeed, I want to admit and to concede as well that Lees-Marshment was right in her argument whereby she insisted that,

"How voters perceived a brand can affect how they judge the product"

(See Lees-Marshment, 2011, p. 66).

However, I want to conclude that since voters' behavior is dependent on the dictates of the policy competition among contesting parties, therefore, the quest by political parties to rightfully situate the generated responses must be seen to appeal to the needs of various demography of voters. It is my candid opinion that a given candidate's political image is measured through his antecedents as a political actor in a society. If one looks at the argument of Lees-Marshment as I have cited above, it hold that actually, "Political brand is a psychological entity" (See Lees-Marshment, 2011, p. 66).

So, therefore, it implies, and just as I am well convinced that 'image' is also psychological entity. Then, since Lees-Marshment had argued that 'image is a creation of past behaviors' made up of impressions, and overall perceptions of a candidate or political party; ultimately, image becomes a product of subjective judgment. The electoral victory of political parties in democracies around the world could not have been possible, on the basis that the parties had the best of policy intents, rather electoral success was possible, because the leadership character of the party as well as the election message delivery mechanism were more cohesive, well promoted and made attractive to the voters[8].

3.6.1). Election Campaign Strategies and the Media

As Claes De Vreese noted, "Campaign communication involve candidates, political parties, organizations, interest groups, news media, and citizens" (See LeDuc, Niemi, and Norris, 2010, p. 118). Indeed, political communication demands, especially with regard to information generation, dissemination, and the relationship between voters and policy evaluation, a holistic appraisal, so as to discover the necessity of voters' input in mobilization and elections. Similarly, De Vreese argued that,

"Public communication campaigns are focused on influencing citizen information levels, awareness, and behavior in the social realm"

(See LeDuc, Niemi, and Norris, 2010, p. 119).

_____

8). an individual voter not sentimentally attached to a party show much interest in the promotional style of a given policy intent as presented by a candidate or political party.

My utmost desire is to look into the adoption, deployment and exploitation of modern media as medium for political information generation, and dissemination in the general democratic process. Indeed, it is my intention to have a connection between the role of the media (figure 3.6 below) in democracy promotion, with emphasis on Nigeria, Kenya and Ghana.

Media	Party and Candidate	Voters
•Television •Internet •Radio	•Packaging •Promotion •Marketing •Visual Presence	•Media dependence •Media Effect

Figure 3.6 showing 4 factors in the media in campaign communication.

The media as the fourth estate in democracy realm does exert strong impact on electoral information generation and dissemination. As partner in governance of the state, and also as a regulative instrument in democratic politics, I want to concede that the media is an essential link between the government and the governed. In the light of the above, I agree emphatically with John Street, who stated that,

"When media report politics, they are telling stories about the world"

(See John Street (2011. p, 49).

Indeed, there are very many scholars who reason along or who were in agreement with John Street position. Such scholars like Robertson, who in his study as cited by Lees-Marshment, stated that,

"You can't completely control the agenda because stuff gets chucked onto it"

(Robertson 2006 cited in Lees-Marshment, 2011, p, 47).

The above position implies that political parties and candidates cannot control their policy positions without influence from the voters through the media. My intention is to use the media in general terms with every aspect of it in mind to showcase how media affect campaigns during democratic elections. As Lees-Marshment noted,

"Unpopular leaders can be rebranded"

(See Lees-Marshment, 2011, p, 67).

In essence, with the role of the media, an unpopular leader or policy intent could be rebranded to attract voters and make them change their perception about the individual or policy issue.

Furthermore, in agreement to the above enumerated position is Claes H. De Vreese, who argued that,

"A precondition for being informed about a campaign is access to different media, including mass media such as television and newspapers, but also importantly telephones (landline and mobile), and internet access"

(See De Vreese, In: LeDuc, Niemi and Norris, 2011, p. 119).

3.6.2)　　　　　Outdoor Election Campaign

According to De Vreese, "the largest share of campaign communication happens through the media."[9] Similarly, Maxwell McCombs in his contribution to the impact exerted on the society by the media argued that,

> "The salience of an issue or other topic in the mass media influences its salience among the audience"
>
> 　　　　(See Maxwell McCombs, 1981, p. 126; see also McCombs and Shaw, 1972).

However, I am well convinced that outdoor campaign practice still retains its prime position above other newly crafted campaign mediums. It is so despite various technological inputs and innovations in election campaigns by political parties in modern democracy. Indeed, according to Stephen Pound,

> "There is no point in being a politician unless you absolutely love talking to people"
>
> 　　　　(Cited in Dalton, Farrell, and McAllister, 2011, p. 56).

In essence, elections avail the public the opportunity in most cases to build direct contact with candidates competing for public office. Furthermore, outdoor campaigns do create opportunity for candidate-voter contact, and provide voters the chance to engage candidates directly on policy issues without having to depend on a medium. As Stephen Pound in his analysis of candidate-voter contact noted, by engaging the people directly, "also you get useful information and tips."[10] Stephen Pound went further to argue that, "There is no better way to take the temperature of a place" (See Dalton, Farrell, and McAllister, 2011, p, 56).

3.6.2.1)   Indirect Election Campaign Bargaining

Election as an essential factor in democracy legitimization is dominated by several issues that are essentially crucial for candidate – voter communication. The dilemma as constituted by candidate – voter communication had compelled Dalton, Farrell, and McAllister to agree as I have cited below that,

> "Political parties and candidates face a fundamental problem: how to communicate with voters and influence them so that they accept the candidates' leadership" They went further to suggest that "such communication may be based on direct or indirect human communication"
>
> (See Dalton, Farrell, and McAllister, 2011, p, 161).

Of course, as I have enumerated above, the electoral communication could be through open rallies, campaign debates by candidates or campaign surrogates, or policy advertising. In reference to the above listed mediums, Dalton, Farrell, and McAllister were convinced that,

> "Constructing a desirable image of politicians and designing their communication related to particular issues is the first step in bringing them closer to election success"
>
> (See Dalton, Farrell, and McAllister, 2011, p. 161).

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9). Claes H. De Vreese (2011, p, 119), "Campaign Communication and Media": in Comparing Democracies 3, Elections and Voting in the 21st Century, edited by Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi and Pippa Norris (2011), London, SAGE Publications Ltd

10). See Russell J. Dalton, David M. Farrell, and Ian McAllister (2011), Political Parties and Democratic Linkage: How Parties Organize Democracy, Oxford, Oxford University Press

Nevertheless, there are other scholars of politics who had the same impression as discussed above by Dalton, Farrell and McAllister. Christopher Wlezien's is one among scholars who have made great contributions in the discourse on media and mobilization of voters during election. In one of his contributions, he was of the opinion that,

"The rise of broadcast television" in electoral communication or what we call 'electoral bargaining' became a fundamental factor in election process in the late 1960s. Wlezien noted, "Getting on the news thus became an effective way to reach many people all at once"

(See Wlezien, 2010, In: LeDuc, Niemi, and Norris, 2010, p. 104).

Obviously, indirect election campaign strategy is a non-personalized communication exercise. The processes can depend heavily on mass media as well as third party facilitators who often represent and negotiate on behalf of a candidate or political party. In several democracies, it is a common practice to have some candidates endorsed or to have series of campaign advertisements sponsored by organizations. Where such activities exist, it is expected that the individual so supported would protect the interest of its supporters either through policy initiation or policy implementation.

3.6.2.2) Tools for Indirect Election Campaign Bargaining

Essentially, indirect campaign is most through the media under two different dimensions, which could be grouped further into two mediums, namely; Electronic and Print Media. In reference to Dalton, Farrell, and McAllister, indirect communication is fundamentally anchored on television, radio and the Internet[11].

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11). Dalton, Farrell, and McAllister believed that the media comprised the television; radio and internet were the most influential subsectors in the mass media

Each communication medium has particular community of users, which often cut across various voters' demography.

Obviously, information about a candidate's political party and its' programs of intent as promoted in an election are disseminated for public consumption. Campaign teams do exploit the opportunities given by indirect campaigns through commercial spots for advertising in television, sponsorship of radio jingles and commercials as well as online advertisement. Political parties and interest groups do patronize the electronic and print media in their efforts to market and generate overwhelming support for the candidates, and the policies each promotes.

3.6.3) Electronic Media:

Electronic media does typify the use of electronic manipulated communication mediums to transmit and disseminate information to recipients in the society. The global role of the media in news dissemination does afford political actors the opportunity to get viewed worldwide. The use of the media platforms in campaign communication does allow each organized political event to generate global attention. As presented by Claes H. De Vreese, who argued that,

"The largest share of campaign communication happens through the media"

(See LeDuc, Niemi, and Norris, 2010, p, 119).

Indeed, I want to agree with the submission of De Vreese that "only a minority of most electorates directly interacts with candidates during a campaign."[12] As presented in figure 3.7 below, the idea is to explore how each medium reinforces campaign communication during elections.

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12). See Claes De Vreese (2010) "Campaign Communication and Media (2010, p, 119)", in: Comparing Democracies 3; Elections and Voting in the 21st Century, edited by Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi, and Pippa Norris (2010), London, SAGE Publications Ltd

Figure 3.7 showing factors in the Media and Election Campaigns.

As I have indicated in figure 3.7 above, the media in this study consist of television, telephone, radio, and internet. My intention is to explore the functions of each of the media subsectors, and to discover also how each medium is used by political actors as campaign tools during elections. Of course, scholars like Dalton, Farrell, and McAllister argued that,

"Instead of the person-to-person channel used with a direct marketing approach, this channel make use of electronic and printed media outlets such as television, radio, newspapers, magazines, direct mail, the internet (e.g., email, websites, blogs), campaign literature (e.g., flyers, brochures, fact sheets), posters, billboards"

(See Dalton, Farrell, and McAllister, 2011, p. 202).

3.6.3.1)   Television

The use of television to advertise and positively project party programs of intents as well as transmission of podium debates across towns and cities has increased competitiveness in the conduct of campaigns. It has created also platform for voters across demography, especially as it enables voters to hear from candidates. The use of television to disseminate programs and policy intents by political parties has widened also the scope of coverage and audience candidates would have probably not reached.

3.6.3.2)   Radio Jingles

As often is the case, political parties and candidates do exploit the opportunity provided by radio jingles to promote policies or castigate opponents' policies and party. Political parties and candidates are known to use sponsored jingles to brand, rebrand or define opponents[13]. A political jingle through radio commercials does provide voters the avenue to have more critical consideration on the various problem-solving options as championed by candidates and political parties during elections. Individual rational thinking is further aided by these jingles in the radio as people known to have used generated information to decide on their voting preferences.

_____

13). In several elections around the world, candidates and political parties deployed jingles in the Radio through commercial placing. Opponents are branded and defined by contesting rivals and most times made to appear fraudulent in the evaluation of voters.

3.6.3.3)   World Wide Web

The "World Wide Web" application has become the fastest means of communication among people, irrespective of demography, gender, location or time[14]. Political parties and candidates have taken into the various platforms offered by the system to build contacts and reach-out to voters. Nevertheless, the "WWW" system has subsectors under Social Networks, and all these Sub-sectors increased the veracity of election campaigns in societies, where internet services are available for use.

3.7)   Print Media:

The use of print media to advance positions, ideals and opposition to policies does provide the society, opportunity to contrast between the existing policies and the various policies and positions promoted by those against the retention of the status quo[15] (figure 4.3 below).

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14). Parties, candidates and supporting groups can effectively run campaigns on privately hosted Homepages. With a hosted homepage, parties, candidates and groups can easily and conveniently design and attend to voters and mobilize supporters during elections. Constant updating of the Homepages help to keep voters informed about development within the party and in the polity. Voters can easily consult hosted Homepages to confirm changes or new development with regards to candidate or party position on any national topical issue.

15). Print media contribution to campaign in the society dated back to several decades before the advent of electronic media in the 1960s. See Plasser, Fritz and Guanda Plasser, (2002), Global Political Campaigning: A Worldwide Analysis of Campaign Professionals and their Practices, Westport, CT: Praeger.

Figure 3.8 showing a tabulation of subsectors in the Print media and Election Campaign.

In most developed democracies, the media is known to play strong roles in directing the electoral process as well as the electoral preferences of voters. I want to concede to the fact that contemporary democratic election processes without the media active participation is inconceivable. Indeed, the essentiality of the media impacts have compelled scholars like Cwalina, Falkowski, and Newman to admit that,

"Campaign literature in the form of flyers, brochures, fact sheets, and letters is an ubiquitous feature on the electoral landscape in every country"

(See Cwalina, Falkowski, and Newman, 2011, pp, 202-203).

Indeed, Newspapers, Magazines, Posters, flyers and billboards can be portable and transferable. Nevertheless, written materials have the advantage of being portable in that they can physically be passed from one community member to another, thus increasing the number of opportunities they have to make an impression[16].

3.7.1)   Newspapers

Newspapers as one among the sub-sectors in "mediated campaign"[17] does provide large proportion of voters chance to receive information from the different political parties without having to attend rallies organized by them. However, despite the wide delivery coverage in Newspaper distribution[18], the content it may intend to deliver to the public has limited penetration in the society. In most developing societies, only very few people are literate enough to read and understand the various positions being canvassed for or against by politicians and political parties. In many societies also, not every eligible voter has the financial liberty to purchase newspapers on daily basis.

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16). See Wojciech Cwalina, Andrzej Falkowski, and Bruce I. Newman (2011, p, 203), Political Marketing: Theoretical and Strategic Foundations, London, M.E. Sharpe

17). The use of mediated campaign is a reference to Wojciech Cwalina, Andrzej Falkowski, and Bruce I. Newman (2011), Political Marketing: Theoretical and Strategic Foundations, London, M.E. Sharpe

18). Mediated campaign through Newspapers has been one among the effective means to advance a party political intention before voters in most societies with low development in electronic media platforms. The use of Newspapers as campaign medium provides voters the opportunity to receive information and election message from several contesting parties and individual candidates. Newspapers publication contains variety of opinions and evaluations from parties, candidates, supporters and political interest groups.

3.7.1.1) Magazines

Another aspect I have viewed to be very important in "mediated campaign" is the use of Magazines. However, the contents in magazines are usually directed to a particular segment in the society. Nevertheless, the nature of news coverage in Magazines makes it exclusively relevant for the affluent in the society. Most times, arguments advanced in magazines do reflect only those policy issues that affect the advantaged ones in the society. Mediated campaign through the use of Magazines is almost an exclusive privilege of the financially balanced working class people in a society. The cost of magazines can make it exclusively for the more educated and people in the corporate realm of the civil society.

3.7.1.2) Posters, Flyers, Billboards

Posters, billboards, flyers containing party as well as candidates' mission statement are parts in "mediated campaign strategy". Indeed, with posters, voters are made to be aware of what each party and candidate support or intend to implement if voted into office. Flyers are distributed by parties' and candidates' agents, who go around town as Volunteers. In various towns, billboards are seen to adorn all corners and streets announcing the presence of different parties and candidates during elections.

3.7.1.3). Social Media: Blogs, Twitter/Facebook, Chat-Rooms

As development in the electronic media has continued to expand, political parties and candidates have continued also to exploit every opportunity provided to reach diverse voters. It is my belief, that Social Media channels have diversified electronic media in election campaigns. Individual voters can easily follow up a campaign of a political party without being physically present at an organized rally. As contained in figure 3.9 below, one can see the various subsectors in social media.

Figure 3.9 Connectivity in relation to Social Media and Election Campaign Strategy.

Bloggers have become integral part of election campaigns as they constantly write about policy issues, missteps of candidates, and above all attack candidates and parties. Blog as a medium is open and accessible to every voter. Furthermore, the emergence of Twitter, Face book and Chat-Rooms has modernized campaign communication, and has also created added message expansion. Since young people are known to have dominated Twitter, Face book and Chat-Room platforms, it has become very easy for sponsored political messages to penetrate users.

3.7.1.4)   Telephone: SMS, Robot Calls.

Another innovation brought to campaigns is the evolution of telephone services through "Short Message System" (SMS). It has become highly patronized in campaign use by political parties and candidates. Various campaign teams are known to have used Short Message System (SMS) to send election campaign

messages to people in different telephone networks. With the innovation in telephone message delivery, voters are inundated with information from candidates and political groups soliciting for votes. Indeed, SMS is used by politicians to peddle rumors, and make also false allegations. The SMS is used for smear campaign by politicians and interest groups.

Robot-call is a telephone propelled election message delivery system. Indeed, "robot-call" is used to mobilize voters during elections. Voters receive unsolicited election campaign messages, which could be sponsored by political interest groups, candidates, or political parties asking for support during elections. Election contenders are known to use the robot-call medium to send negative calls or rebuttal calls to voters. It is an effective medium through which voters are persuaded by vote seeking candidates and political parties. Robot-call is used also to send contrived or falsified information about an opponent.

3.8). Electoral Communication and Internets Users: Vote-Shopping

One among the recent development in technology and policy marketing is the method of election communication. Election campaign teams have seized the innovation and opportunity created by technology to launch various online vote shopping platforms. Several scholars have written on political communication such like Oates, Owen, and Gibson (2006, pp: 1 – 56), LeDuc, Niemi and Norris (2010, pp: 98 – 139), Lees-Marshment (2011, pp: 127 – 237, 2010, pp: 1 – 29, and 263 – 296), John Street (2011, pp: 261 – 282). In major democracies around the world, especially democracies where development in technology induced communication has reached optimum level, parties and candidates are known to use technology implements to shop for potential voters and policy supporters through created online platforms. Of course, these platforms are manned or operated by party agents (figure 3.10 below). The Online vote shopping platforms includes Electronic Mail (E-mail), Newsgroups and Newsletters. Advantage of each of the platforms is in the extensiveness of area coverage. Nevertheless, each platform is capable to deliver bulk message at once.

Figure 3.10 showing a web of communication between voters and campaign teams.

Online vote shopping enable voters cross-check different policy positions as canvassed for or against by candidates and political parties. Online vote shopping enable voters make electoral preferences, or choices without having to attend organized rallies, watch television for election commercials, or listen to campaign jingles on radio.

3.8.1)   Online Communication Models

The Internet does provide users many mediums to communicate with people even outside their own environment. Campaigners can reach their potential voters within seconds, or convince voters without having physical contact with each other. Election campaign teams are known to have engaged voters through various mediums made possible by Internet communication.

3.8.1.1).   E-Mail Campaign Messages

E-mail campaign message delivery system is an innovation exploited by politicians in search for voters. Campaign teams are known to have used E-mail addresses generated in the field and through membership registration to mobilize voters. Electronic Mail campaign strategy can make it much easier for political parties and candidates to reach voters at minimal cost. The use of bulk electronic message delivery system can offer campaigners opportunity to reach wide range of voters.

3.8.1.2).   Newsgroups and Newsletters

Newsgroups and Newsletters are known to offer party campaign teams' platforms to communicate and persuade voters for support. The use of Newsgroup and Newsletter platforms by election campaign teams is aimed at corporate organizations. Indeed, the use of Newsgroups and Newsletters can reduce the need for voters to attend public rallies and campaign programs organized by candidates or political parties.

Chapter 4

4).   The Geography and the People

The state boundaries inherited by each of the three case study countries were arbitrarily constructed, which does not contain the totality of the various ethnic nationalities. As Alex Thompson, while making analysis of Kenya, noted that "Kenya reflects the rest of Africa in that it inherited arbitrary state boundaries from its colonial past" (See Thompson, 2010, p, 24). However, Nigeria and Ghana are located in West Africa, while Kenya is located in East Africa. Incidentally, the three countries had similarities in ethnic characteristics. Each country has multiple ethnic groups, and the ethnic groups lived far separated from each other. The above explanation is further represented on country basis below.

4.1).   Nigeria: Igbo, Yoruba and Hausa-Fulani

Geographically speaking, Nigeria is located in west coast of Africa. Nigeria is the country with the largest population in Africa. According to the account of Nigeria by Iloeje, Nigeria lies between Latitudes 4 degrees and 14 degrees north of the equator, and Longitude 3 degrees and 15 degrees east of the prime meridian (See Iloeje, 2007, p. 2). Nigeria occupies a landmass of 933, 768 square kilometers. The longest distance North-South is approximately 1,605 kilometers. As Iloeje noted, "Nigeria is bordered on the west, north and east by French speaking Benin Republic, Niger, Chad and Northern Cameroun in that order, but on the southeast by the English speaking Western Cameroun" (See Iloeje, 2007, p. 2). Furthermore, Nigeria is bordered in the north by Sahara Desert, while the Atlantic Ocean at the Gulf of Guinea washes its southern shores (Iloeje, 2007). Nigeria as stated before became an independent country in 1960. The country has multiple ethnic nationalities, with three major groups, namely; Igbo in the southeastern, Yoruba in the southwestern, and Hausa-Fulani in the North. However, apart from the south west of the country, each of the other major ethnic groups in the East and North has multiple minority ethnic groups.

4.1.1). The Igbo ethnic group

The Igbo people live in the south eastern Nigeria. According to Okoro, "the southeast of Nigeria is the ancestral homeland of the Igbo (Ibo) people". It went further to suggest that "the area stretched from Cross River in the southeast to the areas across the Niger River in the direction of southwest Nigeria" (See Okoro, 2015, Isichei, 1973). The main domains of the Igbo people are Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu, Imo, and large parts of Delta (Anioma), Rivers, Benue, Cross River, and Akwa Ibom states. However, there are some sub-groups among the Igbo, like the Aros of Arochukwu, the Bams of east Bende, Wawa people of Enugu district, the Ezza of Abakaliki, the Ngwa people of Aba, the Ikwere of Rivers, and the Anioma people of Delta (See Okoro, 2015; Horowitz, 2000, Murdoch, (1959, pp: 242 – 250). Scholars like Ottenberg, Forde and Jones, had categorized the Igbo people into five broad divisions: northern or Onitsha Igbo, southern or Owerri Igbo, western Igbo, eastern or Cross River Igbo, and northeastern Igbo" (See Ottenberg, 1958, pp: 295 – 317), Olisa, (1971, pp: 16 – 29), Okoro, (2015), Isichei, (1969, pp: 321 – 438). Igbo people are known to dominate trade and commerce, manufacturing, Palm fruits farming in Nigeria. The Igbo are known to control also significant part in financial services sector, education, science and technology in Nigeria. They are itinerant, as they are found almost in every town and village in the country and beyond. Above all, Igbo people are Christians, as they travelled around the country; they take along with them their Christian faith.

4.1.2). The Yoruba ethnic group

The Yoruba people live in south western part of Nigeria. As Okoro stated, "state building in the pre-colonial Yorubaland resulted to the establishment of large towns and Kingdoms that operate with concentrated or structured authority" (see Okoro, (2015, p. 121); Ajayi and Smith, (1977). In referencing Oguntomisin's account about Yoruba people; Okoro noted that "there is the summation that the Yoruba share the same mythical ancestor in Oduduwa" (see Oguntomisin, (1981, p. 223 – 237), Atanda, (1973, pp: 1 – 9). According to Forde account, the Yoruba people are found in Ogun, Oyo, Ondo, Ekiti, Lagos, and Osun states. They are found also in parts of Kwara, and Edo state, as well as in part of Benin republic.

There are also sub-groups among the Yoruba, namely, the Ijebu, Egba, Egbado, Ekiti, and Awori (See Forde (1951, p. 1), Lloyd, (1955, pp: 235 – 251). However, looking deeply into the historical factor of Yoruba origin, one would agree with the position of several scholars, who concluded that, "the Yoruba, irrespective of location share some traditional and cultural traits as well as the same history of origin traceable to the Kingdom of Ile-Ife" In view of the above, one may be right to assert that there are no significant differences among the Yoruba people. The Yoruba are known to dominate the civil service of Nigeria. They have significant number of their people in the police force, paramilitary agencies and also in the armed forces. The Yoruba people are also into education, transportation, and cocoa farming. The Yoruba people are mixed in terms of religion, as one could find Muslims and Christians in the same family lineage. There are also other Yoruba people who are traditionalists (worship native gods).

4.1.3).   The Hausa-Fulani

The Hausa and Fulani people live in the extreme north of Nigeria. According to Okoro, "the Hausa or Habe and the Fulani or Fulbe were two distinct nationalities that assimilated one another to become a distinct bloc of people who are called Hausa-Fulani" (See Greenberg (1947, pp: 193 – 211), Smith (1964, pp: 164 – 194), and Ejiogu (2004). The assimilation was a product of Fulani conquest of the Hausa in a jihad, which was declared in 1804 by Uthman Danfodio. Today, the people speak the same Hausa language, and practice their religion under the same Islamic faith (See Smith, 1964). Accordingly, it is right to say that it is only in the north of Nigeria that the Hausa and Fulani exist as a homogeneous mix of Hausa-Fulani (See Coleman (1958), Murdoch (1959, pp: 89 – 99), Tibenderana (1983, pp: 517 – 534), Waldman (1965, pp: 333 – 355). The Hausa-Fulani occupies the extreme northern part of Nigeria. They are the dominant group in the northern region. The Hausa-Fulani are found in Sokoto, Kano, Kaduna, Zamfara, Kebbi, Katsina, and Bauchi. The Hausa-Fulani are found also in large numbers in places like Adamawa, Niger, Taraba, and

Plateau (See Okoro, (2015, pp: 85 – 87), Murdoch (1959,pp: 89 – 99). The Hausa-Fulani are known to dominate the Security Forces, politics and administration of the country. Most of the Hausa-Fulani people rear cattle, so, many among them live

nomadic life style. Above all, many among the Hausa-Fulani are into subsistence farming. Illiteracy rate among Hausa-Fulani ranked highest in the country, and maybe in Africa. They are Muslims, and they are not socially friendly.

4.2):   Kenya: The Kikuyu, Luo, and Kisii

A geographical expanse in contemporary Africa described as "Kenya" is located in the eastern part of Africa. Kenya is bordered in the east by Indian Ocean, and extends west-ward to Lake Victoria. The Landmass of Kenya covers an area of 225,000 square miles or approximately 583,000 square kilometers[1]. Only about 11% of Kenyans landmass is of high or medium agricultural potential with regular and sufficient rainfalls' most of the rest land area is covered by grassland as well as deserts (See Berg-Schlosser, 1984, p.18). However, Kenya is inhabited by several tribes and ethnic groups, namely; the Maasai described by some scholars as eastern Niolitic[2] people as well as the Kalenjin addressed as Southern Niolitic who migrated to the territory known presently as Kenya from the north; there are also people of Bantu ancestry (See Thompson, 2010, p, 23), who migrated from west Africa, such as the Kikuyu, Kamba, Embu, Mbere, Tharaka, Mijikenda' and lastly the Luhya, Gusil and Kisii groups. There are also people of western Nilotic ancestry, such as the Luo found in the western part of the country as well as the Galla and Somali who dominate the north and northeast of contemporary Kenya; they are equally described to be of Cushitic[3] ancestry (See Thompson, 2010, p, 23; Berg-Schlosser, 1984, p, 18).

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1). See Republic of Kenya, Statistical Abstract 1974, Nairobi, 1975, p.2.

2). The use of the term "Niolitic" refers only to common linguistic affinity of the groups and it does not contain any social or political relationship among them.

3). The term "Cushitic" is used here for explanatory convenience to refer to the roots of general classification for linguistic and ethnicity in Kenya.

Indeed, there are about 42 different ethnic groups listed in the Kenyan population. It must be noted also that apart from the Africans, Arab traders were on constant visit to Kenya since the seventh century, while the European migrants began to settle in Kenya around late 19th century. In addition, people of Asian descent from the Indian subcontinent began to stream into Kenya from around 20th century (See Thompson, 2010, p.23-24).

4.3):   Ghana: The Akan (Asante, Fante), Ga - Adangbe, and Ewe

 Modern day Ghana was a creation of foreign and alien political power, just like every other society within the confine of Sub-Sahara Africa. Ghana landmass covered an area of 238,305 square kilometers and has a human population of about 23.5 million[4]. Ghana is located in West Africa and shared border with countries like Togo in the East, Ivory Coast in the West and Burkina Faso in the North, and lastly Atlantic Ocean in the South. Interestingly, like every other sub-Sahara African society, Ghana is populated by people that belong to different ancestral lineage or ethnic identity. There are about 5 dominant ethnic groups in Ghana, namely; the Akan people (Asante, Fante), the Ga-adangbe and the Ewe ethnic groups located in the east and who extended to Togo. There is also the Ga - Adangbe, as well as the Moshi-Dagomba ethnic group (See Thompson, 2010, p. 210). As in Kenya and Nigeria, the several ethnic groups found in Ghana have no common link to each other. Every ethnic group in Ghana existed independent of others.

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4). See Alex Thompson (2010, p, 210), "An Introduction to African Politics, third edition, London, Routledge-Taylor and Francis Group

The above claim on the absence of link between the various ethnic groups is explicitly manifested in the run-up to the 2008 run-off for the inconclusive presidential election. According to Gyimah-Boadi,

"The NDC meanwhile, tried to marshal non-Akan voters by stoking their hatred of the NPP and depicting it as the party of Ashantis and the affluent. Both parties shamelessly attempted to mobilize ethnic votes, virtually declaring their respective strongholds, the Ashanti Region for the NPP and the Volta Region for the NDC as, "no-go" zones for their opponents"

(See Gyimah-Boadi in: Diamond and

Plattner, 2010, p. 142)

Like in every other society in sub-Sahara Africa, ethnicity legitimacy or identity rights protection was invoked as a mobilization tool, especially when the race for the presidential office was seen to be very tight between the two leading political parties, NPP and NDC.

4.4). Post-Independence politics and Principle of Representative Governance:

The three countries used as case study in this dissertation had in the post-independence, a political structure and governance that was tailored along Westminster model. Political competition in the period had assumed different positions, as the inherited political culture was to become ethnocentrically defined. How authority was structured, the composition of the political leadership, and the style of governance is established below.

4.4.1).   Nigeria

As Nigeria became an independent country in 1960, the pattern of representative government was regional structured. However, after independence, the country adopted the bequeathed Westminster political model, with a President who exercised only ceremonial power, and also the office of a Prime Minister who was the head of government.

Nevertheless, the ethnic composition of the country made politics and governance a difficult adventure. According to Gboyega's narration,

> "In 1939, for example, the South was divided into the western and eastern groups of provinces for administrative purposes. Six years later, Arthur Richards, the colonial governor, observed that 'Nigeria falls naturally into three regions, the North, the West, and the East, and the people of those regions differ widely in customs, in outlook and in their traditional systems of government"
>
> (See Gboyega, in: Zartman 1997, p. 155), See also Awa (1964, p.17).

Before independence, three dominant political parties (NPC, NCNC, and AG) were formed, though each of the parties built their support base along ethno-regional interest. However, there were intermittent military interventions in the governance of the country. In 1966, the democratic elected coalition government ended as the military took over government. Although, the exercise was a failed coup attempt but it succeeded in disrupting the democratic government in power. In that circumstance, General Thomas Aguiyi Ironsi assumed responsibility as the head of the established military government. However, in less than seven months there was another military take-over of governance. After the second coup in 1966, Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon was named head of the Military government. Yakubu Gowon was in power until 1975, when he was overthrown by group of Soldiers led by General Murtala Mohammed. Then on the February.13.1976, the military government led by General Murtala Muhammed ended as he was killed in a failed military coup attempt.

However, in 1978, General Olusegun Obasanjo who succeeded late General Murtala Mohammed in office initiated a return to democratic politics. According to Emmanuel O. Ojo narration while referencing Oluleye,

"As part of the process of securing legitimacy, General Mohammed pledged to hand over to a democratically elected civilian government on 1st October 1979 after he might have successfully implemented his transition time table"

(Quoted in Oluleye, 1985, 173), See Ojo, In: Agbaje,

Diamond, and Onwudiwe (2004, p. 66).

Afterwards, General Obasanjo handed over power in 1979 to Shehu Shagari who was the leader of the elected National Party of Nigeria (NPN). However, the democratically elected government led by NPN ended on December.31.1983. The government was overthrown by the Military led by General Muhammadu Buhari under the Military Supreme Council (SMC). But the military government under General Buhari ended in 1985 after it was toppled by some members of the same Supreme Military Council (SMC) led by General Ibrahim Babangida. However, General Babangida military government lasted from 1985 until 1993.

In between though, General Babangida initiated processes to democracy return, but recorded only marginal success. Nevertheless, General Babangida handed over power in 1993 to an Interim National Government (ING) led by Alex Shonekan, before stepping aside from office. Unfortunately, in November 1993, the Interim National Government (ING) ended as the Military once again took over power. General Sani Abacha became the head of the formed Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC). General Abacha died mysteriously in office in 1998, and General Abdulsalam Abubakar took over power, and he initiated another process for return to democratic politics. General Abubakar military government conducted a successful democratic election and handed over power to retired General Olusegun Obasanjo who was the candidate of the democratic elected party, People's Democratic Party (PDP).

Finally, from 1999 to 2011, there has been three democratic election cycles. Above all, People's Democratic Party (PDP) won the presidential elections from 1999 to 2011. The party had controlled also the two chambers in the National Parliament, namely; the Senate, and the House of Representatives.

4.4.2).   Kenya

Political emancipation of the Kenyans began with organized opposition to the colonial domination and rule through the Kikuyu led Mau Mau uprisings in the 1920s. The several anti-colonial violent clashes championed by the natives resenting the colonial administrative policies, forced the colonial authority to seek for the cooperation of elite in the colonial society for political development and partnership. However, those that eventually teamed up with the colonial authority happened to be people who were already engaged in pay job positions in the colonial administration, like teachers, civil service union leaders and many more. Unfortunately, the class of people selected by the colonial authority had no strong social features with the vast majority of locals who championed the Mau Mau uprisings.

However, Kenya became an independent country in 1963, though, sooner than the British colonial authority had envisaged. Nevertheless, the political arrangement that came out of the negotiation was more than what the colonial authority anticipated; because, rather than just a mere junior partnership, the nationalist were actually looking for outright independence and self-rule (See Thompson, 2010, p.26). Despite the sudden evolution of Kenya's independence demand, the British colonial authority managed as parting gift to leave Kenya with a liberal democratic constitution prepared during the pre-independence negotiations (See Thompson, 2010, p.26).

Without doubt, it was very glaring that the political institutions established by the independence constitution would be weak, since it was an imposed document. The Constitution did not emerge from the people or derived its source from the cultural heritage of the local people it meant to serve. Nevertheless, the constitution does contained suggestion for multi-party democracy in Kenya. This was done despite the fact that, there was never a sort of liberal democracy in any part of sub-Sahara Africa. As a consequence, Kenya was forced to establish a political culture that is in agreement to the pluralist political institutions bequeathed to it by the departing colonial authority.

Based on the fact that the constitutional political provisions and model of politics was alien to the Kenyan public, the Westminster democratic model collapsed within one year of post-colonial Kenya.

Consequently, the smaller of the two political parties that contested in the post-independence elections, namely; the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) merged with the winner of the post-independence election, the Kenyan African National Union (KANU) (Thompson, 2010, p. 27). The development created an unwanted political situation as KANU ruled Kenya from 1964 until 2002 presidential multi-party election. Indeed, the state was forced to embark on electoral reforms which eventually provided opposition politicians the chance to challenge and defeat the ruling KANU in 2002. However, centralization of political power in Kenya began in 1964, especially with the abolition of the office of Prime Minister and was replaced with the more powerful and centralized function of presidential system. Also in 1966, the Kenyan Senate or second chamber became abolished and created instead a unicameral legislature.

Incidentally, the death in 1978 of President Jomo Kenyatta brought Daniel Arap Moi into office; and after assuming office, President Moi promised to liberalize Kenya's political process and create room for advancement. However, after surviving an attempted coup staged by the air force in 1982, President Daniel Arap Moi consolidated his position of power by turning Kenya into a one-party state. The return to a one-party democracy brought to an ultimate end the liberal democratic politics in Kenya. According to Schmitz,

> "President Arap Moi and KANU led government suffered serious political attack from internal political contingencies as well as from external pressure to reform the democratic process in the country"

> (See Schmitz, Hans Peter (2006: pp.174-178).

The outcome of the exerted pressure was the return to multi-party democracy in Kenya in 2002. At this time, President Moi retired from politics and a coalition of Opposition politicians defeated his party, the KANU in the December 2002 presidential election. However, in 2007 presidential election, which formed part of the basis for this dissertation, the weaknesses resulting from ethno-political cleavages thwarted every democratic gain Kenya made from previous democratic reforms.

4.4.3).   Ghana

The post independence politics in Ghana was characterized by several political intrigues. The political journey of Ghana showed different phases of democratization process. According to the account given by Boahen (See Adu-Boahen, In: Zartman, Bakary, Adu-Boahen, Gboyega, and Rothchild, 1997, pp: 99 – 144), Ghana has had eight regimes. The first stage started from the post-independence government under Convention People's Party (CPP) led Kwame Nkrumah between 1957 and 1966. The CPP government, which ruled for 10 years, was toppled by the military led by Generals Joseph A. Ankrah and Akwasi A. Afrifa. The military National Liberation Council (NLC) regime handed over power to Kofi A. Busia of the Progress Party (PP), which happened to be the winner of the 1969 democratic election. Incidentally, the government of Busia and his Progress Party ended in 1972 through another military take over just after 3 years. As Boahen noted,

"The second republic under Busia only lasted three years, and it was ended by in 1972 by the National Redemption Council (NRC) followed by the Supreme Military Councils (SMC) 1 and II of Colonels I. K. Acheampong and Frederick W.K. Akuffo, which were removed in 1979 by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) of Flight Lieutenant Jerry J. Rawlings"

(See Boahen, 1997, In: Zartman, Bakary, Boahen,

Gboyega and Rothchild, 1997, p. 97).

However, in 1979, the AFRC handed over power to Hilla Limann who was the leader of the democratically elected People's National party (PNP). Unfortunately, the government under Limann could not last more than two years before it was removed from office. The government ended on 31.12.1981 through the second coming of Jerry J. Rawlings who ruled the country under Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC). According to Boahen,

"After a decade, the PNDC converted to a multi-party regime but rather handing over to a different party; Rawlings ran for office as a civilian and remained in power with the National Democratic Congress (NDC) as the winner of the 1992 elections, inaugurating the fourth republic"

(See Boahen, 1997, In: Zartman, Bakary, Boahen,

Gboyega and Rothchild, 1997, p. 97).

President Jerry J. Rawlings ruled for two terms of four years, and handed over power to President John Kufour in 2000. John Kufour ruled for a two term of four years under National People's Party (NPP), and the government ended in 2008. However, after President John Kufour's NPP led government ended in 2008, the opposition NDC under Late President John Atta-Mills won the 2008 Presidential election. Unfortunately, President John Atta-Mills died in office before the next scheduled presidential election in 2012.

4.5). Authority Pattern in Post-Independence Nigeria, Kenya and Ghana

The political systems, which operated in the three case study countries, reflected the political institutions inherited from the British colonial administration. As the British colonial administration was winding up, apart from living behind its Westminster democratic structures, it bequeathed as well its legislative and judicial systems to the people and countries. As one can see below, each of the countries in my case study list has adopted the British administrative system.

4.5.1).   Nigeria

Effective Democratic experience in Nigeria can be traced back to 1950s, when the country was divided into three regions with regional Assemblies or Legislature in each region headed by a Premier, who served as head of the regional government. Indeed, Nigeria operated Parliamentary democracy, where citizens in the regions, namely; North, East, and West elected their representatives. Of course, the elections were in two-fold, electing members going to the Federal Parliament in Lagos, and electing members for the regional Assemblies. In the 1950s political arrangement, the NCNC as the most viable and dominant party in the eastern region dominated the regional Assembly. Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe was the Premier of Eastern region, and Ahmadu Bello was the Premier of Northern region, while Obafemi Awolowo was the Premier of Western region. However, after Nigeria became Independent, the regional and party leaders opted to move to the federal level. At this time, Dr. Michael Okpara replaced Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe as Premier in the eastern region, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa replaced Ahmadu Bello at the federal parliament as the former prefer to stay back in the northern regional Assembly, while Chief. Samuel Ladoke Akintola replaced Obafemi Awolowo as Premier in the western region.

The members of the federal Parliament in the first republic (1960-1964) consists of 89 elected members of NCNC representing the eastern region, 73 elected members of AG representing western region, and 134 elected members of NPC representing the northern region, while 16 elected members were Independents.

In 1979 return to democratic politics, the country changed from parliamentary democracy to presidential democracy; thereby, changed from one national single or unicameral Legislature to Bicameral national Legislature. However, in the subsequent democratic election cycles, the authority structure based on Bicameral Legislature, consist of Senate and House of Representatives, was retained. The Nigerian Senate consists of 109 elected members based on 3 members each from the federal states and one member representing the federal capital territory. Also, the House of Representatives consist of 360 elected members elected based on population density of each demarcated federal constituency.

The executive functions independent of the Legislature and the Judiciary, thereby projecting the process of check-and-balances. The executive arm of the government is responsible for policy implementations. The president is an executive president, because he is directly elected by the electorate. As the third arm of the government is the judiciary, which is also independent of the executive and the legislature. Meanwhile, the authority structure at the federal level as explained above is replicated at the federal states level. The only exception is the legislature, where there is Bicameral legislature at the federal level (Senate and House of Representatives), but only unicameral (State House of Assembly) legislature at the federal states level.

Unfortunately, all the military governments in the country operated under a single strict military control center. The military government high command functions as executive and also as the Legislature. Only the Judiciary exist side-by-side with the military high command, although with no liberty or freedom to exercise independent authority.

4.5.1.1).   Kenya

Authority structure in modern Kenya politics showed that the presence of check and balances in the business of government administration. As a fundamental feature in a liberal democratic society, Kenya operates Bicameral Legislative Assembly. The Assembly consists of Senate, whose membership is both elected and non-elected,

and also the National Assembly, whose membership is also elected and non-elected representatives of the constituencies and interests. However, the 2010 Constitution divided Kenya into 47 constituencies, and each constituency is to have one elected member in the Senate as a representative.

According to 2010 Constitution article 98, 47 members of the Senate must be directly elected by the registered voters[5] and each of the elected members shall represent one of the 47 single member constituencies in Kenya. In addition, the article 98 stated also that there shall be, "16 women members who shall be nominated by political parties according to their proportion of members of Senate elected under clause (a) according to article 90"[6].

Furthermore, there is the addition of 2 other members, being one man and one woman representing the Youths, and also two members being one man and one woman representing persons with disabilities. Article 98 mandated that the Speaker of the Senate "shall be an ex-officio member."[7] In essence, the 2010 constitution, article 98, which established the Senate, provided for Senate of 68 members both elected and also non-elected representatives.

However, as the lower chamber of the Parliament of Kenya, the National Assembly was equally established through constitutional instrument. The 2010 constitution of Kenya, article 95 establishes the National Assembly of Kenya. The Article 95 provides for the establishment of the National Assembly with 349 members. As the article 95 stated, the National Assembly shall consist of "290 members, each elected by the registered voters of single member constituencies; 47 women, each elected by the registered voters of the counties"[8]. Article 90 of the 2010 constitution further provide for "12 members, nominated by parliamentary political parties according to their proportion of members of the National Assembly in accordance with 'article 90',

to represent special interests, including the youths, persons with disabilities, and workers."[9] It further provide that the Speaker shall be "an ex-officio member"[10]

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6). See Constitution of republic of Kenya, 2010, article 98.

7). See Article 90, Republic of Kenya constitution, 2010.

8). See www.parliament.go.ke/index.php/the-national-assembly

9). See Article 95, Constitution of Republic Kenya, 2010

10). See Article 90, Constitution of Republic of Kenya

4.5.1.2).   Ghana

Ghana post-colonial political advancement emerged from the same pattern taking by other societies in Sub-Sahara Africa. The 1957 Ghana independence resulted in the demise of the former British Gold Coast Colony and British Togoland. The two colonies merged to form Sub-Sahara Africa's first independent state (see Thompson, 2010, p. 205).

However, after securing independence from Britain, the nationalist government that emerged centralized the state, and the political institutions and process became personalized around Kwame Nkrumah. As was the case in most post-colonial West African states, the military ousted the nationalist led governments in both Nigeria and Ghana citing corruption, nepotism and divisive policies. Nkrumah led CPP government was ousted in 1966 by the Ghanaian military. However, the following 15 years was characterized by several coups and counter-coups as well as intermittent presence of elected civilian government. However, the coming of Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings brought measureable stability in the system. Rawlings went on to remain in power until he retired in 2000, having successfully won multi-party elections in 1992 and 1996 (see Thompson, 2010, p. 206).

As part of the authority structure, Ghana operated in 1954 a Unicameral Legislature, which consists of 104 elected parliamentarians. In the 1954 and 1956 Ghana's Legislative Parliament, the CPP under Kwame Nkrumah won 71 seats on each election cycle. However, in 1969, the numbers of Parliamentarians to be elected increased from 104 to 140 members. In the 1969 National Assembly election, the Progress Party (PP) won 105 seats from the total 140 seats to be contested by the parties. The government ended following the intervention of the military, and the parliament dissolved. However, in 1979 return to democratic politics, another Parliamentarian election was conducted. In the third republic parliamentary election the People's National Party (PNP) won majority of the parliamentary seats with 71 members. Meanwhile, the total membership of the National Assembly was restructured to 104 parliamentary seats. As stated before, the third republic ended in 1981 following another military take-over of government.

As the country returned to democratic politics in 1992, the National Assembly membership was enlarged from 104 seats in 1979 National Assembly election to 200 parliamentary seats in 1992 National Assembly election. In the 1992 National Assembly election, the ruling NDC led by President Jerry J. Rawlings won 189 parliamentary seats. Although, the opposition protested and contested the result of the presidential election as was announced, and as a consequence, they boycotted the scheduled December 1992 parliamentary election. Furthermore, in the 1996 National Assembly election, the ruling NDC won 133 parliamentary seats, while the main opposition party, NPP won 60 seats.

Two other minor parties won the remaining 7 seats in the parliament. However, in 2004 National Assembly election, the membership of the parliament was enlarged from 200 to 230 members[11]. In the election to elect National Assembly members, the ruling party NPP led by President John Kufour won majority of the seats. But in 2012 election, the National Assembly membership was further enlarged from 230 members to 275 seats[12]. Indeed, all along, Ghana operates a Unicameral Legislature, with no upper chamber or Senate.

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11). See www.peacefmonline.com/pages/politics

12). See www.peacefmonline.com/pages/politics

Chapter 5:

5). Election and Party Politics in the Case Study Countries

Powell,Jr. explained that competitive elections can be seen as the "instrument of democracy" (See Powell, Jr. 2000, p. 4 – 5), it is my belief as well that elections can enable citizens to decide the political fate of politicians. The above argument is on the belief that Politicians, Interest groups and Political parties compete to assume positions of authority in societies. As I have observed in the case study countries prior to the elections under reference, different ethnic groups had positioned and mobilized their communities to electorally defend their collective historical and political interests. Indeed, the use of previous ethno-regional and political narratives to persuade voters to vote otherwise was a catalyst in the focused elections. Party nomination process for the three candidates assumed the same narratives. Each of the candidates was internally opposed by ethno-regional forces in each party. In Nigeria, the emergence of President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan was deeply resisted and challenged by northern elements in the party who thought otherwise. Also, the candidacy of President John Dramani Mahama was equally challenged by some elements within the party. Indeed, the candidacy of John Mahama was challenged by the wife (Nana Konadu Agyeman Rawlings) of former President Jerry Rawlings, which resulted to her leaving the party to form another party. Furthermore, the candidacy of Mwai Kibaki in 2007 was challenged by Raila Odinga, and as a consequence, Raila Odinga and his supporters left the Party and formed ODM. Raila Odinga had accused Mwai Kibaki of promoting Kikuyu agenda. In all the three case study countries, the re-nomination of the three sitting presidents to contest in the focused election cycles had produced controversies and political discontents in the polities.

5.1). The Period 2011: Presidential Election in Nigeria

Incidentally, the candidates nominated and presented by the four political parties possessed in the perception of many voters more appreciable image than the political parties that nominated them. In that understanding, several voters supported the candidates and certainly not the parties that presented them.

Individually, the candidates over time built up personal image that became recognized by many of the registered voters in the country. According to Okoro narration,

> "Goodluck Ebele Jonathan was formerly a university lecturer, a former deputy Governor of Bayelsa State, a former Vice President, and later assumed functions as an acting president when former President Umaru Musa Yar Adua became incapacitated, and finally on May 2010 became substantive President after the death of President Umaru Musa Yar Adua"

(See Okoro, 2015).

So, before the election, Goodluck Ebele Jonathan has already become a sitting president. However, Muhammadu Buhari was a retired Major General in the Nigerian Army, a former military head of state and have contested as a presidential candidate in the three previous democratic elections and lost in all occasions. On his part, Ibrahim Shekarau was a former teacher and later became a Governor of Kano State in the Northern part of the country. He was actually contesting for the office of president for the first time. On his own part, Nuhu Ribadu had no executive experience before his nomination as a presidential candidate for Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN). However, he was a former Police officer and formerly the head of the country's Anti-Corruption Agency (EFCC).

The desire of political parties to upstage each other had resulted in the candidates and parties employing non-conventional campaign mechanism to win votes during the 2011 presidential election in Nigeria. What was to be a competition driven by ideological differences, supported by superior argument on the best means in solving the numerous socio-political problems in the society, suddenly became ethno-regional and religiously modified. Voters who ordinarily should have cast ballot according to their rationally derived opinions became ethno-regionally converted and made to cast ballot according to their ethnicity, regional and religious affiliation.

The Presidential election in 2011 did not represent democratic competition built on policy intents and ideological demands as exemplified through conservatism and liberalism.

The demand for regime change as championed by the three candidates from the northern part of Nigeria renders their campaigns and the eventual outcome of the election dangerous to democracy consolidation. Despite the fact that the election was a national one, and indeed, an election conducted to elect a President of the country, many of the contenders could not campaign in all the states in the country, but relied on the ethno-regional and religious solidarity to claim victory. Furthermore, many of the candidates do not have presence in all parts of the country; this ultimately made campaigns and message to be regionally centered and religiously modified, thus; lacking conventional and contemporary democratic legitimacy.

5.1.1) Political Parties: PDP, ACN, CPC, ANPP

In the 2011 presidential election, though several political parties participated in the election, but only four parties had very active participation. The Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), campaigned in all parts of the country, though being the ruling party, it was possible for the party to embark on country-wide campaign tour because it had presence in every town and village in the country. The Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) and All Nigerian Peoples Party (ANPP) were able to campaign only in selected states in the country. However, two of the three opposition parties were very dominant and present in every town in the Northern part of the country in the case of CPC and ANPP, while ACN was the dominant political party in the western part of the country. Unfortunately, none of the two northern concentrated parties could boast of any appreciable presence in the entire old Eastern region, thereby given the ruling party advantage in vote hunting.

5.1.2) APGA, Labor

Although, the All progressives Grand Alliance (APGA) and Labor Party (LP) each had control of a federal state, the two political parties could not present any candidate in the presidential election. The two parties, APGA and LP had resolved instead to adopt and support the candidate of PDP in the election. The adoption and support given by the two parties had further brightened the chances of the ruling party and its candidate Goodluck Ebele Jonathan to secure more approval from the electorate.

So, while the other opposition parties were busy trying to use regional and religious solidarity to create sentiment in the country, especially within the old northern region, the ruling party in conjunction with APGA and LP was busy building coalition of voters around the country.

5.1.3)   Party Image

As the presidential election of 2011 drew near, the image factor of participating political parties became a selling point among voters. Since the return to democracy and democratic politics in 1999, the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) has remained the ruling party and has not gone into any merger, loss of name or identity. The presence of the party as the ruling party at the national level and in more than 2/3 of the federal states in the country made the party a household name in the country's political lexicon. Although, many voters have different reservations and conclusions about the overall performance of the ruling party, however, there were several voters who believed in the ability and political philosophy of the party. Nevertheless, the candidates presented by the three major Opposition parties, as well as the image of the parties, were in the perception of many voters, a representation of core religious and regional induced competition[1]. This held perception had worked against the candidacy of the Opposition candidates as Christians in the old northern region voted enthusiastically for the candidate of PDP, and that ultimately helped tremendously to raise the vote count for the president and his ruling party.

Nevertheless, majority of voters in the northern region were relying on the assumed popularity of CPC candidate to clear and win the entire 19 federal states in the region and make inroad into six other federal states in the south to become president-elect.

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1). The reliance on ethnic and culturally contrived demography to fight elections in the selected democratic societies provided avenue for bitter political build-up towards the 2011 presidential election. The adoption and exploitation of the emotional platforms embedded in each of the contrived demography in the society, though less effective in social realms, became a common slogan in the streets and at homes. Consequently, the situation led to charge political and social dislocation, as the people became divided along solidarity electoral demography. Indeed, the contrived scenarios became manifested through social and cultural preferences during the campaigns and in other aspects of the elections.

Unfortunately, the campaign teams, as well as the various interests groups, in the core old northern region introduced religious sentiments into the campaign mobilization drive. Essentially, none of the political parties that participated in the 2011 presidential election could boast of any appreciable and attractive image that voters could refer to as motivation for electoral support.

5.2).   The Period 2007: Presidential Election in Kenya

The presidential election conducted in 2007 in Kenya was to be a replication of political events that shaped the previous 2002 presidential election. Indeed, the 2002 presidential election had led to the defeat of the ruling KANU by a coalition of political actors under National Alliance Rainbow Coalition (NARC) under Mwai Kibaki. Prior to the 2007 presidential election, political differences had divided the ruling NARC, which resulted to the formation of ODM coalition and PNU coalition. As Kagwanja and Southall narrated,

> "The prospects for democracy in Kenya were enhanced by the resounding defeat of KANU by the National Alliance Rainbow Coalition (NARC), itself an alliance of Mwai Kibaki's National Alliance Party of Kenya (NAK) and ex-KANU rebels in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) led by Raila Odinga"

> (See Kagwanja and Southall, 2009, p: 261).

Mwai Kibaki, Raila Odinga and many other smaller parties formed the National Alliance Rainbow Coalition (NARC) ahead of the 2002 presidential election. Unfortunately, the 21 November 2005 Kenyan constitutional referendum had irredeemably divided the elite members of NARC. According to Kagwanja and Southall, the division was,

> "Between those inclusive of Kibaki and many government officials, who backed the government sponsored constitutional draft, and their rivals in LDP and KANU"

> (See Kagwanja and Southall, 2009, p: 261).

But after voters had rejected the draft constitution, Mwai Kibaki had to reshuffle his cabinet and he went ahead to drop all LDP members in his new cabinet. However, following the political uncertainty between 2005 and 2007, and as Jeffrey Horowitz, Kagwanja and Southall, Michael Chege separately narrated in their studies, LDP moved ahead and joined KANU to form a loose opposition coalition, the ODM, while NARC politicians loyal to Kibaki formed a new Party, NARC-Kenya (See Kagwanja and Southall (2009, pp: 259 – 277), Jeffrey Horowitz (2009, pp: 1 – 34), Chege, (2008, 197 – 210).

Unfortunately, the ODM collapsed ahead of the 2007 election and split into two independent parties, namely; Orange Democratic Movement Party of Kenya, and was led by Raila Odinga, and Orange Democratic Movement-Kenya (ODM-K) led by Kalonzo Musyoka. However, the KANU faction led by Uhuru Kenyatta decamped to PNU, a party formed in September 2007 for the purpose of President Mwai Kibaki's re-election effort. Indeed, Mwai Kibaki's alliance with Uhuru Kenyatta to form the Party of National Unity (PNU) ahead of the 2007 could be argued to derive its strength from Kikuyu solidarity more than any national political interest. But with 2007 election in sight and with his resolve to contest against President Mwai Kibaki; Raila Odinga and his allies had to deploy anti-Kikuyu sentiment as campaign instrument to fight the presidential election. However, the implosion of NARC and the working relation between Uhuru Kenyatta led KANU and Mwai Kibaki led National Alliance (NA) was all that was needed to shove Raila Odinga's Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) and its allies away from winning the presidential election.

5.3).   The Period 2012: Presidential Election in Ghana

John Dramani Mahama: As the former Vice President to the late John Atta Mills, John Dramani Mahama, from Northern Ghana, was to become the substantive president of Ghana after the demise of the former President. As a proposed Vice Presidential candidate in the scheduled December 2012 presidential election under National Democratic Convention (NDC), he had to replace the already nominated sitting president late John Atta Mills as the NDC flag-bearer in the election. However, President John Mahama automatic nomination was not without opposition from within

the party hierarchy, especially, from Nana Agyeman Rawlings, the wife of former President Jerry Rawlings.

Nana Addo Dankwa Akuffo-Addo is a well known Lawyer and a close confidant to the former President John Agyekum Kufuor, who ruled Ghana for two terms. Nana Akuffo-Addo is viewed as an astute politician, who contributed immensely in the contemporary democratization of Ghana. However, several among his critics and commentators had viewed Nana Akuffo-Addo as somebody very arrogant, desperate, violent, and too ambitious as well as someone that believes he is an omniscient politician and can alone fix Ghana.

As indicated by several findings prior to the 2012 presidential election, President John Mahama was projected to be elected by majority votes. Indeed, there was general belief or assumption that the party in power, (NDC), had developed a strategy wholly built on dynamism, youthfulness, national mobilization based on branding, and packaging of the president. Ghana as a country on the verge of democracy consolidation had provided stable political atmosphere, where candidates and political parties were able to defend their different held ideological views and policy positions before the voters. Indeed, there was motivation for free, fair, credible and violence free electoral contest. In the light of the above, political parties and candidates had to strive to consolidate in their electoral strongholds, and also made attempts to raid and penetrate opponents' electoral territories for votes during the 2012 presidential election.

Despite policy positions of the candidates and political parties dominating electoral issues and voter preferences in the 2012 presidential election campaigns, the parties had still to rely on the regional mobilization factor to seek support. The NDC had viewed voters in Volta, Northern, Upper East and Upper West regions as its traditional supporters, while NPP had in its' view voters in Ashanti, and Eastern, Central and Western regions as its traditional supporters. Despite Boahen's (See Boahen 1997, in: Zartman, 1997, p. 145), raised fears about Akan and Ewe rivalry, the seemingly peaceful nature, gently disposition of candidates, parties' mobilization strategy and concentration efforts in the 2012 presidential election in Ghana, there was no sign of ethno-regional consciousness in the election.

5.4). Political competition: Ethnic blocs and Election in the Case Study Countries

According to Donald L. Horowitz's opinion,

> "there is one principal conflict issue axis, the ethnic conflict axis,
>
> which preempts others"

(See Donald L. Horowitz, 2000, p. 346)

In the light of the above expression by Horowitz, I did see the need to explore the various fundamental factors politicians relied upon to prosecute their campaigns and political interests. Indeed, the political atmosphere in Nigeria has been that, which is totally eclipsed by ethnicity, regional and religion consideration. Everything politics in the country is centered on ethnicity, religion and region, and everything ethnicity is reinforced by regional and religious affiliation. In essence, politics in the country is synonymous with ethnicity, religion and regional identity.

I want to base my observation and conclusion on Pye's, "communal identity" (See Pye, 1958, p. 469), Geertz's, "primordial loyalty" (See Geertz, 1963, pp. 109 – 113), "collective ancestry" by Donald Horrowitz (2000), and also Lijphart's "communal attachment" (See Lijphart, 1977, p. 17). As I have elaborated already, the 2011 presidential election was fought with instruments provided by ethnic, religious and regional political armory. Voters were divided along the three factors, communities were divided along the three factors, and religious leaders campaigned for their affiliates based on the three factors.

Also, the situation in Kenya was reflective of things that happened in Nigeria. As the 2007 presidential election drew nearer, the political atmosphere had assumed two of the three fundamental factors, which got politics in Nigeria and Nigerians divided. As Horowitz narrated about ethnicity and political domination concerns in the run up to Kenya's Independence,

> "In Kenya, it was 'Kikuyu domination' that was feared"

(See Donald L. Horowitz, 2000, p. 189).

In the run up to the 2007 presidential election, candidates used ethnicity bias as campaign instrument. As Kagwanja and Southall noted,

"Although earlier multiparty elections in 1992, 1997, and 2002 were fought along ethnic lines in most Kenya's communities, ethnic polarization reached a fever pitch in the 2007 election"

(Kagwanja and Southall, 2009, p: 261).

Indeed, ethnic bloc politics has been a recurrent factor in Kenya's elections. According to Kagwanja and Southall narration,

"Since colonial days, political tribalism, and inter-ethnic struggle for the control over the state have revolved around the Kikuyu, Luhya, Luo and the Kalenjin groups, who occupy the high potential agricultural belt from Nairobi and its environs to Lake Victoria and the border with Uganda"

(See Kagwanja and Southall, 2009, pp, 259-277).

Furthermore, Chege narrated how the opposition led by ODM was to become immersed in ethnic modified election campaign as reflected in their incessant rhetoric against President Mwai Kibaki and Kikuyu. The act was a strong pointer to democracy devaluation. According to Michael Chege, ODM campaign turned the election into a contest of,

"Forty-one tribes against one" and "Kenya against the Kikuyu"

(See Chege, 2008, In: Diamond and Plattner, 2010, pp. 205).

In Ghana as well, ethnic bloc political interests terrorized other neighboring communities. As Horowitz narrated in his study, a respondent who happened to be of Ashanti origin expressed her feelings when she said,

"If the British had not come," the Ashanti would have taken over the whole country"

(See Horowitz, 2000, p. 205; and Owusu, 1975, p. 259).

The place of ethnicity in Ghana's politics has been in concealment for decades. Indeed, ethnic nationalism in Ghana as in other Sub-Sahara Africa played out more vividly in the 1969 presidential election. As Owusu narrated how an Ashanti man in Swedru was emphatic in explaining his opposition to a political party led by an Ewe under K.A. Gbedemah in Ghana's 1969 election, where the man said,

"Have you ever heard of an Ewe chief ruling over Ashanti? No, Busia is our man"

(See Austin and Luckham, 1975, p, 255; Horowitz, 2000, p, 307).

As the political interests and tensions anchored on fears were in Nigeria and Kenya, so was it in Ghana though very moderate. Indeed, the age-long ethno-political tension among groups in Ghana, especially between Ashanti and Ewe nationalities had compelled politicians, and voters to think of political and economic domination.

5.5). Evolution of Multi-party Representative Democracy in the Case Study Countries

The growth and expansion of democratic politics in the three case studies had taken different dimensions. Indeed, Nigeria and Ghana had experienced intermittent military interventions, while Kenya never had military interruption in its civil democratic governance. As I have established below, only Nigeria has had multi-

party democracy since independence in 1960. Table 5.1 below is the tabulation of democratic political growth in Nigeria.

Political Evolution in the Case Study countries (1)		
Nigeria: 1960 – 2011		
Year	Party System	Political System
1960 – 1964	Multi-party	Parliamentary Democracy
1964 – 1966	Multi-party	Parliamentary Democracy
1979 – 1983	Multi-party	Presidential Democracy
1989 - 1993	Two-party System	Military / Civilian Democracy
1998	Multi-party	Military / Civilian Democracy
1999 – 2011	Multi-party	Presidential Democracy

Table 5.1: Political evolution in Nigeria from 1960 to 2011.

As I have indicated above in table 5.1, from the year 1960 to the year 1966, Nigeria had a multi-party parliamentary democracy for almost six years. As consequence of intermittent military intervention into politics, the country changed and adopted presidential democracy in 1979. However, after several rounds of military interventions from 1984 to mid 1999, the country decided in 1999 to retained presidential democracy as it returned to path of democratic politics in 1999. Although, the country had a mixture of military and civil democratic arrangement between 1991 and 1993, the parliament and federal states governors were directly elected by voters through Universal adult suffrage. But in 1996 to 1998 democracy attempt, the military government of General Sani Abacha had refused to recognize the election of political office seekers who had won various seats, both as federal states' governors and as members of the federal parliaments (Senate and House of Representatives).

Indeed, political evolution from the 1960's started with the formation of predominantly regional based political parties with massive ethnic followership. The political evolution, especially on the issue of party formation, which I want to agree with, that it does followed the pattern of ethnic party system discussed by Donald L. Horrowitz (2000, pp. 291 – 364). As noted by Donald Horowitz in his characterization of ethnic parties that, "the tendency to organize parties along ethnic lines is very strong in most deeply divided societies, particularly those in which a few major ethnic groups meet at the national level of politics. It is a tendency that is cumulative: once one party organizes along ethnic lines, others are inclined to follow suit" (See Horowitz, 2000, p. 306). Since the first republic, political activity has continued to reflect ethnicity in the country. This has made scholars like Adebayo Williams to conclude that,

"Nothing better encapsulate Nigeria's endemic crisis of nationhood and the grim reality that it is a nation without nationals.

…. No leader has yet made it his conscious mission to weld the disparate nationalities of Nigeria into a unified bloc… (As the) nationalities (are) boxed into geocolonial space of the memories of their distinct histories"

(Quoted by Ayandiji Daniel Aina, In: Agbaje,

Diamond, and Onwudiwe, 2004, p. 94).

The only exception was the two-party system that was introduced by General Ibrahim Babangida during his transition to democracy experiment between 1989 and 1993. The two-party option had removed the presence of ethnicity and religion as political factors in the party politics. As I have indicated in table 5.1 above, there was no military intervention from 1999 to 2011, as election were conducted every four years interval. In essence, Nigeria does operate a four year democratic politics, whereby candidates were elected through popular votes by voters. Below is the table with the list of registered political parties in the Four Republics, beginning from the pre-independence era.

Evolution of Multi-party Democracy in Nigeria: 1960 – 2011		
Year	**Political Parties**	**Coalition government**
1960 – 1964	• National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) • Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) • Action Group (AG)	• NPC + NCNC (In the First Republic)
1964 – 1966	• National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) • Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) • Action Congress (AG) • Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) • United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) • Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) • Mid-west Democratic Front (MDF)	• NNA: (NPC, NNDP, MDF). • UPGA: (NCNC, AG, NEPU, UMBC). (First Republic 2nd Federal election)
1979 – 1983	• National Party of Nigeria (NPN) • Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP) • Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) • Peoples Redemption Party (PRP) • Great Nigerian Peoples Party (GNPP)	• NPN + NPP (As a Presidential System, the Coalition was formed only at the federal Parliament, Senate and House of Representatives)
1983	• National Party of Nigeria (NPN) • Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP) • Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) • Great Nigerians Peoples Party (GNPP) • Peoples Redemption Party (PRP) • Nigerian Advance Party (NAP)	None
1989	• Social Democratic Party (SDP) • National Republican Convention (NRC)	None

1996	• United Nigeria Congress Party (UNCP) • Congress for National Convention (CNC) • National Centre Party of Nigerian (NCPN) • Democratic Party of Nigeria (DPN) • Grassroots Democratic Party (GDM) • All Nigerian Congress (ANC) • Peoples Consensus Party (PCP) • Social Progressive Party (SPP) • Peoples Progressive Party (PPP) • National Democratic Labor Party (NDLP) • National Democratic Party (NDP) • Solidarity Group of Nigeria (SGN) • Progressive Party of Nigeria (PPN) • Peoples Redemption Party (PRP) • National Solidarity Peoples Alliance (NSPA)	Under General Sani Abacha's democratic experiment
1999 – 2003	• Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) • All Peoples Party (APP) • Alliance for Democracy (AD)	None: (Only joint candidate between APP and AD for the presidential election in 1999).
2003 - 2007	• Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) • All Nigerian Peoples Party (ANPP) • Alliance for Democracy (AD) • All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA) • United Nigerian Peoples Party (UNPP) • National Democratic Party (NDP)	None
2007 – 2011	• Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) • All Nigerian Peoples Party (ANPP) • Action Congress (AC) • All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA) • Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) • Labor Party (LP) • Over 55 other small political parties	None

Table 5.2: List of political parties between 1960 and 2011 in Nigeria.

In Kenya, the growth or development of representative democracy in the country can be viewed to have started effectively back 1964. As Thompson noted in his analysis of overall political development of Kenya, whereby he argued that, "Within a year of decolonization, the smaller of the two parties that had contested the independence elections, the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), merged with the victor, the ruling Kenyan African National Union (KANU). KANU was to govern Kenya without an opposition from this point in 1964, right through until electoral reforms were forced upon the state, and it lost election in 2002" (See Thompson, Alex, 2010, p. 27). Table 5.3 below contained the evolution of representative democracy in Kenya.

Democratic Evolution in Kenya as a Case Study country (2)		
Kenya: Political Evolution 1964 to 2007		
Year	Party System	Political System
1964 – 1966	Multi-party System	Presidential Democracy
1966 – 1978	Quasi-one Party System	Presidential Democracy
1978 – 1992	One-party System	Presidential Democracy
1992 – 2007	Multi-party System	Presidential Democracy

Table 5.3:   Evolution of Democratic politics in Kenya.

As indicated in table 5.3 above, one may be right to claim that Kenya had operated One-party system as soon as the first post-colonial election was over. Indeed, in contrast to Nigeria that has operated multi-party democracy from independence to the present, Kenya was dominantly a one-party state between 1966 until 1992. Multi-party democracy did start effectively from the 1992 presidential election, where multiple political parties were allowed to participate in the elections. Indeed, according to the narration given by Michael Chege, "In 1988, government banned secret balloting for legislative elections, and voters were required to line up publicly behind the candidate of their choice" (See Chege, In: Diamond and Plattner (eds) (2010, pp: 199 – 200). Indeed, between 1978 and 1992, democracy in Kenya was effectively degraded. Furthermore, Chege noted that, "In 1989, Freedom House downgraded Kenya's aggregate ranking to Not Free" (See Chege, In: Diamond and Plattner (eds), 2010, p. 200).

The above statement from the Freedom House 1989 ranking and democracy status of Kenya confirmed, as cited by Michael Chege in his analysis of politics in Kenya that the country went from "Not too free to Not Free". Indeed, between 1978 and 1992, Kenya had become officially a One-party state. The official One-party status of Kenya had lasted for fourteen years (1978 – 1992). However, multi-party democracy in Kenya had started officially with the 1992 multi-party national elections. However, as Chege in: Diamond and Plattner (2010, pp: 199 – 210), Thompson (2010), Kagwanja and Southall (2009, pp: 259 – 277), had separately narrated, in 2002, a coalition of multiethnic political actors under National Alliance Rainbow Coalition (NARC) was able to defeat the ruling KANU. But in 2007, another two coalitions were formed, and namely; Party of National Unity (PNU), which was the ruling party, and Orange Democratic Movement (ODM).

As I have stated above, there was no clear difference between the era of KANU under President Jomo Kenyatta and the period ruled by Daniel Arap Moi. President Kenyatta had abolished features that represented opposition politics in his time, and President Daniel Moi in turn had made politics in Kenya effectively a One-party democracy. In contrast to Nigeria where no single political party, elected President or government could effectively banish opposition politics or turn the country to a One-party democracy; Kenya had two strong men in President Kenyatta and President Moi. Both men had become authoritarian leaders in their political actions. Indeed, the actions and leadership styles of the two former presidents had made the practice of multi-party democracy in Kenya difficult. Consequently, Michael Chege in his analysis of President Daniel Arap Moi leadership style had concluded that, "The Kenyan people expected an end to the culture of impunity and corruption that characterized the Moi years and the prosecution of the malefactors; they expected fair public appointments "that reflected the face of Kenya" and renewed efforts to reclaim Kenya's international reputation for stability and hospitality to tourists and foreign investors" (Diamond and Plattner, 2010, p. 200). In my observation and analysis, multi-party democracy is very young in Kenya.

Nevertheless, there is still not the presence of multi-party system in the real sense of party politics in Kenya, because, the election in 2002, and 2007 were fought by two different coalition parties, which one could describe as "coalitions of convenience". As instrument or institution through which democracy is given meaning, political parties,

should either as a multi-party or one-party democratic system, provide opportunity for fair competition. I have in table 5.4, the list of registered political parties in Kenya from 1964 to 2007.

Evolution of Multi-party Democracy in Kenya 1964 – 2007		
Year	**Political Parties**	**Coalition parties**
1964 – 1966	- Kenya African National Union (KANU) - Kenyan African Democratic Union (KADU).	None: Oginga Odinga joined President Jomo Kenyatta KANU party, and that brought to an end the issue of Multi-party politics in the 1960s
1966 – 1978	Kenyan African National Union (KANU)	None
1978 – 1992	Kenyan African National Union (KANU)	None
1992 – 1997	- Kenya African National Union (KANU) - FORD-Asili (F A) - Democratic Party (DP) - FORD-Kenya (F-K) - Kenya National Congress (KNC) - Kenya Social Congress (KSC) - Kenya National Democratic Alliance (KNDA) - Party of Independent Candidates of Kenya (PICK)	None
1997 – 2002	- Kenya African National Union (KANU) - National Development Party (NDP) - Democratic Party (DP) - FORD-Kenya (FK) - Social Democratic Party (SDP)	None

	• FORD-Asili (F - A) • Kenya National Congress (KNC) • Kenya Social Congress (KSC) • FORD-people (F-P) • Kenya National Democratic Alliance (KNDA) • United Patriotic Party (UPP) • Green African Party (GAP) • Labor Party (LP) • Independent Economic Party (ICP) • UMMA Patriotic Party (UMP)	
2002 – 2007	• Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) • Democratic Party (DP) • Ford-Kenya (F-K) • National Party of Kenya (NPK) • Kenyan African National Union (KANU) • FORD-People (F – P) • FORD – Asili (F – A) • Safina (S-P) • Sisi Kwa Sisi (SKS) • Shirikisho Party of Kenya (SPK)	• NARC (NA, LDP, others). • KANU
2007 – 2012	• Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) • Party of National Unity (PNU) • Orange Democratic Movement-Kenya (ODM – K) • Kenya Peoples' Party (KPP) • Kenya Patriotic Trust Party (KPTP) • Saba Saba Asili (SSA) • Chama Cha Uma (CCU) • Republican Party of Kenya (RPK)	• ODM Coalition • PNU Coalition

Table 5.4: List of major Political Parties in Kenya 1964 – 2007.

Nevertheless, in the 2007 National elections, there were about 118 different registered political parties that participated in the election. However, only about 23 political parties were able to win seats in the Legislative Assembly. The development of representative democracy in Ghana began effectively after the country became independent. Table 5.5 below contains the tabulation of growth in representative democracy from the First Republic or post-independence election in Ghana to 2012.

Democratic Evolution in the Case Study countries (3)		
Ghana: Evolution of Representative Politics 1957 – 2012		
Year	Party System	Political System
1960 – 1964	Multi-party System	Westminster System
1964 – 1966	One-party System	Presidential System
1969 – 1972	Multi-party System	Presidential System
1979 – 1981	Multi-party System	Presidential Democracy
1992 – 2012	Multi-party System	Presidential Democracy

Table 5.5: Evolution of Representative Democracy since post-independence in Ghana.

As I have indicated above in table 5.5, representative democracy in post-independent Ghana began in 1960, when Kwameh Nkrumah was made the President of the republic. Indeed, the political structure inherited from the departing British colonial authority had remained until 1964, when President Nkrumah suspended multi-party democracy through the suspension of the country's constitution. By the suspension of the constitution by President Nkrumah's government, Ghana was to become officially and effectively a one-party state.

The second republic began in 1969 and it lasted until 1972, when the military once again took over government. A national election under multi-party democracy was conducted in 1969, which was won by Dr. Kofi Busia and his Progress Party. Unfortunately, the military intervention stunted the growth of democracy, and they also refused to allow political actors to progress and learn from their mistakes. However, the 1969 national election that brought Dr Kofi Busia to power was conducted under multi-party system.

The third republic began from 1979 and it lasted until 1981, when the military under Flt Lt Jerry John Rawlings successfully intervened and removed the democratically elected government under Dr Hilla Limann. However, the fourth republic began in 1992 under multi-party representative democracy. The election was won by Flt Lt Rawlings and his party, the National Democratic Congress (NDC). As was the case with Nigeria, there were intermittent military interventions that disrupted the flow of democratic practice.

As narrated by Gyimah-Boadi in his analysis of politics in Ghana, "the country has enjoyed vast improvements in the quality of each successive election under its Fourth Republic. Despite persistent challenges, the independence and administrative capacity of Ghana's Electoral Commission (EC) has improved with each election, while levels of public interest in national elections has remained high (evidenced by voter turnouts consistently above 70 percent)" (See Gyimah-Boadu, In: Diamond and Plattner, 2010, p. 137). However, in table 5.6 below is a list of active political parties from 1964 to 2012 in Ghana.

Evolution of Multi-party Democracy in Ghana: 1960 – 2012		
The Transition to multi-party democracy		
Year	Political Parties	Coalitions
1960 – 1964	- Convention Peoples' Party (CPP) - United Party (UP) - United Gold Coast Party (UGCP)	None
1964 – 1966	Convention Peoples' Party (CPP)	President Kwameh Nkrumah declared Republic of Ghana a one-party state.

1969 – 1972	• All Peoples' Republican Party (APRP) • Justice Party (JP) • National Alliance of Liberals • Peoples' Action Party (PAP) • Progress Party (PP) • United Nationalist Party (UNP)	• None
1979– 1981	• Action Congress Party (ACP) • Popular Front Party (PFP) • Peoples' National Party (PNP) • Social Democratic Front (SDF) • Third Force Party (TFP) • United National Convention (UNC)	• None
1992 – 2012	• All Peoples' Congress (APC) • Convention Peoples' Party (CPP) • Democratic Freedom Party (DFP) • National Democratic Congress (NDC) • New Patriotic Party (NPP) • National Democratic Party (NDP) • Democratic Peoples' Party (DPP) • Peoples' National Convention (PNC) • Progressive Peoples' Party (PPP) • Independent Peoples' Party (IPP) There are other 20 small registered political parties in Ghana.	There are about 30 registered political parties in Ghana since the beginning of the 4th Republic

Table 5.6: List of Political Parties in Ghana between 1960 and 2012.

As I have established in table 5.6 above, the registered political parties in Ghana numbered about 30, but only two political parties are strong enough to make impact in both presidential and parliamentary elections. As was the case with Nigeria, there were several military interventions and interruption of democratic governance, but unlike in Nigeria where multi-party democracy was a tradition, Ghana experienced under President Kwameh Nkrumah a one-party democratic era.

5.6). Election and Campaign Factors in the Case Study Countries

The feeling of being dominated or marginalized in national politics has served as incentive for each ethnic community to want to protect and preserve its interest and unique identity. As was cited by Donald L. Horowitz in his reference of ethnic fears and hypothetical reaction in Nigerian assert that,

> "Northern Nigerians suspected that, in a self-governing Nigeria the north would in effect be a backward protectorate governed by southerners"

> (See Horowitz, 2000, p. 188).

Even in the account and narration of other scholars of Nigeria's history and politics, the sequence of narratives has always been weaved around policies and measures with corresponding ethnic representation. Coleman is one among the several Euro-African scholars with various works on politics and ethnic constellation in Nigeria. He had argued as I want to quote below that,

> "The threat of southern domination, fancied or real, was the major stimulant in the northern awakening"

> (See Coleman, 1958, pp. 360-363).

Looking also at the comment made by Agbakoba, who is a frontline legal practitioner and one time President of Nigerian Bar Association (NBA- an umbrella body of legal practitioners in Nigeria), whereby he argued that,

> "We don't have political compass for Nigeria. So, we are a mass of people with various cleavages, and fault-lines, religious, ethnic, and linguistics roaming in the vast territorial space called Nigeria"

> (See more on, www.vanguardngr.com/2015/05/the-booby-traps-before-buhari-olisa-agbakoba/#sthash.u9w4ngk1.dpuf).

Indeed, the above conclusion by Agbakoba does reflect the inner-political thinking of an average Nigeria. I am deeply convinced that the fundamental factors on which democracy and elections relied upon in Nigeria are culturally, socially and politically interconnected. Furthermore, I want to objectively agree that Pye (1958), Geertz (1963), Lijphart (1977), Lewis (1965) were right when they centered their positions on primordial cleavages as source of political mobilization force in heterogeneous societies, which Nigeria is one.

In Kenya as well; the basis for campaigns and mobilization of voters were vividly captured by Chege (2008, pp: 190 – 200), Mouka (2008), Kagwanja and Southall (2009, pp: 259 – 277), and also by Jeffrey Horowitz (2009, pp: 1 – 34). In their separate submissions on elections and campaigns in Kenya, they were all in agreement that primordial loyalty as factor had moderated the various campaigns prosecuted by the parties and political interest groups. As Chege had noted in his analysis of ODM campaign strategy, and as I have cited below,

> "The party's grassroots campaign turned the election into a contest of 'forty-one tribes against one' and 'Kenya against the Kikuyu', with the campaign highlighting Kikuyu domination of government, and the commanding heights of the economy, including banking and trade, and blaming Kikuyu success for the marginalization suffered by the other groups"

<div align="right">(Chege, 2008, In: Diamond and Plattner, 2010, p. 205).</div>

Mutua is also one among several indigenous scholars who had argued that the promotion of ethnic interest above national interest has contributed negatively to erode political trust among the political elites in Kenya. Indeed, the refusal of Mwai Kibaki to keep to an agreement he had reached with other political actors after the 2002 presidential election was viewed by others as betrayal and sign of ethnic domination. According to Mutua's argument,

> "Political parties in Kenya typically fall under tribal lines, valuing ethnicity above political ideology and policy. This is due to the perception that the party offers the best hope for one within the tribe to assume power, and then share state resources with tribal members"

> (See Mutua, 2008, p. 22; Jeffrey Horowitz, 2009, p. 6).

In essence, election and campaign factors in Kenya have remained primordial loyalty centered. Ethnicity and imaginary political domination concerns are determinant of party coalition, electoral preferences and choices made by voters during the 2007 presidential election. Democracy consolidation has contributed significantly in the removal of several of the political hindrances that had shaped politics in Ghana. As observed from the 2012 as well as the recent presidential elections in Ghana, ethnicity or primordial loyalty factors have diminished from the public discourse. Nevertheless, despite educational issues coming top among issues in campaign during the 2012 presidential election, ethnic consideration was still able to find its way into determinant factors as a voting preference. As reported in one of the Online News platforms, a member of New Patriotic Party (NPP) and also supporter of the party candidate in the 2012 presidential election, Kennedy Agyepong, while mobilizing the party supporters for the 2012 presidential election had advised them,

> "To arm themselves and slaughter the members of Ewe and Ga tribes"

> (See www.thewillnigeria.com/2012/07/politics/ghana-election-2012-who-wins-and-why?

But despite such calls and political mobilization as was advised by Agyepong, there was no report of any serious security breach either during the campaigns, or after the election. It is equally one among the reasons that I want to agree with Boahen's conclusion, where he noted that,

> "Apart from the occasions of military coups and attempted coups, conflict in Ghana has not assumed any violent form"

> …"Conflict in Ghana has not been seriously centered on or caused by issues of identity, race, religion, or ethnicity"

> (See Boahen, in: Zartman, 1997, p. 144).

Indeed, primordial loyalty as election and campaign factors had lost its influence in Ghana in the preceding years after independence in 1957. Although, it is to the credit of Ghanaians, that religion has never become a serious or determinant factor in political or social relations in the country. Nevertheless, Boahen had admitted that ethno-regional political concern does exist in Ghana, especially between Akan and Ewe tribes. He did agree that there is some animosity and rivalry between the Akan and Ewe. Again, Boahen had equally admitted that,

> "The antagonism has never resulted in any direct conflict between those two ethnic groups except occasionally within the armed forces"

<div align="right">(See Boahen, in: Zartman, 1997, p, 144).</div>

Unlike in Nigeria, and Kenya, where primordial loyalties is the determinant factor in electoral preferences, and serve also as source of conflict between ethnic groups; conflict in Ghana was never regional, religion, ethnicity, race, or class determinant. As Boahen posited,

> "All the conflicts in Ghana have been between the various organized demand-bearing and interest groups and the government"

<div align="right">(See Boahen, in: Zartman, 1997, p. 145).</div>

Chapter 6:

6). Democratic Presence in the Case Study countries

In this dissertation, another of my intention is to establish the level and presence of democracy in the case study countries of Nigeria, Kenya and Ghana. However, how to measure the presence or absence of democracy in a society cannot wholly be dependent on every factor raised by freedom-house, National Democratic Institute (NDI), International Republican Institute (IRI), United States Institute of Peace (USIP), European Union Election Observation Mission (EU-EOM). As much as I want to acknowledge the validity or universal acceptance of findings from the above listed or more organizations, I may not be compelled to focus my attention and observation only on the Institutional factors. My concern in this chapter Six is to look at the appointment mechanism, how each democratic institution leadership is recruited, appointed or installed. Indeed, the fundamental intention is to evaluate the influence of primordial factors in the appointment, recruitment or installation of the occupants of each democratic institution in the case study countries.

6.1). Nigeria: Presidentialism: Executive-Bicameral Legislature-Judiciary

Democracy presence in Nigeria, as I was able to find in my study is reflected in the mode of recruitment, and appointment of those who have occupied the Institutions of democracy. Under presidential democracy as practiced in Nigeria, the executive, the legislature, and judiciary were meant to operate separately. It does imply that each organ, as an institution in democratic governance, should strictly adhere to the principle of separation of powers or check-and-balances. The Nigerian 1999 constitution has established and recognized presidential system of government, with executive, bicameral legislature at the federal level, and executive arm, single legislature and judiciary at the federal states level (See table 6.1 below).

The Legislature in Nigeria	
The Senate	**The House of Representatives**
President of the Senate	Speaker of the House
Deputy President	Deputy Speaker
Majority / Minority Leader	Majority / Minority Leader
Chief / Minority Whip	Chief / Minority Whip
Others officers	Others officers
109 direct elected members	360 direct elected members

Table 6.1 showing structure of the Legislature as Democracy Institution.

The 1999 Nigerian constitution did establish in chapter V, section 1, sub-section: 47, 48, and 49, the institution of Legislature. In chapter V, section 1, sub-section 47 stated that "there shall be a National Assembly for the Federation which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. In sub-section 48, it says,

"The Senate shall consist of three Senators from each State and one from the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja". Then, in sub-section 49, the constitution established the membership of the Federal House of Representatives, where it stated that "Subject to the provisions of this constitution, the House of Representatives shall consist of three hundred and sixty members representing the constituencies of nearly equal population as far as possible, provided that no constituency shall fall within more than one State".

Furthermore, in chapter V, section 1, sub-section 50 (1.a), it is stated that,

> "There shall be a President and a Deputy President of the Senate, who shall be elected by the members of that house from among themselves", and sub-section 50 (1.b) stated that, "there shall be a Speaker and a Deputy Speaker of the House of Representatives, who shall be elected by the members of that house among themselves."

The States Legislature is equally constitutionally established through the 1999 Federal constitution in chapter V, section ii, and sub-section 90, 91, and 92. The Executive organ is also a product of the 1999 Nigerian constitution as established in chapter Vi, section 1, sub-section 130 (1 and 2), and 131 (a, b, c, d). (See figure 6.1 below. The executive arm of government is meant to function exclusively as the organ responsible for the implementation of policies and decision-making in the polity.

The Executive arm of the government Nigeria
The Executive President
The Executive Council : President and his Ministers

Figure 6.1.Executive arm of the government in Nigeria.

Indeed, the constitution does provide that the President shall exercise executive order. The president shall also be the Commander in chief of the Armed Forces. The executive arm of the government must operate without institutional interference from the legislature and the judiciary. Thus, by the non interference of the other arms of government, the principle of checks-and-balances can be guaranteed. As a trade mark of democratic politics, separation of powers among the organs of governance is to ensured independence in policy-making and policy implementation. The 1999

Nigerian constitution did establish also the judiciary in chapter Vii. The Judiciary in Nigeria is structured as contained in figure 6.2 below.

The Judiciary in Nigeria

A	Supreme Court of Nigeria
B	The Court of Appeal
C	Federal High Court
D	The High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja
E	The Sharia Court of Appeal, Federal Capital Territory, Abuja
F	The Customary Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja

State Judiciary

A	High Court of a State
B	Sharia Court of Appeal of a State
C	Customary Court of Appeal of a State
D	Magistrate Courts

Figure 6.2 showing the Judiciary structure as an Institution of Democracy.

The judicial structure in the country is one among the several problems that has retarded democracy in Nigeria. Apart from the conventional court system, there is the existence of religious court structure, the Sharia system. The recognition of Sharia judicial system in the Federal constitution provided for two judicial systems in the country. However, the presence of institutions of democracy as represented in the structure of government proved presence of democracy in the country.

6.1.1). Kenya: Presidentialism: Executive-Bicameral Legislature-Judiciary

As provided for in the Kenyan constitution, some members of the Legislature are to be elected on the basis of single member constituency, while some are to be nominated by political parties in the parliament according to the proportion of votes received by each party in the election (See table 6.2 below).

Kenyan Parliament	
Senate	**National Parliament**
Speaker: Ex officio member	Speaker: Ex officio member
47 elected members	290 directly elected
16 nominated women by parties	47 elected women on County basis
2 nominated members (Youths)	12 nominated members by Parties
2 nominated members (disabilities)	
68 members	349 members

Table 6.2 shows the structure of Kenya's Parliament.

As a presidential democracy institution, the legislature being an arm of the government in Kenya is to function independent of the executive and judiciary, thereby reflecting separation of powers among the three arms of government. The independence of the Legislature in Kenya is to ensure also check-and-balances among the three arms of government.

Kenya is ruled through a presidential system of government. The President is directly elected by voters and he shall exercise executive powers as the commander in chief of the Kenyan Armed Forces. As the head of the executive arm of the government, the president shall appoint his ministers alone, though with the approval or confirmation of the nominees or nominee by the Parliament.

The Executive Arm of Government, Kenya
The Executive President
The executive council: President and his Ministers

Figure 6.3 Executive arm of government as democracy Institution in Kenya.

Indeed, as was the case with the legislature, the executive arm of government does function as well without the interference of the Legislature and Judiciary. The Independence of the executive arm is to guarantee separation of power among the three arms of government. Indeed, the independence of the Arms of government is to ensured adherence to check-and-balances, which is the hallmark of presidential democracy.

The Judiciary in Kenya
The Supreme Court of Kenya
The Court of Appeal
The High Court
Environment and Land Court
The Magistrate Court
The Kadhi's Court

Figure 6.4 showing the structure of the Judiciary in Kenya.

The judiciary in Kenya, as a democracy Institution does function independent of the executive and legislative arms of the government. Appointment and recruitment is subject to relevant section of the constitution regulating judicial services in Kenya. The independence of the judiciary in Kenya is to ensure that separation of power among the three arms of government is protected. Furthermore, the ability of the judiciary to function independent of the executive and Legislature ensured the maintenance of check-and-balances in the government. As trade mark of presidential democracy, the separation of the judiciary from the executive and legislature is to guarantee functional democratic politics.

6.1.2). Ghana: Presidentialism: Executive-Unicameral Legislature-Judiciary

The republic of Ghana does operate a presidential democracy, with an executive president who is directly elected by voters every four years. Ghana does operate also a single Legislative house, unlike Nigeria and Kenya. However, all the Parliamentary members or Parliamentarians are directly elected by the voters. Each elected parliamentary member has a four year mandate. Put differently, there is election every four years to elect new parliament members. There are 275 members in the National Parliament of Ghana representing different constituencies and political parties (See figure 6.5 below).

The Legislative Arm of Government, Ghana
275 elected members
4 political parties and Independent candidate represented

Figure 6.5 showing the composition of members of the Ghana Legislature.

As an institution of democratic politics, the composition of the Legislature is to ensure adequate representation of the masses in the act of policy-making. Consequently, the Legislature in Ghana functions independent of the executive and judicial arms of the government. However, the Laws establishing the Legislature in Ghana did provide for two Deputy Speakers in the parliament, and that one of the deputy speakers must be elected from the opposition party in the parliament.

The Judiciary in Ghana
The Supreme Court of Ghana
The Court of Appeal
The High Court of Justice
The Regional Courts

Figure 6.6 showing the structure of the Judiciary in Ghana.

The judiciary in Ghana, like in other developing democracies, is structured according to superiority. The judiciary operates without executive or interference from the Legislature. Under Ghana's constitution, the independence of the judiciary is guaranteed and protected. In essence, the independence of the judiciary ensured separation of power among the three arms of government. The principles of checks-and-balances in the functions of the executive, legislature, and judiciary guarantees non interference from any of the arms of government.

6.2).   Democracy and Periodic Election

As mark of democratic processes, the president and each of the elected member of the Parliament, either Senate or the House of Representatives as in the case of Nigeria, must stand election every four years. Of course, as mark of democratic principles, each elected Lawmaker must go back to the electorate and seek for mandate extension or for fresh four year tenure as the case may be. Periodic election is to ensure legitimacy of democratic authority, as elected public officials are rewarded for quality representations or rejected for poor representation. Of course, the tenure of an elected president or member of the national parliament ends after four years from the day of oath taking. Again, it is explicitly established in 1999 Constitution of Nigeria chapter v, section D, and sub-section 71 – 77 procedures in how to elect members of the Parliament through periodic democratic elections. Also, the 1999 Nigerian Federal constitution did establish in chapter vi, part 1, section A, sub-section 132 – 135 the procedures for the election, and tenure of an elected President of Nigeria.

In Kenya, the President, and members of the Parliament are constitutionally mandated to seek for the voters' mandate through periodic elections. As contained in the 2010 Kenyan constitution in chapters 9, the president, when elected shall hold office for tenure of five years before the next election. As stated in chapter 9, section 136, sub-section 2 (A), "An election of the President shall be held on the same day as a general election of Members of Parliament, being the second Tuesday in August, in every fifth year" (See Kenya Constitution, 2010, chapter 9, section 136, sub-section 2 (A)). Also the chapter 8 of the 2010 constitution of Kenya established the Kenyan Legislature comprising the National Assembly, and the Senate. The constitution of Kenya in chapter 8, section 101 stated,

> "A general election of members of Parliament shall be held on the second Tuesday in August in every fifth year"

>> (See the Constitution of Kenya, 2010, chapter 8, section 101).

Indeed, as I have stated and cited above, the chapters 8, and 9, of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 did establish the processes for periodic elections to elect the President and also the Members of the Kenyan Parliament. In Ghana, the periodic democratic election is guaranteed in the Constitution of Ghana 1992. As stated in chapter 8, section 66, and sub-section 1 that,

> "A person elected as President shall, subject to clause (3) of this article, hold office for a term of four years beginning from the date on which he was sworn in as President"

>> (See Constitution of Ghana, 1992, section 66, subsection 1).

Also in chapter 10 of the Constitution of Ghana, it stated that,

> "Subject to clause (2) of this article, parliament shall continue for four years from the date of its first sitting and shall then stand dissolved"

>> (See Constitution of Ghana, 1992, article 113, subsection 1).

The needs and processes for periodic democratic election in Ghana were boldly spelt out in the relevant sections of the Constitution of Ghana. With the all the processes I have enumerated above, I hold the belief, that institutionally speaking, there is the presence of democracy in the three case study countries.

6.3). Governance Structures and Interest Representation

The performance of the Institutions of democracy in the three case study countries does raised doubts about the sustenance of democratic principles in personal recruitment. The role and influence of primordial factors in the recruitment of government officials, elected and non-elected, does create doubts. As a consequence of primordial or identity factors, every government office, especially federal offices are known to have demanded for religious as well as ethnic and regional balancing. As depicted in figure 6.8 below, all the arms of government in Nigeria, where election is to be used to recruit office-holders, the above three factors must apply.

As indicated in figure 6.8 below, where the president and head of the executive is a Christian, and hails from one of the three constitutionally recognized regions, the vice president must be a Muslim and from the North. The same structure applies in the two chambers of the federal Legislature. Where the president of the Senate is a Christian, the deputy to the Senate president must traditionally be a Muslim (Although, there are exceptional cases). A good example is the composition of the national public officers after the 2011 national election.

Administration and representation: Nigeria		
The President		
Region	Religion	Ethnicity
Eastern	Christianity	Ijaw
The Vice President		
Region	Religion	Ethnicity
North	Muslim	Hausa-Fulani
Senate President		
Region	Religion	Ethnicity
North	Christian	Idoma
Deputy Senate President		
Region	Religion	Ethnicity
Eastern	Christian	Igbo
Speaker House of Representatives		
Region	Religion	Ethnicity
North	Muslim	Hausa
Deputy Speaker House of Representatives		
Region	Religion	Ethnicity
East	Christian	Igbo

Figure 6.7 showing presence of primordial factors and structure of organs of governance.

As presented above, governance structures in the country are under the influence of primordial or identity factors, thus; making Institutions of governance and democracy vulnerable to primordial attacks. It has been a tradition in the country's democratic history, that two individuals who belong to the same religion must not jointly occupy leadership positions in the country. Since 1960's, the office of the President and that

of the Vice President have been rotating between a Muslim and a Christian (as showed in table 6.3 below).

Governance Structure in Nigeria: The Presidency		
Year	**President**	**Prime Minister**
1960 - 1966	Christian	Muslim
Year	**President**	**Vice President**
1979 - 1983	Muslim	Christian
2003 - 2007	Christian	Muslim
2007 - 2010	Muslim	Christian
2010 - 2015	Christian	Muslim

Table 6.3 showing governance structure in the Presidency, Nigeria.

The import from the content in table 6.3 above is that consideration of primordial or identity factor is used to determine in greater measure the structure of government in Nigeria. Obviously, I hold the belief, that the dependence on identity factors to determine the shape of government functionaries is a threat to democracy and democratic principles.

The Governance structure in Kenya could not provide any explicit clues about the role of primordial or identity factors in its composition. However, there is element of constitutional backing in the formation of the executive council, or the selection of Ministers. As stated in chapter 9, article 130, subsection 2 of the Constitution of Kenya that,

"The composition of the national executive shall reflect the regional and ethnic diversity of the people of Kenya"

(See Constitution of Kenya, 2010, chapter 9, article 130, subsections 2).

In essence, the portion of the constitution recognizing primordial or identity properties in Kenya, does suggest a role for primordial or identity consideration in the recruitment of public office holders in Kenya.

Governance Structure in Kenya: Executive Arm	
President	**Executive Members**
Directly elected by Voters	- To be nominated by President - To reflect regional, and ethnic diversity of Kenya

Table 6.4 showing the presence of primordial factors in Government Structure.

However, in contrast to Nigeria and Kenya, the government structure in Ghana did suggest absence of primordial loyalty or identity factors in the nomination and composition of the organs of governance. Unlike in Nigeria, that include the use of quota system as well as federal character in the recruitment of public office holders, and in Kenya, which also did recognize regional and ethnicity in the nomination and composition of its Institution of governance; Ghana was able to expunge such factors and consideration. There is no constitutional recognition of ethnicity, religion, or regional affiliation in the recruitment processes of public office holders in Ghana.

Chapter 7:

7).   The Critique of Existing Discourse and Theories

Considering how electoral violence had erupted in Nigeria and Kenya during the 2011 and 2007 presidential elections respectively, one may but marveled why it happened in the first place. Although, the events had caught several scholars unaware, as it happened spontaneously without prior sign. Several scholars have conducted research on elections and democratization process in the developing democracies, but none has been able to conjecture reasons elections end always in fiasco in many of the democracies in Sub-Sahara Africa. Scholars like Bratton and Van der Walle (1997, pp: 98 – 100), Rothchild (1997a), Hyden (2006, pp:), Amutabi and Nasong'o (2013), Diamond (2009), Chege, in: Diamond and Plattner (2010, pp: 197 – 210), Gyimah-Boadi, in: Diamond and Plattner (2010, pp:), Suberu, in: Diamond and Platnner (2010), and Kiai (2010) were not able to provide appropriate responses. As I have argued previously, many of the scholars had actually concentrated only on the failures of Institutions of democracy, and not on the reasons for the low performance of the institutions.

7.1).   The Need for Theoretical Reappraisal

The exclusion of the fundamental factors responsible for democracy failures in sub-Sahara Africa democracies does require a new theoretical approach. Notwithstanding the submissions by the Freedom-House in the classification of countries and democracy; the roots and motivations for violence has to be exhaustively evaluated. Obviously, the existing inter-ethnic grievances among ethnic nationalities that constitute the population of each country have to be theoretically and methodically re-evaluated. The reasons for communal identification approach as used by citizens for voter mobilization demand that study about the state of democratization process in Nigeria, Kenya and Ghana should have a theoretical framework, which includes pre-independence and post-independence political structure of each country.

I want to object to the dependence on rational theory or functional institutionalism approach alone to seek remedy for a problem that is "Inter-ethnic historical grievances" centered. In the light of the above argument, I have chosen to have a different view on the election violence in the selected countries, using historical institutionalism approach. The use of "H-I-A" will enable me to seek for clues beyond mere political competition among competing interests in the countries.

7.2). Bringing in the Nationalities and their Political Interest

Part of the argument I want to advance in the course of this dissertation is my position, which suggest that issues on electoral violence in the case study countries are both historical and primordial factors defined. Democratization processes that have covered several decades of attempts, the absence of electoral stability and the negative effects on all aspects of democracy in the focused countries, has been matter of discourse to scholars who have researched on different theoretical perspectives in the social sciences and in other academic departments in the humanities. In anyway, I want to argue that many of the propositions on elections in the focused countries are without empirical clarity why violence was able to erupt in the cited election periods. Among my many criticisms of the previous efforts on democratic elections in the countries is the fact that several of them are mostly speculative, and hypothetical in nature. Incidentally, not much effort was made to re-evaluate the diverse and distinct nature of the ethnic composition of the "case study" countries.

Arguments and findings as were established in studies by Horowitz (2000), Kagwanja and Southall (2009, pp: 259 – 277), Jeffrey Horowitz (2009, pp: 1 – 34), Chege, in: Diamond and Plattner (2010, pp: 197 – 210), Lijphart (1977, pp: 16 – 17), Lewis (1965), Pye (1958), and Geertz (1963), does suggest that primordial loyalty have significant influence in elections in multi-ethnic societies. In view of the above submissions, I want to contend that cleavage or identity consideration is pivotal in the violent outcome of the focused election periods. I want to agree not only with the opinions of the scholars, but admit that primordial loyalty and pre-independence inter-ethnic conflict have been responsible for many of the electoral

discontents, ethnicity, regional and religious voter mobilizations measures in the countries. Indeed, these mentioned features were the things that prepared the ground for the experienced spontaneous election violence in Nigeria and Kenya.

Indeed, the above positions are enough satisfactory grounds for a study like this dissertation. Above all, the arguments, and findings, which emerged from it can provide clues why elections in the case study countries remained violent prone. Indeed, it has become necessity imperative to re-evaluate and admit the intensity of the pre-colonial ethnic influenced political discontents among nationalities that constitute the case study countries as factors in the democratization process of the states. As Kagwanja and Southall (2009, pp: 259 – 277), Mutua (2008), and Chege (2010, 197 – 210, in: Diamond and Plattner, 2010) had argued, it is my position as well that the violent election incidents, is associated with pre-colonial as well as post-independence ethnic and regional political discontents. In essence, I want to agree with the notion that the inter-ethnic political conflict constitute obstacle to violent free election in the case study countries.

In many divided countries where democratic politics is used to recruit public office-holders, ethnic interests are known to be determinant factor in office allocations. Of course, there is strong evidence to confirm that the presence of violence during cited elections in the case study societies were due to the neglects of primordial loyalty and the pre-independence political contentions among ethnic groups in the evaluation of democratic elections by scholars as factors. As I have explained in chapter 4, 5 and 6 of this dissertation, that primordial loyalty, in reference to Pye (1958), Geertz (1963), and Lijphart (1977), was responsible for the election induced inter-ethnic conflict in the case study countries. I hold the opinion, that if the pre-independence and post-independence ethno-regional and religious induced political conflicts were evaluated as part of democratization process in the case study societies, the outcome of the democratic elections in the case study countries would have been violence free.

In any case, going back to the focused election periods in the case study countries, becomes necessity imperative, as to bring home the argument, which suggested that voters who participated in the elections conducted in 2011 (Nigeria), and 2007 (Kenya) were influenced by what Lucian W. Pye (1958) called "identification attachment".

Indeed, the spontaneous nature of the violence can be seen to reflect the division in the societies under study. Of course, I want to establish, that there had been inter-ethnic discontents among the tribes in the pre-independence and also in the early post-independence history of the countries. I have established in chapter 4, 5 and 6 factors that were in opposite to previous studies on democracy and elections in the focused countries, in which pre-independence inter-ethnic conflicts were intentionally ignored as unit of evaluation. In my study, I have generated a theoretical design or concepts in "Material and Solidarity incentives", which I want to use to respond to the methodological inadequacy inherent in the previous studies about elections and voter mobilization, as factors.

7.3). Accommodating the Concept of Material Incentive and Solidarity Incentive (MI-SI) within the Election Campaign Paradigm

The conception of democracy in the discourse about election violence in Nigeria, Kenya, and Ghana is the fundamental issue in this dissertation. The determinant factors I have chosen to use ranged from "communal identification", Pye (1958: 469), Geertz (1963: 109-113), Lijphart (1977: 17), which antagonists have criticized as obsolete and an absurdity in democracy discourse, to material and solidarity incentives.

Indeed, without sounding dismissive of the importance and contributions of scholars in social research studies who have centered their electoral evaluations of my case study countries on functional democracy paradigms; I am well convinced that "Material and Solidarity Incentives" as electoral campaign paradigms are most appropriate for my re-evaluation of the causes of election induced violence in the focused countries. I am making the argument based on the fact that "communal solidarity" does emphasize electoral solidarity and the accompanying constraints on the behavior and electoral preferences of voters in the focused societies. It will be obvious when my narratives, which I will explicitly elaborate in chapter 8, chapter 9 and chapter 10, are considered, especially, about the role played by the concepts, and how the campaign strategy used by each coalition, political party and the political actors in the focused elections, had affected individual voter preferences and choices they made.

Although, I vividly agreed with the argument put forward by Almond that political phenomena in societies are better understood, when they are considered "in a longitudinal and historical perspective" (See Almond, 1988: 871).

The above position by Almond is in line with my evaluation and characterization of "communal identification" as a factor in voter mobilization. Above all, the emphasis placed by many scholars of democracy and democratization process, whereby democracy in sub-Sahara Africa amount more to "functionality of democratic elected institutions, than the underlying factors responsible for violent election outcomes. The above empirical arguments confirmed my criticisms of previous studies, and based on my observations and findings, which I have vigorously argued in favor, especially on the use of Material and Solidarity Incentives as instrument for voter mobilization. The exclusion of communal identification in the previous studies, in terms of the ethnic configuration of the focused countries, the characteristics of the people, age-old inter-ethnic grievances, and absence of violent free democratic elections, made them incomplete.

I hold the view that my use of Material and Solidarity Incentives as concepts to re-evaluate democracy and democratization processes in Nigeria, Kenya and Ghana, would provide a more suitable platform in the study of Election and Voter Mobilization in sub-Sahara Africa. As divided societies, it is my view that over dependency on "end result" from elections in the case study countries as projected by scholars of politics cannot provide the much needed answers to consistent election induced conflict in developing democracies.

The concept of Material and Solidarity Incentives, which has appeared consistently in the dissertation, is a thought out concept, which I want to use to explain the campaign strategy used for voter mobilization in the focused election periods, and as contrast to conventional election campaign methods used in developed democracies. The use of the mentioned "concepts" can represent another fundamental contribution made by this dissertation to democracy and election studies. Based on concept of "communal attachment" (Lijphart, 1977: p. 17), or the concept of communal identification used by Pye (1958: p. 496), primordial cleavage by Geertz (1963: p. 109 – 113), and Horrowitz (2000: pp: 22 - 42), who spoke exclusively on historical grievances and the use of "solidarity" as an incentive for interest protection, and as

such, I believe it is an unavoidable instrument for voter mobilization in divided societies. Regrettably, several studies had focused only on "end result of elections" based on "who-won" and "who-lost" concept, despite the inherent and consistent historical grievances among ethnic groups in the case study countries.

But, despite the various explanations for democracy consolidation, election triumph of candidates or political parties, the only single denominator visible in their findings and conclusion is the "end results of elections in the focused case study countries. In the case study countries, it could be argued that it is due mainly to age-long or historical grievances among ethnic nationalities that have made communal identification to persist. As such, it has become difficult for democracy and democratization process to sink effectively into the societies' political lexicon. I have explained explicitly in chapter 3 about the acrimonious post-independence relationship among ethnic groups in Nigeria and in Kenya. I have also narrated about the different political transitions in not only in Ghana, but also in Kenya and Nigeria.

Above all, I have established that the persistent election crisis in the case study countries in the pre-independence, and in the immediate post-independence era is a confirmation that the various ethnic nationalities have refused to view peaceful electoral process as instrument of state-building. Indeed, the persistent election conflict is an indication that each community feel threatened, thus; their resolve to use "electoral solidarity" as instrument of communal identification. Again, I am of the opinion that it is improper to focus only on "end result of elections" in the case study countries, as such does not provide clues on how best to resolve the issue of historical grievances that had impeded democracy and the conduct of democratic elections in the focused election periods. I have provided ample instances in the dissertation as evidence that primordial cleavages, operated under electoral solidarity, had reinforced historical grievances in the communities.

Material and Solidarity Incentives were used by the contending candidates for the purpose of voter mobilization, and in addition rejuvenate the age-old inter-ethnic historical and political grievances among ethnic groups. However, in two of the countries, namely; Nigeria and Kenya, the use of ethnic solidarity by the political actors for the purpose of voter mobilization, had dictated the campaign processes

and had successfully instituted the spirit of political comradeship among voters using ethno-regional as well as religious solidarity in the countries. The peculiar nature of the inter-ethnic historical grievances, which became pronounced in the early part of post-independence years, could not have allowed for conventional type campaign strategy in the case study countries. Indeed, some of my findings does support the proposition put forward by scholars like Lewis (1965), Pye (1958), Geertz (1963), Lijphart (1977), and Horowitz (2000), Chege, in: Diamond and Plattner (2010, pp: 197 – 210), Kagwanja and Southall (2009, pp: 259 – 277), which obviously had implied, that groups do result to the use of primordial cleavages as instrument of interest protection. However, I am convinced that election violence in contemporary African societies is derived from the inter-ethnic and historical grievances, which is hallmark of political relationship among ethnic groups, especially in sub-Sahara Africa.

By the use of Solidarity Incentive concept, I am able to establish how inter-ethnic historical grievances as factor in voter mobilization had devalued democracy in the case study countries, vis-à-vis election violence. The concept of "Electoral Solidarity" is used to expose the origin of both 'inter-ethnic historical grievances' among various groups, and the 'campaign strategy' used by the candidates to devalue democracy, especially in Nigeria and Kenya. The various attempts made by the candidates and political parties to transform from ethnic propelled political ideology to modern democratic system through open but skeletal media involvement were subdued by 'solidarity mobilization' of voters. I am well convinced that many of the existing studies about problems of 'democratic elections' in the case study countries, and indeed, in most of the countries in sub-Sahara Africa, have been wrongly presented. I want to insist on the above position because many of the existing studies on election induced violence had failed to take into consideration the role of "inter-ethnic historical grievances among the ethnic groups" in the countries under study. Above all, the use of "electoral solidarity" concept underscores the fact that I have refused to exclude the political history and consistent inter-ethnic discontents, especially, in Nigeria and Kenya, with partial reference to Ghana, vis-à-vis the election campaign strategy used during elections by candidates and political parties.

7.3.1). Why I limited the Study to the three Focused Countries and Election Periods?

The nature of ethnic composition in the countries, and the characteristics of their political history had made it possible for me to limit the study to Nigeria, Kenya and Ghana. But, without such decision, I would have been unable to establish the similarity in their political history. By observing the various mobilization instruments used by the political parties and candidates during the focused election periods, I was able to test-run some of my hypotheses, and even above mere democracy consolidation concept. Such in the belief, that social, political, and economic difference among ethnic groups does not inhibit democracy consolidation. I want to conscientiously admit that the selection of Nigeria, Kenya and Ghana as representative cases in the study was deliberate. Nevertheless, all historical accounts do indicate that election violence in Nigeria, Kenya, and Ghana had never been determined exclusively by "economic reasons" or demography of voters. The pre-independence and early post-independence grievances are fundamental factors that motivated and influenced the hard-line political posture of each ethnic group in the focused election periods. Again, as I have empirically established in chapter 4 and 5, the relative proximity in identity between the larger ethnic groups and the smaller groups in Nigeria and Kenya had made ethnic alliance during elections viable.

My overall intention and preference is to establish with the three countries an exigency-driven sample of representative cases in the dissertation. Obviously, I have never intended that my selection and concept would be an end in itself, but a flowing mechanism, which would allow for examination of historical narrative of people, and about election violence in the three focused countries, within the focused election periods.

7.4). Coding Solidarity Incentive Mechanism as factor in Voter Mobilization

Democratization process and Election violence in Nigeria, Kenya and Ghana were simply the autonomous action of voter mobilization strategy based on "Solidarity Incentive." Indeed, the fundamental factors that necessitated the violence were products of collective ancestry, inter-ethnic historical grievances, and political uncertainty. The various ethnic communities were faced with political competition incensed with grievances for decades. Secondly, the political interest of politicians in the contending political parties had equally played decisive part in the use of ethnic solidarity as incentive for voter mobilization.

Democratic Election in Nigeria, Kenya and Ghana has been the subject of interest in many research studies, and most of which were recently conducted by not only African scholars but also European scholars. Some of the studies had concentrated mainly on the failure or low performance of democratic institutions in the selected countries. Such studies includes, Hyden (2006), Bratton and Van de Walle (1997: p. 114 – 122), Wimmer, Goldstone, Horowitz, Joras, and Schetter (2004, p. 225, 255). Also included is the Freedom-House report on democratization covering several countries (2003 – 2015). The exclusion of campaign strategy adopted by candidates and political parties to fight elections, and the consequent eruption of violence has in my opinion made the study of democracy and election in the three countries incomplete. Indeed, the reliance on ethnic alliance to mobilize voters for the elections had exerted undue pressure on the processes of democracy.

Kagwanja and Southall (2009, pp: 259 – 277) study was only about how each candidate in the 2007 election in Kenya fought its campaign, and it was never about the fundamental factors responsible for the adoption of the used voter mobilization strategy, and the subsequent violence that followed the election. The same is also about Chege (2010, pp: 197 – 210, in: Diamond and Plattner, 2010), and Mutua (2008), as each had concentrated mainly on recent personality conflict among the political class in Kenya, which ultimately led to the balkanization of the political parties. Indeed, the balkanization of the ruling NARC had resulted in the creation of "ethnic centered coalition parties or coalition of convenience" (See Donald L. Horowitz, 2000, pp: 365 – 366) in Kenya.

There has never been any tangible written study on the 2011 and 2012 elections in Nigeria and Ghana. Despite many lives lost in the 2007 and 2011 elections in Nigeria and in Kenya, scholars were only interested to report about the conduct of the election, and institutional constraints that had affected the election as reported by NDI, IRI, USIP, and EU Election observation Missions[1].

My coding of 'Electoral Solidarity' in the 2007 and 2011 elections in Kenya and Nigeria as campaign strategy in voter mobilization is an innovative contribution in the study of democracy and election in divided societies.

Indeed, I viewed my coding of solidarity during elections as fundamental factor in inter-ethnic political competition, in which without, the violent follow-up to the 2007 and 2011 elections in Kenya and Nigeria, respectively, would not have been possible. I coded electoral solidarity as voter mobilization instrument on the premise that the concept derived its influence from inter-ethnic grievances, collective ancestry, and communal identification. Above all, the factors were all weaved and became transformed into campaign strategy, which gave rise to violent election crisis in two of the case study countries, namely; Nigeria and Kenya.

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1). www.iri.org/files/2313_ng_report_election07_043008.pdf, www.ndi.org/files/NDI final Report on the Nigeria 2011 Electionsnew_Part1.pdf, www.usip.org/publications/nigeria-s-2011-elections-best-run-most-violent,
www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/eueom/pdf/missions/preliminary-statement-nigeria2011_en.pdf,

7.5).   Applying the MI-SI Theory in Voter mobilization

An analytic-theory driven case study like this dissertation does strive to establish and provide observations on a given case. This is mostly done in light of existing theories or assumptions. However, the intention is to scrutinize the factors exhaustively, so that my findings can validate, replace or modify already conducted studies. The factors that contributed in the election violence, which followed after the election results were announced, were not identified by previous studies. Of course, the reasons may not be divorced from the fact that they ignored and excluded the inter-ethnic historical grievances among the ethnic communities in my case study countries. However, I am convinced that my "Solidarity Incentive" theory and the influence of Inter-ethnic historical grievances have never been used to examine 'election induced political violence' in the case study countries, or any other country in sub-Sahara Africa. Indeed, the application of 'solidarity incentive' theory as voter mobilization instrument is another conceptual contribution to election study, and political science in general.

Solidarity theory is based on the nature of ethnic composition and the inter-ethnic historical grievances among the various ethnic groups in political realm. Although, Powell.Jr's (2000, pp: 3 – 10), democracy conception based on elections was the focus-point of many scholars in democratization process in Sub-Sahara Africa, as they had essentially concentrated on elections as instrument of democracy. However, my perspective on the campaign and voter mobilization factors presented in this dissertation is different from G. Bingham Powell. Jr (2000) view on democracy and election. Of course, Powell.Jr had classified election as the "instrument of democracy" (Powell, jr., 2000, p: 1). Indeed, I want to argue that Powell, Jr., argument is centered largely on procedural and adherence to processes of electing political leadership in a society, where individuals would have the right to participate in the selection, nomination or electing a preferred candidate without hindrance. Neither of the previous studies had exposed nor addressed the problems of inter-ethnic historical grievances, election and voter mobilization in the case study societies. Aside the above reiterated failures, the issue of violent acts as follow-up to declared election results was never contemplated upon by any of the previous studies. Above all, I have established the presence of ethnic political alliance and the

use of inter-ethnic historical grievances as voter mobilization instrument in Nigeria and Kenya.

7.6). Implications of the MI-SI Scheme for Theory and Sociological Research

Several of the studies and theoretical assumptions made about election and democratization in countries within Sub-Sahara Africa, have been exhaustively scrutinized with the application of my "Material Incentive and Solidarity Incentive theory". Of course, in several countries in Africa such like Gabon, Senegal, Zimbabwe, Mali, Tanzania, Uganda, and also in other countries like Belgium, elections and democracy have had interruptions because of the effects associated with solidarity instincts under communal attachment. In my belief, there is no question about the argument put forward in previous studies on the state of elections and democratization process in my case study countries. Indeed, the assumptions in the previous studies had tended to believe that outcome of the 2011, 2007, and 2012 elections in Nigeria, Kenya and Ghana respectively, are givens. Thus, their argument had implied that the products of the elections in my case study countries were acts of political competition among various democratic interest groups.

I am further convinced that such assumptions had only tended to support their argument that elections and voter mobilization in Nigeria, Kenya and Ghana are what one can call "conflict in political interest" using instrument of democracy. But then, the premium, which the previous studies had placed on low performance of "Institutions of democracy" in my case study countries as the reason for "election violence" are untenable and insufficient. I want to conclude that such assumption does not support the gravity of the violent action and reactions in the focused election periods. By citing and using performance of institutions of democracy as determinant of elections and level of democratization (as Freedom House, National Democratic Institute, International Republican Institute, United States Institute of Peace, etc), European Union Election Observation Mission), in Nigeria, Kenya, and Ghana does not provide responses or answers to the question of 'inter-ethnic historical grievances and voter mobilization strategy' in the focused election periods.

My use of "electoral solidarity" theory in voter mobilization strategy by candidates in the focused elections enables any scholar who so wish to undertake research on election and voter mobilization strategy in sub-Sahara Africa to go ahead, but to do so by including "inter-ethnic historical grievances, collective ancestry, and communal identification" as explanatory variables of interest. I hold the belief that by involving the above mentioned fundamental factors in such studies, one would have recognized the ethnic composition in the countries. Indeed, the citizens in my case study countries had viewed their identities on the premise of their ethnic affiliation or membership of their indigenous societies, and not on the basis of abstract nationalism offered by an artificially constructed country. Using solidarity as an instrument in the mobilization of voters in political competition is a product of identity socialization provided through collective ancestry and historical grievances. I am convinced above all doubts, that, it is the inter-ethnic historical grievances, that had prepared the various ethnic groups and political interests to use solidarity as instrument of voter mobilization, especially in Nigeria and Kenya. Consequently, I want to believe that the above factor is highly significant to exclude in any effort meant to explain the reasons for election violence in the 2011 and 2007 elections in Nigeria and Kenya, respectively.

I want to argue that since the fundamental factors that gave rise to "inter-ethnic grievances" have not in any way receded from the social and political development among the various ethnic groups that constituted my case study countries, then, I can submit that the inter-ethnic historical grievances, which produced solidarity incentive as voter mobilization strategy is scientifically and logically valid. I have arrived at such given conclusion, because I am of the opinion that the use of 'inter-ethnic grievances' as basis for 'voter mobilization' strategy had allowed the candidates and supporters to hide under ethnic solidarity. I have applied "solidarity incentive" framework to present the analysis why the election violence erupted in the 2007 and 2011 elections in Kenya and Nigeria, respectively. However, my findings as it is presented in this dissertation cut across anthropology, ethnology, political sociology and political science.

8).   Case Studies

8.1).   Nigeria:

The dissertation is designed to investigate the impact created on voters by the use of Inter-ethnic grievances as voter mobilization strategy in the 2011 presidential election. My findings will help me to prepare a comprehensive data for future elections on how best to prevent violence during elections in the case study countries. The primary focus in this regard is to determine how related Inter-ethnic historical grievances, electoral solidarity as mobilization strategy, and the pre-election events were to the post-election spontaneous violent reactions from voters and supporters, especially in Nigeria and Kenya.

Obviously, democratic election cannot be viewed to be complete, without ideological divergence among contending political parties. However, the utmost concern is to know, if actually, the actions exhibited by the parties do represent the ideals inherent in democracy. Evaluation of the crisis, which originated from the 2011 election, can enable one to establish the effects of campaign strategies used by candidates for the 2011 presidential election in Nigeria. The idea is to find out, if the used strategies met the minimum universally acceptable standard for democratic election campaign. Election campaign, as the artery of democratic politics can neither support violent actions nor activities, which can lead to hostility, discomfort the citizens, and devalue democracy. However, I have chosen to re-evaluate these political outcomes through the theory of "Material Incentive and Solidarity Incentive" (figure 8.1 below).

Material Incentive
- use of money for votes
- use of food items for votes
- promise of contracts for votes

Solidarity Incentive
- Regional identity
- Religious identity
- Ethno-political interest

Figure 8.1 showing factors under Material and Solidarity Incentives

Nevertheless, I was able to discover through my findings, that the instrumentalization of the above two mentioned theoretical factors by political actors had helped them to manipulate the electoral communities for individual political set-goals. The urge to assume political leadership in a given politically delineated constituency had compelled many individuals to seek alternative vote hunting mechanism; hence, the turning of democratic elections into a merchandize. In an attempt to aid their political glory in the polls, every material and immaterial instrument was to become essentially important, especially, with a social and economic ravaged population at the mercy of those who can wield political power in the society. Indeed, the exploitation and manipulation of voters, by the use of "Material and Solidarity Incentives" as election campaign strategy by candidates and political parties, had transformed political debates, which ordinarily should be anchored on violence free exercise, into violent modified election campaigns in Nigeria.

Although, Material and Solidarity Incentives campaign as voter mobilization strategies were opposite to each other; however, the final intention of the two strategies was to aid election success of a candidate and his political party. Indeed, Material Incentive campaign approach give political actors the opportunity to approach un-informed voters with gift items, promises on policy initiatives as well as financial inducement. However, the case of inducement does not translate to a situation of an unpopular candidate making effort to entrench himself into the voting calculation of voters alone, rather, the strategy is adopted as a potent and faster means to manipulate votes and avoid any unwanted and unexpected defeat in the election.

Unsuspecting voters were made to believe through the handouts distributed to them that a candidate and his political party cared more for the welfare of their communities. Material incentive as a strategy is tactfully deployed in a bid to capture the political sympathy of the vulnerable, poor and illiterate voters. Unfortunately, the failures in effective democracy delivery in most parts of the country had made several voters believe that the materials offered by candidates does represent the only visible as well as tangible dividend of democracy anybody within the community could possible enjoy. The use of Material items like bags of Rice, Textile materials, Motorbikes, Cars and monetary inducement (See pictorial demonstration under Stomach Infrastructure below), have shown clear evidence on how political parties and candidates without exception maneuvered the intelligence of the hungry, poverty-ridden, and mostly politically illiterate voters in the election.

Material incentive strategy has extensive and highly potent in attracting voters' sympathy. Solidarity incentive with its inbuilt sentiment does dominate each campaign team's operational strategy. Voters were approached using the two mobilization strategies not only in the remote parts of the country, but also in the urban cities. Solidarity campaign slogans were structured to cut across several and diverse areas in the society and the slogans were exploited to the fullest advantage by the political actors. Although, I hold the belief, that there is no single political party or candidate in contemporary election in all the democratic societies that does not embark in the promotion of solidarity campaign theory, though the intensity is society dependent.

8.2).   Expansion in the Electoral Market

The 2011 presidential election had an increase in the actual voter participation to a very high level all around the country. The Material Incentive and Solidarity Incentive campaign strategy used by the political actors had expanded the electoral market. Number of newly registered voters had increased across the country. Several ethnic and socio-cultural associations had campaigned, and raised awareness in the communities about the importance of the 2011 presidential election. Many of the ethnic groups had used tribal unions in different towns and cities to mobilize voters for the election. Organizations had their members mobilized, and had urged them to embark on varieties of street actions, including also neighborhood orientations, in an attempt to market the candidacy of their preferred candidate. Many people who have never voted in the previous elections were actively mobilized to participate in the 2011 presidential election. Furthermore, the use of regional solidarity sentiment by campaigners was able to raise to a new level the ethnic and religious consciousness, and by implication, increased the level of voters' participation.

8.2.1).   Objective of the Expansion in the Electoral Market

In clear difference from the previous elections, political actors and their supporters had expanded the electoral market using Inter-ethnic historical grievances as mobilization factor. Indeed, the ultimate objective in the expansion, as I have noticed in the electoral market, was to increase voters' participation through electoral solidarity. As I have explained previously, the use of ethnicity, language, regional and religious sentiments to promote or market candidates, was very effective across religion and ethno-regional boundaries. I was able to realize in the course of this study, that the only political element that can motivate the Hausa-Fulani voters was the desire to produce a president who is a Muslim, and who is also somebody from North of the country. I could realize also, that voters in the old eastern region had mobilized massively for President Goodluck Jonathan, who was the candidate of PDP in the 2011 election. However, the adoption of Goodluck Ebele Jonathan does not translate to approval for the type of politics played by his political party (PDP); rather the mobilization and support had depended largely on ethnic and regional political sentiment, especially on the salient issue of "Inter-ethnic historical grievances".

Besides, the voters in the region had viewed the candidacy of Goodluck Ebele Jonathan as a collective responsibility, which required the support of everybody in the region, irrespective of party affiliation. Moreover, in collaboration with some political elements from the middle belt region, promoters of Goodluck Ebele Jonathan were able to launch aggressive vote hunting under what could be describe as "collective duty" using religious solidarity platform. Indeed, the overall objective for the expansion was to use religion, ethnicity and regional sentiments to mobilize voters for each candidate.

8.3).   Local Campaigners and Policy Issues

Despite the promotion of several policy issues in the media by the political parties, the foot-soldiers, who had campaigned for the political actors in the hinterland, were busy marketing different agendas to the voters. In that regard, the policies promoted in the media were significantly different from the issues canvassed for by local campaigners. While the party and election campaign teams of the candidates had through the media promoted issues on economy, unemployment, infrastructural development, massive investment in energy generation and health services, the local campaigners of the same candidates were fixated in the promotion of regime change, and continuity. For many among the elites, the campaigns were policy issues centered on social factors, and media projected, but for many among the locals, the campaigns were viewed as an avenue to settle old scores on Inter-ethnic grievances. Consequently, one respondent who had observed the campaigns in Kano, one of the largest towns in the Northern Nigeria stated that,

> "Because of personal political interest, some political actors converted the campaigns to that of Inter-ethnic competition, and used the "regime change" slogan to orchestrate violence."[1]

_____

1). A contribution in opinion made by an anonymous public servant who was one among several respondents that participated in the organized interactions in Kano.

As a response to such actions, the polity was to become polarized and had compelled different segments in the society to mobilize voters for the election using Inter-ethnic solidarity as motivation. In essence, social pressures had to take the back stage in the voters' electoral preferences. Campaign Teams were only able to promote policy issues in the media outlets, but on the campaign field, they deployed solidarity incentives to build up Inter-ethnic historical grievances sentiments among voters.

8.3.1) Target Group and the Electoral Market

According to Maarek, one among the problem areas in political marketing is on,

> "How to locate those segments in the general population, which might be subjective to the influence of political communication"

> (Maarek, 2011: p, 42).

Indeed, the aggressive political tones, which had reverberated from every corner and across the country during the 2011 presidential election, had made every political interest to engage in massive Intra-ethnic voter mobilization. The supporters of the President, especially those in the old eastern region, were able to launch extensive campaign offensive, and voter mobilization within and outside the region to shore up support for the president. Campaigners had targeted voters based on ethnic, regional and religious affiliations. The voters were targeted and mobilized by campaigners actually cut across demography, geography, gender, and profession (See figure 8.2 below). However, the absence of official data-bank, with information about young voters, elderly voters, women and men, Christians and Muslims, as well as employed and unemployed, has made it difficult to categorize voters who were targeted during the election. However, the campaigners were able to use religion, ethnicity, and regional identity to target voters.

Ruling Party	Opposition Parties
Ethno Cultural Associations	Core Hausa-Fulani Voters
Non Indigene Voters	Muslims Voters
Anti-Hausa-Fulani Oligarchy	Personality affection

Figure 8.2 showing target groups by political actors in the 2011 presidential election

Indeed, the electoral market was built on Inter-ethnic historical grievances. The combination of factors, such as language, collective identity, religion, and regional affiliation, were to serve as source for voter recruitment. As result of failed strategic calculation, some election experts had underestimated the effects of Inter-ethnic grievances on voters in the country. Incidentally, there was no candidate from the south-western Nigeria representing any one of the strong opposition parties in the election. In the absence of that, the region was to become a battle-ground in the electoral market. Political actors from North and East of the country were to struggle in the electoral market offered by southwestern voters. Several voters, who had detested the domineering presence of the Hausa-Fulani oligarchy in the national politics of the country, were to settle for Goodluck Ebele Jonathan. In the middle belt region, the people, who had felt deeply marginalized and politically exploited by the core north were religiously compelled to withdraw their electoral alliance with the core north, and had to vote for the PDP candidate. The middle belt region, being home to many Christians, and has also large concentration of Igbo, minorities and Yoruba people, took the shine off the political calculation of senior Hausa-Fulani politicians,

who had planned to use votes from the middle belt region to neutralize the PDP candidate's expected vote advantage from the eastern region.

As I have argued previously, the displacement of campaign messages, which were centered on social pressures, by regional and religious solidarity mobilization strategy, had denied me the sociological indicators, which I would have used to explain more about the classification of voters.

Again, I hold the belief, that the various campaign measures, which were used by the campaign teams, were created with the impression that the messages were designed to provide collective political appeal. Social pressure issues were promoted in the media, but the issues promoted were never the factors that determined electoral preferences of voters. Inter-ethnic grievances built on regional political relevance; religious identity and ethnocentrism were the actual factors that became exploited by the political actors in the electoral market. Indeed, the use of Inter-ethnic grievances as voter mobilization instrument was able to create emotional political consciousness, as well as solidarity sentiment in the electoral market. Conversely, it had made several voters to anchor their electoral preferences from the feedback they have received from the electoral market. As a consequence of the above enunciated situations, the electoral preferences of voters were to become victims of electoral market provided feedbacks, which became transmuted into regional divides. Consequently, voters were become enveloped with ethno-regional, and religious political consciousness.

8.4)   Negative Campaign

I was able to discover that even before the campaigns began, the country was already enveloped by threats, smear campaigns and realignment by politicians, especially those in the ruling party who were of northern region extraction. In essence, the ruling party was to become heavily polarized internally, because of the resolve of the President to contest in the party nomination primary. In fact, some of the political elements from the northern region had made some consequential threats to make the country ungovernable for the president, should he contest and win the election under the platform of the ruling party (See Okoro, 2015).

Alliances were formed even within the ruling party in a bid to stop the President from contesting in the nomination primary election. While the political elements from the core northern part of the country were busy campaigning against the participation of President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan in the 2011 presidential election process, the people from old eastern region and partly from the western as well as Middle Belt regions were in support of the president's decision to contest in the election. Unfortunately, as the political elements from both sides were busy advancing their reasons and positions, ordinary voters had to jump into the frame quickly, and they easily bought into the positions taking by the political elements from their various regions. As a consequence of the antagonistic postures that were developed prior to the processes leading to the presidential election, the Nigerian polity was inadvertently and unceremoniously plunged into crisis of political confidence.

The negative messages that were peddled by opponent of the President, Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, of which some people had accused him that he usurped the position of the northern region to rule the country from 2007 until 2015, won many voters in the region. On the other hand, supporters of Goodluck Ebele Jonathan had successfully branded Muhammadu Buhari as an Islamist and a religious bigot. But, despite the fact that Muhammadu Buhari had a Christian, Pastor Tunde Bakare, a Yoruba, from the western part of Nigeria as his vice presidential candidate, the effort failed to doused, free or repaired the damages done to his candidacy by the branding. Unfortunately, his campaign team was not able to turn things around, and they failed to define him before the public, and instead, they allowed the ruling party to define him to the electorate. I want to conclude however, that the branding of the candidates from the north of the country as representing the "born-to-rule" mentality, which is a southern Nigeria terminology, associated with the Hausa-Fulani oligarchy in Nigerian politics had damaged seriously the chances of each of them in Central and Southern Nigeria.

8.4.1) Negative Election Campaigns and Rebuttal Strategy

In a bid to control the damage inflicted on the candidacy of President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan by the northern political elements, the campaign team and supporters of the President went into the argument, that since the President was initially vice President to the late President Umaru Musa Yar Adua, then he has the constitutional right to participate as a candidate in the primary election process of his party. Although, the campaign team had surreptitiously engaged younger and some moderate members of the ruling party from the northern region, these set of members were able to battle the older politicians for relevance. The president was able also to embark on fence mending as well as reassurance visits to many traditional rulers (Emirs) in the region. All his efforts were in a bid to market his candidacy to the people. However, using Material Incentive strategy, the campaign team of the president was able to engage some Youth members of the party as foot soldiers in every locality in the northern part of the country. The idea was to interact with locals, distribute material items to them, and market the candidacy of the president. Many elected as well as appointed federal officials were equally co-opted by the campaign team in the overall effort to secure appreciable support for the president in the core northern region.

On the other hand, Muhammadu Buhari, as well as, other major candidates from north of the country went into campaign offensive, and had tried in many ways to reduce the effects of their branding as Islamists and religious bigots in the eastern and western regions, as well as, among the Christian community in the north, but without any tangible success. Besides, the low presence of the opposition candidates in the other parts of the country other than the northern region was a confirmation that they were only representing the interest of the Hausa-Fulani oligarchy. The inability of the campaign teams of the opposition candidates and their parties to counter the negative political attacks and the smear campaigns launched by the ruling party against them had only compounded their electoral woes. Although, Muhammadu Buhari had made several attempts to have himself freed from the various labels the ruling party prepared for him in the public domain. He had made several visits to Christians and church leaders; it was still difficult for him to convince many that he was not an Islamist and religious bigot as alleged.

8.5)   Panic Campaign in the face of Opposition Challenge

I was able to discover in my study that prior to the 2011 presidential election, that each of the Campaign teams had tried to engage the rational capacity of majority among voters in the country. In the course of pursuing indirect campaign negotiation, the ruling party as well as the Opposition parties had viewed the presence of each in their strongholds as challenging. The anxiety that emerged through campaign rivalry was able to compel each party to concentrate on solidarity incentive as well as material incentive strategies (See figure 8.3 below). As a result, the ruling party was able to tour and campaigned in every state within the northern region, trying to pacify political leaders, distribute gift items, shared money, in an attempt to convince voters to accept the candidacy of Goodluck Ebele Jonathan.

Parties	Voters	Campaign Themes
• Rulling Party • Opposition Parties	• Solidarity Incentive • Material Incentive	• Continuity • Change

Figure 8.3 showing Campaign themes and Campaign tools used by both Parties.

The Campaign team of the President and his party had developed the message of "continuity", and they had promoted the argument that the candidacy of the President was continuation of Late Umaru Musa Yar Adua presidency, policies and objectives.

Tactically, the Campaign team was trying to reassure the northern voters that the party would continue to implement the laid down policies of the late President. The assertion as made by the President was a campaign strategy, which was meant to win the support of voters among northerners, and Muslims. Again, I was able to observe from responses in the polity, that the campaign strategy adopted by the candidates, through the use of Inter-ethnic historical grievances as solidarity factor, was able to play vital role in the devaluation of democracy in the country. Indeed, the campaign messages were very successful as it had the public divided along ethnicity, regional and religion lines. Each of the candidates had appropriated the above three mentioned sensitive issues in the country to source for support and political approval.

8.5.1) Partial Media Role: Voter Mobilization and Electoral Crisis

The media was also to a measure a contributive factor in the commotion that ensued, as result of acrimony created by the centralization of Inter-ethnic historical grievances in voter mobilization processes. The Media had exploited the situation, and had the issues in contention overbrown out of proportion. The development was to contribute heavily in the polarization that was to follow after the election. The Election had eventually become sensationalized, because of sentimental attachment people had on the issues raised. Members of the media community, especially the Print section of the media, had overstretched the issue on the president taking the position of the northern region to produce the candidate of the ruling party. It was indeed the media that made what ought to be purely party internal affair to assume national dimension and problem. The continuous reportage and wide coverage given to the issue had the polity heated up, and was able to set the country into North-South dichotomy. It was able also to introduce Muslims versus Christians' political tango. Consequently, individual political interest had to shift from party and candidate competence to Inter-ethnic political grievances.

8.5.1.1)   Talk-Shows and Election Campaign message

Talk shows, as a conventional and universally accepted method of campaign, used in all developed democracies in the world, was to become a theater of political war during the 2011 presidential election. Most of the people that had acted as surrogate to the candidates could not use the medium provided by these Talk shows to optimally articulate the position of their candidates on many of the national policy

issues. Instead of paying attention on policy position of their candidates, explain and defend rationally the quality of each candidate; they ended up most times advancing the regional, religious and ethnic affiliation of candidates in the contest. As a consequence, most speakers were only able to exploit the opportunities given by the coverage to defend the identity of a candidate based on regional affiliation, as well as making controversial political statements. In essence, moderation was to become expensive virtue to extract from many of the political actors. The visual campaign displays as was exhibited by candidates and their surrogates were only able to create and build perceptions in the minds of many voters, and as a consequence, created dangerous political situations waiting to explode. In most of the televised programs like the "Kaakaaki" political platform, and Focus Nigeria on African Independent Television (AIT), the "Politics Today" on (Channels Television), as well as Democracy Debate aired weekly on Nigerian Television Authority (NTA).

8.5.2)   Electronic Campaign and Candidates' TV Debate

The various debates staged on selected television channels were meant to provide Voters the opportunity to hear direct from the candidates as each attempted to make his policy position known. I was able to discover in the course of this study, that various debates were organized by National Election Debating Group (NEDG), Silverbird Television, Channels Television and other Media houses.

Although, several of the debates could not in any way attract appropriate recognition from among the contenders. It was so unfortunate, that the leading candidates could refuse to jointly participate in any of the debates. The different Campaign Organizations had accused each other of colluding with the body that organized such debates to secretly provide opponents the debate questions in advance. Ultimately, the apprehension, which was raised in the public domain, was allowed to extend to the media houses. Campaign teams had chosen debates their principals were to attend, and in the process had denied the general public the privilege and opportunity to listen to all the main candidates taking part in the election. Obviously, the wide campaign outreach, which is provided by the coverage capacity of television, was missing in the 2011 presidential election.

8.5.2.1) Election Campaigns and Comprehensive Media Role

Escalation of conflict in most societies can be most times orchestrated and aided by the media. In the ensued confidence crisis, which had risen among political actors as well as among the voters, the media community had the situation compounded by constantly churning out series of aggressive reports from already charged politicians. In all segments in the media community, print and electronic as well, threats and counter-threats were to dominate the daily debate in the society during the 2011 presidential election. The development was to further arm the people with enough argument, and built up their confidence in support of the candidates on the basis of Intra-ethnic, regional affiliation and religious solidarity. The daily reports about the threats by some political actors to perpetuate violence in the case of electoral misfortune had prepared the ground for electoral violence during the campaign and after the election (See Okoro, 2015). The media community had failed in their duty, and could not moderate their style in news reporting. The Media community could not arrest the declining political situation in the country. The media had failed also by not making emphasis on the eligibility question of the candidates, as well as, educating voters about the dangers, which election campaigns motivated by Inter-ethnic historical grievances, posed on the country. The media had consciously and unconsciously went silent on the raised issues about ethnicity, regional and religious sentiments among voters. I want to conclude that the absence of that moderation had given law breakers the motivation to cause trouble.

8.5.3) Regularization of Political Temperature and the Perception of Voters

The development of Opposition among members of political parties, especially on the question of qualification and right to participate in the election for the office of the President, had created binary problems for the parties' leadership. Members of the same political party were to become antagonistic to each other based on religion as well as on ethno-regional affiliation. Individual political interest, which had pitched one member against another, was to suddenly spread into the polity, and became prioritized by the voters. Democracy being a rallying point for people, who share the

same political ideology and policy orientation, could not under that circumstance shock-absorbed the crises in the polity.

As the Campaign progresses, many voters in the core northern region; especially those voters who had believed in the political propaganda projected by several elements in the region, were to view the candidacy of the President in the election and under the platform of the ruling party as a direct challenge to their collective identity, and political interest. At the same time, the populace in the old eastern region as well as the majority of voters in the western region had the belief also that the northern region has had enough in occupying the presidency. In that respect, the resolve by the southern region, especially the old eastern region to hold onto the Presidency as against the agitation of the core northern region to have power return to them through the ruling party, or as it turned out to be, through another political party with a northern candidate, and who must be a Muslim, was to become a daily topic and debate in every street and homes in the country. The inability of the party campaign teams to manage and control the level of aggressive utterances that were coming from members of the party was to develop into a hydra-head problem in the public sphere. The consciously created violent political temperature motivated voters to reappraise their electoral preferences and choices in the 2011 presidential election.

8.5.4) Election Campaigns and the Exploitation of genuine and Media induced events

Reports about campaign violence between supporters of candidates was made daily occurrence in the media reporting. The fact that majority of the constitutionally qualified voters in the far north were democratically illiterate, made it much more difficult to educate and create awareness about the need for peaceful election activity. In essence, many of the voters had hardly rational appraisal of any political situation before reacting violently. Incidentally, they consciously exploited the opportunity given to them by campaign messages, which were dished out by the political actors, to launch attack on innocent citizens.

The proposition, which had supported the usurpation argument, that the South wanted to take away the office of the President from the northern part of the country was to emboldened most voters in the core northern region into believing the information. Some sections in the media were guilty as they kept repeating the accusation to generate further public reaction. The situation was to degenerate, and indeed, was to help infuriate many voters in the deep northern part of the country. The campaign teams were to exploit the situation the more and violent clashes were to be recorded from the campaign period until the final election result was announced (See table 8.1 below).

Pre-election and Post-election Violence figures in Nigeria, 2011		
	Pre-election Violence	**Post-election Violence**
Number of Deaths	Over 100	Over 800
Number of Injured	Over 500	Over 1000
Number of Displaced	N/A	Over 250,000

Table 8.1: Adapted from NDI final report for the 2011 Elections in Nigeria

In most towns and villages in the core northern region, the belief that Muhammadu Buhari, the candidate of the opposition (CPC) would win the election, especially by mere winning the 19 federal states in the northern region, was a time bomb waiting to explode. However, when the "Bomb" eventually exploded as I have established through table 8.1 above, several innocent citizens were either killed or displaced and forced to migrate to different towns outside the core northern states.

The above permutation by the frequent "change" slogan, which was popular chant by voters in the core north of the country, was to create among the many voters of an

imaginary belief that Muhammadu Buhari would emerge victorious. I was able to discover, that when it became obvious to many voters in the north after the election result was announced, that it was actually the president that won the election; the gate of hell was let loose through what I can call "failure of expectation". Actually, the change slogan was to mean, "change from a Christian President to a Muslim President", and change from a "southern President to a northern President". Considering the role of the media with regard to the "right to contest" controversy under the ruling party, and the consequent internal political buildup among ethnic and religious communities in the country, many voters had in the core north of the country developed the impression that their political right was being taken away.

8.5.4.1)   Policy Bargaining and Voter Solidarity

The 2011 presidential election in Nigeria was characterized by series of campaign events that were to become orchestrated through "change slogan". The political actors had moved from location to another seeking voters' support. As the candidate of the ruling party, President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan had to travel around several towns in the North of the country, where he engaged in consultation as well as assuring the northern leaders (Emirs), and the general electorate about his readiness to continue with the implementation of late President Umaru Musa Yar Adua policies. The president was to argue persuasively in his campaign speeches, that there would be no difference between policies in his administration and that of his late predecessor. The tense political atmosphere in the country was necessitated by the use of ethnic solidarity in voter mobilization, and the tension was to explode as soon as the presidential election result was made official.

 Candidates and political parties had organized open rallies and each party had used the opportunity, which was created by such gatherings, to reel out promises and programs intended to be executed, if voted into office. But the rallies were equally not free from financial inducement, as people were paid to come down to the rally grounds and make the event appear as well attended by supporters of such candidate and his party. The use of Material Incentive strategy during the campaigns was in my opinion a great disservice to democracy. Political parties and agents of

candidates had invested heavily through sharing of money to certain political actors in a bid to secure the support of their constituents.

8.5.4.2). Expanded Campaign Communication and Voter Reaction

In the 2011 presidential election in Nigeria, the expansion in media and social communication channels had succeeded only in increasing anxiety and division among voters. The intensity of reports about violence as was promoted by the media had dominated every aspect of public discourse in the country. Furthermore, the use of Inter-ethnic grievances as campaign instrument was to consume the influence of policy debate among voters and political actors. Ironically, the voters were to become the chief marketers of the candidates, instead of the campaign team of each of the contenders doing so. Unfortunately, the electoral discourse in the country was to assume a dimension far away from democratic politics. Social pressures and policy alternatives were to become less important to voters' electoral preferences. As I have established in figure 8.4 below, the ruling party and the opposition parties in the 2011 presidential election had promoted and anchored their voter mobilization strategies on pre-independence, and post-independence ethno-political competition, under the motivation of Inter-ethnic historical grievances.

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┌─────────────────┐              ┌─────────────┐         ┌─────────────────┐
│  Ruling Party   │              │             │         │  Opposition     │
│                 │     ───►     │  Voters     │   ◄───  │  Parties        │
│ •Christians     │              │             │         │                 │
│ •Igbo and Eastern│             │ •Party Loyalty│       │ •Muslims        │
│  Minorities     │              │ •Regional   │         │ •Hausa-Fulani   │
│ •Middle Belt    │              │  solidarity │         │ •Others         │
│  Minorities     │              │ •Religious  │         │                 │
│                 │              │  Solidarity │         │                 │
└─────────────────┘              └─────────────┘         └─────────────────┘
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
Figure 8.4 showing division in communication within the society

Considering the nature of aggressive debates that had arose from the opposition mounted by members of the ruling party, who were from the core northern region, against the participation of the President in the election, voters who could not have voted in the election were to become strongly interested in the election. Many voters in the core north of Nigeria were to become heavily mobilized against the candidate of the ruling party. As indicated in (figure 8.4 above), the ruling party and all the opposition parties in the election had expanded their campaign communication efforts. Several of the political actors were to use solidarity incentive to target voters along religious, regional, ethnic and party loyalty.

The mobilization strategy was perfected through the use of Inter-ethnic historical grievances as electoral instrument. Outside the reach of the party campaign teams, community and tribal associations were recruited and they went into aggressive political sensitization and mobilization.

In essence, while campaigns were on going, the ethnic associations were busy promoting the religious, political and regional importance of the election on the entire ethnic group, as well as the regional relevance of each in the national politics. Furthermore, religious leaders were drawn into campaign mobilization debate. The religious leaders in most cases had campaigned for their chosen candidate,

especially on the premise of collective religious identity. As a fall-out, many Islamic teachers in the North of the country had to admonish their followers to mobilize and vote only for Muhammadu Buhari in the election. The implication of their involvement was to either return political power to the North, and above all a Muslim, or to have political power retained in the South, and with a Christian as the President.

The combination of qualified voters among the Igbo, and other minority groups in the eastern region as well as the Christians in the middle belt region and Western part of the country were able to create an army of voters, who had shown electoral solidarity in support of President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan. Detached from the dictate of the campaign teams, electoral solidarity influenced volunteers were massed out in the cities and villages, with the sole aim to sensitize, persuade, and mobilize voters to cast their votes in support of a chosen candidate in the 2011 presidential election. Basically, solidarity influenced volunteers were to become more visible and effective in voter mobilization than the party funded Media adverts.

I was able to find out in this study, that some voters were to become deeply involved in the solidarity battle, which was created by the use of Inter-ethnic grievances as mobilization instrument. Basically, some party supporters were faced with problems I want to call PL2R[2]. Since Party loyalty (PL) ordinarily ought to supersede sectional interest, members of political parties were to become sand-witched by the politics of either to support party choice, and ignore sectional politics, or to support a candidate in another party on the premise of religion and regional identity. Furthermore, the 2R[s] of regional political solidarity (r-p-s) and religious political solidarity (r-p-s) were used to subject voters to an undemocratic drama. As I was able to observe, most voters would have voted for a candidate in another party other than the candidate they eventually voted for in the election. As eventually observed in the voting pattern in the 2011 presidential election, the PL2R[s] played essential role in the outcome of the election. As I have argued previously, the use of Inter-ethnic grievances as the center of voter mobilization and sensitization by political actors in the eastern as well as in northern regions was able to create electoral preference problem for voters.

The second part of the 2R,^{s} which are embedded on religious political solidarity, goes beyond the regional base. This was observed from the trend of support received by Goodluck Ebele Jonathan from among the several Christian voters in the middle belt region as well as Christians among the Yoruba in the western part of Nigeria. It was able also to establish a contrast in the trend of votes recorded for Muhammadu Buhari in the Muslim dominated federal states in the core north, and the votes recorded for him in the eastern and western parts of Nigeria. In essence, the combined effort of regional loyalty and religious solidarity were able to boost the electoral chances of Goodluck Ebele Jonathan and the ruling party in the eastern, western, and in the middle belt. It could be interpreted also, that without the binary influence of the 2R^s, the victory recorded by Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, and the ruling party would not have been possible.

I was able to find out also, that the impact of electoral solidarity on the process of democratization in the 2011 presidential election was able to deplete, devalued and significantly impeded democracy. My above claim is manifested in the degree of violent protest, which had erupted after the election result was made public. As a matter of political convenience, each party had picked a candidate based on ethnic and religious balancing, and not necessarily on the basis of individual competence. Furthermore, I was able to discover in the course of this study, that each party had configured its campaign strategy to accommodate the sentiments associated with Ethnicity, regional identity, and religion of a nominated candidate.

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2). I use PL2RR as a concept to establish the factors of dilemma, which voters confronted in the 2011 presidential election.

8.6).   Material Incentive: Stomach Infrastructure and Votes

As a component of the binary factors used by political actors to mobilize voters in the 2011 presidential election, Material Incentive has several components. The various material items used to gain unmerited electoral favor by political actors ranged from perishable to non-perishable goods and materials. In the pictorial evidence below, one could see how political actors were able to manipulate democracy and electoral processes to win elections in Nigeria, and indeed, in many Sub-Sahara African countries.

Photo 8. 1. showing Textile materials and Cars to be distributed to voters by a political actor (Photo by: Aniakor, Nchedo Becky/11/10/2014)

As I have stated before, some political actors used Material Incentives to win electoral sympathy from voters. As I was able to discover in the course of this study, these gestures are given either before elections, during campaigns or after elections.

Unfortunately, many among the voters who had received these material items were very happy and satisfied.

Photo 8. 2. showing Cars to be distributed to some supporters by a political actor (Photo by: Aniakor, Nchedo Becky/11/10/2014)

Photo 8.3. showing voters on the line receiving packaged parboiled Rice from political actor (Source: www.informationng.com/accessed on 22/05/2016)

Photo 8.4. voters being given money to vote for a particular candidate in election (Source: www.olumidefafore.blogspot.com/accessed on 22/05/2016)

Photo 8.5. showing material items to be distributed to voters by a political actor (Photo by: Aniakor, Nchedo Becky, 04/12/2014)

Photo 8.6. showing material items ready to be distributed to voters by a political actor (Photo by: Aniakor, Nchedo Becky, 16/09/2014)

Photo 8.7. showing Motor-bikes to be distributed to voters as part of material incentives by a political actor (Photo by: Aniakor, Nchedo Becky/ 16/09/2014)

Photo .8.8. showing Material Items to be distributed to voters as part of Stomach Infrastructure (Source, www.scannewsnigeria.com/accessed on 22/05/2016)

Photo 8.9. showing the after effect of Stomach Infrastructure/Material Incentive as voter mobilization strategy (Source: www.news2.onlinenigeria.com/accessed on 22/05/2016)

As I have established through pictorial evidence 1 to 9 above, the use and effects of Material Incentive strategy as voters' mobilization instrument, has tremendously devalued democracy. I am well convinced to conclude that the activity of political actors has devalued democracy through exploitation, and manipulation of voters' material poverty.

8.7).   **Solidarity Incentive**

As I have tenaciously explained, solidarity incentive as voter mobilization strategy was extensively used by political actors in the 2007, 2011 and 2012 presidential elections in Kenya, Nigeria and Ghana, respectively. Political actors in Nigeria had structured their campaigns during the elections, so that the strategy adopted for mobilization of voters, could fit into Inter-ethnic grievances. As I have indicated in figure 8.5 below, each campaign team had focused on particular regions, with a particular message structure, particular mobilization strategy, and particular tools in the 2011 presidential election in Nigeria.

Figure 8.5 showing the structural characterization of campaign agenda of parties

8.7.1). Campaign rhetoric and the Making of Political Crisis

The effort by political actors in the 2011 presidential election in Nigeria to recruit greater number of supporters had ended up deadly. This was essentially made possible through the combined influence of two election factors in recruitment and voter mobilization. The combative nature of those recruited, the tools deployed and the strategy adopted by campaign teams in the election, had rendered policy debate as foundation of election campaign very obsolete. Indeed, the communication tactic adopted and deployed (Table 8.2 below) by the contending political actors in the 2011 presidential election had punctured the contemporary postulation about election campaigns.

Respondents in the Three Regions in Nigeria			
	North	East	West
Men	95	90	70
Women	25	70	65
Total	120	160	135

Table 8.2 Respondents in the three regions on Motivation factors in the 2011 presidential election

in Nigeria

As I have indicated in Table 8.2 above, the respondents were selected randomly without prior knowledge about their individual political preferences or inclination. I was able to interview and interact with 120 persons in the old northern region. At the same time, I was able to interview and had interaction with 160 persons in the old eastern region, while I was able to interview and interact with 135 persons in the old western region. My concern here is to know why the participants voted the way they did. I wanted to know as well, how the campaign strategies used in voter mobilization by the political parties were able to shape their electoral preferences in the election. My effort to study the campaign strategy used by various Campaign Teams to mobilize voters in the 2011 presidential election had compelled me to seek for several opinions.

As I have indicated in table 8.3 below, I was able to interview and interacted with 120 persons in the North, and 103 persons among the respondents had voted in the 2011 presidential election. The respondents who voted in the election comprise of 88 men and 15 women (See table 8.3 below). Furthermore, I had interview and interacted also with 160 persons in the old Eastern region, and 145 of the respondents had actually voted in the 2011 presidential election. My respondents in the eastern region comprise of 80 men and 65 women (Table 8.3 below). Lastly, I had interviewed and interacted with135 persons in the old western region, and 101 persons voted in the 2011 presidential election. My respondents in the old western region were 55 men and 46 women (Table 8.3 below).

Number of Respondents who actually voted in the 2011 Presidential Election in Nigeria by Gender			
Gender:	North	East	West
Men	88	80	55
Women	15	65	46
Total	103	145	101

Table 8.3 Respondents who voted in the 2011 Presidential Election in Nigeria

Indeed, my overall intention in the interview conducted as explained previously was to capture the motivation factors that had influenced each person's preference in the presidential election. I have presented in diagram 8.1 below the percentage of the respondents on regional basis. However, the disparity in the number of persons interviewed or interacted with in each region was not deliberately structured. Nevertheless, about 29 percent of the respondents who had voted in the 2011 presidential election were in the northern region (diagram 8.1 below), and about 42 percent of the respondents were in the old eastern region (diagram 8.1), while about 29 percent of the respondents were in the old western region (diagram 8.1 below). The number of respondents I was able to engage in the study has reviewed the level of political involvement among the people in the various communities.

Percentage of Respondents who actually voted in the 2011 Presidential Election

Diagram 8.1 Demography of Respondents by region in the 2011 Presidential Election in Nigeria

In another demographic classification of the voters, the number of young voters and first time voters was more than the elderly voters. As I have indicated in table 8.4 below, 46 from 103 respondents in the northern region who had voted in 2011 presidential election were elderly persons above 45 years of age. At the same time, 57 persons among the respondents in the northern region, and who had voted in the 2011 presidential election were between 22 years and 44 years in age.

Number of Respondents who actually voted in the Presidential Election 2011 in Nigeria by Age.			
	North	East in %	West in %
Elderly Voters	46 (45+)	31 (45+)	20 (45+)
Young/First Time Voters	57 (22 – 44)	114 (22 – 44)	81 (22 – 44)
Total	103	145	101

Table 8.4 Demography of Respondents who actually voted in the 2011 Presidential Election

Diagram 8.2 showing demography of voters in the three regions by age

As I have indicated in table 8.3 above and also in diagram 8.2 above, in all the three regions, the number of Young and the first time voters in this study were more than the elderly. This was deliberately programmed as to help in the evaluation of the effects of campaign strategy used by Campaign Teams in the election. As indicated in table 8. 4 above, the number of male respondents was higher than the number of female respondents. The fundamental factor for the disparity was my intention to drive-home the argument about the male domination of the northern political space,

especially in terms of political decision as it affects the generality of the region. However, the near parity in the number of male and female respondents in both eastern and western regions was based on the open and equality participation opportunity that characterized social life in the two regions.

Diagram 8.3 showing graphical representation of the number of Male and Female participants in the Interviews conducted in the three regional political blocs

As I have indicated in Diagram 8.3 above, the Male-Female ratio, the number of Young/first time voters and the Elderly voters had shown a disproportionate representation (Diagram 8.4 below). Once again, the idea behind the disparity in the numbers emerged from the political consciousness of the young people from 22 to 44 years of age in the three regions. I do share the impression that establishing the motivation factors in the regions, would give me the needed breakthrough in how primordial loyalty factors shaped voters' electoral preferences. I was able to observe in the course of this study, that, the presidential election in 2011 had witnessed completely different voter mobilization strategy anchored on Inter-ethnic historical grievances. I had concentrated on the Young voters as well as those who were to vote for the time, in an attempt to find out, why the mode of mobilization was Intra-ethnic centered, and if it is culturally engineered, or motivated through socio-political pressures.

Diagram 8.4 showing a demographical presentation of the number of Interviewed Elderly and Young/First Time voters in the three regions

As I have indicated in Diagram 8.4 above, the age classification of the respondents in the three regions, does confirmed the strength of social cohesion in each region. Indeed, in each of the regions, the number of Young and First time voters does outnumber the elderly voters. My primary intention with the above classification is to use the participation of Young voters to measure the overall effects of the mobilization strategy. Since, one is dealing with factors of violence in the 2011 presidential election in Nigeria; then, it is paramount to involve the Youths as much as one can. In my resolve to find out the remote facilitators of violence during the focused election period, I have decided to re-evaluate and make an attempt to exploit the themes embedded in the campaign strategy used in the mobilization of voters as a factor in violence (Table 8.5 below). I am well convinced that the act of electoral solidarity, as it was widely expressed by voters, is culturally embedded as communal attachment. Based on my social interaction with people across regions, I am deeply convinced that voters had reacted to the demands inherent in solidarity strategy, because, it is an internally held socio-political and Inter-ethnic prejudice. Indeed, the Inter-ethnic grievances were to become translated into social cues, and further transformed into group held socio-political ideology.

The social forces inherent in the cues were to become mobilization tool in the armory of political actors, which were to moderate voters' preferences in the election. Inter-ethnic historical grievances between the North and East of the country were to give rise to solidarity political action (Table 8.5 below).

Where I-G represents Inter-ethnic grievances, and A-S represent Anti-South political feeling in the North, while R-2-P represents "return of political power" to the North (Table 8.5 below). In the same theoretical reasoning and empirical expression in the eastern region, I-G is to represent Inter-ethnic grievances. However, in western part of Nigeria, the political expression does revert to Anti-North political feeling and individual political preference. The theoretical keys contained in Table 8.5 below are what I used in my interactions, which had enabled me to determine how the electoral preferences of my respondents were influenced.

Demography of Voters and Mobilization Factors			
Voters	North	East	West
Men	I – G + A-S + R - 2P	I – G	A-N + Others
Women	I – G + A-S + R - 2P	I – G	A-N + Others
Elderly	I – G + A-S + R - 2P	I – G	A-N + Others
Young/First Time Voters	I – G + A-S + R - 2P	I – G	A-N + Others

Table 8.5 showing Demography of voters and motivation factors in the three regions of Nigeria

Furthermore, I was convinced to believe, that, the adoption of Inter-ethnic grievances as electoral instrument, used in voter mobilization, had discredited the relevance of political ideology in divided societies. I was able to discover in the course of this study, how the local support groups of the candidates had discreetly promoted sectional political interest over national political cohesion.

I was able to find out how the use of Inter-ethnic historical grievances for voter mobilization purposes were able to undermined the importance of policy debate as fundamental factor in democratic elections. Indeed, my evaluation of table 8.5 above had revealed why policy issue factor, as a fundamental indicator of election campaign

maturity had failed to alter the effects of Inter-ethnic historical grievances in the 2011 presidential election.

 In trying to explain further the contents in table 8.5 above, I want to conclude, that, the use of Inter-ethnic grievances as voter mobilization strategy was able to build up the political mindset of voters, which otherwise had characterized voters' preferences as I have shown in table 8.6 below. As I shall explain in table 8.6 below, the percentage of votes recorded for each political party and candidate in the Northern, and in Eastern regions had suggested that voters' mobilization strategy in the 2011 presidential election in Nigeria was very defective.

I want to conclude, that the hard-line political positions, undertaken by several political actors before the commencement of campaigns, and during the campaign were already huge signals for danger. The implication of the above situation does indicate that there would be trouble, if the expectations of voters in the core northern region fail to materialize. I want to use the data in tables 8.6, 8.7 and 8.8 below to establish further, the campaign effects of Inter-ethnic grievances (I-G) on voting pattern in the three regions.

Total Number of States won by each Party in Eastern region (South East-South South).			
PDP	CPC	CAN	ANPP
11	0	0	0
Total Number of States: 11			

Table 8.6 showing percentage of votes recorded by each party in the Eastern region

As hinted earlier, the desire of the two opposing political divisions of north and south, especially between the core north and eastern region, to mobilize voters for their preferred candidates had impacted heavily on the election. The impacts as I was able to observe, does emanate from the message and tools used by each group to

sensitize their base. As I observed, signal of danger in the election had began from Party nomination primaries. The situation was to become heightened by the campaign messages, which were primarily designed by the parties, zonal concentration of candidate's presence, and the "bottom-up" voters' mobilization strategy. The data in Table 8.6 is used to show that the ruling party candidate was able to record over 98 percent of the total votes cast in the entire eastern region, while other opposition parties and candidates combined were able to receive less than 2 percent of the total votes cast in the region.

Indeed, the fact that the ruling party candidate could record a landslide electoral victory in the eastern region of the country does not suggest the acceptance of the party policies, rather the candidacy of the President was a political message well received by the people in the region. The solidarity fire-wall, which was built by vote canvassers through political rhetoric, had ultimately reignited Inter-ethnic historical grievances between core northern region and eastern region. As implication, it was able to devalue the essence of ideology debate on best problem-solving strategy in the society. I have presented further generated impacts from the voter mobilization strategy on voters through the election in table 8.9 below. In the other two regions of West and North, the result declared by the Election Commission had indicated the presence of the old long held political sentiment as shown in Table 8.7 and Table 8.8 below.

Total Number of States won by each Political Party in the Western region			
PDP	CPC	ACN	ANPP
5	0	1	0
Total Number of States: 6			

Table 8.7 showing the number of states won by each party in the 2011 Presidential election

Obviously, the percentage of valid votes received by each party and candidate in the western region of Nigeria can support my argument, that majority among Yoruba voters were never enthusiastic to vote, or the people were never in election frenzy each time nobody of Yoruba extraction is a candidate in any of the main political parties. Indeed, the disparity in number of valid votes recorded for the ruling party and the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) does support the argument, that majority of voters in the region can only show aggressive political concern each time a Yoruba person is the direct candidate of the ruling party or main opposition party. Despite fielding a Yoruba person as a Vice Presidential candidate to a candidate nominated by the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), which by national presence and operational definition, had always controlled politics in the region, and as such had strong appeal and presence in the region. The opposition Action Congress of Nigeria was only able to win in one federal state from six available in the region. The result recorded for Action Congress of Nigeria in the western region does support my argument about the effect of Anti-North (A-N) voter preference motivation among the Yoruba in the 2011 presidential election (See table 8.7 above).

Apparently, the election campaign teams had designed and had prosecuted their campaigns through the promotion of regional and religious sentiments above social pressures. The adopted strategy and methods had provided voters and non-voters an opportunity to key into the promoted regional political solidarity sentiments, and thus, was able to defeat the idea of contemporary political ideology debate on national policy issues.

The elimination of national political thought through voter mobilization strategy, defined under Inter-ethnic historical grievances, had diminished and uprooted the structures of democratic election. I want to conclude, however, that the use of electoral solidarity as an instrument for voter mobilization by political actors in the 2011 presidential election in Nigeria, had handicapped universal suffrage, and consequently, was able to render the various sanctioned democratic norms, such like absence of hate speech, irrelevant.

Indeed, the decision of some political actors to manipulate the political arena through the use of Inter-ethnic grievances in voter mobilization had emboldened many deviants, who organized themselves into deadly political miscreants. I was able to discover, that the recruited political deviants had waited, and were prepared to explode should the election go against their expectation. The manipulation of the campaign system in the 2011 presidential election was able to build-up band of ethnic irredentists in the North. I found out also, that several of the political actors in the North had viewed some of the Muslims and some people who had supported and campaigned for President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, as enemy of the northern region, as well as Muslims' political interest in Nigeria.

Total Number of states won by each Political Party in the Northern region			
PDP	CPC	ACN	ANPP
7	12	0	0
Total Number of States: 19			

Table 8.8 showing number of states in the Northern region won by each party in the 2011

Presidential election

In this study, I was able to find out that the use of Inter-ethnic grievances (I-G), as campaign instrument by the opposing political interests, the local associations, and support groups were to become politically united more than ever. The campaign, and voting pattern, which had characterized previous exercises, did not end; rather the many undemocratic factors that have combined to impede democracy and democratic election in the country were to become more pronounced through arson and violent attack as was witnessed in several towns and villages in the northern part of the country (See table 8.1 above and also table 8.9 below).

I want to agree with the popular political notion that young and newly registered voters often deviate from existing voting pattern, and political sentiments in a democracy. However, the 2011 presidential election in Nigeria had disproved the above highlighted political notion. In essence, individual political interests were to become ethnic in nature, and regionalized in processes. Many Young voters in the North were to become very restive and outspoken in support of the many established politicians in the region. I was able to discover also in the course of this study, that the call for "Change" by the North was a call for a return of political power to the North, and it was also a call for a President who is a Muslim. It was difficult to call many of the young people in the several towns and villages in the North to order. Consequently, the tension created by the use of Inter-ethnic grievances as campaign instrument, and pursued under the tenet of electoral solidarity had made the situation almost irredeemable.

However, the accumulation of threats, hate political and religious speeches and deep held political animosity between elements from northern and eastern regions were able and potent enough to shape the participatory readiness of voters in the two regions. I can confidently conclude that the spontaneous eruption of violence in several towns in the northern region after the announcement of the 2011 presidential election result was a product of Inter-ethnic historical grievances (See Table 8.9 below). Above all, the activity of several political actors in their promotion of electoral solidarity as a campaign strategy has destroyed contemporary democratic election campaign models. Again, I hold the belief, that the devaluation includes equally the democratic worth of the institutions that emerged from the processes as result of questionable national political legitimacy.

2011 Presidential Election Violence in Nigeria		
Northern Region	➢ Niger: Bomb attack at campaign rally in Suleja, Arson and destruction of Residential houses. ➢ Plateau: deaths on campaign trail ➢ Kaduna: Properties destroyed, Arson ➢ Kano: Destruction of properties, Arson, burning of Churches ➢ Zamfara: Properties destroyed, Arson, burning of Churches ➢ Gombe: Properties destroyed, Arson ➢ Katsina: Properties destroyed, Arson, burning of Churches ➢ Bauchi: Properties destroyed, Arson ➢ Taraba: Properties destroyed, Arson ➢ Borno: Properties destroyed as well as massive violent demonstration, and Arson	• Over 50 death recorded and many injured • Over 12 deaths recorded and several injured • Over 10th deaths recorded and many injured • Over 5 deaths and several injured • Several people injured • Over 17 deaths reported, over 370 persons injured • Over 15 deaths, several injured • Over 20 deaths, over 4,000 persons displaced, several people injured • Over 11 persons shot dead, several people injured • Several people killed and many more injured
Eastern Region	No pre-presidential or post-presidential election violence in the 2011 Presidential election	No Death or Injured
Western Region	No Pre-Presidential or Post-Presidential election violence in the 2011 Presidential election	No Death or Injured

Table 8.9 showing regions, violence and number of deaths after 2011 Presidential election

As I have documented in table 8.9 above, the casualty rate in the 2011 presidential election in Nigeria was very alarming for democratic politics. I continued to argue, that the use of electoral solidarity as campaign strategy by parties and candidates, more than any other factor, had built up army of angry supporters. As I have emphasized in this study, the situation was to explode the moment the result of the presidential election became public. Consequently, deadly violence was triggered-off in several towns in the North by supporters, sympathizers, religious extremists, and regional irredentists. Apart from the evidences as I have established in Table 8.6, 8.7 and 8.8 above, (which showed voting pattern across the three regions), the data in Table 8.9 above, with the number of deaths, the injured, and the volume of properties destroyed by the aggrieved supporters in the north, can confirm my argument that the campaigns were prosecuted using wrong strategy in voter mobilization. I want to insist that the use of Inter-ethnic grievances as campaign factor, and under electoral solidarity strategy in the 2011 presidential election was anti-democracy, and anti-peace. Obviously, the violent response from the perceived losers in the election by extension had devalued democracy and democratic processes.

I am in opposition to the positions of scholars like Bamgbose (2012, pp: 205 – 219), Sobechi, 2011: p. 15; Akhaine, 2011: p. 16, Abuh, 2011: p. 12, and Sabiu et al, 2011: p. 53), who through their individual accounts on the 2011 presidential election, had failed to recognize that the spontaneous eruption of violence was the attribute of campaign based on Inter-ethnic historical grievances as pursued through electoral solidarity strategy.

I was able to discover in the course of this study, that the use of Inter-ethnic grievances was able to transform generation of voters into that of political generation equipped under Inter-ethnic grievances. In essence, voters in the old Eastern region of the country had voted massively for the candidate of the ruling party, PDP. Obviously, the campaign strategy used during the campaign by parties and candidates had prepared the ground for the election result produced in Tables 8.6; 8.7 and 8.8 above. Voters in the northern region were to become entangled in the two campaign theories in display. Consequently, solidarity incentive factors were able to divide the voting population. The implication was the weakening of the electoral capacity and projection of the Opposition candidates. I hold the belief, that, electoral solidarity votes linked to the Christian community in the middle belt or geographically

speaking, south of northern region, had provided the ground for the ruling party to secure the constitutionally mandatory 25 percent of votes spread in 25 from the 36 federal states in the country. As I have stated above, the strategy for voter mobilization was anchored on dangerous premise, whereby ethnic, religious and regional solidarity frames were used to shape voters' preferences in the election.

Social Solidarity
- Exclusiveness
- In-group and Out-group Campaigners
- Community Associations
- Market and Traders Union
- Co-operative Associations

Religious Solidarity and Mobilization
- Christian Groups
- Muslim Groups
- Ethno-Religious Alignment

Ethno-Regional Mobilization
- Eastern Region
- Northern Region
- Western Region

Figure 8.6 showing factors used in voters' mobilization in 2011 presidential election

8.7.2). Regional and Religion Induced Voter Mobilization Strategy

One among the fundamental factors I was able to observe, is the role played by Solidarity motivated votes in the election. It was disturbing in the sense that Solidarity Incentive and Material Incentive Campaign strategies were able to twist the facts surrounding election in any democracy. The Strategy as used by political actors to prosecute the 2011 presidential election in Nigeria had compelled voters to act under the influence of Inter-ethnic grievances. Indeed, S-I and M-I had provided the Campaign teams cohesive and dependable voters. The argument for "change" was riddled with religious, ethnic, and regional undertones. I did observe from my interaction with some voters, that the call for "change" in leadership was also symbolic. It was to return the political power to northern region, and to make a Muslim the president of the country. The above call was responsible for the mobilization strategy used to market the opposition candidate in the North. Using Inter-ethnic grievances to mobilize voters, electoral solidarity was to become the only available option to return political power to the North, and also to make a Muslim the President.

Clear difference in electoral support during the 2011 presidential election had become much more crystallized through regional and religious solidarity. Consequently, religious fundamentalists in the northern region and moderate number of voters among the Yoruba in the western region had combined to oppose the candidacy of Goodluck Ebele Jonathan. The change advocates, who were opposed to President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan election bid, had launched massive electoral drive to mobilize voters for the main opposition candidate from the northern region, and who by religion was a Muslim. As I have indicated in diagram 8.5 below, the number of votes recorded for each party and candidate support my argument.

Diagram 8.5 showing percentage of votes received in selected federal states in the eastern region by each of the four dominant political parties in the 2011 presidential election (adapted from results released by www.inecnigeria.org/presidential-election-results/2011)

The data in diagram 8.5 above is used to represent the percentage of actual valid votes received in five federal states in Eastern region by four main political parties in the 2011 presidential election. As I have established in the data, the ruling party's candidate was able to record a landslide electoral victory over all the opposition candidates and parties combined. However, the record of votes received by each candidate does provide incontrovertible evidence about the impact of regional and religious solidarity in the 2011 presidential election. Aside the introduction of regional and religious factors in voter mobilization strategy in the 2011 Presidential election in Nigeria, many voters would have had a different preference. Indeed, the abysmal performance of the opposition candidates had no connection with the qualification of the contestants. I am well convinced that the voter mobilization strategy adopted by political actors in the eastern region was responsible for the failure or electoral misfortune suffered by the opposition candidates.

The adoption and the use of solidarity incentives as election campaign tool by parties and supporting groups had inflicted deep political injury on the emotional psyche of voters. Regional and religious issues being fundamental factors in Nigeria's political fault-line was a strong rallying instrument used by political actors and supporters to drive home age long held regional and political perception against each ethnic group in the country. The use of Inter-ethnic grievance as a voter mobilization strategy was promoted on the premise of regional and religious solidarity.

Diagram 8.6 showing percentage of votes received in some selected federal states in the northern region by each of the four dominant parties in the 2011 presidential election (adapted from results released by (www.inecnigeria.org/presidential-election-results/2011)

The impact of the electoral solidarity strategy is further presented in diagram 8.6 above. As the data in diagram 8.6 had indicated, the number of votes recorded for each political party and candidate in 7 selected federal states in the northern region, had shown strong disproportionate in value. As indicated in diagram 5.6 above, it is clear to note that the Opposition candidate, Muhammadu Buhari was able to win overwhelmingly in states with Muslim majority in contrast to the performance of President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan in states with Christian majority in the Northern region. I was able to observe also, the presence of large number of people from Eastern region resident in the various states in the Northern region had contributed significantly in pushing up votes recorded for the President.

The influence so exerted by regional and religious solidarity on voters in the 2011 presidential election was an avoidable political setback for the country's nascent democracy. Evidence as it is provided in diagram 8.6 above had shown that in Kano and Sokoto states, the President's party had failed to secure the constitutional mandatory 25 percent of the votes cast in the election; then 75 percent of votes received by the President in the two states came mostly from among Christians, and peoples of eastern region resident in the states. The adoption of religious places of worship as campaign grounds, and the involvement of religious leaders in voter mobilization processes, had introduced a deadly and unwanted angle in the

campaigns for the 2011 presidential election in Nigeria. In contrast, the electoral returns from states in western part of the country had presented another dimension in electoral solidarity campaign strategy (Diagram 8.7 below).

Diagram 8.7 showing the percentage of votes received in the western region by each of the four dominant parties during the 2011 presidential election (adapted from results released by www.inecnigeria.org/presidential-election-results/2011)

As a neutral political ground that was up for grabs, the leading political actors and voters in the region had chosen to weigh their options between the two political Camps of North and East. In all the states in the western region, the votes received and the margin of victory between President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, and the Opposition candidates was very minimal. I was able to observe, that the nomination of a Yoruba person as the Vice presidential candidate to Nuhu Ribadu, being the candidate of Action Congress of Nigeria, had divided the Yoruba, and indeed the voters in western region. Some had campaigned for the Action Congress of Nigeria on the premise that one among them could become an elected Vice President, and some had campaigned for the ruling People's Democratic Party based on their dislike for a Hausa-Fulani becoming the elected President. However, many voters of Eastern region extraction, who of course numbered several millions in the western region, had chosen to vote massively for President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan.

I want to conclude, however, that the results as presented in table 8.9 and diagrams 8.5; 8.6 and 8.7 were direct products of the Campaign strategies used by political parties and candidates during the 2011 presidential election. Above all, I was able to find out, that the argument against Hausa-Fulani or a Muslim presidential ambition after several years of unproductive governance under successive governments by persons from the region, had received massive support from majority of voters across the two southern regional blocs, irrespective of religion affiliation.

8.7.3).   Social Solidarity and Voter Demography

Election times in a democracy are known to have often granted different groups in a society the opportunity to be noticed by political actors and supporters. In the three presidential elections as was conducted in Kenya (2007), Nigeria (2011), and Ghana (2012) had attracted voters from various voter demography in the countries. Electoral preferences and choices to be made in a democracy have binary effects: solidarity in decisional outreach, and demography of subjects or group classification in a society. As was argued by Jeffrey C. Alexander (2006), whereby he insisted that,

> "Seldom… do political events alter the stereotypes of partisan groups… As people reflect on whether they are Democrats or Republicans… they call to mind some mental image, or stereotype, of what these sorts of people are like… One's partisan self-conception is guided by a sense of who belongs to these groups and one's relationship to them… Ordinary politics and life experiences are … forums for intergroup competition"

> (Quoted in Alexander, 2006, p. 129).

Indeed, as a factor in voter mobilization during the elections, social solidarity had very insignificant effects in the electoral decisions of voters that voted for each one of the political parties or coalitions on the premise of demography. In Ghana, the President and his political party, the National Democratic Congress, had courted the youths and had mobilized heavily for their electoral supports during the 2012 elections. Indeed,

as stated by Michael Chege in his evaluation of campaigns by political actors prior to the 2007 presidential election in Kenya, whereby he was particular about the type of campaign ran by the opposition ODM actors. Michael Chege had stated that,

> "Politicians stoked ethnic tensions with an effective campaign of disinformation in the run-up to the election, pitting the Kikuyu against Kenya's other African ethnic groups"

> …Building on the rhetoric of the 2005 referendum, the ODM grassroots campaign turned the election into a contest of "forty-one tribes against one" and Kenya against the Kikuyu"

> (See Michael Chege, In: Diamond and Plattner, 2010, p. 205).

Also, in Nigeria's 2011 presidential election, the mindset of voters across the eastern region and northern region was that built on continuity and change. The voters in the eastern region had wanted continuity in governance, while voters in the northern region, especially among Hausa-Fulani voters, had wanted change that would return political power to the region for symbolic reasons. In the same way, voters and political actors of non Kikuyu ethnic groups had wanted a change on the basis that they do not want any Kikuyu to be elected President of Kenya. Consequentially, every political camp in the elections had become more interested in ethnicity influenced voter mobilization strategy.

So, in the normative sense of social solidarity, there was no effective established link between social status, solidarity and demography, with regard to voters and how each person voted in the elections in Nigeria and Kenya. How voters voted in the focused elections in Nigeria, Kenya and Ghana cannot be empirically substantiated due to the absence of any verifiable data to that regard. People can only speculate or arrive at conclusions by mere assumptions. The strategies used by political actors to campaign for votes, sensitize the citizens, and mobilize supporters during the elections; especially in Nigeria and Kenya, had made it practically impossible to graduate voters on the basis of demography.

In the absence of field or electronically generated demographic data about those who voted in the focused elections, it was difficult for me to categorize the voters on the issue of social solidarity. Indeed, the characterization of voters on the basis of demography could not be realized even in the case of Ghana, where the processes for the 2012 presidential election were able to gain international approval and commendation. However, I can conclude that the absence of electronic voting system in any of the three case study countries had made it possible not to generate verifiable data about the voters. Of course, the consequence is the inability of this study to characterize voters along the line of social inclination, which could have demographically helped me to establish election and social solidarity possibility link. Therefore, I hold the belief, that despite all the shortcomings in technology, the use of Inter-ethnic grievances and ethnic solidarity in voter mobilization drive by political actors had made discourse on demography of the voters irrelevant. On that note, I want to ally my position and empirical argument on Donald Rothchild's position, whereby he stated that,

> "Where ethnic leaders engage in uncompromising behavior and seek to advance ethnic group interests at the expense of other groups, it can lead to polarization and increased conflict as the date of the election approaches"

> (See Rothchild, In: Wimmer, Goldstone, Horowitz,

> Joras and Schetter, 2004, p. 229).

8.7.3.1).   Educated Voters

I was able to discover in the course of this study that the social constituency of the candidates did not play any visible significant role in voters' preferences and choices during the election in 2011 in Nigeria. Although, it may be argued that many among the educated voters, and who knew and who had studied extensively about many problems in the country had supported President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan. Nevertheless, the support from the demography cannot be predicated on the image of the political party sponsoring the president, rather on account of the President's developmental project plans. There were several other voters in this demography too that campaigned and voted also against the president. Indeed, I was able to discover in the course of this study, that the more north or south one moved, the less support one get for either the president or the opposition candidates. Such development as I have discovered, is predicated on Inter-ethnic historical grievances, and religious solidarity in the polity.

8.7.3.2).   Non-Educated Voters

The demography of non educated voters cannot be measured or empirically verify because of absence of verifiable data and strategy used in the election. However, majority of the voters under this demography in the north of the country had voted overwhelmingly to the main opposition candidate in the election, Muhammadu Buhari. The reason for the shift is derived from the fact that the greater percentage of people with low or no education but qualified to vote in the election were among the Hausa-Fulani. This demography of people with no or low formal education is known to have dominated the population in the North of Nigeria. Like in the above sub-demography sector, the more north or south of the country one travels, the less support one find for either the president Goodluck Ebele Jonathan or the opposition candidates. As I discovered in the course of this study, it was not predicated on the image of political parties, rather on Inter-ethnic historical grievances and religious bias held by a voter.

8.7.3.3).   Aged and Old Time Voters

The degree or percentage of voters in this demography cannot be empirically quantified, because there was no data or valid information with record of voters' participation in the election showing the demography of voters in Nigeria. But as it were in other sub-factors in voter mobilization strategy, the Inter-ethnic grievances and religion bias had motivated voters in their electoral preferences and choices.

8.7.3.4).   Young and First Time Voters

Like in sub-factor on age above, the data or record of voter participation is a non issue in election documentation in Nigeria. However, empirical evidence had proved that majority of the young and first time voters, who were from southern and middle belt region, and who were also Christians had voted for the election of President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan in the 2011 presidential election in Nigeria. In contrast to the above sub-demography, majority of the young and first time voters, who were Muslims, and from the extreme North, and some communities in the western part of the country had voted for the opposition candidate, Muhammadu Buhari.

8.7.3.5).   Employed and Unemployed Voters

The actual number of the employed and unemployed voters who had participated in the 2011 presidential election could not be ascertained. The absence of data or valid documentation of voters during elections is responsible for that empirical evidence. Nevertheless, election processes in Nigeria have never been design to accommodate such vital demography classification. In essence, democracy and election in Nigeria is still very rudimentary. However, preferences in the election were solidarity defined and choices made were Inter-ethnic grievances and religion biased motivated.

8.7.4). Ethno-Regional, and Religion Voter Mobilization as Sources of Violence.

Eastern Region	Western Region	Northern Region
• Igbo • Minorities • Christianity • No Power Shift	• Yoruba • Christian/Muslim Solidarity • Ethno-Regional Interest	• Hausa-Fulani • Minorities • Muslim/Christian Solidarity • Power Shift

Figure 8.7. showing voter mobilization factors in Nigeria during the 2011 election

8.8).   Outcome and Findings

8.8.1).   Loss of Regulative Influence and Power

The use of Material Incentives to lure voters' support in the 2011 presidential election, and the acceptance of such material items had resulted to loss of regulative influence and power over elected public office holders as argued by Jeffrey Alexander (2006, pp: 107 – 150). In exchange of electoral regulative control over politicians, voters had jettisoned their responsibilities and have handed to the elected public office holders the instrument of regulative control and electoral coercion.

8.8.2).   Creation of fanatical support base

As one can obtain from demography of voters above, the use of solidarity incentive, being product of Inter-ethnic grievances had resulted in the creation of fanatical support-base along ethno-regional lines. Inter-ethnic historical grievances had become the rallying point for the supporters of each candidate in the election. I was able to discover in the course of this study, that majority of voters had identified with candidates in the 2011 presidential election on the basis of ethno-regional and religious concerns. The above statement is located in the voting pattern, which had emerged from the election, as voters in the eastern region as well as Christian dominated areas were found to have voted for President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, likewise voters in the northern region, and areas dominated by Muslims were found to have voted for the main opposition candidate, Muhammed Buhari. This situation is aptly presented in diagrams 8.4, 8.5, and 8.6 above.

8.8.3).   Ethnic and Religion Hardliners

As I was able to observe in the course of this study, the voter mobilization strategy, under Inter-ethnic historical grievances, was designed to drive the message of the candidates. The Strategy was highly successful, as it helped to shape the opinion of voters. Consequently, the strategy had produced ethnic and religion hardliners in the

eastern and northern regions. The binary problems that had developed out of the adopted voter mobilization strategy were used to poison the political firmament. Inter-ethnic historical grievances were able to set voters and politicians in the eastern and northern regions apart. Town Unions, Village Associations, Traders Associations, all had their members mobilized for the election. The voters and by extension, the country had become divided along ethno-regional lines. Furthermore, the religion bias between Christians in the southern region and middle belt zone against Muslim dominated far north of the country was become very obvious. As a fall-out, religious leaders were to step into the frame, and began to mobilized and motivate members of their faith to vote according to their religion affiliation.

8.8.4). National Fragmentation: North-South Dichotomy

I was able to discover also, that the voter mobilization strategy used by politicians and supporters, had fragmented the country along North-South Dichotomy. The election was elevated from being a national election to becoming a regional and religion motivated political competition. Majority of the politicians from eastern and northern regions were discovered to have abandoned party allegiance and supported candidates from their regions. Indeed, the posture adopted by voters and politicians in each region is a direct consequence of the voter mobilization strategy used in the election. Inter-ethnic historical grievances had moderated campaign messages and political awareness among people of the East and North, Christians and Muslims alike.

8.8.5). Rejection of Election Result

I was able to discover, that the forces that had motivated some voters and people in various towns in the north to attack people of southern origin and non Muslims were products of Inter-ethnic historical grievances, as well as religion bias. I want to factor the reason for rejection of the election result as announced by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) on "Inter-ethnic grievances". As presented previously, many of the voters and prominent politicians in the North had viewed the election as direct competition between Christians and Muslims, and between Northern region and Eastern region.

8.8.6).   Widespread Violence: Death, Injuries, Arson and Displacement.

As consequence of the election result outcome, several people, who are not Muslims, and especially people from the Southern part of the country were brutally murdered. Several of the Election Commission workers, who managed the Polling Centers, were killed in cold-blood. Houses and properties of southerners resident in many towns in the north were destroyed, and burnt down. Even the properties of some prominent northerners were not spared, because they were accused of working and supporting President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan on the expense of a Muslim and candidate, who does represent the interest of Muslims and the North. Consequently, many southerners resident in many towns in the North were displaced and many of them had to return to their towns and villages in the South. I was able to discover that the people most affected by the displacement, and the subsequent migration to the South, were people from the eastern region. Indeed, I am well convinced that the architect of the violence, which had erupted after the announcement of the 2011 presidential election result in Nigeria, was the "Inter-ethnic historical grievances and religion bias." In the perspective of several voters and politicians in the North, the election, the message, and the voter mobilization strategy in the 2011 presidential election in Nigeria, is a representation of "Inter-ethnic and religious competition."

8.8.7).   Democracy Devalued

In my evaluation of the factors and circumstances around the election, and violence thereafter, I am convinced that the voter mobilization strategy adopted by candidates and supporters had prepared the ground for the eventual violent outcome. Although, campaigning by candidates and supporters to seek for voters support is a fundamental feature in democratic politics. The strategy adopted by politicians and supporters in the 2011 presidential election in Nigeria had devalued democracy. The use of Inter-ethnic historical grievances and religion bias to mobilize voters had devalued democracy. Of course, the displacement of social policy issues with Inter-ethnic grievances and religion centered politics is a devaluation of democracy.

Consequently, the combination of the binary factors, premised on Inter-ethnic grievances, and religion motivated political competition had created opportunity for deviants to exploit and emptied barrels of hatred and destruction on innocent citizens. The use of Inter-ethnic historical grievances premised on "electoral solidarity" to mobilize voters in the 2011 presidential election, had failed to advance the course of democracy and democratic politics in the country.

Chapter 9

9). Kenya

My evaluation of the 2007 presidential election in Kenya can be best argued to have produced some startling results. My presentation in figure 9.1 below does contained factors, which I am concerned, had impeded democracy in the country. As it was the case in voter mobilization strategy in Nigeria, so it is in Kenya. The use of Inter-ethnic historical grievances as voter mobilization strategy by the political parties, supporters and candidates had resulted in the dilution of democratization processes in Kenya. In the course of this study, I have been able to discover that the formation of Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) was predicated on Inter-ethnic historical grievances.

As I have indicated in figure 9.1 below, I was able to discover, that some politicians who had personality issues with President Mwai Kibaki, had decided to form political alliance to protect individual political interest. Indeed, the alliance so formed, was consummated with one enemy in focus, President Mwai Kibaki. However, I was able to discover, that as the campaign went on, the political parties and candidates were to become transmuted from political alliance into ethnic alliance, with one enemy in focus, the Kikuyu ethnic group. Indeed, I have been able to discover, that the quest for political power was manipulated through the media, and subsequently, the process was to leed to the creation of In-group and Out-group in the campaigns.

Figure 9.1 showing the structure of competing factors in the campaigns in 2007 presidential election in Kenya.

9.1).   Democracy and Mobilization

Although, the several Opposition political actors had before the 2007 presidential election been strong advocates of "regime change," but the Opposition Coalition as a collective body had still zero defined leadership. I have discovered in the course of this study, that prior to the presidential election in 2007; the public perception about the political parties was on the down-ward trend (See table 9.1 and diagram 9.1 below).

The Opposition Coalition that emerged at the time was with cautious optimism perceived, by some sections in the society, as the best alternative to the ruling party, and the coalition had quickly gained support and popularity across the country.

However, several pollsters had shortly before the election, projected outstanding Opposition Coalition electoral success both in the parliament and the presidential election (See table 9.1 below). However, from my observation, the opposition coalition parties had no corresponding ideological blue-print; instead what had unified the parties was the resolve to effect regime change.

What was your impression about the Political parties during the 2007 Presidential election?	
a). I had the expectation that ODM would do better for Kenya than the ruling PNU	0
b). I did not believe in the parties because none is founded on a political ideology	1
c). I observed that both political parties were very aggressive and desperate.	2
d). I was not convinced that any of the parties can effectively fight corruption in the system	3
e). I voted for PNU because of Mwai Kibaki and Uhuru Kenyatta	4
f). I voted for ODM because of Raila Odinga	9

Table 9.1, Questionnaire seeking response from participants on why they voted the way they voted in the

2007 Presidential election

But, I was able to find out in my interaction with people, that many among the voters had fixed opinion. Many had decided long before the day of the election on their preferences. As I have indicated through the responses in table 9.1 and in diagram 9.1 below, I am well convinced; that the voter mobilization strategy used to prosecute the campaigns was undemocratic.

As I have indicated in diagram 9.1 below, 49 among the 60 respondents in the questionnaire interviews had fixed opinion about the political actors (diagram 9.1 below). Although, political party structures in Kenya was not built on individual's political image, but voter mobilization strategy used in the presidential election itself was built on Inter-ethnic historical grievances.

The coming together of former opposition political actors to form common opposition coalition on either side, purposely for the 2007 presidential election, had prepared the ground for a protracted voter mobilization. I want to conclude, therefore, that with the above situation, the voters were denied the opportunity of having political parties with established institutional structures going into the election. As a replacement, voters were offered two "gang-up" political blocs. As the Campaign progresses, the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) had impressed their desire on the electorate about their calls for regime change. The campaign strategy and messages, which were developed by the Opposition coalition under "regime change," had compelled voters to revolve their electoral preferences around electoral solidarity strategy. The strategy was anchored on Inter-ethnic historical grievances (diagram 9.1 and figure 9.2 below).

Diagram 9.1 showing respondents' opinion on the Campaign factors in the 2007 Presidential election in Kenya

However, many voters interviewed had defended their preferences in the election, citing ethnic solidarity. In the same light, 22 of the respondents who had voted for PNU in the election, had cited also ethnic solidarity, candidate of the party, party policies, and campaign message as reason, while 26 of the respondents who had participated in the election, were able to cite the candidate of the ODM coalition, and the party's campaign theme, as well as messages, as the factors responsible for their decision to vote for ODM. I want to share the belief, that the positions taken by voters in the 2007 presidential election have suggested exploitation of existing ethnic-fault-lines in Kenya's politics.

I can observe a contrast in the preference of voters, especially as 26 of the respondents, who had voted for ODM, were able to show stability in their preference for the candidate, as well as, the campaign message of the coalition, against the coalition as a party in itself and its proposed policies.

I was able to find out also, that the ODM campaign slogan was premised on regime change, but the voter mobilization strategy used by the coalition led by ODM was centered on electoral solidarity driven by Inter-ethnic grievances. As I have discovered in the course of this study, the resolve of the coalition led by ODM was to displace PNU and Mwai Kibaki from power, they did not take into cognizance the fundamental factors, which their calls for "regime change" could rejuvenate. In my questionnaire interviews as contained in (table 9.2 and diagram 9.2 below), majority of the respondents were able to show tremendous support for the use of Inter-ethnic grievances as voter mobilization instrument. Although, the coalition led by ODM was able to win the majority in the parliament, but the ODM coalition could not displace the ruling PNU coalition, and Mwai Kibaki. I agreed that the reason was due largely to voters' migration motivated through electoral solidarity, which was anchored on Inter-ethnic historical grievances.

Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement A or Statement B.			
A: The use of ethnic affiliation as Campaign tool in the 2007 Presidential election was wrong.		B: I had no problem with the use of ethnic affiliation as Campaign issue in the 2007 Presidential election	
Agree very strongly with A1.	Agree with A2	Agree with B3	Agree very strongly with B4
Agree with Neither			5
Don't know			9

Table 9.2 showing respondents' response on ethnic solidarity as factor in the 2007 presidential election

The contents as I have established in table 9.2 above were designed to generate responses from my respondents who had voted in the election. I had 60 respondents randomly selected, and the outcome of my efforts is graphically presented in diagram 9.2 below. I was able to find out also, that 27 respondents, which represent about 45 percent of the overall respondents, had disapproved the use of ethnic identity of a candidate as campaign factor in the 2007 presidential election. However, 24 persons, who represent about 40 percent of my respondents, had accepted the use of ethnic identity as a campaign factor. I want to conclude, therefore, that the support expressed by majority of voters for the use of ethnicity in voter mobilization was made possible by Inter-ethnic historical grievances.

Use of Ethnic Affiliation as Campaign Tool

Diagram 9.2 showing respondents opinion about the use of Ethnicity as Campaign factor in the 2007 Presidential election in Kenya

As I have established in diagram 9.2 above, 9 of my respondents, which represent 15 percent of the total respondents, had disapproved the use of Inter-ethnic grievances as voter mobilization strategy in the election. I was able to observe, though, that the number of my respondents, who were in support or against the use of ethnicity as central factor in voter mobilization, was overwhelmingly high. I was able to find out through generated responses, as expressed in diagram 9.2 above, that the minor difference in the two opinion camps, had shown clear sign for possible civil unrest after the election.

9.2.)   Election Campaign Themes

The resolve of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) to displace the ruling PNU from power, using "Regime Change" slogan, was greeted enthusiastically by its supporters. However, the additional use of the controversial "41 against 1" slogan was viewed by many as a declaration of electoral war on the Kikuyu ethnic group. I want to have a share in the belief, that it was a reminder of the pre-independence and post-independence Inter-ethnic grievances.

I was able to discover in the course of this study, that though the ruling PNU government led by President Mwai Kibaki was focused on mobilizing its support base to vote for continuity in the election, the PNU coalition was also engaged in the use of Inter-ethnic grievances as voter mobilization instrument. I want to argue, however, that the structure and manner used to mobilize voters had created divisions, and which ultimately had compelled voters to center their electoral preferences based on the message of campaigns. I found out also, that the strategy used by Campaign teams to market their candidates had affected the average voter on the street. I have agreed also, that the repeated use of "41 against 1" as voter mobilization strategy by members of ODM had created the impression that the people were not the same (see diagram 9.2 above, and figure 9.2 below).

Hate Speech	• PNU • ODM
Threatened	• Kikuyu and Allies • Luo and Allies
Political Decision	• To win the election • To win the election

Figure 9.2 showing factors that shaped the election Campaign in 2007 presidential election

As I have indicated in figure 9.2 above, each campaign team had engaged in aggressive voter mobilization, using ethnic support. I was able to find out, that the use of electoral solidarity had resulted in the use of hate speeches in the campaign stumps. I was able to discover also in the course of this study, that in the various campaign rallies across the country, hate and inciting speeches were freely used by supporters of each coalition camp. As I have indicated in figure 9.2 above, threat was a product of incitement, and hate speeches. I was able to find out that the desire of the Luo ethnic group and its other ethnic allies was to defeat the PNU, remove Mwai Kibaki, and elect for the first time in the political history of Kenya a non Kikuyu supported president. I want to share in the belief as well, that the centralization of Inter-ethnic grievances as voter mobilization strategy had given rise to hate speech, incitement, fear of political domination, economic and social treats. In light of the above, I agreed that the use of collective identity campaign factor was able to build-

up hardened followership, and which had translated into electoral solidarity votes in the election (figure 9.2 and diagram 9.2 above). I want to conclude, therefore, that individual political interest was allowed to transmute into group political fight, and the actions had left Kenya as broken nation in all ramifications.

9.3)　　　　Ethnic Alliance and Voter Mobilization

I was able to discover in the course of this study, that voter mobilization strategy was consciously centered on Inter-ethnic historical grievances, and it does produce electoral solidarity in the system. I was able to find out also, that the dependence on ethnic mobilization of voters had raised old political grievances between ethnic groups in Kenya. I have viewed the famous campaign slogan of "forty-one ethnic groups against one ethnic group, or "Kenya against Kikuyu" (See Chege, 2010, pp: 197 – 210, in: Diamond and Plattner, 2010), Kagwanja and Southall (2009, p: 267) as anathema to democracy and democratic politics. I want to conclude, therefore, that the use of the above slogan to mobilize voters was a call for electoral anarchy. Although, the opposition political actors' primary concern was to displace the ruling PNU, and as such, they had formed ethnic alliance with other closer groups, but the use of Inter-ethnic grievances as voter instrument was responsible for anxiety in the polity.

I have discovered also, that the campaign had become ethnically defined, because, the voter mobilization strategy used by several opposition actors had actually called for it. However, the coming together of Uhuru Kenyatta and President Mwai Kibaki, which led in the formation of PNU, had given political actors and supporters of ODM the impression that PNU as a political party belong only to the Kikuyu ethnic group.

9.3.1)   Potential Voters

One among the technical problems I had encountered in the course of this study is the absence of election documentation in Kenya. I could not scientifically make accurate projection about the number of voters who had identify with a particular political coalition in the 2007 presidential election in Kenya. Besides, with voter mobilization, which was premised on Inter-ethnic grievances, to determine who had supported what political coalition on the basis of ideology was even more difficult.

I hold the belief, though, that the election was won and lost on the basis of ethnic coalition, and not on the basis of contemporary democratic factors. The dominance, and support, which PNU had enjoyed from Kikuyu natives was made possible by ODM's alliance with other ethnic groups, and also the campaign theme of "forty-one against one", "Kenya against Kikuyu. As a consequence of the voters' alignment, which found comfort on the basis of ethnic electoral solidarity, the two political camps had to depend heavily on the support of voters from alliance ethnic groups. I was able to discover in the course of this study, that the ruling PNU coalition was able to mobilize Kikuyu, Kamba, and Meru/Embu voters for effective support, while ODM coalition was able to mobilize the Luo, Luhya, Kisii, and others for anti-Kikuyu campaign. With the ethnic alliance driving voter mobilization, Kenya was divided, effectively, into ethnic camps.

9.4)   Expansion in the Electoral Market

As I have observed from the voter mobilization strategy, which was used by the political actors, with regard to call for ethnicity driven electoral solidarity, many people were motivated to become interested in the election. I found out that the large participation of voters in the election was made possible by mobilization strategy, campaign themes, and slogans used by candidates, and political actors. Inter-ethnic grievances had increased electoral enthusiasm among voters across ethnic groups and counties across Kenya. As I have stressed before, the use of ethnic solidarity, and anti-Kikuyu sentiments to build-up large voter base, the opposition coalition had reignited pre-independence ethnic rivalry. I was able to discover, that voters had found the need to reconsider their electoral preferences, because, the interest in the 2007 presidential election was beyond ordinary democratic competition.

In light of the above, many voters had to refuse the view of ideological differences and leadership alternative as an important factor in their electoral preferences and choice. Literally speaking, the Luo led ethnic alliance under ODM's "regime change" slogan was to 'change from Kikuyu political domination to Luo alliance'. Apart from mobilizing voters living in the slums with populist arguments, the ODM coalition could not convince enough rational value voters, voters who had affections for President Mwai Kibaki, as well as majority of the Independent minded voters to support their Campaign theme in the election.

9.4.1)   Objective of the Expansion

I was able to discover as well, that the overall intention of the expansion in the electoral market was to exploit existing ethnic fault-lines, and to secure support from the voters. I found out as well, that the ODM led ethnic alliance intention was to create anti-Kikuyu, and to demonize anything Kikuyu in the mind of majority voters. I observed that those voters who were in strong agreement with the campaign theme of the Luo led ODM alliance, had engaged in deep sensitization of voters in the various ethnic homelands. I found out also, that the driving force behind the massive sensitization, the use of Inter-ethnic historical grievances, was to enlarge voter participation for the benefit of ODM coalition. I discovered in the course of this study,

that the ODM coalition had used radio messages, Robot-calls, and television commercials, to drive home its' message contents to the listening of the rural dwellers. Many voters and ethnic irredentists had their morale boosted with the "forty-one ethnic groups against One ethnic group", and "Kenya against Kikuyu" slogan. The voter mobilization strategy, built on Inter-ethnic historical grievances, was able to raise the political and collective identity consciousness among voters across the two formed ethnic alliances. I discovered that the presence and participation in mobilization of voters by the sons of the two former political arch-rivals, in Jomo Kenyatta/Uhuru Kenyatta (Kikuyu) and Oginga Odinga/Raila Odinga (Luo), in the two rival ethnic alliances drew emotional followership among voters, and increased the political temperature.

I have observed from my evaluation of events that the use of Inter-ethnic historical grievances, as voter mobilization strategy, by each of the two ethnic political alliances was to assist each of them to sensitize, mobilize, and make their supporters become aggressive and ethnic hard-liners. Obviously, the overriding interest was to exploit the existing ethnic fault-lines, manipulate voters with the divisive issues that had artificially separated the various groups in the country. By the use of Inter-ethnic historical grievances, as voter mobilization instrument, the two-formed ethnic political coalitions had succeeded through electoral solidarity strategy to prosecute their campaigns.

9.4.2)   Target Groups and the Electoral Market

The ruling PNU coalition as well as the ODM coalition had made strong appeals through solidarity incentive strategy in their drive for support among the various ethnic groups. I was able to discover that both the ruling PNU, and the ODM coalition had concentrated their campaign efforts in their electoral strongholds. I found out that each ethnic political coalition had struggled to make in-roads into the various allied ethnic camps. I am convinced, though, that the primary idea with the above endeavor was to win ethnic bloc votes. Consequently, the political actors, through electoral solidarity strategy, had the voters divided along ethnic lines. Again, it must be understood, that the use of Inter-ethnic historical grievances, as voter mobilization instrument, had the electoral market destabilized, and had made voters' electoral

preferences to be determined along ethnic interest protection. Indeed, the massive dependence on electoral solidarity strategy to mobilize voters was to result into panic voting during the 2007 presidential election.

I found out also, how the electoral market was negatively divided through the use of ethnic sentiments in campaign stumps. As I have established in table 9.3 and table 9.4 below, the electoral market was highly mobilized, as each ethnic coalition had made effort to convince voters who ultimately were divided between the Kikuyu led ethnic coalition under PNU, and the Luo led ethnic coalition under ODM. As I have indicated in table 9.3 below, the ruling PNU coalition had targeted voters of Kikuyu extraction being the support-base of PNU, as well as ethnic homeland of Kibaki and Uhuru Kenyatta. In the process, the Kikuyu region was designed by PNU coalition as "Secure zone" while the Eastern region was classified as "Key area".

Ethnic Alliance and Mobilization for Votes	
PNU Alliance	ODM Alliance
• Kikuyu • Kamba • Meru/Embu	• Luo • Luhya • Kalenjin • Kisii • Mijikenda

Table 9.3 showing ethnic Mobilization by the PNU and ODM (Adapted from www.Steadman-group.com/ Poll, 2007)

As I have indicated through the content in table 9.3 above, it is clear how the voter mobilization was prosecuted by the Ethnic alliances. PNU had secured the electoral support of majority voters among Kikuyu, Kamba, and Meru/Embu ethnic communities. However, ODM on its own side had secured the electoral support from majority of voters from among the Luo, Luhya, Kalenjin, Kisii and Mijikenda ethnic communities. Also in table 9.4 below, I have presented the provincial alliance and political alignment that had supported each candidate and political alliance.

Provincial Alliance and Voter Mobilization	
PNU	ODM
- Central - Eastern - Rift Valley* (1/3) - Nairobi* (1/3) - Coast* (1/3)	- Nairobi - Coast - Nyanza - Rift Valley - Western - North Eastern

Table 9.4 showing provincial alliance in Voter Mobilization in Kenya (Adapted from www.Steadman-group.com/ Pollster, 2007)

As I have observed in my evaluation, the ODM led coalition had hoped to dominate the larger cities like Nairobi, Mombasa and western Kenya, the latter being the ethnic region of the Luo as well as the home region of Raila Odinga, candidate of ODM. Both the ruling PNU coalition as well as the ODM coalition had worked to see that every qualified voter in their area of exclusive advantage was mobilized, persuaded and motivated before the election.

9.5).   Media in Kenya

There are as matter of facts many public owned as well as privately owned Media houses in Kenya (See figure 9.3 below). The media had played very significant role in the mobilization of voters during the 2007 presidential election in Kenya. There are two prominent Print media houses with several publications under their stable. One of the two leading media houses is the Nation Media Group. The Nation Media Group publishes "The Daily Nation", and it publishes also four other Newspapers, namely; the "East African", with emphasis on news and analysis on East Africa, "Business Daily", which concentrates on economy and business in East Africa, "The Daily Metro" with greater emphasis on young readers and also the "Taifa Leo", which is Daily Nation in Swahili language. The second prominent media house in Kenya is the Standard Media Group. The group publishes the Standard Newspapers.

Other Newspaper publishing houses in Kenya are People Daily, The Kenya Times Star. However, most of the Newspapers circulate or are found in the urban cities.

Nevertheless, Media houses in Kenya have no bearing history of open endorsement of any particular political party or candidate during the election campaigns. Unlike in other democracies, private lives of candidates had no significant effects or reviews in the media. On the Electronic Media, there are two prominent Television stations in Kenya.

Print	• Nation Media Group (Daily Nation, East African Daily, Nairobi Star, Loa Taifa) • Standard Media Group (Standard Newspaper)
TV	• KTN • NTV • K24 • KBC-Channel 1
Radio	• KBC-General Service • Radio Citizen FM • Capital FM • Classic FM

Figure 9.3 showing list of some Media Houses in Kenya both public and Private

Incidentally, like in the Print media, the two leading television stations are owned by the Nation Media Group, and the Standard Media Group. These Television stations are the NTV and KTN (See figure 9.4 below). The Nation Media Group own NTV, while KTN is owned by Standard Media Group. However, KTN is widely viewed in Kenya as having anti-government posture, and more liberal in their criticism of the opposition parties. On the other hand, the NTV is considered more balance in news reporting, less political and very objective in news reporting and analysis.

Private	State
• NTV • KTN • Citizen Tv • K24	• KBC - channel 1

Figure 9.4: some of the television stations in Kenya

Nevertheless, there are several other Television channels, such like the KBC-Channel 1, Citizen TV, and K24 Channel. The KBC-Channel 1 is a government owned Television channel. It has extensive coverage capacity in the country, as it can be received in every part of Kenya. The Citizen TV shows more emphasis on News reporting about events in Kenya. However, Citizen TV is owned by the Royal Media Services and it has nationwide coverage capacity. Another Television channel in Kenya is the K24 channel. K24 channel emphasizes more on 24 hours News reporting, however, its coverage capacity is limited only within Nairobi and surrounding areas. It is modeled in the form of CNN news coverage.

Furthermore, there are several radio stations in the country (See figure 9.5 below). They are Capital FM, Classic FM, Easy FM, Radio Citizen, Kiss 100 FM and KBC General Service.

Private
- Capital FM
- Classic FM
- Easy FM
- Radio Citizen
- Kiss 100 FM

State
- KBC General Service
- (There are several sub-stations of KBC)

Figure 9.5: list of some Electronic media houses in Kenya

The various media mediums had provided the citizens extensive opportunities for information sourcing during the election in 2007. Radio jingles, and anchored Phone-in programs were frequent mediums for citizens' interaction about the election and issues under debate. However, the insignificant role of Internet in voter mobilization during the election could be factored in the low development of technology in the country as only few individuals had access to Internet facilities. Nevertheless, the expansive developments in Print and Electronic media had compensated voters for the low Internet development. However, the nature of campaign in the 2007 presidential election in Kenya could not have benefited from the expansion experienced in the electoral market. As discussed by Chege (2008), the media had contributed immensely in the violence, which had erupted after the presidential election in 2007 in Kenya. Political actors had polarized the ethnic rhetoric through

the spread of hate speech, using different native languages, and frequently disseminated through various FM radio stations.

9.5.1) Partly Media Role

I did discover in the course of this study, that, apart from sensitization of the general public about relevance of the presidential election, the media does negatively contributed in the heightening of political atmosphere in the country. Again, I found out that the promotion of the "forty-one ethnic groups against one ethnic group", "Kenya against Kikuyu", by the different media platforms had contributed heavily in raising ethnic consciousness among voters. Indeed, the several campaign commercials and radio jingles, which were placed by the formed ethnic coalitions, in the media, hate speeches by individual supporters in open rallies, and groups' debates had contributed in dividing Kenya voters. However, I want to share in the belief, that, both the ruling PNU coalition as well as the ODM coalition had fair share in the media actions. Again, I want to insist, that the media actions sponsored by the political actors, and their supporters had raised the Inter-ethnic grievances factor in the Kenyan society. Indeed, the consistency in how the media ran reports about hate speeches made by prominent political actors had raised also ethnic tension, and had increased the level of hatred across ethnic divide. I am also convinced that the Inter-ethnic grievances factor was propelled by the pre-independence and post-independence Land issues in the Rift Valley region, which has remained as a political albatross in Kenya's ethnic relations. In essence, the media had provided platform to series of anti-peace events, which were turned to the advantage of some ethnic irredentists and hard-liners.

9.5.2) Complete Media Role

I found out through this study, a wide held perception by many of the anti-Kikuyu elements, though promoted by pollsters in the media, that Raila Odinga, and his ODM coalition was going to win the 2007 presidential election (Table 9.5, and Table 9.6) below. Indeed, the Steadman polling group had predicted victory for the Luo led ODM coalition, and with the Inter-ethnic grievances driven voter mobilization strategy,

the sign of danger was very evident. I hold the belief, therefore, that the poll projection by Stedman and other Pollsters giving the presidential election to Raila Odinga led ODM coalition, had given members of ODM coalition false hope. Indeed, the projections by Pollsters, such like Steadman group, had made ODM coalition, and its supporters to hold the belief, that the Election Commission had colluded with the government to deny them victory, which unfortunately resulted to violent ethnic killings. I believe in my assessment, that, the emotions raised by the use of Inter-ethnic historical grievances as voter mobilization strategy was the greatest disservice to democracy in Kenya. Again, the projection from the Pollsters had also exacerbated the already precarious situation, as the campaign around the projections had created false hope, and the anticipation for electoral victory in the camp of the Luo led ethnic alliance. I believe also, that, the infamous "forty-one ethnic groups against one-ethnic group", "Kenya against Kikuyu" campaign slogan, which had combined with Pollsters projections, were the fundamental factors that prepared the ground for violence after the result of the presidential election was made official. I want to insist, that in my assessment, the Media had misplaced the attention of voters by substituting policy debate with inter-ethnic historical grievances.

Indeed, the argument about Kikuyu political and economic dominance over other ethnic groups had resonated so well among the Luo, Luhya and Kisii voters. As I was able to observe from the above situation of things, several people in the non-Kikuyu friendly ethnic groups were to become highly ethnocentric, and they had capitalized on such allegations to build up political hatred for anything Kikuyu in the election.

I found out in this study, that the ethnic configuration of Kenyan society was responsible for the confrontation, and it had allowed Inter-ethnic historical grievances factor, to penetrate voters successfully (See Table 9.5 below). As I have indicated in table 9.3 and 9.4 above, and as contained in table 9.5 below, none of the five most populous ethnic groups could claim absolute domination over others in terms of population. Furthermore, the difference between the largest ethnic group and the second largest ethnic group is just about 7 percent, while the difference between the second largest ethnic group and the next three large ethnic groups is between 2 percent to 3 percent.

Table 9.5. Ethnic Groups in Kenya	(Percentages)
Kikuyu	21
Luhya	14
Luo	12
Kalenjin	11
Kamba	11
Kisii	6
Meru	5
Mijikenda	5
Masai	2
Turkana	1
Embu	1
Other (each < 1%)	9

Table 9.5: Source: The 1989 Kenya National Population Census Adapted from Horowitz Jeffrey (2009)

In essence, the media role in the campaign process during the 2007 presidential election can be argued to have significantly contributed in the final outcome of the election. In the table 6.6 below, the position and the level of readiness by the ethnic groups does show the direction of support for the candidates in the election.

Table 9.6: Voting Intentions by Ethnic Group in September 2007 (Percentages)				
	Kibaki	Odinga	Musyoka	Other/Undecided
Kikuyu	90	6	1	4
Luo	4	94	0	2
Kamba	24	9	59	8
Luhya	22	68	3	6
Kalenjin	13	76	2	9
Kisii	26	68	0	7
Meru/Embu	88	5	1	5
Mijikenda	33	52	0	10
Other (each < 5%)	35	57	0	8
Total:	39	48	8	6

Table 9.6: Source: Horowitz Jeffrey (2009, p: 39): This is a Survey conducted by the Steadman Group, September 8-20, 2007 (n=2,020). Note: Some rows do not add to 100% because of rounding.

As I have established, using the Steadman group projection, which is presented in table 9.6 above, over 90 percent of the respondents who were of Kikuyu descent had said, that they would vote for President Mwai Kibaki, but only 4 percent of the respondents who were Luo had confirmed, that they would vote for Kibaki in the election. However, over 94 percent of the respondents who were of Luo descent had confirmed, that they would vote for Raila Odinga in the election, while about 6 percent of the respondents who were of Kikuyu origin said that they would vote for Raila Odinga in the election. In contrast to the Kikuyu and Luo, 88 percent of the respondents, who were of Meru/Embu origin had said, that they would vote for President Mwai Kibaki, while about five percent of the respondents said that they would vote for Raila Odinga. About 68 percent of the respondents who were of Luhya origin, 76 percent of the respondents who were Kalenjin, and about 68 percent of respondents who were of Kisii origin had said, that they would vote for Raila Odinga in the election.

Interestingly, Musyoka who is from Kamba ethnic group, and who was equally contesting in the presidential election, was only able to receive the support of 59 percent of the respondents above his other rivals. With the above events, I am convinced that the role of the media in voter sensitization had aided the two ethnic formed political alliances led by PNU and ODM in voter mobilization. Of course, the projections helped cement the mobilization along the line of ethnic solidarity during the 2007 presidential election.

9.5.2.1)   Exploitation of genuine and Media Induced Events

I am able to discover through this study, that the political actors in both camps had exploited the political dilemma, which was created by the media steady reports about Inter-ethnic grievances, especially with the use of "forty-one ethnic groups against one-ethnic group", and "Kenya against Kikuyu." I was able to find out also, how political actors in the ODM led coalition had used two dimensional approaches in information generation mechanism to attack the ruling PNU coalition. Indeed, one of the strategies was the issue of corruption in the government of President Mwai Kibaki. The second strategy was the issue around Inter-ethnic historical grievances. It was clear that the ODM led coalition had raised the issue of corruption against government officials in the media, so as to discredit the government. They had accused the ruling PNU of protecting the alleged corrupt officials. I discovered that the ODM led coalition had used the Inter-ethnic historical grievances to mobilize its traditional supporters, and ethnic alliance in the local and remote communities, using the issue of land redistribution, eviction of natives/settlers, and the alleged political domination of Kenya by Kikuyu ethnic group.

Another aspect of importance in this study is about the exploitation of media induced events, and the manipulation of the media reports by the ODM led coalition. Campaigners for the ODM coalition had gone into the interiors and projected the election as a political contest between the Kikuyu and other ethnic groups in Kenya. Indeed, the data as contained in table 9.7 below does support my position. I want to conclude, therefore, that the idea behind the use of such message pattern was to

promote ethnic hatred among voters, and to project the Kikuyu led alliance as enemy of other ethnic groups in Kenya. I want to conclude also, that the use of Inter-ethnic historical grievances as voter mobilization instrument had prepared the ground for the outbreak of vicious violence, after President Mwai Kibaki was announced as winner of the 2007 election. Not satisfied with the result, the aggrieved supporters of the defeated Luo led ethnic coalition went violent mob action, and attacked anything Kikuyu, and those perceived to have supported the PNU coalition. Above all, I want to share in the belief, that the impulses generated in the field during the campaign were the facilitating elements, which had made the acceptance of the election outcome difficult.

As prelude to the election debacle, the various regulative institutions in the country had failed in their responsibilities, as none could take a proactive measure to contain several visible signals in the polity. As I have presented in table 9.7 below, a survey conducted in September 2007 by the Steadman group, just few months before the election, had shown possible voting preferences across counties in Kenya. As indicated in table 9.7 below, the voting intention of voters according to provinces, had shown that President Mwai Kibaki and the ruling PNU coalition could record above 50 percent support only in 2 provinces, namely; Central province 82 percent, and Eastern province 51 percent, from available 8 provinces. However, Raila Odinga, and his ODM led coalition was to received overwhelming support of 50 percent and above in 6 of the 8 provinces.

Table 9.7: Voting Intentions by Province in September 2007	Kibaki	Odinga	Musyoka	Other/Undecided
Nairobi	38	52	5	4
Central	82	12	1	4
Coast	36	50	6	8
Eastern	51	7	35	7
Nyanza	8	90	0	2
Rift Valley	35	54	3	7
Western	26	67	4	3
Northeastern	27	70	3	0

Source: Horowitz Jeffrey (2009, p: 42) Survey conducted by the Steadman Group, September 8-20, 2007 (n=2,020).

The strategy used by the campaign teams had built the concentration of voters along ethnic political renaissance. However, I have the firm belief, that the situations as presented in table 9.6 and table 9.7 above were direct products of the media. Indeed, I can confidently conclude, that the use of Inter-ethnic historical grievances as voter mobilization instrument, had created reasons for electoral solidarity among ethnic groups in the 2007 presidential election in Kenya. The Kenyan electorate, across ethnic divide had received contrived information more than it could actually manage. On that premise, I hold the belief, that the failure of expectation had trigger-off the accumulated ethnic animosity, which was built-up through the use of Inter-ethnic grievances as voter mobilization strategy.

9.6). Effects of Solidarity Incentive in Election Campaign

As I want to insist, however, that the strategy and the tone of language used to send out messages had created anger in the ethnic communities. Consequently, the voters were to become ethnic centered in their electoral preferences in the election. Again, I want to view the anger as was vented by ODM supporters against the Kikuyu and PNU as direct effect of solidarity, and "failure of expectation," because, their candidate was not declared winner in the election, as they erroneously had anticipated. I believed also, that the motivation to vote along the created ethnic alliances was a response to solidarity campaign. I viewed the violent reactions, which had followed the return of President Mwai Kibaki as the winner of the 2007 election, to be spontaneous.

According to several of my respondents in Nairobi, many voters prior to the 2007 presidential election were utterly alarmed by the reckless use of words by politicians; while on campaign stumps in the rural communities (See table 9.8 below and Diagram 9.6 below). I had wanted to evaluate the opinion of voters on the issue of claimed unequal distribution of resources in the country, and in addition, the question of eviction and land issues.

Which of the following is closest to your own opinion? Choose one of either A or B			
Based on the outcome of the 2007 presidential election I really regretted the wrong use of language in the campaign rallies by parties?		Considering the political and ethnic configuration of Kenya, I would say that the use of ethnic biases by candidates to hunt for votes was wrong?	
Agree A1	Strongly Agree A2	Strongly disagree B3	Disagree B4
Neither A nor B			5
I don't know			9

Table 9.8 showing questionnaire on the conduct of campaigns during the 2007 presidential

Election rallies

Based on the several politically induced events and development that accompanied the 2007 presidential election campaigns, the import of figure 9.8 was to test the emotional reflection of some voters in connection with the election violence, which had occurred after the announcement of the presidential election result. Considering the rate of damage that had emanated from the erupted violence, it had become pertinent to mirror the opinion of some of the people who had participated in one way or the other in the election.

Number of Respondents and Gender		
Male	Female	Total Number of Respondents
49	11	60

Table 9.9 showing the total number of respondents in an interview questionnaire

As I have indicated in table 9.9 above, 60 persons had actually participated in the questionnaire interview. My respondents can be said to have consisted of 49 male, and 11 female respondents. How the Campaign events were able to influence their electoral preferences in the 2007 presidential election, and how the atmosphere created by it had formed the bedrock of their participation in the interview. However, diagram 9.3 below is the tabulation of data, especially the percentage of opinions based on the questions asked in the questionnaire.

Opinions on the use of divisive words during Campaign rallies for 2007 Presidential election

Diagram 9.3 showing the percentage in opinion from the respondents on the use of divisive statements in the Election rallies

As I have established in diagram 9.3 above, and from the respondents' standpoint, 24 respondents, which does represent 40 percent of the total participants, had agreed, however, that the use of Inter-ethnic historical grievances in voter mobilization had affected their electoral preferences in the 2007 presidential election. However, only 10 respondents, which of course represent about 17 percent of the total participants, had different opinion. Meanwhile, only 3 respondents, which represent about 5 percent of the total participants, had neutral opinion, and only 5 respondents, which represent about 8 percent of the participants, were undecided in their opinion. Above all, 33 respondents, which represent 55 percent of the respondents, had admitted, that, the use of Inter-ethnic grievances to mobilize voters was inappropriate. I had 19 of the respondents, which represent 32 percent of the participants, who had believed, though, that the configuration of Kenya society does demand the use of electoral solidarity strategy during elections. I am well convinced that the use of Inter-ethnic historical grievances, as voter mobilization strategy, had increased ethnic consciousness in the country. The use of hate speeches, and other sundry actions during the campaigns, had undermined social cohesiveness of the polity, and as such had prepared the ground for violence. The attendant violent crisis

had devalued Kenya's democracy credentials, and had subjected democracy and democratic elections in the country to dangerous trend.

9.6.1) Target group and Campaign Method

As I have indicated in table 9.6 and table 9.7 above, Kenya was divided into two ethnic political alliances. The PNU led the Kikuyu ethnic alliance, while ODM coalition was led by consortium of ethnic groups with a Luo candidate. However, I could not find any electoral documentation on how the voter demography had voted in the election in 2007. As I have explained before, the PNU ruling coalition was dominated by Kikuyu political actors. Secondly, the political actors that formed ODM coalition were drawn from various ethnic groups other than the Kikuyu. I was able to discover, however, in the course of this study, that the two political camps had targeted voters from their own support counties.

I found no documentation, which had indicated the demography of voters along gender, age, profession/occupation, religion, and ethnicity. I was only able to base my evaluation on the strength of the ethnic groups in the two formed ethnic political alliances, and was as led by Kikuyu and Luo under PNU and ODM, respectively. Again, I want to conclude, though, the absence of demography defined voters had aided in the success of Inter-ethnic historical grievances as voter mobilization instrument in the 2007 presidential election.

Although, the two political camps had used populist agendas to seek support from voters, especially those voters, who were resident in the slums, but the strategy used, in the campaign communication, had in itself created political deviants in the system. Besides, each of the two Campaign teams had drawn strength from ethnic solidarity, which was promoted by the formation of the two ethnic political alliances. As I have indicated in tables 9.4, 9.5, 9.6, and 9.7 above, the choice of Raila Odinga, a Luo native, as candidate for ODM coalition had made the 2007 election to be a direct ethnic competition with the ruling PNU coalition led by President Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu. The presence of the two political actors as candidates for the created ethnic alliances had resulted into what one can call "Bantu language alliance against Cushite alliance".

9.6.2).   Ethnic Alliance and Political Alignment

PNU Alliance	ODM Alliance
Kikuyu	Luo
Meru/Kembu	Luhya/Kalenjin/Kisii and Mijikenda

Figure 9.6 showing the structure of Ethnic Alliance in the 2007 Presidential election in Kenya

As I have indicated in figure 9.6 above, the Party for National Unity (PNU) had led an ethnic alliance formed between the Kikuyu and Meru/Kembu nationalities, while Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) led an ethnic alliance that was formed from among the Luo, Kalenjin, Kisii, and Mijikenda ethnic groups. I discovered that the alliances had reawakened the age-old Inter-ethnic historical grievances among the various ethnic groups in Kenya. I found out in this study also, that personality crisis among politicians had transmuted into political alliance, and finally was to become transformed into ethnic alliance as the election approaches.

9.7).   Outcome and Findings

9.7.1).   Ethno-tribal voter mobilization

I discovered in the course of this study, that due to transmutation of individual political interest into ethnic alliance, the campaigners had resulted into the use of inter-ethnic grievances as voter mobilization strategy in the election. I am convinced beyond doubt, though, that the solidarity mobilization strategy used by the political actors is a devaluation of democracy in Kenya.

9.7.2).   Ethnic Irredentism

I am able to discover, that, the pre-independence and immediate post-independence ethno-political competition had built-up the situation for ethnic irredentists to re-emerge in the political scene of Kenya. As Chege (2010, pp: 197 – 210, in: Diamond and Plattner, 2010), in his evaluation of the 2007 presidential election had noted, the "forty-one tribes against one," "Kenya and against the Kikuyu," was used to build opposition to anything Kikuyu. The assertion from Michael Chege had indicated the transmutation of average Kenyan politician in the 2007 presidential election as irredentist. As I have indicated in figure 9.2 above, the formation of ethnic alliance, through the use of Inter-ethnic historical grievances, to mobilize voters had divided Kenya and Kenyan voters into Anti-Kikuyu and Pro-Kikuyu.

9.7.3).   Political Hardliners

It is discovered in the course of this study, how the use of Inter-ethnic historical grievances had built-up band of political hardliners among the political actors and supporters. Again, I discovered in this study, that politicians and supporters were compelled to become anti each other. Politicians and supporters as indicated in figure 9.2 above were made to become intolerant through the mobilization strategy employed. As it was the case between eastern region and northern region in Nigeria, the Kikuyu people and alliance were to become hunted by an alliance of ethnic nationalities, which had depended on Inter-ethnic historical grievances to mobilize voters against the Kikuyu, especially as personified in President Mwai Kibaki.

9.7.4).   Rejection of Election Result

Again, I was able to establish through this study, that the rejection of the 2007 presidential election result was expected. The failure of expectation as was expressed by the anti-Kikuyu camp had ripped off the veil of burning hatred, which had enveloped the entire campaign period. In my findings, I have been able to establish how the anti-Kikuyu political actors, and the Luo led ethnic-alliance under ODM, had rejected the outcome of the election as announced by the Election Commission. Consequently, it resulted to eruption of violence, and Kenya was plunged into deadly political crisis. I am convinced that, the use of electoral solidarity strategy, as observed in the voting pattern, had shown how democracy became devalued in the 2007 presidential election.

9.7.5). Widespread Violence: Deaths, Injuries, Arson and Displacement

Again, the use of Inter-ethnic historical grievances as voter mobilization strategy by political actors in the 2007 presidential election in Kenya was responsible for the violence after the announcement of the election result. The violence, which occurred, was a consequence from the use of Inter-ethnic grievances under solidarity strategy in voters' mobilization. Of course, it resulted to people sustaining varying degrees of injuries, deaths, arson and displacement. I am convinced, though, that the use of Inter-ethnic grievances as campaign factor had built-up political consciousness. I am further convinced that, the use of electoral solidarity as political instrument was a strong indicator how democracy became devalued in Kenya.

9.7.6). Ethno-tribal consciousness and national political dislocation

I discovered as an outcome of the 2007 presidential election, a strong rise in ethno-tribal political consciousness during and after the 2007 presidential election in Kenya. The outcome of the election had resulted into massive dislocation of people and mass movement of ethnic groups away from hostile communities to native or friendly ethnic communities. In effect, the pre-independence and post-independence Inter-ethnic grievances had motivated several voters to locate their electoral preferences and voting choice on electoral solidarity. Above all, the campaign message,

mobilization strategy and preferences had reflected the existence of inter-ethnic historical grievances among various ethnic groups in Kenya.

9.7.7).   Democracy Devalued

Having considered all the factors as I have enumerated in figure 9.1, and figure 9.2 above, I am highly convinced that, the political actors have devalued democracy in Kenya through the use of Inter-ethnic historical grievances as voter mobilization strategy in the 2007 presidential election. I was able to find out that the adoption, and the subsequent use of the above mention factor, as voter mobilization strategy, had divided the society along ethnic line. Of course, the voters had made preferences along the line of formed ethnic alliances, and ethnic nationalism had become the rallying chorus of participants in the election. The spread of the strategy through the mediated and non-mediated media platforms had created unwanted tension in the Kenyan society. The created security tension was a security threat, which was ignored by not only the government agencies, but also the citizens of Kenya. Finally, I am convinced that all the institutions of democracy, political actors in the election, voters and non-voters, and the mobilization strategy, which were built on ethnic solidarity , had combined to devalued democracy in Kenya.

Chapter 10

10).   Ghana

In my findings about the 2012 presidential election in Ghana, I am able discovered in various factors used for voter mobilization, some significant differences from what I had discovered in the 2011 and 2007 presidential election in Nigeria and Kenya respectively. I am able to discover the presence of strong use of the media, both mediated and non-mediated media platforms, for voter mobilization. I was able to discover also, that, the political parties and political actors had run regional campaigns, as each candidate had concentrated heavily in some regions more than others. I was able to find out also in the study, that, the parties and candidates had designed their campaign messages as to appeal to different demography of voters in Ghana. As I have presented in figure 10.1 below, in the various segments, and in the overall campaign and voter mobilization strategy in Ghana, there is strong evidence, that voter mobilization strategies used in Nigeria and Kenya were significantly different from that used in Ghana.

Figure 10.1 showing factors in voter mobilization strategy in the 2012 presidential election in Ghana

10.1). Conservative ideals versus Social Democratic Ideals

As I have indicated in table 10.1 below, democracy in Ghana is under multiparty system. However, in my findings, I was able to discover, that only two political parties had national or nationwide coverage. The New Peoples Party (NPP) and National Democratic Convention (NDC) were the two dominant parties, as only the two parties have been able to produce presidents through the ballot box. The 2012 presidential election contest was essentially between conservative and liberal leaning parties. I was able to discover in the course of this study that the two parties had engaged each other fiercely in the 2012 presidential election.

List of Registered Political Parties for 2012 Presidential Election in Ghana		
National Democratic Convention	NDC	Liberal/Socialist
New Patriotic Party	NPP	Conservative
Convention People's Party	CPP	Socialist
People's National Convention	PNC	Socialist
Progressive People's Party	PPP	Liberal/Socialist

Table 10.1 showing the list of Political Parties in the 2012 Presidential election in Ghana

However, I am able to discover also, through this study, that the NPP had altered its ideological platform, and went ahead to pick up some leftist agendas in a bid to build a coalition of voters against the ruling NDC. I found out also, that the NDC campaign platform was not significantly different from its 2008 message platform. I was able to discover through my re-evaluation of the campaign messages, that the NDC had used the same 2008 presidential campaign format, but with little modification in terms of areas of coverage. NDC in line with its liberal credential had used the provision of social amenities to the citizens, building of new schools, provision of health facilities, and improvement in energy supply to rural communities and cities, as campaign promises. I found out also, that the NPP had promised voters changes in education funding, and qualitative health-care services. Therefore, I hold the belief, that, the NPP inclusion of education funding, free tuition in senior schools, and investment in healthcare was to win over some unstable NDC supporters.

10.2) Potential Voters

I was able to discover in this study, that, there was not any existing voter documentation to rely on for demography classification of voters in Ghana 2012 presidential election. Again, the political parties were very much engaged in massive voter mobilization campaign. Each candidate and party was able to traverse all corners in the country to seek support from old and newly registered voters. Unlike in Nigeria and Kenya, voter mobilization in Ghana's 2012 presidential election was policy dependant. Consequently, supporters and voters were much more interested in policy position of candidates and ideological leaning of the political parties. As I was able to discover in the course of this study, the campaigns were driven by policy alternatives, and not by ethnicity. I found out that, instead of ethnic solidarity, what had motivated voters were social pressure issues. In essence, ethnic solidarity as voter mobilization strategy was rendered unattractive by the use of social pressure issues as campaign factors (See table 10.2 below).

What factor(s) would you say made you to vote for a candidate in the 2012 presidential election? Multiple answers allowed (1 – 5)	
a). Party program of intent	1
b). Affectionate to the candidate	2
c). Ethnic affinity with the candidate	3
d). Religious identity with the candidate.	4
e). Regional affiliation with the candidate	5

Table 10.2 showing Interview question on the choice of candidate

As I have indicated in the questionnaire sample presented as table 10.2 above, voters were tested on ethnic mobilization as a campaign strategy. However, my findings had confirmed my position, that, Ghana's democracy and voters were very different from Nigeria and Kenya. The political awareness, which had emerged prior to the election, was able to diminish and reduce ethnic consideration in voters' electoral preferences and choices made. As I have indicated in Table 10.3 and 10.4, as well as in diagram 10.1 below, candidates' quest for credible electoral processes,

and democracy consolidation were paramount, and were able also to translate into strong political education.

Total Number of Respondents according to Gender	
Male	Female
56	32

Table 10.3 showing respondents according to Gender

As I have indicated in table 10.3 above, 88 respondents were randomly tested with this question. From the 88 respondents tested, 56 of them were male respondents, while 32 of them were female respondents. I had actually based the criteria for participation in the questionnaire interview on active involvement in the 2012 presidential election.

Total Number of Respondents according to Occupation	
Employed (Public and Private)	Unemployed (Youths, Students and House-wives)
64	24

Table 10.4 showing respondents according to Occupation

I did consider the occupational status of the participants as to give me a hypothetical idea about the level of responsibility of each participant outside the election activities. I had 64 respondents, who were gainfully employed in either public Institutions, or in private establishments. In addition, 24 of the respondents were without any pay employment at the time of the election in 2012. However, the unemployed respondents were students, graduates, and House-wives.

What motivated you to vote for a candidate?

- Regional Affiliation 6%
- Religious Affiliation 2%
- Ethnic Affinity 6%
- Affectionate to the Candidate 17%
- Party Program of Intent 69%

Diagram 10.1 displaying respondents response to question on motivation for choice of a candidate

in the 2012 presidential election in Ghana

As I have indicated in diagram 10.1 above, 61 of the respondents, which does represent 69 percent of my 88 respondents, had made their electoral preferences based on party program of intents. However, 15 of the respondents, which represent about 17 percent of my 88 participants, made their electoral preferences based on affection to the candidate. I had 5 respondents in two different sectors, with each representing about 6 percent, made their electoral preferences by their use of ethnic and regional affiliation. Nevertheless, I had just 2 respondents, which represent about 2 percent of the 88 respondents, who had admitted to have made their electoral preferences based on religious identity.

In this study, I discovered that the NPP had targeted voters in the Ashanti and Eastern regions for massive support in the election, but, the admiration and affection voters had for youthful President John Mahama was able to influence and alter the electoral preferences of voters, especially in NPP strongholds. I discovered also that, the NDC was able to receive tremendous sympathy votes as result of the death of the former President, John Atta-Mills. Indeed, the NPP Campaign team had hoped to win all the regions and places, where the former Ghana's President, John Kufuor had won in 2004, as well as, where the Party was able to win in 2008. But as I was able to discover in my interactions with voters, the NDC was able to cut into potential voters, who could have supported NPP, because John Mahama had attracted sympathy votes from NPP controlled regions.

10.3)   Expansion in the Electoral Market

I was able to discover in this study, that as the 2012 presidential election was approaching, the political parties had begun to mobilize its members for country-wide voter recruitment. Each Party had begun to show strong presence in their respective strongholds, and at the same time, were able to sensitize large number of eligible voters, who had not registered to vote to do so. As I have reliably understood, the idea was to enlarge the number of potential voters in the election. All the political parties and candidates had campaigned vigorously around the country for that purpose. I found out that, the Campaign teams were able to use different social media platforms to seek support among young people.

With the electoral dominance, which NPP had recorded in the Ashanti and eastern regions in the 2004 and 2008 elections, the NDC concern and focus was to try and erode such advantage in the 2012 election. I was able to discover in this study that, the Campaign teams of NPP and NDC had embarked on massive mobilization of young voters through the recruitment of the youths as Campaign volunteers. I found out that during the election, the NPP was more preoccupied with the idea of keeping its electoral strongholds in Ashanti and Eastern regions, while the ruling NDC had gone for national campaign strategy. I was able to discover that, the NDC was successful to build a national coalition of voters, which had cut across regions and electoral demography. The NPP and NDC as the two most prominent political parties, with national spread, had aggressively persuaded and mobilized their members, unstable and fringe voters for the election.

10.3.1)   Objective of the Expansion

As I have discovered in the course of this study, each political party had tried to keep its traditional supporters, and had remained consistent to avoid losing them to the opponents. I found out also, that, the main intention of the political parties was to sensitize many unregistered voters to do so before the election. The Parties had intended to use the newly registered voters to broaden their support base. I was able to discover, though, that the engagement of youths as volunteers was to help win

voters from opponents' camp, and to convince newly qualified voters to vote for their candidate. I discovered also that, the death of the former President, John Atta-Mills, had given the opposition NPP the impression, that supporters of the late President, could be won over. Of course, the intention of NPP was to invade the support base of NDC. The opposition political actors had launched aggressive mobilization campaign, with the intention to cripple NDC. I found out also, the reason for NDC massive mobilization campaign was to engage the people, and assure, especially, the supporters of NDC, that he was capable of leading the country. Indeed, all the political parties had made great efforts to widen their support bases through the engagement of many first time voters.

10.3.2).   Target Groups and the Electoral Market

As I had continued my interactions with people, I was able to discover, that voters, in relation to the electoral market, could not be scientifically explained. Of course, I believed so, because, the absence of a documented data, with classification of voters, had made it difficult to attempt doing so. However, I found out that the Campaign teams of the political parties had made attempt to retain the areas each of them had won in the previous presidential elections. I was able to gather also, that, the NDC Campaign team had intended to run a national campaign strategy, while the NPP Campaign team had intended to concentrate mainly on the Ashanti and Eastern regions. As I have further discovered, the NDC, despite its strong efforts to penetrate every community and every category in the electoral demography, the ruling Party was able to protect its strongholds in areas, such as, Brong Ahafo, Western and Central regions. I want to conclude in my evaluation, that, the NDC Campaign team optimum intention was to cut down the strength of NPP in its electoral strongholds. In that regard, NDC was able to build-up massive volunteer teams, which was to help the President's team to conduct successful "Door-2-Door" voter mobilization. Again, I was able to discover, that, the strategy of using volunteers and Door-2-Door" campaign had enhanced NDC's electoral chances in the constituencies, where the Party had performed badly against NPP in the 2004 and 2008 elections. I am well convinced, however, that the NPP and NDC focus on social pressure alternatives to seek voters' support in the electoral market, have confirmed the differences between Ghana, Nigeria and Kenya.

10.4)   Media and Election Campaign Bargaining

I found out in the course of this study, how instrumental, the Media houses were in the successes, which were recorded by the parties in the voter mobilization drive. Again, I was able to discover, that, the interest of citizens in the role of the media platforms in voter sensitization during the campaign, was to compare and contrast alternatives. As matter of facts, however, there are several media houses in Ghana, and each Media House had contributed immensely in the mobilization drive of various Campaign teams. Although, as I have indicated in table 10.5, table 10.6, and table 10.7 below, many of the media houses are privately owned. In that effect, voters had options in which radio station or television channel to depend on for information generation. As I have further indicated in table 10.8 and in diagram 10.2 below, several of my respondents had confirmed, that, they were able to make their electoral preferences and choices based on the campaign messages and information, they had received from the media houses.

List of some Newspapers in Ghana	
Newspapers	
Media House/Publisher	Publications
Private owned	Accra Daily Mail
Private	The Ghanaian Chronicle
State	The Ghanaian Times
Kinesic Communications (NPP media link)	The Statesman
Private	The Finder Newspaper
State owned	The Daily Graphic

Table 10.5 showing list of some Print Media Houses in Ghana

Indeed, there are several Newspaper publications in Ghana, some are weekly and some are daily. However, I have decided to select the above listed in table 10.5 on the basis of their wide circulation, and the topics they covered, especially national political issues. As I have indicated above, some of the publications are owned by the state, and some are owned by individuals, or corporate entities.

List of some Radio Stations in Ghana	
Electronic Media: Radio	
Media House	Stations
Private	Joy FM
Private	Peace FM
Private	Citi FM
State	Ghana Radio
Private	Top Radio
Private	Hot FM
Private	Web Radio

Table 10.6 showing list of some Radio Houses in Ghana

As I did observe in the ownership of Newspaper publications in Ghana, the radio aspect of the electronic media is dominated by private Individuals and corporate ownership as well. I have decided to select the above radio houses in representative form. There are of course several radio broadcasting stations in Ghana, though; most of them are on FM frequency. Radio Stations, such like Joy FM, Ghana radio and Peace FM, each of them has high number of listeners. The Ghana radio, as a state controlled broadcasting entity, has extensive coverage area capacity, and its' signal is received all over Ghana.

List of some Television Channels in Ghana	
Electronic Media: **Television**	
Media House/Owner	Channels
State	Ghana Television
Private	Viasat 1 TV
Private	TV3
Private	Crystal TV
State and Private (joint ownership)	Metro TV

Table 10.7 showing list of some Media Houses in Ghana

As I have established in the data, which I have presented in table 10.7 above, there are several television channels in Ghana. In my evaluation, prominent among the channels are Ghana Television, Metro TV. However, the Viasat 1 TV is a cable television network. I found out also, that, the television houses had contributed immensely in voters' education, and public mobilization through sensitization and awareness creation. I discovered further, that the television stations had played vital role in keeping the candidates and their supporters on message during the campaigns, and after the 2012 presidential election. As I have indicated through the data, which I have presented in table 10.7 above, some of the Television houses are owned by private individuals, corporate organizations and some by the state.

As part of my evaluation on the role of the Media in the 2012 campaign, some of my respondents, who had voted in the election, were asked, how the role of the Media had affected their electoral preferences and choices during the presidential election. As I have established in table 10.8 below, the respondents were tested to ascertain the mobilization effect from the Media, and basically, how each of the subsectors in the media industry had contributed in their choice of candidate during the presidential election. I hold the belief, however, that as catalyst to democracy and credible democratic process, balancing in news coverage and unbiased reporting, could go a long way to streamline opinions and stabilize the polity. With a volatile polity, and

since elections are capable of invoking violent reactions through stimulation of memories, the unbiased role of the Media had become highly pertinent for successful democratic process, especially in societies such like Ghana.

Which of the Media subsectors contributed in your choice of candidate during the 2012 presidential election?	
Newspapers	1
Radio Stations	2
Television Channels	3
All of the above	5
None of the above	9

Table 10.8 showing sample of questionnaire about the role of the Media in voters' mobilization

in the 2012 presidential election in Ghana

I had selected the 88 respondents for the questionnaire interviews randomly. As I have indicated in diagram 10.2 below, each participant had the privilege to pick either one or more than one option in the questionnaire. However, from the 88 respondents, 59 participants had admitted, that they were able to make their electoral preferences based on information, which they had received from radios and televisions. I had 76 respondents, who had agreed also, that their electoral preferences and choices were impacted by media effects. Simultaneously, 59 respondents had admitted to have been influenced by the media through series of political debates, and programs, which were anchored in different television channels. In my interactions with people at the University of Accra, majority of the respondents had agreed, that the media had offered voters the opportunity to listen to the candidates, members of the Campaign teams, or senior party officials about their party's position on several national policy issues under debate. Furthermore, 34 participants had agreed, that Newspaper reporting had offered them the opportunity to have deep and concise analyses about the policy issues under debate. However, 12 of my respondents had

admitted, that neither of the media subsectors had any direct impact in their electoral preferences and choices in the presidential election.

Diagram 10.2 showing the number of respondents according to Media subsector

In my assumption, I hold the belief, though, that the impact of the Media subsectors in voters' electoral decision-making process during the election was high. I found out, that the diversification in the Campaign processes, through strong media presence, was able to reduce undue negative temptations, which have often accompanied elections in multiethnic societies. Furthermore, as I randomly selected the participants, I had the intention to have substantial number of the respondents as females. The idea was to create and infuse ideological, as well as, social balance in my findings. In table 10.9 below, I did indicate the presence of 56 male and 32 female respondents in the questionnaire interviews.

Total Number of Respondents according to Gender	
Male	Female
56	32

Table 10.9 showing number of respondents according to Gender

My classification of the respondents according to gender is further produced in diagram 10.3 below showing the percentage of each gender.

Participants according to Gender

Female 36%

Male 64%

Diagram 10.3 indicating the percentage of respondents according to Gender

As I have indicated in diagram 10.3 above, 64 percent of the participants were male respondents, while 36 percent of the respondents were females. However, further clarification of the respondents' status, as presented in table 10.10 below, had shown that, from 88 participants, 64 respondents were under pay employment, while 24 respondents were unemployed. Indeed, the idea to include the occupational status of the respondents was to enable the author to speculate how the issues on social pressures were able to affect their dispositions and judgments.

Total Number of Respondents according to Occupation	
Employed	Unemployed
64	24

Table 10.10 showing Number of participants according to Occupation

For more clarity, I have classified the employed respondents to consist of those working either in private, corporate or in public institutions, while the unemployed respondents were consist of students, university graduates and fulltime house-wives. As I have indicated in diagram 10.4 below, I have presented the respondents according to the percentage of each group.

Diagram 10.4 showing percentage of the respondents according to Occupation

From an occupational point of view, 73 percent of the respondents were employed, while 27 percent were unemployed. Nevertheless, the climate of engagement in the Media houses was one filled with moderation, as they had played down every divisive situation from public attention. I did hold the belief that, the efforts, which were put in place by the media houses, had discouraged the use of incitement statements, or the creation of situations, which was capable of setting off unwarranted reaction, had

helped to secure 2012 presidential election in Ghana. I want to conclude, though, that the decision to ignore, or to downplay divisive comments from politicians was most commendable, as many of the voters had depended more on television and radio news reports for information about the election. Above all, I want to share in the belief that, the low voter patronage, which was recorded by Newspaper publications, with regard to election reports and debate monitoring, was never an indictment; rather it has confirmed, that economic stability of a voter has tremendous effect on ability to seek information.

10.4.1)   Talk-Shows Platform

As I re-evaluate the role and impact of the Media in the 2012 presidential election in Ghana, I was able to discover, that, several organized Talk-Shows as well as radio phone-in programs had helped to provide information to voters. I found out also, that all the political parties had used the platform to call on voters to make good electoral decisions. However, I am convinced that many of the television anchored Talk-shows had enabled voters to have access to electronic campaign arena, hear from the campaign teams and supporters on how each party and candidate had intended to tackle the many social pressures in Ghana. Indeed, the activity of several surrogates and supporters in the Talk-Shows had increased the political tempo, and provided the citizens another method in voter mobilization.

10.4.2)   Exploitation of Genuine and Media Induced Events

I was able to discover in this study, that Volunteers working for the candidates were able to respond, in many situations, to issues in the media. Volunteers had roamed the streets, and they were very active in the rural communities, where each supporting group had to market the policies, in the bid to raise support for candidates. I am able to discover also, that Volunteers had engaged in image laundry, as they mobilized voters for the candidates. I found out also, that the recruitment of volunteers was necessitated by the presence of Spin-doctors in voter mobilization through smear campaigns against candidate's individual life style, and manipulation of facts.

I am well convinced, however, that the involvement of the Volunteers and the efforts, which was mounted about policy alternatives in the media organizations, had helped to neutralize the ethnic card, and regional centered campaign pursued in Nigeria, and in Kenya.

10.4.3.)   Target Groups and Election Campaign Method

Again, I was able to discover, that, mobilization of voters as a process-driven adventure, can dwell only in the ability of a candidate or parties to convince various voter demography. In this sense, political parties can use different mediums to reach target voters. I was able to discover in the course of this study, how the campaign teams had utilized their message delivery systems. I found out that the campaign teams had their resources split. I want to believe, however, that the split of resources was made to accommodate spaces for policy position sensitization through technology driven mediums, such like Television houses, Radio Stations, Robot-calls, Short-Message-Service (SMS), as well as non-technological driven channels, such like Newspapers, Billboards, Posters, Handbills and "Door2Door" calls by Volunteers. I discovered also that NDC and NPP had made conscious attempt to mobilize youths for support. I discovered that there was not specific strategy for any voter demography. Essentially, I found out that, in different occupational demography, such as teachers, market women, Youth organizations, co-operative societies, public officials, self employed ventures, and unemployed, were able to receive the same campaign messages.

Above all, I was able to discover, that, the campaign teams had targeted their traditional voters, who had voted for each party in the 2008 presidential election. I found out also, that, the NPP had courted young voters, and parents with its proposed free tuition High Schools program in Ghana. However, NDC main target was to retain those voters, who had voted for the party in 2008 presidential election, and make attempt to record a minimum of 3 percent vote increase from the NPP strongholds, especially in the Ashanti, and Eastern regions.

I found out also that, both parties had used House2House campaign format to meet and discuss with voters about their party's program of intents. I was able to find out in the course of this study, that apart from the use of grassroots mobilization pattern, the campaign teams had organized town hall meetings, where voters were sensitized about what the party had intended to do when voted into office. In my findings, the town Hall meetings were organized with emphasis on cooperative societies, different farmers associations, trade associations, women associations, and Youth associations.

10.5).   Outcome and Findings

10.5.1).   Aggressive Voter Mobilization

I am able to find out in this study about the 2012 presidential election in Ghana, that, the political actors had concentrated in supporters' mobilization. In contrast to Nigeria and Kenya, where campaign messages, mobilization strategies and voters' preferences were subjected to the use of Inter-ethnic historical grievances to seek support, political actors and voters were much concerned about policy options in Ghana. I was able to discover in the course of this study, that the political actors had engaged the media in message dissemination. I found out also, how the use of mediated and non-mediated platforms in voter mobilization had differentiated the campaign strategies, which were used by political actors in the Ghanaian 2012 presidential election, to those used in Nigeria and Kenya.

10.5.2). Policy Marketing and Personality as Campaign Resource

I was able to find out, how concentration in policy issues by political actors had energized voters, and was able to establish debate on best possible option for development of Ghana. The modernization of party's ideology and the incorporation of middle-point political ideologies had brought strong competition in the electoral market. In contrast to Nigeria and Kenya, where the campaign issue was regime change under electoral solidarity. Of course, in Nigeria and Kenya, a fundamental factor in voter mobilization strategy was the use of Inter-ethnic historical grievances as campaign instrument in the elections. I have discovered also, that in Ghana, political actors, supporters and voters had ignored the issue of ethnicity or pre-independence and post-independence political competition among ethnic groups, as campaign instrument. I am well convinced that through the use of policy issues, and the candidates' image, as factors in voters' mobilization, Ghana had differed politically from Nigeria and Kenya.

10.5.3).   Party Policy Position and Public Response

I was able to discover, that, unlike in Nigeria and Kenya, voters in Ghana were more interested in the policy position of political parties and candidates. In Nigeria and Kenya, the interest of most voters was hinged on the question of what ethnicity, region or religion affiliation should the elected president belong. Voters in Ghana were least interested in where the president comes from, what religion, ethnic group, or region he should belong. Voters and political actors were more interested in good governance, and development in all fields. I want to conclude, though, that by ignoring the use of Inter-ethnic historical grievances as voter mobilization strategy, the 2012 presidential election has enhanced democracy and democratization process in Ghana.

10.5.4).   Rejection of Election Result and Judicial Litigation

I have discovered that, the rejection of the 2012 presidential election result by the main opposition party (NPP) was premised on legal questions. However, unlike in Nigeria and Kenya, the announcement of the election result did not elicit ethnic cleansing, or vicious violent attacks against or between ethnic groups in Ghana. The rejection and the protest, which had erupted, was made a judicial issue, as the opposition only challenged the declared outcome of the election in court. I want to conclude that the choice of legal process in the determination of final outcome of the 2012 presidential election in Ghana was in line with democracy and democratic norms.

10.5.5).   Demonstration and Legal challenge

I want to conclude, therefore, that the demonstration, which was embarked upon by members and supporters of the opposition candidates against the outcome of the election in 2012, did not follow the pattern in Nigeria and Kenya presidential elections in 2011 and 2007, respectively. As it was the case in Nigeria and Kenya, there was no displacement of people, arson or killing of innocent citizens on the account of ethnic identity. On the basis of the legal challenge, as adopted by the main opposition party (NPP), I am convinced, that, the action has enhanced democracy and democratization in Ghana.

10.5.6).   Democracy Consolidation

After going through all the enumerated factors from sub-factor (i) to sub-factor (v), I am well convinced that the processes and method of campaign message delivery, and voter mobilization strategy used by political actors the 2012 presidential election in Ghana, have shown the presence of democratic maturity. I want to agree, however, that democracy in Ghana, as represented in the 2012 presidential election, has shown consolidation of democracy. The Campaigns, the activity of political actors, and the various voter mobilization strategies used in the election, have shown great departure from what I discovered in Nigeria and Kenya.

Chapter 11

11). Hypotheses

11.1). Selection of the Explanatory Variables

Among the fundamental issues in this study is how to measure the Inter-ethnic historical grievances, which influenced voter mobilization strategy, and consequently altered the election outcome and responses in the three case study countries. However, the below listed criteria might provide clues in that respect.

11.2). The Three Hypotheses:

The import of the hypotheses is captured diagrammatically through my presentation in chapter 2, which I have re-presented below as table 11.1. As I have indicated, the factors on the left and right sides of the table do provide details about the independent and dependent variables, respectively (see Table 11.1) below. Furthermore, some elements of the three factors are interconnected, as they appeared in the three hypotheses presented below. The three case study countries are multi-ethnic entities. An important variable for elections in a distressed or divided society is the degree of Inter-ethnic historical grievances among the nationalities that constituted the society.

11.2.1). Hypothesis Nr. 1:

Despite the wide social and political heterogeneity among different ethnic nationalities in Nigeria, Kenya and Ghana that were compelled to form the countries by the colonial conquest of the British, the chances that election campaigns would be successful and violence free in the countries is exceptionally high.

11.2.2).   Hypothesis Nr. 2:

Given the wide heterogeneity in the ethnic configuration of the countries, the chances that violence will erupt due to the campaign strategy used by political actors will be extremely high. (ii): the higher the Inter-ethnic grievances among the ethnic nationalities in the countries, the higher the chances for violence during the elections.

Figure 11. 1: Factors that contributed to election violence in the distressed societies. The direction of the arrows indicates the reasons for violence in the elections

11.2.3).   Hypothesis Nr. 3:

Hypothesis 3 is in opposition to Hypotheses 1 and 2. Hypothesis 3 does suggest that the higher the rate of grievances among the ethnic nationalities in a case study country, the greater the chances for electoral violence during elections.

Hypothesis 1: This is the utilization of some aspects of the Powell, Jr's conceptual argument about the importance of election in democracy. As one can see from the insight about the impact of colonial legacy in the case study countries, the governance pattern is a legacy of colonial influence.

However, in contrast, I have derived **Hypothesis 2** from Lijphart, Horowitz, and Geertz concepts about collective identity, and communal political actions in multi-ethnic society. Hypothesis 2 focused on the grievances among the various ethnic groups. However, Hypothesis 3 concentrated on the voter mobilization strategy and its effects on election as a fundamental factor in democracy.

11.3).   The usefulness of the Explanatory Variables

The figure below, I want to summarize my evidence for the impact of Inter-ethnic historical grievances as voter mobilization strategy in the case study countries.

Case Study Countries			
	Nigeria	Kenya	Ghana
1. Size	Large	Large	Small
2. Political competition	High	High	Absent
3. Ethnic groups	Several	Several	Few
4. Ethnic rivalry	High	High	Low
5. Ethnic homeland	Present	Present	Present
6. Ethnic mobilization	Present	Present	Absent
7. Religious mobilization	Very High	Absent	Absent
Political System	Multi-party	Multi-party	Multi-party
Participation in electoral Process	Yes	Yes	Yes
Non-participation	No	No	No
Opposition in Government	Yes	Yes	No
British colonial political legacy	Present	Present	Present
Colonial recruitment and bureaucracy	Present	Present	Present

Table 11.1: Showing the Summary of the Explanatory Variables

I want to establish the premise for the use of each of the enumerated factors in voter mobilization by political actors in the three case study countries. As I have enumerated in chapter 1 and 3, my intention is to establish how related the central question, and the enunciated democracy factors are to the three case study countries. In the first boxes, one can see the similarity in structural and political variables between Nigeria and Kenya. In contrast to Nigeria and Kenya, there are significant dissimilarities in structural and political variables between Ghana and the former two countries. As I have observed, the size of each polity varies; essentially, Nigeria and Kenya are both large societies, in comparison to Ghana with small land mass and population.

Indeed, there are strong variations on the issue of political competition among ethnic groups, ethnic rivalry, fear for political domination, and ethnic mobilization between Nigeria, Kenya and Ghana. Whereas Nigeria and Kenya showed presence and high level in the listed factors, Ghana showed absence of the factors. Political actors in Ghana, whose society has low propensity for ethnic induced tension, had no reason to use ethnic or Inter-ethnic grievances as voter mobilization strategy. However, political actors used Inter-ethnic grievances as the fundamental factor in voter mobilization in Nigeria and Ghana. Interestingly, political actors in Kenya and Ghana had no reason to use religion as voter mobilization, despite the presence of large Muslim population in the two countries. In contrast to Kenya and Ghana, Religion as voter mobilization strategy was exploited and heavily used by political actors in Nigeria. The variation in the use of ethnic mobilization as voter recruitment strategy in the two countries, Nigeria and Kenya, are very clear and self explaining. The devaluation of democracy through voter mobilization strategy during elections is highly impacted by the enumerated Independent variables.

11.4). Discourse about Democracy Devaluation using Voter Mobilization Strategy: Operationalization of the Hypotheses

How can one locate the fundamental factors responsible for violence in the 2007, 2011, and 2012 in Kenya, Nigeria and Ghana, respectively? Of course, the answers to the above question can be found in the enumerations made in the preceding chapters of this dissertation. Hypotheses 1 and 2 gave me the impression to believe that when divided societies that (a) became unified in their social, political and economic developments under external influence and, (b) exhibit strong dissimilarity in their approach to voter mobilization, chances of electoral violence are bound to be high. Again, it suggest as well that voter mobilization processes through which democracy evolve and government established are critically important, just as the factors that created such processes.

The two enumerated hypotheses are supported by the evidences provided in chapter three. My analysis indicates that political actors in Nigeria, and Kenya used similar voter mobilization strategies, but with tremendous difference from that used by political actors in Ghana to prosecute their campaigns. In Ghana, political actors, who campaigned during the 2012 presidential election used the media, volunteers, and social pressure issues, and rejected the use of Inter-ethnic historical grievances as voter mobilization strategy. But in contrast to political actors in Nigeria and Kenya, political actors in Ghana rejected the use of ethnic or religious sentiments in the voter mobilization process during the election. Indeed, the only viable exception as I have indicated in the figure above is Ghana, because, while Nigeria and Kenya used Inter-ethnic historical grievances premised on fear of political domination to mobilize large and massive number of voters in the elections under review, political actors in Ghana used political persuasion and policy debates, candidate branding and marketing to mobilize voters during the 2012 election.

The heterogeneous structure of the case study countries qualified each of them to be defined as racial communities (Huntington, 1982: 8), built under the authority of colonial power. The three case study countries are divided societies peopled by groups who have no known collective identity. From the available information I can confidently claim that reasons for the violence recorded in the elections in Nigeria,

and Kenya derived largely from the use of Inter-ethnic grievances to mobilize voters. An important aspect is the fact, that the use of Inter-ethnic grievances as voter mobilization strategy functioned most effectively in Nigeria and Kenya, where ethnic rivalry was high and contentious.

The analysis in chapter eight, nine and chapter ten showed that the use of Inter-ethnic grievances in voter mobilization had double effects in election campaign, namely; to divide the society on the basis of ethnicity, and secondly to promote hatred and crisis in the system. As I have indicated in chapter 9, the effects are very obvious in how the political actors in Kenya used ethnic alliance to mobilize voters, thereby turning election and democracy into ethnicity defined competition. The deadly violence, which led to the death of several hundreds of Kenyan and Nigerian citizens in the 2007 and 2011 presidential elections respectively, could be traced to the impacts of the used Inter-ethnic grievances as voter mobilization strategy.

Violence did not erupt in Ghana after the declaration of the presidential election result in 2012. Instead, expressed disaffection about the election outcome was pursued through judicial system. However, in my findings, I discovered that the presence of ethnic rivalry in any divided society would create feeling of political domination among the contending ethnic groups. On account of the enumerated discoveries, I can confidently claim that there is a strong connection between ethnic rivalry and fear of political domination among different groups in Nigeria and Kenya. I can confidently assert that the use of Inter-ethnic grievances to mobilize voters in the elections conducted in Nigeria (2011), and Kenya (2007) was to enable ethnic groups claim political authority, and to assert their legitimate identity. Therefore, I want to conclude that the attempt by ethnic groups in Nigeria and Kenya to assert their legitimate political identity is evident in the deadly violence, which erupted in the two countries after the official result in the focused presidential elections were made public.

Some analyzed aspects in chapter six support the claim in hypothesis 3. This is premised on the argument that ethnic rivalry and fear of political domination among different ethnic groups in Nigeria and Kenya is the source of conflict among them. My findings in that argument indicate that the use of Inter-ethnic grievances as voter mobilization strategy resulted in the formation of ethnic alliances, and the subsequent electoral solidarity witnessed in the two presidential elections in Nigeria and Kenya.

Proof of that claim can be traced to the presence of the three variables in the second stanza as presented in Table 11.1 above. The three case study countries had differed only on one factor, namely; ethnic influenced opposition in government policies. There is the presence of ethnic influenced opposition in government policies in Nigeria and Kenya, but such opposition is absent in Ghana. The absence of ethnicity influenced opposition politics contributed immensely to the peaceful democratic atmosphere in Ghana. Unlike in Nigeria and Kenya where government policies are dressed in ethnic coat, ethnic defined government policies have no chance to survive in Ghana.

Furthermore, I discovered in this study that Inter-ethnic historical grievance has been present and part of democratic politics in Nigeria and Kenya for decades. I discovered in my analysis that due to the presence of Inter-ethnic grievances in Nigeria and Kenya, electoral conflicts and other issues that emerged in the states were usually difficult to settle. Indeed, Tsurutani (1968, p, 911), had described the above situation as "the existing institutional framework for decision-making." In Tsurutani (1968, p, 911) argument, where such situation exist, the state hardly "enjoys genuine support" above particular parts of the polity. Consequently, the idea of genuine support in Nigeria and Kenya outside individual ethnic homelands and ethnic political interest is very insignificant.

Pye's communal identification concept from which I have derived Hypothesis 3 partly suggests that ethnic groups will tend to defend a policy that has collective effect, even if such does not play well to the interest of other groups. As I have discussed in chapter 8, and in chapter 9 of this dissertation, I discovered that for several decades the various ethnic groups in Nigeria and in Kenya did not have trust and confidence among themselves. As I found out in the case study countries, the situation is even more precarious between the Igbo and Hausa-Fulani in Nigeria, and between the Kikuyu and Luo in Kenya. From my presentation in figure 6.3, and figure 6.4, it is clear to notice that Inter-ethnic grievances were the fundamental factors, which necessitated the use of ethnic solidarity in the 2007 and 2011 presidential elections, respectively. The use of inter-ethnic grievance as mobilization factor in the elections demonstrates the divided nature of the countries under review, and thus, affected democratic election.

The number of deaths recorded in the two elections in Nigeria (2011) and in Kenya (2007) showed the gravity and intensity of the violence, which erupted after official results were announced. Indeed, the violence in Kenya was directed against the Kikuyu, and the violence in Nigeria was directed against easterners or non Muslims, non Northerners, and including northerners perceived to have betrayed the collective political aspiration of the North in the election. But in Ghana, there was the absence of violence, partly because those who lost in the election chose to seek redress in the court through the rule of law. My argument in Hypothesis 3 that the rivalry among ethnic groups in the case study countries has the tendency to create electoral instability is noticeable in the data presented in figure 9.6 and 9.7 in chapter 9. The conduct of the focused presidential elections in Nigeria and Kenya was characterized by ethnicity induced deadly election violence. Ethnicity induced electoral violence manifested itself in Nigeria and Kenya through ethnic alliance and electoral solidarity built under the premise of Inter-ethnic historical grievances.

11.5). Situating the Explanatory Variables and Campaign Strategies

As a functional factor, the variables I have deployed in this study provided me the much needed framework, in which the fundamental issues were built upon. As contained in Table 11.1 above, the presence of ethnicity influenced political rivalry as well as the presence of ethnic grievances among ethnic groups; the tendency for the political actors to manipulate the democracy processes was very high.

Considering the fact that a fundamental factor used by political actors to mobilize and sensitize voters in Nigeria was the issue of "change" (return of political power to the northern region and in that case a Muslim) in the political leadership of the country, irrespective of the political party. In Kenya as well, the underlying reason for the formation of coalition of convenience was primarily to retrieve political power from the Kikuyu ethnic group and its allies. In the two countries of Nigeria and Kenya, there was the imaginary feeling of political and economic domination among the ethnic groups. As I have indicated in the list of my explanatory variables through the presence of Inter-ethnic grievances as well as presence of definite homelands for the different ethnic nationalities, each one of the ethnic groups believed that the activity

promoted by another denied them the right of part ownership or legitimate member of the country. Hence, Horowitz had argued that,

> "To understand the concept of group legitimacy, it is necessary to link it to ownership. Legitimacy goes to one's rightful place in the country. To be legitimate is therefore to be identified with the territory"

> (See Donald L. Horowitz, 2000, p. 201)

> …Georg Simmel shrewdly notes that the ethnic stranger is "no "owner of the soil' – soil not only in the physical but also in the figurative sense of a life-substance which is fixed, if not in a point in space, at least at an ideal point of social environment"

> (Georg Simmel (1950, p. 404) is cited in Horowitz, 2000, pp. 201 – 202).

The legitimacy right and the ownership fight were the fundamental stimuli that political actors in both Nigeria and Kenya anchored their separate calls for regime change. Indeed, change in the normative sense implies replacing a ruling party with any one of the opposition parties. Of course, the type of change demanded by a voter in Yorubaland is not the same thing with the change a voter of Hausa-Fulani origin wanted in the 2011 presidential election in Nigeria. The same thing applies to Kenya, because the type of change a non-Kikuyu voter wanted (Luo, Kalenjin, Mijikenda, Kisii), is not the same change that a voter of Kikuyu origin wished to see emerged from the 2007 presidential election in Kenya. The religious angle in the debate about who is to be elected President of Nigeria created or introduced another question on the legitimacy right and ownership fight in the country.

Evidence as provided through the presence of indigenous homelands in the case study countries supported my argument on the type of change desired by each of the ethnic groups. I am convinced that the legitimacy right and ownership fight was responsible for the mobilization strategy used in the presidential elections in Nigeria and Kenya. The argument as was made by Donald L. Horowitz in his study reinforced my position on the Inter-ethnic grievances among and between the various groups in Nigeria and Kenya. As was argued by Horowitz whereby he said that,

"As there are several ways to acquire ownership of property, so there are several sources of legitimacy. I may acquire property and the right to exclude others from it because I inherited it, or because I purchased or squatted on it, or because I built from scratch by my toil, or because I annexed it to adjacent property that I own. If the property is really mine, then the claim of another to the same property is nothing more than theft. Access to enjoyment of the property will be granted or withheld on my terms. The same applies to ownership of the country"

(See Donald L. Horowitz, 2000, p. 202).

The argument which emerged from the presence of Inter-ethnic rivalry in the case study countries acknowledged my empirical findings and theoretical position on the use of solidarity as instrument in voter mobilization during the focused elections. When considered also, Donald Rothchild argued that,

"If ethnic interests in multi-ethnic societies can be compatible with the thrust and parry of democratic politics, it can also at times provoke destructive conflict in the deeply divided societies"

…Where ethnic leaders engage in uncompromising behavior and seek to advance ethnic group interests at the expense of other groups, it can lead to polarization and increased conflict as the date of the election approaches"

(See Donald Rothchild, In: Wimmer, Goldstone, Horowitz,

Joras and Schetter, 2004. 229).

By taken a close look at hypotheses 2 and 3, it is very obvious that the factors that could necessitate group interest protection abound. As exhibited through the listed explanatory variables, the presence of conflict variables and facilitators implied that each one of the ethnic nationalities would attempts to protect its interest in the society. Indeed, the adoption of Inter-ethnic grievance as fundamental factor in the voter sensitization drive by each of the contending political interest in Nigeria, as well as the coalitions of convenience as it was the case in Kenya, had necessitated the use of electoral solidarity in the mobilization of eligible voters.

It does confirm the argument, which I have projected in hypothesis 2. Furthermore, it has confirmed also the argument Donald L. Horowitz made in his study, although it was cited from a Survey conducted in the northern Nigeria by the New York Times, monthly supplement (March. 1967), with majority respondents suggesting that,

"A person's loyalty should be to his region rather than to his country," and a child should be taught to protect the welfare of his own people and let other tribal groups look out for themselves"

(See Donald L. Horowitz, 2000, pp. 6 – 7).

11.6).   Policy Dilemma and Voters in Divided Societies

In the three case study democracies, campaign strategy used by the political actors to market their candidates and electoral intents prevented me from evaluating votes on the basis of policy positions of political parties. Normatively, the direction of campaign messages and policy position of political actors compelled many voters to remain loyal to their ethnic induced electoral preferences in the election. In what one may describe as an attitudinal trend in democracies, where voters refused to draw conclusion on the party and candidate they believe proved more capable to handle various issues in the state, voters in Nigeria and Kenya were more concerned about the ethnic representation and authority configuration of the government to be elected.

Policy Intents and Voters in divided societies	
Party member	Non Party member
➢ Support based on party position ➢ Belief in party's ideology ➢ Party and candidate image	➢ Alternative or middle position ➢ Personal situation as a catalyst ➢ Candidate's antecedents ➢ Party and public perception

Table.11.2: showing voters and policy issues schema

As political actors mobilized for votes in the case study countries, voters were reminded to be conscious of the future of their ethnic and religious relevance in the power equation of the country. It is either one is asked to vote for a candidate in a bid to elect a president as a religious symbol or as an ethnic symbol, but never on the need for national development. One is recognized either on the basis of religion or on the basis of ethnic identity. Ordinarily, when a voter decided to vote in an election, it could be on the basis of his support for a party based on policy position, affection to a candidate, or ideology (See Table.11.2 above). Political actors and voters in Nigeria and Kenya were much deep in the fight for political relevance, while political actors and voters in Ghana were much more concerned about the policies to be implemented by the elected government. As I was able to discover in the case of Ghana, several voters without party affiliation had depended on individual economic condition, rather than any group's collective interest.

As I have tabulated in table11.2 above, the voters in Ghana, from the two realms of support, had evaluated the candidates without being ethnocentric. In the 2012 presidential election in Ghana, political parties had vigorously campaigned, using combined pro-market and pro-poor slogans to woo voters. Indeed, the economic situation in the country had compelled the political actors to focus on social issues, which they people had to contend with on daily basis. Despite being a conservative party, the main opposition party, New Patriotic Party (NPP), was able to delve into social issues as part of its campaign promises to the voters. The decision of NPP candidate and his party to make promises on free tuition High Schools, Health services and social benefits, was well out of conservative ideas, which the party had claimed to represent. Conversely, the ruling National Democratic Convention had used its performance in the four years it has been in government to campaign for votes. Unfortunately, in Nigeria and Kenya, where infrastructural decay and the need to rebuild and retool were much needed, the political actors and voters were in contest, debating which ethnic group or region should produce the president, or what religion yet to be elected president should belong. In both countries, the opposition political actors' choice to use ethnic card, was a disservice to democracy in the countries.

In essence, the electoral rhetoric, as it was advanced by the Orange Democratic Movement in Kenya, had motivated its supporters beyond the argument for social infrastructures. Even in Nigeria, the involvement of religious leaders in voter mobilization exercise, had transformed the exercise into religion collective interest protection. However, the nature of party membership, and political activity in Nigeria and Kenya, was able to defeat the argument for policy issues as central to election campaign debate. In my findings on democratic elections in Nigeria and Kenya, I have been able to discover three issues, which had combined to influence voters in taking electoral decisions, namely; the possible power equation in the country after the election, the possible ethnic representation in the cabinet to be formed, and the question of Inter-ethnic grievances among the several ethnic groups. The above findings were in contrast to what was the case in Ghana, where economy and other social issues had influenced voters.

Even the 2008 Freedom House democracy and countries classification on political rights and civil liberties had placed Nigeria, Kenya and Ghana in different categories (see Freedom House scores, 2008: African regimes in 2009). Indeed, Ghana was placed as a "Liberal democracy" with a value score of (1.2), while Nigeria and Kenya were classified as "Competitive Authoritarian" with value scores of (5.4) and (4.3), respectively (See Diamond and Plattner, 2010, p, xxvi). Unfortunately, the report from the Freedom House does represent part of my criticism about research on elections and democracy in sub-Sahara Africa. Like Hyden (2006), in his criticism of those political scientists, who have endeavored to conduct studies on democracy in several countries in Africa south of the Sahara, said that,

> "Political scientists typically operate differently from historians and anthropologists in that they are more ready to engage in generalizations and comparisons. Because their ambition is to generalize, they often overlook the wealth of knowledge that is contained in the many case studies of specific countries or events that scholars in neighboring disciplines, such as anthropology and history, produce"

> (See Hyden, 2006, p, 2).

I want to argue that several scholars have concentrated only on Institutions and the functionality of those states' institutions. They have not in any way considered the effects of Inter-ethnic grievances and election campaign strategies, which were used to prosecute elections in sub-Sahara Africa democracies. In like manner, voters' can only react to situations they feel concerned about or connected to. Likewise, Geertz (1963), who is one among the modernization theorists, had argued that, the, "community in African countries as a barrier that had to be hurdled as a condition for progress, especially when the community took the form of a clan or ethnic group" (Geertz, 1963, Hyden, 2006, p, 52). In essence, political parties, political actors, and candidates' position on national policy issues have two way effects, namely; either to motivate voters who have remained loyal to their collective identity, or to convince voters to ignore their feeling for communal identification. However, the above mobilization dilemma can conveniently deny a candidate and his political party victory in an open election.

Although, not underrating the fact, that ethnic loyalty, most times is difficult to predict, and the probable effects are hard to measure. However, drawing inference from the argument as it was advanced by Horowitz (2000), where he insisted that people who are exclusivist, are often the most preoccupied with the fate of their "nation" (see Horowitz, 2000, p, 200). Obviously, fears for the unknown during elections had often compelled political actors to indulge in clandestine vote shopping measures, where different tactics in voter mobilization drive are deployed. The above narrative does coincides with Hyden's (2006) argument in his proposal on the impact of collective loyalty on politics in Africa, where he said that,

"Primordial ties had to be loosened and identification with the state and its central institutions encouraged if these countries are going to develop in orderly fashion"

(See Hyden, 2006, p, 52).

In the absence of collective national myth and narratives, political actors and voters could become exclusivists, since each group would view the maintenance of existing ethnic boundaries as precarious. As Horowitz noted,

> "If claims are asymmetrical, it follows that exclusivism produces a reaction among those to be excluded"

<div align="right">(See Horowitz, 2000, p, 200).</div>

In such circumstances as is claimed by Horowitz, political actors would ultimately fall back on primordial cleavages in search of electoral support.

11.6.1) Voter Migration: Ideology Dilemma

If it is true that election is an instrument of democracy as argued by Powell, Jr (See Powell, jr. 2000), then, one would assume that elections must also provide voters the opportunity to access their previously elected government, or representatives in the parliament. Therefore, the performance of elected representatives would invariably determine the loyalty of voters or the migration of voters to another candidate. In the case study countries, the issues in Nigeria and Kenya were never based on previous performance, rather voters' and political actors' action, have always confirmed Horowitz's argument that,

> "If claims are asymmetrical, it follows that exclusivism produces a reaction among those to be excluded"

<div align="right">(See Horowitz, 2000, 200).</div>

Likewise, Horowitz had classified the Kikuyu of Kenya as "one of the most exclusivist ethnic groups", it then follows, that those other ethnic groups in Kenya, who feel excluded from positions of political authority in Kenya, would react by using elections to protect their interest.

I want to argue that the same situation does apply to Nigeria, where two regional blocs have always competed for political and religious relevance using national democratic elections to advance their legitimacy rights claims. But, unlike in Nigeria and Kenya, voters in Ghana, who had previously voted for a candidate or a political party, might find the need to migrate to another party or vote for another candidate on the argument that they were under-represented by the very individual, or might find it difficult to be convinced by the policy summersault of their preferred party.

So, as I have indicated in figure 11.2 below, while voters in Ghana had used policy argument as reason for the shift in their electoral preferences, voters in Nigeria and Kenya had only shifted their electoral support to another candidate on the basis of ethnocentrism, or the protection of collective religious interest. In the 2011 and 2007 presidential elections in Nigeria and Kenya, respectively, political actors had used exclusivists approach to seek votes. The use of "forty-one ethnic groups against one ethnic group" or "Kenya against Kikuyu" as campaign or voter mobilization slogan in the 2007 presidential election in Kenya could be likened to what Horowitz had enumerated about Inter-ethnic grievances, where he cited it as examples of conflict factors in different societies. Horowitz said that,

> "When Bengalis resisted the imposition of Assamese as the sole language of state government, extensive violence was perpetrated against them, and a movement gained ground to expel them from the state. Bengal Kheda- "Drive the Bengalis out" – was the motto of the movement." "Get rid of the Mossi" (Ivory Coast, 1969), "upcountry people to their home areas" (Kenya, 1962), "Muslims Quit India" (Ahmedabad, 1969), "Fiji for the Fijiians"

> (See Horowitz, 2000, 199).

According to Horowitz, the above slogans are "some of the many slogans of ethnic exclusion, most of them linked to violence" (See Horowitz, 2000, 199). Like the case of 2007 and the 2011 presidential elections in Kenya, and Nigeria, respectively, slogans, such like "forty-one ethnic groups against one, "Kenya against Kikuyu", "Change", and "Continuity" had resulted into violence outbreak after the elections.

Ghana	→	Nigeria	→	Kenya
•Employment •Job creation •Social Pressures		•Ethnocentrism •Religious solidarity •Regional political interest		•Ethnocentrism •Ethnic alliance •Inter-ethnic electoral solidarity

Figure.11.2 showing migration of voters during elections in a democracy

While Ghanaian political actors had engaged voters, through product branding and the use of marketing strategies to seek voters' support, conversely, voters on another hand were being meticulous in their search for more realizable policy alternatives among provided policies. But, in contrast to Ghana, political actors and voters in Nigeria and Kenya had steeped their necks deep in what Horowitz (2000) had called "Coalition of Convenience", as well as the creation of "exclusivist" tendencies in search of votes and electoral support. This does imply, that the migration of voters or shift in support by voters during elections could be supportive of a group held collective interest, or political philosophy. Indeed, the three presidential elections I have used in this dissertation as case study could be argued to have taken place in three distinct societies, but, I want to insist that the factors and the political stimuli available in the countries were similar. If one can consider the findings by Horowitz (2000) about ethnic affiliations, where he had cited Philippine and Nigeria, and claimed that,

"In a Philippine study, children as young as six were aware of their ethnic identity and by the age of ten provided strongly ethnic responses"

(See Horowitz, 2000, p, 6).

In like manner, Horowitz had argued that, "Questions about appropriate political behavior also elicit responses cast in ethnic terms, responses sometimes startlingly ethnocentric. Thus, Horowitz said that,

> "In Philippine, it is "better" to vote for someone "from your own home region" In Nigeria, a person's loyalty "should be to his region rather than to his country" and a child "should be taught to protect the welfare of his own people and let other tribal groups look out for themselves"

> (See Horowitz, 2000, p, 7 – 8).

Furthermore, ethnic identity is strongly felt, behavior based on ethnicity is normatively sanctioned, and ethnicity is often accompanied by hostility toward out-groups. Migration of voters in the 2011 and 2007 presidential elections in Nigeria and Kenya, respectively, was possible because majority among the voters had such political orientation as explained by Horowitz in his study.

In every democratic society, the three case study countries inclusive, people are shaped politically through internal conditions as well as through external pressures. But, where Inter-ethnic grievance is to dictate the tune of campaign and messages, then, it hold that voters could possible find themselves thorn between the two social dilemmas, "going along ethnic political interest, or going along social pressures". In that case, many voters in Nigeria, Kenya and Ghana were left to make electoral decisions on preferences and choices through the influence of internally generated political and social cues.

Nevertheless, there were several voters who had migrated or who had shifted their political loyalty from their original political preferences to another party on the basis of internally generated cues. In any case, I believe strongly, that voters' migration in Nigeria, and Kenya cannot be aggregated to have emerged from social inducement or social pressure alone as internal condition within a party could shape the electoral preferences of members, as represented in PDP's presidential candidate nomination crisis for 2011 election (Nigeria), and the NARC's memorandum of understanding (MOU) on equal ministers nomination after the 2002 presidential election (Kenya).

The act of switching electoral preference during elections by voters can create somewhat ideology problem for the voters on one hand, and ideology credibility crisis for political parties. In developed democracies of Western Europe and North America, voters have always described themselves either as Liberal, Conservative or as Independent. Each voter can cast ballot for the political party, which one believes had embodied preferred ideological principles, as expression of political identity.

11.6.2)　　　Active Voters and Traditional Solidarity Effects

If one among the primary functions of election is the provision of platforms for the election of government and representatives, then, there ought to be inbuilt corresponding factors to help streamline local demands, especially, in multiethnic societies. When Horowitz was discussinng about legitimacy of ethnic claims, he had stated that,

"To be legitimate is therefore to be identified with the territory"

(See Horowitz, 2000, p. 201).

As Donald Rothchild had in his argument on democracy and multi-ethnic society stated,

"In multi-ethnic societies such as Mauritius and Botswana, where ethnic groups are recognized as legitimate and feel secure about their future, ethnic politics can be compatible with democracy"

(See Wimmer, Goldstone, Horowitz, Joras

and Schetter, eds, 2004, p, 229).

I believe the above position is where democracy in Africa can be argued to be different from democracy in western countries. When ethnic groups are constitutionally recognized to be legitimate in a state, then, the type of democracy to

be practiced in such societies must have inbuilt mechanism to accommodate the configuration present in the society. If the above statement holds, then, questions should be asked; if the democracy practiced in Nigeria and Kenya is suited to the societies it meant to serve.

Since the legitimacy claims of various ethnic groups in Nigeria and Kenya are not constitutionally recognized as legitimate entity in the countries, there abound to be conflict among the groups on whose legitimate right it is to rule. Horowitz had asserted that legitimacy claims by ethnic groups is,

"To be identified with the territory"

(Horowitz, 2000, p. 201).

So, it holds that where ethnic groups' legitimate right is constitutionally recognized as part of the territory, there is chance for democracy. In the 2007 and 2011 presidential elections in Kenya and Nigeria, respectively, the competition was ethnic defined, because some groups felt they have lost their legitimacy right claims.

Normatively, voters would want to respond to issues under contest in the public realm, but the consistency in which political actors would pursue the set goals is dependent on responses received from voters. The use of exclusivist slogans in voter mobilization exercises in Kenya and Nigeria by political actors had provided incentives for conflict. As Donald Rothchild had rightly noted,

"Where ethnic leaders engage in uncompromising behavior and seek to advance ethnic group interests at the expense of other groups, it can lead to polarization and increased conflict as the date of the election approaches"

(See Wimmer, Goldstone, Horowitz,

Joras, and Schetter, 2004, p. 229).

Indeed, the strategy used for the mobilization of voters in Ghana was at variance with the instruments used by political actors for the same purpose in Nigeria and Kenya. As I have observed in Kenya and Nigeria, the 2007 and 2011 presidential elections were classical examples of exclusivists' electoral behaviors by the political actors. Voters were manipulated into accepting the argument of legitimacy denials as advanced by the political actors. The ODM use of "forty one ethnic groups against one ethnic group" and "Kenya against Kikuyu" slogans were acts of political exclusivism, and as Horowitz had said, an act of exclusivism will ultimately produce,

"A reaction among those to be excluded"

(See Horowitz, 2000, p. 200).

Indeed, one may as well argued that the Luo led ODM Inter-ethnic electoral alliance was a reaction to exclusionary tendencies of Kikuyu led PNU Inter-ethnic electoral alliance. It may be argued as well that the Inter-ethnic electoral alliance was to contest against the Kikuyu on the right of legitimate identity rights and participation in the governance of Kenya. As Donald Rothchild had said,

"The way that elites mobilize their supporters for collective action is critical in terms of regime outcomes"

(See Wimmer, Goldstone, Horowitz,

Joras, and Schetter, 2004, p. 229).

Obviously, any radical change in the political behavior of actors in the field of politics could trigger strong wave of voter migration in support of ethnic political philosophy. As I was able to notice in the case of voter mobilization exercise in Nigeria, the introduction of legitimate identity claims by political actors in the Muslim dominated north of the country and the Christians in the South, especially in the East, and also

in the middle belt region has devalued the essence of democratic election in the country.

As I did observe in the three case study countries, political parties and political actors had embarked on massive voter mobilization drive in a bid to either return political power to certain regional structure, ethnic group, religious adherents, or react to exclusionary group political domination. In Kenya, the reaction of the excluded ethnic groups in the business of governance was able also to create conflict scenarios with their voter mobilization strategy in the 2007 presidential election. The reaction can also be seen as an attempt by political actors from other non Kikuyu friendly ethnic groups to re-establish, and to reassert their legitimate identity claims in Kenya.

Indeed, the division that had emerged from the personality conflict, which was to lead to the split in NARC coalition in Kenya, and the internal sabotage, which had afflicted PDP in Nigeria, are different from the split in Ghana's ruling NDC. As I have discovered in the course of this study, in contrast to Nigeria where religious solidarity was used in the 2011 presidential election to reclaim a legitimate identity in the nation's governance, however, exclusivists action was used in the 2007 presidential election in Kenya, which was in an attempt to reclaim legitimate identity by other ethnic groups, who had challenged the political dominance of the Kikuyu. However, the absence of claims for legitimate identity by political actors in Ghana was able to result into a violence free presidential election in 2012. From my evaluation, I can confidently conclude, that the presence of Inter-ethnic grievances in any democratic society would always play major role in voter mobilization drive of political actors. It was difficult for me to establish the actual number of traditional supporters of each political party in the three case study democracies. But in a given political situation, where party followership is not ideology driven, but rather a collection of ethnic alliances, political activity could assume the form of what Horowitz called,

"Coalition of convenience",

(See Horowitz, 2000, p.366)

Horowitz stated in his evaluation of multi-ethnic party and democratic competition, that the primary intention of promoters of,

"Coalition of convenience" is fostered by little or nothing beyond the necessity for ethnic parties to "form a government"

(See Donald Horowitz, 2000, p: 366).

Migration of voters during the focused elections, as I was able to discover in the case of Nigeria and Kenya, was based on the need to reassert claims of legitimate identity by the different groups in the two case study countries. In the above circumstance, I want to concede, though, that the consequences, which one could associate with the presidential elections in 2007 in Kenya and 2011 in Nigeria, were in line with two of my variables, and also my hypotheses 1 and 2. But in the 2012 presidential election in Ghana, the traditional voters' loyalty, and candidate's likeness were visible through the election outcomes. Where voters are recruited and motivated with exclusionary motives, chances are that such people would form a cohesive force in a bid to assert their legitimate identity. In essence, migration of voters or shift in electoral preferences in multi-ethnic society is dependent on how exclusive the ethnic groups are.

11.6.3).   Voter Migration and Candidate's Affection

In my re-evaluation of the mobilization drives, which were undertaken by the various political actors, I was able to discover, that unlike in normal monolithic societies, where voter migration is candidate or policy position dependent, the movement of voters during the 2011 presidential election in Nigeria and the 2007 presidential election in Kenya had no connection with the factors. According to Arthur Lewis (1965),

> "Thinking about Africans as a homogeneous group cannot lead us anywhere, since Africans differ more from each other than Europeans or Asians differ from each other. In the older continents, relatively easy means of communication over many centuries has imposed broad uniformities of thought, behavior and institutions, as well as of language and religion. In Africa, on the other hand, one can find within a hundred miles two tribes whose thought patterns differ from each other more fundamentally than those of France and Germany, or those of Burma and Ceylon"

(See Arthur Lewis 1965: pp. 35-36).

Again, I was able to observe in Nigeria and Kenya, how voters had their electoral preferences shifted into the already formed exclusivists groups. Indeed, the shift in electoral preferences had no link to personal credibility of the candidates in the elections, rather the support, which was received by each of the candidates, was on the basis of what Horowitz (2000.p, 353) called "variety of overlapping cleavages".

In the 2007 presidential election in Kenya, and 2011 presidential election in Nigeria, it was obvious that violence was inevitable. The argument here is in support of Horowitz (2000) proposition about ethnic based political parties. Horowitz noted that,

> "An ethnically based party derives its support overwhelmingly from an identifiable ethnic group (or cluster of ethnic groups) and serves the interests of that group"

> (See Horowitz, 2000, p. 291).

I hold the belief, that, since the PNU and ODM were both products of ethnic alliances, then, it holds that each one of the ethnic "coalition of convenience" would derive its followership among members of those ethnic groups. When I had the electoral opinion of voters before the 2007 presidential election in Kenya re-evaluated, it became clearer to me how the two formed Inter-ethnic electoral alliances, were able to shape the political arena. Even in the case of Nigeria, my evaluation had shown that the "legitimate identity right claims" from the two regional blocs of East and North, and the two religious blocs of Christianity and Islam, were able also to shape the electoral preferences of majority among voters. Obviously, the behavior of political actors as was the case in the two presidential elections had confirmed the proposition discussed by Donald Horowitz on ethnocentrism, exclusivists in multi-ethnic societies (See Horowitz, 2000, pp. 7 – 8, and 196 – 202). In a rare contrast to Nigeria and Kenya, political actors in Ghana were able to abandon the old age political acrimony among ethnic groups, especially between the Ashanti and the Ewe ethnic groups. As Horowitz in his reference to ethnic political animosity in the old Ghana stated that,

"An elderly Ashanti Man in Swedru was … emphatic" in explaining why he rejected the party led by the Ewe, K.A. Gbedemeh, in the 1969 Ghana election: "Have you ever heard of an Ewe chief ruling over Ashanti? No, Busia is our man"

(See Horowitz, 2000, p. 307).

Despite the misgivings that had existed among ethnic groups in Ghana in the past, the political behavior of political actors in the 2012 presidential election in Ghana was able to render those Inter-ethnic misgivings obsolete, and inconsequential. Many voters were able to make their electoral preferences based on party image, competence and credibility of candidates, while in Nigeria and Kenya, voters were only able to follow the prescribed exclusivists' direction of political actors. My conclusion on the political engagement between political actors and voters is that, the voters' migration or shift in electoral preferences, noticed in Nigeria and Kenya, was never the product of candidates' likeness by voters, rather the shift in electoral preferences were responses from voters to calls made under legitimate identity claim agenda.

Indeed, the use of "legitimate identity rights claim" by political actors to prosecute the 2007 and 2011 presidential elections in Kenya and Nigeria, respectively, and the outcome of the two elections, more than ever, aligned with my argument on devaluation of democracy through campaign strategies, which were used by the candidates.

11.6.4) Debate on Identity Legitimacy Claims and Voters' Mobilization

The presence of Inter-ethnic grievances in a multi-ethnic society could lead to building of inter-ethnic alliances with the intention to claim, or to assert groups' legitimate identity rights. Although, conflict and violence may not be the same, just as Brubaker had stated that,

"Conflict and violence vary in the degree to which, as well as the manner in which, organizations are involved"

<div align="right">(Quoted in Wimmer, Goldstone, Horowitz, Joras,</div>

<div align="right">and Schetter, 2004, pp. 41 – 42).</div>

Indeed, legitimacy identity claim by groups could provoke violence, since each group want to assert its legitimacy right. Arguing further, Rogers Brubaker said that,

"Although, organizations (sometimes ephemeral ones) may play an important role in preparing, provoking, and permitting such riots, much of the actual violence is committed by broader sets of participants acting relatively spontaneous fashion and in starkly polarized situations characterized by high levels of groupness"

<div align="center">(Quoted in Wimmer, Horowitz, Goldstone, Joras, and Schetter, 2004, p. 42)</div>

During the 2007 presidential election campaign in Kenya, the formed coalitions of convenience led by Kikuyu dominated PNU on one hand, and the Luo led ODM on another hand, had energized their ethnic groups with exclusivists' agendas. As Michael Chege (2008) stated,

"The PNU campaign lacked all political flair, not to mention a clear message to counteract the opposition's rhetoric of ethnic inequality"

<div align="center">(Quoted in Diamond and Plattner, 2010, p. 207).</div>

From the above comment, it was clear that the political actors had dwelt on exclusionary rhetoric to mobilize supporters. The use of "ethnic inequality" as campaign slogan by the "coalition of convenience under ODM was a clear expression of exclusivist agenda as well as claim of legitimate identity rights. The Campaign slogan, as it was projected by the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), was primarily intended to be used to seek support and votes to defeat the ruling party, and by extension, to effect "regime change". Furthermore, the campaign rhetoric of "41 against 1" was to create solidarity among many voters, who had probably negative views about the Kikuyu ethnic group and politics in Kenya.

As further contained in Chege's account,

> "Activists at the precinct level, meanwhile, drove home the promise of redressing inequality. In parts of the Rift Valley, Kikuyu received orders to leave for good. In Nairobi and its environs, some Kikuyu landlords were threatened with expropriation and told that they themselves would become the tenants"
>
> (Quoted in Diamond and Plattner, 2010, p. 206).

In Nigeria as well, the same scenario had played out, when political actors from the North of the country had threatened that they would,

> "Make the country ungovernable for President Goodluck Jonathan, should he win the 2011 presidential election"
>
> (Quoted from Cyprian F. Okoro, 2015).

Furthermore, Raila Odinga, the presidential candidate of the amalgamated ethnic alliance under ODM had stated in his acceptance speech as the ODM candidate that,

> "ODM would end Kenya's economic apartheid", under which one black group had all the privileges"
>
> (Quoted by Chege in Diamond and Plattner, 2010, p. 206).

Meanwhile, in my observation, I was able to discover that, two scenarios were used in the campaign strategies in Nigeria and Kenya, but, both were absent in Ghana. Firstly, political parties and candidates had used policy argument to attack each other in the media, just like it was done in Ghana, but other political activists used legitimate identity rights claims to campaign and attack ethnic groups in the villages. Secondly, political parties and candidates had used politics of affection to promote candidates in the media, but activists had used age old Inter-ethnic grievances to attack each other in the local villages. In Ghana, there was neither the presence of legitimate identity rights claims, nor was there presence of Inter-ethnic grievances as campaign strategies, which could be used in the mobilization of voters by political actors.

However, the redistributive campaign slogan, which was used by the ODM members found support from the argument advanced by Christopher Bakwesegha (2004, pp: 53 – 60, in: Wimmer, Goldstone, Horowitz, Joras, and Schetter, 2004), that,

"During election times, it is customary for people to vote in blocs and on ethnic lines. The ruling ethnic group would normally mobilize its ethnic comrades in order to remain in power at all costs and continue to enrich themselves at the expense of other ethnic groups. At the same time, those ethnic groups that have been neglected all along usually mobilize themselves for combat against the ruling ethnic clique, which is not expected to win the election again. The end product is ethnic polarization and tension, which may subsequently give rise to repression, massive violation of human rights, violent conflict, and outright war – all leading to outflows of refugees as well as internal human displacement"

(See Bakwesegha, in: Wimmer, Goldstone, Horowitz,

Joras, and Schetter, 2004, p. 55).

PNU
- Continuity
- Selective Mobilization

+

→

- Inter-ethnic grievances
- Inter-ethnic alliances

ODM
- Regime Change
- Resource Redistribution
- 41 Ethnic groups against 1 ethnic group,
- Kenya againt Kikuyu

Figure 11.3: showing campaign focus and electoral concerns between Political Parties and Voters

Figure 11.3: above does depicts the argument and position, which was advanced by several scholars, such like Diamond and Plattner (2010), Horowitz (1994, pp: 35 – 54, in: Diamond and Plattner, 1994), Hyden (2006), Chege (2008), and also Christopher Bakwesegha (2004, pp: 55, in: Wimmer et al, 2004). In reference to Bekwesegha position as I have stated above, during the 2007 and 2011 presidential elections, political actors in Kenya and Nigeria were able to mobilize their supporters along ethnic and religious lines. However, during the 2012 presidential election in Ghana, the processes, which were used by political actors, was different, both in its planning, and in its execution.

The political mindset of an average Ashanti voter against any Ewe politician or candidate from any other ethnic group in Ghana (See Horowitz, 2000, p. 307; Owusu, 1975; Austin and Luckham, 1975, p. 255) was consumed by argument on the best way to fund education, provide health services, create jobs and reduce wastage in governance.

As I had the instrument used and the strategy employed by political actors to market their arguments in Kenya and Nigeria re-evaluated, I was able to come to conclusion that, the exploitation of the existing inter-ethnic grievances by the ethnic inspired coalition of conveniences, had resulted to ethnic and groups' interest protection measures. In the light of the above stated postulations, mobilization of voters was to assume, rather an awkward dimension as campaign messages and slogans, which had dominated the polity, were well off democracy expectation. As I have demonstrated in figure 11.3 above, debates on social amenities, employment crisis, economic development policies, and security issues, which had occupied the top choices in voting preferences of the electorate in the previous elections, had evaporated without trace. Indeed, the creation of enabling environment for employment generation, effective healthcare delivery and services had become consumed through electoral solidarity campaign strategy, especially as orchestrated by political activists, exclusivists, ethnic irredentists, and religious extremists in the remote villages and provinces across Nigeria and Kenya (See Okoro, 2015; Chege, 2010, pp: 197 – 210, in: Diamond and Plattner, 2010).

Furthermore, I was able to observe also, that, the campaign schemes, which were designed by the contending political parties and political actors, had trapped the voters into ethnic divisions. Indeed, the desire for effective political leadership and policy formulation for the good of the political majority in Nigeria and Kenya were effectively suffocated and drowned in the River of old Inter-ethnic motivated political antagonism. In essence, many voters were caught between the legitimate identity rights claim campaign bug, and the economic as well as social pressures, which had faced the country in the election. The campaign issues were to become a decisional dilemma for several voters. One must either support a candidate or an ethnic alliance on the basis of social pressures, ethnocentrism, or on the premise of individual ideological stance, based on liberalism and conservatism.

The political consequences, which had emerged from the measures and tactics used by political actors to woo voters in the three presidential elections in Kenya (2007), Nigeria (2011), and in Ghana (2012), were so damaging that apart from Ghana, the political atmospheres in Kenya and Nigeria have remained toxic. In the course of this study, one among my respondents had argued that,

"The Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) relied heavily in the demonization of Kikuyu ethnic group. The campaign team and supporters consistently claimed in their several campaign outings that only rigging could prevent ODM from winning the elections".

(See Chege, in Diamond and Plattner, 2010, pp: 197 – 210)

Indeed, the above assertion has corresponded also to what Chege presented in his analysis of the measures taken by political actors to market their positions and lines of arguments in the election. Chege (2008) had asserted that,

"In December 2006, prior to these populist appeals, Kibaki led Odinga in the polls by 42 to 14 percent. In those conducted after Odinga's nomination as ODM standard-bearer, he led Kibaki by 42 to 38 percent"

(See Michael Chege, in Diamond and

Plattner, 2010, pp. 206 – 207).

In my observation and analysis of the campaign development, I was able to discover that the message structure of the opposition campaign teams were anchored on either to return political power to the region as in the case of Nigeria, or effect a regime change, the redistribution of national resources as in the case of Kenya, or to enhance economic growth through infrastructural development as in the case of Ghana. As I have consistently argued, the exclusionary agendas, and the activity of exclusivists in both Kenya and Nigeria, were used to demonstrate and assert their legitimate identity right claims in the countries.

Indeed, in their effort to assert their legitimate identity rights, the two ethnic motivated formed coalitions of convenience in Kenya under PNU led by a Kikuyu candidate and ODM led by a Luo candidate, according to Chege (2008) had resulted in the manipulation of the media. As Michael Chege noted in his narrations,

"The polarizing ethnic rhetoric turned into hate speech, getting mass circulation via FM Radio in the mother tongues of Kenyan ethnic groups"

(See Michael Chege, In: Diamond and Plattner, 2010, p. 208)

In agreement to Chege's position, one of my respondents in Nairobi had stated that the campaign teams and the political actors were fundamentally wrong, especially in how they went about to promote their messages, and manipulated the voters through inter-ethnic grievances inspired rhetoric in the media at the expense of policy debate.

Certainly, the use of the media to spread hate speech and ethnic hatred in attempt to establish legitimate identity rights claim, or to respond to exclusivists' agenda of another ethnic group, using the presidential election as a medium, was a fatal disservice to democracy and the Kenyan nation.

Chapter 12

12).   Summary of my Findings

My findings as reasons for the breakout of violence after the official announcement of results in the presidential elections conducted in Nigeria (2011), and in Kenya (2007) had shown identical factors. However, in contrast to Nigeria and Kenya, the presidential election conducted in Ghana had shown absence of violence. As I have stated, the main concern of this dissertation is to find out how democracy and democratic elections were devalued through the election campaign strategies, which were adopted by the political actors in the three case study countries.

For a democratic election to be adjudged free, such an election must have met what scholars called "universally acceptable minimum standard" for the processes leading to it (See Dahl, 1982, pp: 5 – 7), Schiller, 1999, p: 33), Whitehead, 2002, pp: 10 – 11), Berg-Schlosser, 2007, pp: 16 and 139). In the light of the above postulations, this dissertation is designed to look into the connection between Inter-ethnic grievances and voter mobilization strategy, which were adopted and used in the elections. Indeed, the voter mobilization strategy used by political parties and candidates to fight elections in the case study countries, not only confirmed the strong rivalry among ethnic groups, but it has revealed also, hidden factors that necessitated the devaluation of democracy in the Election period under focus. Indeed, the devaluation occurred through what I call "Incentive based election campaign motivators". The dissertation used "Inter-ethnic historical grievances" as incentive factor for voter mobilization.

12.1).   Campaign Strategy and Voters Mobilization

1). I discovered in this study, that the political actors had used Inter-ethnic historical grievances as voter mobilization tool in Nigeria and Kenya. I found out that the adoption, and the subsequent use of Inter-ethnic grievances for voter mobilization had resulted to electoral solidarity during the election in Nigeria and Kenya. Indeed, one major effect of electoral solidarity was the conversion of the election into North-

South (Nigeria), Kikuyu led ethnic alliance, and the Luo led ethnic alliance (Kenya), Muslims against Christian (Nigeria) electoral competition. Inter-ethnic historical grievance was used by political actors in the North to seek return of political power to northern region, while political actors in the East used the same method to seek for retention of political power in the region. In Kenya, Inter-ethnic historical grievances were used to seek the control of political power by the ethnic alliance led by Luo, while the Kikuyu ethnic alliance had fought to retain political power. In contrast to Nigeria and Kenya, ethnic rivalry in Ghana was absent as Inter-ethnic historical grievances had no impacts on voters' electoral preferences during the 2012 presidential election. Therefore, I am deeply convinced that, the use of Inter-ethnic historical grievances to mobilize voters, not only had divided the electorates in Nigeria, and Kenya, but it had succeeded also to devalue democracy through the deadly violence, which broke out after the elections.

12.2).   Solidarity Incentive: Regional Mobilization

Evidence from votes received by each of the major candidates and the main political parties had proved that political actors had used responses from the regional base of each contesting candidate to mobilize for votes. Across political parties in Nigeria and in Kenya, electoral solidarity was built through regional biases. Put differently, regional solidarity sentiments were used to mobilize voters by political actors in the two countries. However, in contrast to the above mentioned countries, regional political sentiment as voter mobilization strategy was ignored in Ghana by political actors. Indeed, the regional coloration of the presidential election campaigns in Nigeria and Kenya has created political red-flag for future elections. Based on the effects of regional based campaigns, which were very obvious in the presidential elections, there abound several implications on Democracy and democratic politics in the focus countries. Regional concentration and mobilization of eligible voters by Election Campaign Teams had divided the people and indeed the country, and build-up ethno-regional political alliances. Ethno-regional preferences have consumed also the patriotic principles necessary for national cohesion and social stability, thus; made democracy a divisive factor in the political consciousness of the people.

12.2.1). Solidarity Incentive: Religion based Mobilization

The use of religion as campaign Instrument by the Campaign Teams was very much evident in Nigeria. The 2011 presidential election campaign had attracted the involvement of religious leaders, and religious based organizations in the country. In different Church organized activities, political partisanship had almost always dominated in the speeches made by several speakers. In that respect, Islamic teachers and several Islamic religion based organizations are known to have taken time to campaign for a particular candidate in the Mosques. The involvement of religion and active participation of religious leaders in the mobilization of voters was very evident. As much as democracy is known to abhor religious interests' intervention in the conduct of electoral activity, the presence of it has made social reconciliation to become a big task, as the countries have become deeply ethnically fragmented and socio-culturally segregated. Again, the implication is that, Muslims would always want the political power return to a Muslim, and Christians would always want a Christian to also retain political power. The use of religion as voter mobilization strategy has devalued democracy in Nigeria. In the 2011 presidential election, Voters were emotionally compelled to vote for a candidate on the basis of collective religious identification.

12.3). Implications of Incentive based Democratic Election Campaigns

As I did discover in this my study, the elections conducted in the three case study countries were able to derive their outcomes from diverse developments. I have established how political actors used electoral solidarity, and material gifts as incentives to mobilize voters during the election campaigns. Indeed, the political actors, especially in Nigeria and Kenya, had adopted the strategy in their campaigns to secure bloc votes. I found out that electoral solidarity campaign anchored on ethno-regional and religious sentiments had created the atmosphere for solidarity defined electoral preferences. One other serious implication created by incentive defined voter mobilization is that people voted in the old eastern and in the core northern

regions of Nigeria; and in the Eastern and Western Kenya under the influence of electoral solidarity. However, in the Eastern and Ashanti regions of Ghana, voters had voted under the influence of party loyalty. I was able to discover also, that voters in the middle belt region and in the core northern part of Nigeria had voted on the basis of religious solidarity in the 2011 presidential election in Nigeria. I can confidently conclude also, that the use of electoral solidarity to determine electoral preferences in the case study countries has created serious policy implications for future elections in the countries.

12.3.1).   Social and Economic Implication

I discovered that the use of Inter-ethnic grievances as voter mobilization strategy by political actors in the elections have created social and economic stability implications. One major implication is the fact that citizens were fragmented along ethno-regional and religious lines, especially in Nigeria and Kenya. Indeed, people were uniquely separated and removed from each other. An unwanted social segregation had taken over the environment as people from the different tribal and ethnic affiliations have remained suspicious of others. I was able to observe the above condition from the areas of campaign concentration, by the political parties in the case study countries, especially, Nigeria and Kenya. As I did observe from the elections, political actors had focused much attention either in the home region or areas populated by people who do share the same religion with a candidate. As matter of fact, the campaign strategy was to become religiously tainted, and ethno-regional driven. Another implication is the violent crisis, which had broken out as response to the election outcome. I am also convinced that the deadly violent crisis, which had broken out in Nigeria and Kenya, had managed to create anxiety among foreign Investors. Many Investors were scared about the security of their investments in the countries. In essence, the crises, which had erupted through the elections, had successfully placed the economy of Nigerian and Kenya under precarious condition.

12.3.2).   Legislative Implication

The outbreak of violence and the subsequent deaths, injuries and destruction recorded in Nigeria and Kenya had created legal implication for the two countries. A major implication is that the existing laws in the two countries have no deterrent measures or appropriate judicial response to the atrocities committed in the name of election. I discovered also that the case study countries were lacking in the area of legislative capacity to deal with election influenced breach of peace. In essence, there is absence of proportional judicial provision to bring those responsible for the mayhem to justice. Since judicial pronouncement could be easily bought in the countries under study, the Courts cannot be trusted to provide appropriate and proportionate justice.

12.3.3).   Political Implication in Democracy Devaluation

I discovered another implication also, which is a political one. The strategy of using Inter-ethnic historical grievances as voter mobilization instrument had resulted into ethno-regional solidarity campaign. The use of the strategy had divided the country, and had set the people against each other, ethnic group against ethnic group, and ethnic electoral alliance against ethnic electoral alliance. Another political implication I have discovered is the creation of In-group and Out-group within each country, especially, in Nigeria and in Kenya. Furthermore, the use of Inter-ethnic historical grievances as voter mobilization tool had created also problem of ethno-regional, and religious solidarity sentiments.

I was able to find out how voters were under pressure to follow a collective pattern adopted by communities. Where a voter refused to follow a prescribed and agreed voting preference, such people were castigated, humiliated, and declared political enemy of the community. The inter-ethnic conflict between tribal groups and kingdoms in the case study countries was rejuvenated through election campaign messages and slogans. As I have indicated in chapter 8 and 9, the use of Inter-ethnic historical grievances as campaign instrument had set the stage ready for the reinvention of the pre-colonial political struggle among the ethnic groups, especially

in Nigeria, and Kenya. As consequence, political actors in Nigeria and Kenya had to pursue political power through the use of electoral solidarity to mobilize support.

12.3.4).   Security Implication of Democracy Devaluation

Ultimately, the strategy deployed in fighting the election by each Campaign Team had created security challenges in the countries. Many lives were lost through reaction against the outcome of the election, because of "failure of expectation". The strategy adopted by candidates and their political parties to prosecute the elections, conducted in Nigeria (2011), and Kenya (2007), had polarized the countries. It had the existing cohesion, and harmony in the countries distorted. The strategy used by the campaign teams in the elections under study has devalued democracy, so much so, that their actions have turned democracy to an issue of life or death affair. Indeed, the violent crisis, which had broken out as consequences of the presidential election result, had tactically created insecurity, marginalization and domination fears. It has unified the people along ethnic, regional and religious lines, as against national consciousness, and social harmony. As I have argued, the use of Inter-ethnic historical grievances by political actors as voter mobilization instrument had compelled the formed ethnic alliances to recruit political hard-liners, and ethnic irredentists, who were ready to defend the collective interest of each group. I found out that the mobilization of voters along the formed ethnic alliances, as between East and North in Nigeria, Kikuyu and Luo led group in Kenya, was responsible for the crisis in the two countries. Again, the anti-Igbo, and the anti-Christian in the North of Nigeria, as well as the anti-Kikuyu campaign in Kenya had led to the high number of casualties recorded during the 2011 and 2007 elections in Kenya and Nigeria, respectively. People were forced to relocate from their place of resident and move back to their ancestral homelands. In Kenya, several people of Kikuyu extraction were forced to abandon their businesses and homes in the Rift Valley as well as in western Kenya. In Nigeria as well, the people of Igbo extraction and other Christians were targeted in the Northern cities, and many among them had to relocate back to their ancestral homelands.

12.3.5). Democracy Devaluation and Constitutional Implication

The use of Inter-ethnic historical grievances as campaign strategy in the elections in 2007 and 2011 in Kenya and Nigeria had undermined the conviviality needed for campaign conducts during elections. I was able to discover, that, the use of Inter-ethnic grievance as campaign tool was beyond the regulative power of the constitution in each of the case study countries, and by implication has devalued democracy. This is based on the fact that the Constitution of the countries under study are lacking in stringent regulative mechanism to control campaign messages and voter exploitation. I want to confidently conclude that the use of material gift items to entice voters was moral corruption, as voters were pressured to vote otherwise, and the process has consequently promoted corruption in office. I hold the view, that the distribution of material gift items to voters can be understood as an investment, which must generate benefits to the Investors. Beside the aforementioned factor, politicians had used material gift items to exploit the material-poverty status of most voters in the case study countries, especially in Nigeria. Campaign during elections is a process in the series of events required for the conduct of democratic elections, but it could become devalued, when the Constitution is silent on what constitute appropriate strategy in voter mobilization.

12.4).   Recommendation

Based on the various factors that have hindered democratic elections in the case study countries as well as in other developing democracies, campaign strategy adopted by political actors are known to posed the greatest threat to democracy. Several political players have regarded democratic politics as an enterprise, which is meant to help accumulate wealth, and social power. Indeed, the heavy investment in financial and in human efforts have made elections to become dangerous, and attainment of credible result extremely difficult. From the various results I was able to generate in the field in the course of this Dissertation, I have come to agree that the following steps must be taken and institutionalized, if Democracy and democratic elections must be safeguarded in the case study countries.

12.4.1). Adherence to Media Ethics in Election Campaign Reporting

I want to share in the belief that media houses had contributed in the election crisis, which had erupted in the countries, especially in Nigeria and Kenya. This was evidently made possible through orchestrated reporting of divisive events without caution, restrain or moderation from either the media regulative organs or the political actors. Negative reports had built up tensions and had breed hatred in the minds of the populace, especially in ethnicity and religion divided societies like Nigeria, and Kenya. Reporters and Media houses in the case study countries must be compelled constitutionally to abide and adhere strictly to the ethics of Journalism, especially with regard to hate speech before and during campaigns. To report facts of election campaigns without being sensational and evade the temptation of creating situation for ethnic or religious influence confrontation to arise.

12.4.2).   De-emphasize Primordial Cleavages

 The political actors, government agencies and interest groups have responsibility in the political education of the general public, especially on the demerits, and dangers inherent in the use of Inter-ethnic grievances for voter mobilization. Political actors must be admonished to caution their supporters who are known to have constantly

used ethno-regional and religious incensed messages to mobilize voters. The use of Inter-ethnic historical grievances in election campaign can divide the public, instead of unifying them for common good of the country.

12.4.3). Strict Electoral Regulations

I would like to recommend that the Election Institutions should be constitutionally empowered, and members of staff appropriately remunerated. Such measure will help to discourage, and avoid fraudulent activity, especially collusion with desperate politicians, who may want to truncate the process. In many instances, members of staff of the Election Commission have been indicted or caught perpetrating electoral fraud to the disadvantage of one candidate or political party. The non adherence to the rules, and regulations guarding the conduct of democratic elections in the case study countries should be re-evaluated, and modified as to protect the sanctity of future elections.

12.4.4). Strict Regulative Control of Campaign Finance

Provision should be made to regulate how political actors spend money in the pursuit of votes during elections. The amount of money to be expended by any candidate or political party during elections should be regulated. Violation of such measure must be appropriately penalized, and Campaign managers prosecuted based on enacted laws to that effect. It is my belief, though, that if political parties and candidates are restrained from excessive spending, successful candidates will have less appetite to embezzle public funds, and would rather focus on providing quality service to the community.

12.4.5). Discourage and Defocus Material Gifts distribution during Election Campaigns.

An appropriate law should be enacted to regulate distribution of material gift Items by political actors to voters during election campaigns. When this is the case, political actors would be compelled to campaign based on their services to their electoral Constituencies, acceptance by majority of voters, and consequently reduce the rate of official corruption in governance. The process would as well enable voters to take full control of the democratic process. The political parties and politicians would be mostly mindful of the public probable reaction through votes during elections. Voters would have the moral authority to demand for accountability from public office holders and from those aspiring to replace the previously elected ones.

Chapter 13

13). Situating the Concept of Inter-ethnic Historical Grievances in the Realm of Election Campaign:

As fundamental elements used by political actors in voter mobilization effort, Inter-ethnic historical grievances have occupied central position in my effort to discover how elections and democracy had become devalued in the focused countries. Basically, as a democracy dilemma, the cause and effects of its use does demand explicit re-evaluation. Inter-ethnic grievance as a factor and dilemma has limitations, though, inexplicably difficult to be divorced from collective identification and social conviviality inherent in Voter-Candidate transactions. Without doubt, the dilemma occasioned by solidarity defined socio-political transactions does suggest cultural affinity, sectional sentiment, and antagonistic tendencies. How the above mentioned factors have influenced and determined the outcome of the focused elections can be found in their ability to drive voters' assumptions and their electoral preferences. The assumption, that an imaginary enemy does exists, had resulted in the campaign and voting pattern recorded in the various political constituencies, as observed in the focused countries, especially in Nigeria and Kenya. Substantially, the role played by Inter-ethnic grievances, as factor in Voter-Candidate political transaction, had eroded the chastity of democracy and democratic election.

13.1). Material and Solidarity Incentives as Dilemma

As a concept, one can define Material Incentive in social science realm as a method or system used to drive a process. It is not an end to itself but rather a means to an end. In democratic elections, political parties and candidates do aspire for votes from voters using different approaches to reach their targets. Election campaign being an open process, and time-bound, where every participating interest has limited opportunity to convince voters, made it incumbent on the participating political actors to design strategies capable of translating into votes in the election.

However, to run Election campaign in a democratic society where service delivered is not good enough to convince average voter, it then demand that candidates must use a more voter friendly approach to gain attention. In doing so, material items could become the only viable option to replace defaults in the provision of infrastructural and social services to voters. As a motivation factor, voters could become enthusiastic, and they could choose to trade their votes with gifts from political actors. Although, not minding its consequences on democracy and democratization process in the society, circumstantially, politicians and voters do go into barter-trade. But, no matter how politically justifiable the process may be or seems to be, I want to believe that such practice is a sabotage to democracy. I want to conclude, that it is dangerous, as the process could lead to disguised commercialization of democracy in the society.

However, material Incentive as a Campaign instrument is designed to assist political actors win over voters they could probably not have convinced to key into their line of ideological argument. But then, election being the bedrock of democracy, or as Powell, Jr said "Election as instrument of democracy" (See Powell, Jr. 2000, p: 1 – 2), remains defined by the combination of human resources, and Institutional characteristics present in a society. Besides, the electoral process and the application of non democracy sanctioned strategy, either breeds corruption or stifle competition in the system. In view of the above, it becomes certain that the process introduced into election campaign and the strategy adopted has strong effect on the overall outcome in every democratic election. In that respect, I want to believe that the use of Material gifts to win over voters during election campaign has become an interesting aspect in Election Science.

From the realm of product marketing, branding has super-imposed aura on a product. In most cases, people do patronize a product based on the branding and marketing style of the marketer. In several developing democracies, candidate's marketing during elections does take pre-eminence over Party branding. The danger inherent in such situation is that the success and failure of the party is built on the individual and not on the party as an Institution. Since an individual candidate is just a political factor and not an Institution in itself, then it implies that the marketer of such factor would have limited or restricted options and strategy through which he can market the brand he created in the factor.

As I have enumerated in chapter 8, material incentive as electoral marketing strategy, which is designed to market a political factor, has elastic propensity in relation to electoral preferences of voters.

Obviously, the deficiencies inherent in the factor are consciously immune or shielded through exchange of tangible gift items from adequate scrutiny. The use of tangible material items to market a political factor during elections, does imply, that the acceptability of the brand in the market can only become possible through material exchange.

My adoption of solidarity as an incentive concept, which is used during election campaigns, is intended to help me in the generation of cues responsible for the use of it by political actors. Indeed, I found the concept to be endowed with stimuli, of which primary objective is to stimulate voter confidence through collective identification factor. Electoral solidarity has the potential to manipulate voter decision-making process. Solidarity in the realm of Election campaign or voter mobilization definition does imply the use of non value argument in election decision-making. In my effort to establish how the use of solidarity mechanism in voter mobilization processes was able to stifled debates, and encourage political parochialism, I had to re-evaluate the tangential factors that had emerged from the application of the strategy in political competition in my three case study countries. Indeed, the use of solidarity sentiment in voter mobilization had created political apprehension and social dislocation in the polity, especially in Nigerian and Kenyan societies. Solidarity through religion, ethnicity, and regional collective identification have created avalanche of misconceptions, especially in two out of the three case study countries, namely, Nigeria, and Kenya.

Furthermore, solidarity branding as Campaign instrument is designed to draw confidence from the inconsistencies, which are much inherent in the socio-cultural composition of the case study countries. The primary idea is to penetrate the electoral demography, disrupt the social cohesion, and cultural stability in the societies, especially in Nigeria and Kenya. Solidarity branding as electoral campaign tool can displace policy debates and ideology based arguments, which are necessary for democratic competition. I was able to discover, that the capacity of solidarity branding to dislocate campaign direction of political actors had manifested itself very

strong through exploitation of the Inter-ethnic grievances, which are known to be very much present in Nigeria, and in Kenya.

Of course, the inability of the corrective instruments to detect and re-direct the processes involved in voter mobilization processes was an impetus to those political elements that have depended on the stimulus created by the instrument of solidarity to win votes.

As I was able to observe from Kenya, where political alignments had transmuted into ethnic alliances, because, Solidarity as voter mobilization instrument was allowed to dictate the direction of Campaign. Or as I have discovered in Nigeria, where Inter-ethnic grievances had transformed into religion solidarity, and also into regional collective identification endeavor, and both factors were responsible for the spontaneous outbreak of violence, because, one side had lost in the elections.

Indeed, the solidarity aspect in ballot decision-making has never been considered relevant or effective enough to trigger-off drastic violent reactions during elections. Electoral solidarity as a Campaign instrument was anchored on ethnicity, regional and religious consciousness. The idea was to build loyal support base and secure bloc votes based on the already built affinity. I discovered that solidarity as campaign instrument was a product of Inter-ethnic historical grievances. Indeed, the use of solidarity as mobilization stimulus in election campaign by political actors had built up political parochialism, and subsequently resulted into violent crisis among ethnic groups. In view of all the above enumerated factors, I can confidently conclude that the impacts of electoral solidarity on voters during the focused elections have devalued democracy.

Conclusion

Democracy as a process based on politically influenced competition, aimed at achieving a projected and premeditated result or otherwise, can be argued to be risky and crisis prone, especially in socio-culturally divided societies. Ideally, political competition through elections does provide for equal chances, especially when established norms and rules must be adhered to by the participants. The events and developments in the three selected case study countries; namely, Nigeria, Kenya and Ghana had provided me with some strong insights on how certain human features had castrated and devalued democracy and democratic politics. In my candid view, democracy devaluation was possible through the use of two prime factors. However, each of the factors is further divided into two instruments. One of the two factors as discovered by me is "Inter-ethnic grievance", which I believed was a carry-over from the pre-independence and immediate post-independence ethnicity influenced political competition. The second factor as I have rightly discovered in this study is socially induced, which is built on "material inducement". In my observations, though, I have chosen to classify the two factors to constitute Incentive approaches, namely the distribution of "Material Gift Items", and "Electoral Solidarity" as response and reward. I was able to discover also the Non-Incentive approach, which is built on the "use of threat", and the application of "violent acts". When I had the events that followed the 2011, and 2007 presidential elections in Nigeria and Kenya, respectively, aggregated, and have them compared to the 2012 presidential election in Ghana, I came to the conclusion that the use of material incentives to gain voters' electoral sympathy had devalued the electoral process and by extension, democratic politics. Furthermore, the use of Inter-ethnic grievance as voter mobilization instrument or strategy by political actors had introduced into the system, ethnic solidarity effects, and consequently, had democracy and democratic processes in the conduct of elections in Nigeria and Kenya devalued.

In chapter 1, 3, 8, 9 and 10 of this dissertation, I have strived to explore the circumstantial evidences why elections in divided societies are violent prone. Using my findings in the three selected countries as yardstick, I have compared the

solidarity response of voters in Nigeria and Kenya where Inter-ethnic grievance was used to mobilize voters and compared the situation to Ghana, where political actors had refused to prioritize ethnic mobilization as campaign instrument during the 2012 presidential election, and I have discovered incidences that confirmed the argument advanced by several scholars of anthropology, history and politics. Like Pye's (1958), collective identification concept, Lewis (1965), Geertz's (1963) primordial loyalty, Lijphart's (1977) communal identification, and Horowitz's (2000) collective ancestry and legitimacy rights argument, I want to agree, though, that every society is challenged by man desire for power and the quest to accumulate material wealth, which had often compelled political actors to want to defend only their interests at all times. It is evident that the factors, which had invoked violence in a society, could equally be legitimate political factors. I hold the belief that violent acts could occurred in societies when political actors have the existing fault-lines exploited, which could be through the manipulation of structural elements inherent in the system.

In chapters 1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, and 10, as well as in section 3, I exposed the genealogy of relations among ethnic groups and political interests in the case study countries. In chapters 2, 4, 5, 6 also, I was able to establish links, which had shown how political interest of various ethnic groups were pursued through legitimate democratic processes, and how these in-built processes had helped to nurture democracy and prevent violence in Ghana's 2012 presidential election. Indeed, I have exposed how the emergence of technology and its' application in voter mobilization universalized election processes in Ghana, and how the absence of it had led to division, formation of ethnic alliances, and the subsequent deadly conflict, which had occurred in Nigeria and Kenya in 2011 and 2007, respectively. Furthermore, in chapters 8 and 9, I was able to establish how ethnic groups as political factors had monopolized and manipulated technology, and had used its products as an input to create chaos in the societies, win elections and had their political interests protected.

Again, in chapters 8, 9 and 10, I have established how the use of Inter-ethnic historical grievance had disabled all the factors necessary for free and credible electoral competition in Nigeria and Kenya. Consequently, the application of the products of Inter-ethnic grievance to mobilize voters in the 2007 and 2011 presidential elections, under electoral solidarity, had resulted into chaos, and the subsequent destabilization of Nigerian and Kenyan societies.

I am well convinced, though, that the desire to protect ethnic, regional and religious political interest had cumulative effects on campaign processes and factor moderation during the 2007 and 2011 elections in Kenya and Nigeria, respectively. I am equally convinced that the temptation to win elections had built-up the urge for manipulation of the electoral factors. I was able to discover this tendency in the application of material incentive strategy as I have established in chapter 8 and 9. Indeed, the misapplication of the inbuilt democracy factors, through the instrumentalization of cultural and social Incentives as voter mobilization instruments, have diminished the sanctity of free and violent free election as was suggested by Robert A. Dahl (Dahl, 1982, pp: 5 – 7), Laurence Whitehead (2002, 10 – 11). Consequently, the instrumentalization of Inter-ethnic grievance had built-up binary effects on democracy itself, and also on the recipient of democracy output, in this case, the society.

In chapter 3, I was able to exposed the various argument put forward by scholars and how the use of technology inputs as voter mobilization instruments can promote, as well as protect the serenity and sanctity of electoral processes from system manipulation. In this regard, my defense of Election campaign processes, prosecuted through violence free acts, is confirmed through election campaign strategy used by political actors and the outcome of the 2012 presidential election in Ghana.

Indeed, as I have established through the voter mobilization strategy, which was used by political actors in the Ghana's 2012 presidential election, the absence of material incentives as a factor in voter mobilization had translated into absence of electoral system manipulation. Nonetheless, in chapters 8, 9 and 10, the dissertation was able to establish the binary effects of instrumentalized electoral solidarity as voter mobilization strategy. Firstly, the society had become plagued by the combine influence of ethnocentrism, which had built-up irredentists, political hard-liners, as well as religious fanatics. Furthermore, the exploitation of the voters' emotional status, and the manipulation of the states' structural institutions had built-up also, socio-cultural hard-liners. In chapters 4, 5, 7, 8, and 9, I was able to establish how ethnocentrism through Inter-ethnic historical grievance, and religious fanaticism had defined the electoral preferences of voters. I have equally established how the application of solidarity incentive tools and the use of Inter-ethnic grievance, as campaign strategy, had destabilized the campaign processes, introduced ethnic

modified electoral alliance, and consequently influenced the outcome of the election. In my opinion, it is the divisive factors, which had become embedded in the formed ethnic alliances that were able to build-up chains of solidarity as electoral stimuli. I could conclude, though, that the built-up electoral stimuli were what various political actors in Nigeria and Kenya had manipulated through factor branding to manipulate the electoral market and have democracy devalued.

As I have established through figure 8.5, 8.6, 8.7 and pictorial evidence in chapter 8, as well as in Table 9.6, and Table 9.7, the chains of reaction from the stimuli generated by solidarity influenced voter electoral preferences, had impacted very negatively on the final outcome of the 2007 and 2011 presidential elections in Kenya and Nigeria, respectively. Meanwhile, in the 2012 presidential election in Ghana, the solidarity stimuli were to become disentangle, and demobilized through the application of technology inputs, and the rejection of Inter-ethnic grievances as voter mobilization instrument. I had observed; that as the political actors were struggling in Nigeria, Kenya and Ghana to outsmart each other through systemic manipulation, democracy as a process had to become a victim of interest manipulation. The dissertation has established also how the adoption of the two strategies had compounded the existing political and religious fault-lines in Nigeria. Furthermore, it has established also how the use of Inter-ethnic historical grievance was manipulated by political actors to gain political advantage. The successful manipulation of the voter mobilization processes had resulted into the transmutation of political alignments into Ethnic electoral alliances in Kenya (chapter 9), and religious affiliation into religious alignment in Nigeria (chapter 8).

I am convinced, however, that the emergence and the subsequent use of solidarity branding through Inter-ethnic message contents manipulation had devalued the election campaigns. I arrived at such conclusion, because, I am convinced that the message contents were never premised on society induced political cues. Indeed, the dependency on Inter-ethnic grievance, and the followed up emotional attachment to collective identity and the ethnic legitimacy rights claims by voters and political actors in Nigeria and Kenya, had created opportunity for the manipulation of campaigns in the 2007 and 2011 elections. As I have established in chapter 8 and 9, political alignments were transmuted into ethnic alliance, and it became transformed into campaign instrument, which was used in the mobilization of voters. As I have

presented also in chapters 4, 5, and 7, and argued in chapter 8, and chapter 9, the application of the strategy had compounded the fragile cultural tolerance and social stability in Nigeria and Kenya. As I have argued in chapter 8 and in chapter 9, the application of solidarity as electoral incentive, which was used by actors in voter mobilization process, had exploited the existing socio-cultural as well as political fault-lines in Nigeria and Kenya, and consequently plunged the two societies into avoidable bloodletting. As I have argued, solidarity branding, as a candidate marketing concept in the 2007 and 2011 presidential elections, was able to divide the electorates in Kenya and Nigeria into regional, ethnicity, and religion influenced voters. As a consequence, voters were to become much more interested and loyal to ethnic political interests. In Kenya, I have exposed in chapter 9 how the use of Inter-ethnic historical grievance, as voter mobilization strategy, had disrupted the existing fragile peace among the various ethnic communities. I have equally established in chapter 9 how the use of Inter-ethnic historical grievance, as campaign strategy in the 2007 presidential elections divided Kenya, had built-up ethnic irredentists, created political hardliners and was able to transformed "political party alliance into ethnic alliance", and subsequently leading to deadly violence.

Finally, in chapter 10, I have established how the absence of Inter-ethnic grievances as a campaign instrument, and voter mobilization strategy had compelled the political actors to focus on policy issues as voter mobilization tool. I have argued also in chapter 10 that the absence of Inter-ethnic discontent, and the dependency of political actors, as well as the voters in Ghana on policy argument, was able to create a platform for candidate and policy re-evaluation. I am well convinced, that the outcome of the 2012 presidential election in Ghana in contrast to the 2007 and 2011 presidential elections in Kenya and Nigeria, respectively, is a confirmation of my findings, that, the Campaign Strategy, which was used by political actors in Nigeria and Kenya had devalued Democracy. I hold the belief, that, the use of Inter-ethnic historical grievances was responsible for the disputes, which were to degenerate into violence, arson and killing of innocent citizens in Nigeria and Kenya as consequence of the elections. Indeed, the outcome of the presidential elections in Nigeria and Kenya carries credibility and legitimacy questions that are yet to be answered by scholars of democratic election.

Policy Implications

I have presented varieties of theoretical questions in chapter 1 to serve as guide in this dissertation. The factors surrounding the central question provided me with issues, which I have strived to expose in this dissertation. Indeed, the major issue raised by the central question has to deal with the use of Inter-ethnic grievances in voter mobilization processes by political actors in the two of the three selected case study countries. I have tried to establish in the dissertation how the use of Inter-ethnic grievances by political actors, as instrument for voter mobilization, had led to introduction of electoral solidarity. My search for clues that could establish the implications of using such as voter mobilization instrument in democracies could be of assistance in future research studies. However, I am highly convinced that the issues, which have emerged from the question of Inter-ethnic grievances and voter mobilization processes, have policy implications with regard to the 2011, 2007 and 2012 presidential elections in Nigeria, Kenya, and Ghana, respectively.

My findings in this dissertation are in support of the argument that the use of Inter-ethnic grievances as voter mobilization instrument had actually devalued democracy in Nigeria and Kenya. For an election to be adjudged as democratic; there ought to be evidence about the presence of Robert A Dahl's (1982, pp: 5 – 7) suggestions. Absence of politically motivated disorder, state sponsored aggression or violence is a fundamental indicator to testify about the free nature of a conducted election. Indeed, a democratic election ought to have a reflection of the absence of violent mechanisms. In political environments as represented in Nigeria, Kenya and Ghana, where ethnic fragmentation is used to divide the societies in terms of communal identification, or ethnicity legitimacy rights (as argued by Horowitz, 2000, pp: 201 – 202) one must anticipate the possible application of divisive mobilization instruments in political sensitization in each constituency. Indeed, in my observations, I have been able to discover that the Inter-ethnic grievances was the only way possible through which solidarity incentive as an Inter-ethnic electoral alliance strategy or what Horowitz called "Coalitions of Convenience" (Horowitz, 2000, p. 369), could be used as voter mobilization instrument in the case study countries.

Without doubt, racial and ethnic groups, communities or nationalities have moral rights and claims to make in their environments (See Van Dyke, 1971 and 1974, Ejiogu, 2004, Huntington, 1982). Horowitz had argued also that, "the moral basis of ethnic claims lies in groups' legitimacy within a territory". Horowitz had noted that "Legitimacy is asserted to be distributed unevenly among ethnic groups" (See Horowitz, 2000, p, 201).

I am convinced that the social pressures and development policy issues, which were used for voter mobilization in Ghana for the 2012 presidential election, and as it is used in other developed democracies were unsuitable for the 2011 and 2007 presidential elections in Nigeria and Kenya, respectively. The use of Inter-ethnic historical grievances and the formation of coalitions of conveniences, for the purpose of political power, by the ethnic groups through electoral solidarity, were certainly the only possible instruments they needed to use to assert their moral rights and claims in the case study countries. Indeed, the dependence on Inter-ethnic historical grievances as voter mobilization processes by political actors, especially in Nigeria and Kenya, were meant to enable the formed electoral coalitions to contest for the political control of Institutions of democracy and political authority in the case study countries. Obviously, the intentions were to alter the Institutional structures, promote coalition's interests, and perpetuate political control and the exploitation of resources they claimed to have moral and legitimate rights to be included. The above situation had confirmed also that Donald Horowitz (2000) was correct in his argument about the formation of coalition of convenience by political actors in divided societies (See Donald L. Horowitz, 2000, p. 369).

The use of Inter-ethnic historical grievances to fight elections in Nigeria and Kenya was a reflection of the inherited colonial socio-political mindset among the political elites. Most political actors had accused others of transforming "colonial inhumanity" into "ethnic inhumanity", hence the need to displace the ruling parties through whatever means possible. In Ghana, where voter mobilization for the 2012 presidential election was conducted in a different way, the campaign process was able to produce violence free democratic election, despite being a multi-ethnic society, just like Nigeria and Kenya.

Now in comparative terms of presidential elections in the three case study countries, Ghana is the only country where election campaign activities had produced results that were in consonance with democratic norms (Freedom House report, Afrobarometer, NDI report on the 2012 election in Ghana, USIP report on the 2012 election in Ghana, IRI report on the 2012 election in Ghana).

Like Nigeria, the multi-ethnic composition of Kenya's polity had forced the political actors in Kenya to form Inter-ethnic electoral alliances or "coalitions of convenience" (see chapter 9), to fight the 2007 presidential election campaigns. But unlike Nigeria and Kenya where the presidential elections were fought through the formation of coalitions of convenience, use of Inter-ethnic historical grievances as voter mobilization instrument, which eventually introduced electoral solidarity in the polity; the political actors in Ghana had chosen to ignore the use of Inter-ethnic historical grievances in their voter mobilization drive.

The use and dependence on policy issues and social pressures for voter mobilization as a strategy by political actors in Ghana had enhanced democratic participation and facilitate violence free presidential election in 2012. It had suppressed their feelings for Inter-ethnic grievances and had built contributed in the political parties running national political movements. The political actors in Ghana were able to create that much needed environment which had favored democracy. Consequently, it had enabled them to conduct violence free campaigns, and eventually returned a verdict on the presidential election process, which boast of undisputed legitimacy.

Annexures: Appendixes iii - xiv

Appendixes: iii

List of people interviewed by Cyprian Friday Okoro in Nigeria with date and place		
Name	Date	Place/Town
Anonymous	2014/12/10	Enugu
Anonymous	2014/12/10	Enugu
Anonymous	2014/12/11	Enugu
Anonymous	2014/12/11	Enugu
Anonymous	2014/12/14	Owerri
Anonymous	2014/12/14	Owerri
Anonymous	2014/12/14	Owerri
Focus-group	2014/12/15	Owerri
Focus-group	2014/12/15	Owerri
Focus-group	2014/12/15	Owerri
Focus-group	2014/12/16	Port-harcourt

Focus-group	2014/12/16	Port-harcourt
Focus-group	2014/12/16	Port-harcourt
Focus-group	2014/12/16	Port-Harcourt
Focus-group	2014/12/17	Port-Harcourt
Anonymous	2015/01/14	Lagos
Anonymous	2015/01/14	Lagos
Anonymous	2015/01/14	Lagos
Focus-group 1	2015/01/15	Lagos
Focus-group 1	2015/01/15	Lagos
Focus-group 1	2015/01/15	Lagos
Focus-group 1	2015/01/15	Lagos

Focus-group 2	2015/01/16	Lagos
Focus-group 2	2015/01/16	Lagos
Focus-group 2	2015/01/16	Lagos
Focus-group 2	2015/01/16	Lagos
Focus-group 2	2015/01/16	Lagos
Anonymous	2015/01/22	Abuja
Anonymous	2015/01/22	Abuja
Anonymous	2015/01/22	Abuja
Anonymous	2015/01/23	Abuja
Anonymous	2015/01/23	Abuja

Appendix: iv.

List of people interviewed by Cyprian Friday Okoro in Kenya with date and Place		
Name	Date	Place/Town
Anonymous	2015/02/15	Nairobi
Anonymous	2015/02/15	Nairobi
Anonymous	2015/02/15	Nairobi
Anonymous	2015/02/16	Nairobi
Anonymous	2015/02/16	Nairobi
Anonymous	2015/02/16	Nairobi
Anonymous	2015/02/16	Nairobi
Anonymous	2015/02/17	Nairobi
Anonymous	2015/02/17	Nairobi
Anonymous	2015/02/14	Mombasa
Anonymous	2015/02/14	Mombasa
Anonymous	2015/02/14	Mombasa

Anonymous	2015/02/13	Nairobi
Anonymous	2015/02/13	Nairobi

Appendix: **v.**

List of people interviewed by Cyprian Friday Okoro in Ghana with Date and Location		
Name	Date	Location
Focus-group 1	2015/02/09	Accra
Focus-group 1	2015/02/09	Accra
Focus-group 1	2015/02/09	Accra
Focus-group 1	2015/02/09	Accra
Anonymous	2015/02/09	Accra
Anonymous	2015/02/12	Tema
Anonymous	2015/02/12	Tema
Focus-group 2	2015/02/12	Accra
Focus-group 2	2015/02/12	Accra

Focus-group 2	2015/02/12	Accra
Anonymous	2015/02/12	Accra
Focus-group	2015/02/11	Tema
Focus-group	2015/02/11	Tema
Focus-group	2015/02/11	Tema
Focus-group	2015/02/10	Takoradi
Focus-group	2015/02/10	Takoradi
Focus-group	2015/02/10	Takoradi
Focus-group	2015/02/10	Takoradi

Questionnaire 1:	Nigeria	

Question.	Yes	No
Were you registered as a voter during the 2011 presidential election?		
Would you say that you had a preferred political party in the election?		

Question.	North	West	East
What part of the country are you from?			

Does your Religion affect or define your relationship with others?

Yes:	No:

What is your reading about people from other ethnic nationalities in Nigeria?

No biases:	We are Nigerians:	Don't know:

Would you say that you relate with them freely and without reservations?

Very well:	Somewhat:	No:	Don't know:

What was your take on the role of ethnicity and religion in the 2011 presidential election?

Very Negative:	Negative:	Very Positive:	Positive:

What factor(s) would you say determined your preference and choice of candidate during the 2011 presidential election?

Religion	Ethnicity and Regional identity	Economic situation	Party Manifesto	Qualification of the candidate

Do you approve the method and the language used by political actors to campaign for votes in the 2011 presidential election?		
Yes, I do:	No, I don't:	Don't know:

Do you agree that the politics of "Us and Them" created the 2011 presidential election post-election violence in many towns North of Nigeria?		
Yes, I agree:	No, I don't:	Maybe:

Appendix vi: Interviews Questionnaire sample used in Nigeria (Source: Okoro, 2017)

Questionnaire 1: Kenya			
Would you say that you were satisfied with the Campaigns leading to the 2007 presidential election?			
Satisfied:	Somewhat:	Not at all:	Don't know:

Are you a registered voter?	
Yes:	No:

Though you are a Kenyan, but what is your ethnic origin?		
Kikuyu:	Luo:	Kalenjin/Others:

How would you classify the political parties during the 2007 presidential election?		
Coalition of Convenience:	Ethnic Alliances:	Both

You participated in the 2007 presidential election as what?			
Voter:	Vote Mobiliser:	None:	Don't know:

Were you satisfied with the outcome of the 2007 presidential election?			
Yes:	No:	Somewhat:	Don't know:

Do you agree with the argument that the method and language used by politicians during the 2007 presidential election campaigns contributed to the post-election violence?

Yes, I agree:	No, I disagree:	Don't know:

As a registered voter who voted in the 2007 presidential election, did you receive any material gift / money from a politician / party for your vote?

Yes:	No:	No idea:

How would you rate the role played by the politicians across party lines?

Negative:	Positive:	Don't know:

Would you say that the Media contributed in the escalation of the post-election violence in 2007?

Partly:	Yes:	No:	No Idea:

Appendix vii: Questionnaire sample (Source: Okoro, 2017).

Questionnaire 1: Ghana

You participated in the 2012 presidential election as what?

Voter:	Campaigner:	None:	Don't know:

As a registered voter who voted in the 2012 presidential election, did you receive any material gift / money from a politician / party for your vote?

Yes:	No:

Would you say that you were satisfied with the Campaigns leading to the 2012 presidential election?

Very satisfied:	Not satisfied:	Don't know:

If you are asked to rate the media involvement in the 2012 presidential election, how would rate the media?

Positive:	Negative	No Idea:

Though you are a Ghanaian, did your ethnic identity affect your preference and choice during the 2012 presidential election?

Not at all:	Yes:

What was your view about the Campaign programs of the political parties in the 2012 presidential election?

Competitive:	No difference:	Don't know:	Ambiguous:

Would you say that you were satisfied with the outcome of the 2012 presidential election?

Yes:	No:

Appendix viii: Questionnaire sample (Source: Okoro, 2017)

Samples of Interview Questions:

In your opinion, do you believe that Kenya would be stable and remain democratic, despite the post-election violence that followed the 2007 Presidential election?	
Kenya is not a democracy	
Not at all likely	
Not very likely	
Likely	
Very likely	
Don't know	

The use of Ethnicity in Voter mobilization by political actors was most appropriate?		The use of Ethnicity in voter mobilization is anti-democratic	
Agree	Strongly Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
I don't know			
Neither A nor B			

Which of the following activity in the Media would you say contributed more to your decision on who to vote for in the presidential election?	
Campaign messages on Radio	
Campaign Commercials and Debates on Television	
Campaign Posters and Handbills	
Campaign message Advertisement on Newspapers	
None	

ix). Adapted from Afrobarometer series with modification: (www.afrobarometer.org)

How would you rate the Campaign message of the Political Parties?		
	Yes	No
a). National Issues oriented		
b). Negative attacks only		
c). Ethnicity, religion and regional centered		
d). Social and Economic centered		

X).   Sample of Questionnaires used (Source: Okoro, 2017).

Appendix: xi

A protocol of an Interview conducted in Nigeria.

Ques: Sir, would it be correct to say that culture difference, as depicted by the use of identity legitimacy claims during the 2011 presidential Election campaigns, is responsible for the post-election violence, which unfortunately erupted after the final result of the 2011 presidential election was announced?

Ans: Well... it is right to claim that we Nigerians are different from each other... From North to the West and from West to the East... as you are aware... the people are not the same. How each group reasons... or react to situations is also different... Sincerely speaking... majority of our people in the North believe... that politics in Nigeria should be "North first", then "Nigeria" and "others"... with such picture in mind... I would say yes... ethnic identity and loyalty played major part in the post-election violence... after the 2011 presidential election final result was announced.

Ques: Is the rate of electoral violence as recorded in the 2011 presidential election an attribute of systemic failure?

Ans: Just like I have explained before... the systemic failure... and the identity question... were the two fundamental factors... I believed... caused the breakdown of law and order in that period.

Ques: Since the issues that tend to divide the ethnic nationalities are more than the issues that they hold in common, can democracy in any way serve as a unifying force?

Ans: Honestly... I wouldn't say yes nor say no... You see... I use to believe that the problem of national unity... and social cohesion... is multi-layer in this country... Politics is interpreted differently by people from each of the ethnic nationalities... So... the type of democracy... and the kind of policies those in the North want... are different from the type of politics and policies... people in the west and in the East of the country want... in my personal opinion... I

would say that... it is going to be very difficult to achieve unity... at least... not with such type of post-election violence... as we witnessed in 2011 after the election.

Appendix: xii

A protocol of an interview conducted in Nigeria (2).

Ques: There is the issue about Election violence during the campaigns and after announcement of the presidential election result; do you see identity legitimacy claims having direct influence on this situation? How in your opinion do you think that the problem can be eliminated?

Ans: You see... there were various reasons that could trigger off negative reactions from people... irrespective of ethnic identity... However... as you can see... it is a common occurrence in Nigeria... that at each election period... security uncertainty... always take centre stage... the crises... as witnessed in several parts of the country during the campaigns... were more or less fighting between mobilized or sponsored party thugs... But... I sincerely agree with the notion expressed by many commentators... which suggested at the time... that the spates of violence that occurred in several towns in the North of the country... had in large degree... ethnic coloration... But you know... most of the people targeted by the arsonists... were non northerners and by extension non Muslims... Again... another good look at the nature of the crisis... revealed that... even northerners who suffered from the crisis... were targeted by those who viewed them as betrayals... in fact... I would say that... many among the supporters of Muhammadu Buhari... had the impression that their actions were justified... they vented their anger against those who supported the PDP in the election... So... one may be right to say... that the violent actions were perpetrated against an outcome... they believed was against the overall political interest of the North... as represented in Muhammadu Buhari candidacy... In essence... my impression at the time was... and even now... it remains that the violence was influenced by identity legitimacy

claims... You aware... to an average Hausa-Fulani Muslim... change in political leadership carries different meaning... when compare to what it means to an Igbo... Yoruba person... or somebody from any of the many minority ethnic groups in the country...

Well... the solution... how best to prevent future occurrence of post-election violence... is dependent on the political and religious class... As you know... the thugs can't go to the street to protest if nobody asked them... or mobilize them to do so... political thugs can't attack anybody... if nobody mobilize... and motivate them to do so... My opinion is that the political class need to end the practice of arming and mobilizing thugs during elections...

Ques: What is your assessment of the media community, particularly on how the media collectively managed reports about the conduct of political actors during the 2011 presidential election?

Ans: My assessment of the media with regard to the 2011 presidential election cannot be anywhere close to positive response... I have my reasons...

1. The media... I mean... both electronic and print... they all failed this country... they were simply obsessed with the campaign frenzy.... they neglected one of their primary roles... I mean... they failed to make elaborate report and in collaboration with the security agencies... declare certain areas and towns in the north of the country as flash-points... volatile or security risk areas...

2. They failed also to help sensitize the people... especially on the importance of violence free election... You know... everybody was aware about the division in the country... what I am saying... is the division caused by ethnicity and religion... everything that happened leading to the election... pointed to uncertainty... there were noticeable... I mean... strong discontents among the political class... there were... I mean... obvious division between the political North and the political south, especially... the eastern region...

3. So, in my assessment... the Media... I would say... collectively... failed to moderate the polity... because... the crisis could have been averted... if those in the media had played their role...

Appendix: xiii

A protocol of an interview conducted in Nigeria (3).

Ques: Sir, what in your opinion is the greatest problem facing democracy in Nigeria?

Ans: like in every other society... and also like in every given democratic society... there are always many contending issues seeking for solution... in the case of Nigeria... and in my personal opinion... I have always agreed with the school of thought... those who argued against too many political parties... in our political system... I am of the opinion... that if we can use the threshold format... whereby... any registered political party... that failed to obtain a minimum of 5 percent of votes cast cannot produce a representative... in the Legislature... However, my suggestion would demand a change in the electoral system... changing from presidential democracy to parliamentary democracy with proportional representation... Alternatively, we could retain the presidential system... but with a supporting legislation from the National Parliament... which ultimately would limit the number of political parties in the system... to at least 5 strong political parties...

Again... I do not see anything wrong with the secrecy of the voting process... that is... the use of secret ballot... All what is needed for the system to perform optimally... is to have trusted and dedicated personnel... I mean... people with good character and integrity... if we can have people hard to compromise... then... elections would be free and fair...

Another area I see as a problem... if not... the greatest problem to contend with... is the issue of regional politics... again... under regional politics... you have also ethnicity defined political orientation... every ethnic group... believes or aspires to produce the president of the

country... or to have strong representation in the central government... so... in their bid to achieve this parochial objective... some politicians would go and mobilize some of their people to cause havoc... and create fear and confusion in the polity... So... to be sincere with you... regional politics and ethnocentrism are binary factors... I believe... they are working against democracy and acceptable elections in Nigeria... it is a problem that I see in every ethnic group in Nigeria... yes...

Ques: What is your take on the method used by political actors to fight the 2011 presidential election, especially on the issue of ethnic alliance and religious alignment?

Ans: I would like to align with the opinion of many commentators... who have argued against the idea of such method... Like I usually tell people... if politicians fail to remove and distance religion and ethnocentrism from our democratic processes... I can see a situation... where... our governmental institutions may not be able to contain the ripples... which I believe... can emerge from our elections... because... the argument about religion and ethnicity would extend to the management structure of the Election Commission... if that happens... then... it will be difficult to conduct and have an acceptable election in this country... as you may want to know... the use of ethnicity and religion created avenue for the post-election violence we had in... ehh... 2011 presidential election...

Ques: Do you share in the sentiment that democracy will survive and succeed in the country, even though Nigerians have strong differences in political and cultural orientations?

Ans: Well... I am one among those... who believed that democracy can still work in Nigeria... Honestly... I have no doubt in my mind... that... it is going to be possible... you see... to me... my take... is that the problems are with the politicians... in my opinion... ordinary voters have no blame... So, I will say... the success and failure of democracy in Nigeria... is dependent on the actions and inactions of politicians in the country... division or differences... you know... is a common factor in every multi-ethnic society... How... politicians manage the differences is

another matter... So, in most cases... you will discover that... exploitation of the differences in any society is the handwork of politicians...

Appendix: xiv

A protocol of an interview conducted in Kenya.

Ques: Would you say that you were happy with the outcome of the 2007 presidential election in Kenya? And could you explain the reason for your state of mind?

Ans: Noo... not at all... I was not happy... I... can never be happy about the outcome of the 2007 presidential election. You know what happened... the processes leading to the election were wrong... again... we don't have the right institutions to take care of the developments noticed... people don't just care... ahh... the entire system was broken and in total chaos... I feel sad... by the gravity of destruction as result of the post-election violence... It was... and honestly... it is still a sad memory for me... So many innocent souls were lost in that post-election violence... as you know... I feel very sad... each time I remembered that so many people lost their precious lives... you know... and just because of political interest of some individuals...

Ques: Sir, would you say that your ethnic group is being neglected to the advantage of other ethnic groups?

Ans: I can't claim or agree with the argument that my ethnic group has not been favourably considered... especially in the area of development... or provision of infrastructures to our communities.... I beg to disagree with such notion... you know... I have tried many times to evaluate the activities of the government... I have looked at the members of the President's cabinet... my effort... as you know... was to look at the credentials... or if you like... you can

say... the qualification of those the president appointed to work with him... Again... I would say that... any feeling of neglect could be politically motivated... or so to say... if you look at the manner... politicians twist situations... if you are not careful enough... you may just end up... making wrong conclusions... I have the belief that... whoever is selected to serve in the government... must be the best person... the president believes... he could effectively work with... or individuals the president believes would give him the services he deserved as leader of the country...

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Professional Experience

April 2007 – July 2007	Research Assistant (Hochschule Fulda/Prof Baumgratz-Gangl)
May 2001 – May 2002	Corpers Liason Officer National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) (Federal Government College, Kano)
June 2001 – May 2002	English Language Teacher: (Junior/Senior Classes) Federal Government College, Kano

Academic Studies

October 2013 – October, 2017	University of Osnabrueck (Social Sciences) Dissertation (Political Parties and Election Violence in Distressed Societies: A Case Study on how Campaign Strategy of Political Parties Devalued Democracy in Nigeria, Kenya and Ghana Supervisors: Prof. Roland Czada and Prof. Ralf Kleinfeld
September 2011 – Aug 2013	University of Osnabrueck (Democratic Governance and Civil Society) Master Thesis: Democracy Consolidation: Dilemma of Cross-Carpeting; the role of Elite Networks and Political Investors in Party Instability, Nigeria as Case Study 1959-2011 Supervisors: Prof. Hans-Peter Saalbach and Prof. Dr. Andreas Lenschow

April 2008 – December 2012	Philipps University Marburg (Political Science) Dissertation (Democracy and Good Governance in a multi-ethnic Society, Nigeria as case Study: A Grassroots Study of Igbo, Yoruba and Hausa-Fulani 1999 – 2011 Supervisors: Professor Dr: Dirk Berg-Schlosser and Professor Dr Claudia Derichs
September 2004 – April 2007	Hochschule Fulda (Intercultural Communication and European Studies) Master Thesis: EU Common Foreign Policy and its effects on Nigeria-EU Political and Diplomatic Relations Supervisors: Professor Dr. Wolfgang Platzer and Professor Dr. Gudrun Hentges
June 1996 – February 2001	University Ibadan (European Studies/ German Studies) Bachelor Project: Die Rolle der Diplomatie in den Nationalen Einigung Deutschlands, der Epoche Otto Von Bismarck, 1862 – 1890 Supervisor: Dr. Maxwell Amanor Boadu
1991– June 1994	Alaye High School Ayetoro (Ogun State)

Academic Qualifications

October 2017	Ph.D (in view, Uni-Osnabrück)
Aug 2013	M.A (Uni-Osnabrück)
December 2012	Ph.D (Uni-Marburg)
April 2007	M.A (HS-Fulda)
February 2001	BA (Uni-Ibadan)
July 1998	ZMP (Goethe Institut-Lagos)
April 1998	ZDaF (Goethe Institut-Lagos)
December 1995	SSCE (WASCE – Ayetoro/Nigeria)

Personal Abilities and Competences

Languages: Igbo, Yoruba, Hausa, English and German

Hobbies: Football, Reading, Travelling

Awards and Honors

2009   MARA Student Travel Assistance Award

                                                The Financial Prize was for Field Study and
                                                travelling assistance for Doctoral candidates'
                                                the Philipps University Marburg

2006   Der „Verein zur Förderung internationaler
                                                Studierender an der Hochschule Fulda e.v
                                                (VFiS-HF.ev)

                                                I was one among the 6 foreign Students of the
                                                Hochschule Fulda that won the yearly
                                                Scholarship award in 2006.

1999   Deutsches Akademisches Austausch Dienst
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                                                I was one among the best 4 Students, from the
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Erklärung über die Eigenständigkeit der erbrachten wissenschaftlichen Leistung

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